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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of the demographic character­
istics of urban localities that were subject to a planned 
industrialisation strategy in India beginning in the 1950s*
It studies the local age and sex structures that emerged 
and evolved in these populations over time, down to 1971, 
using the Censuses as the main sources of data, and focus­
ing on the iron and steel producing region of Eastern India, 
with comparisons drawn from the West of the country. To aid 
interpretation a simulation model of urban demographic growth 
is constructed, and various growth patterns are projected#
At the same time, the empirical evidence of migration and 
fertility differentials in different types of towns is 
explored. The study addresses the hypothesis that modern 
technology, in combination with factor proportions typical 
of a developing country (with relatively abundant labour) 
gives rise to the formation of local population structures 
that are unusual if -not unique in history - (some comparative 
historical material from 19th Century England is presented 
here) -, and that these demographic features, as they emerge 
over time, carry exceptional implications for the allocation 
of local welfare expenditure (especially in the field of 
housing), and for the local labour market, as subsequent 
generations enter the labour force# The implications are of 
most interest in the case of the fastest growing localities 
(related to heavy industry), and the slowest growing localities, 
and these therefore are discussed the most# The welfare and 
employment implications are further analysed at the level of 
the household (using additionally the 1959 Labour Bureau 
survey data), and the strategies adopted by the households 
themselves to mitigate the more adverse consequences, especially 
in single-industry towns, are investigated and assessed# 
Similarly, strategies that have been adopted by the State 
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PREFACE
I would, like to think this thesis will be read 
by various readers with differing interests, I would 
like its possible significance (besides any intrinsic 
interest in the detail of the analysis) to be considered 
on „the following scores. Firstly, as the first attempt to 
write a demographic history of post-Independence industrial­
isation in India, Secondly, as a didactic exercise throughout: 
as a simulation of industrial-demographic relationships, 
where interrelated variables are more or less systematically 
incorporated from macro to micro in a chain-like formation 
not previously explored in the literature, (In formal terms, 
the demographic side alone is modelled, in a rather short­
term perspective. But the rest of the scenario is selectively 
introduced to enable a wide range of socio-economic 
considerations to be explored without an unwieldy technical 
model: some rigour may be lost this way, but the results
are more easily communicated to others,) Thirdly, as the 
exploration of a hypothesis (rather than its rigorous testing) 
linking technology and demography in a fairly innovative way 
(see Chapter 1), Finally, perhaps as a study that leads to 
the introduction of an original thesis (that will need sharper 
tooling) on the vulnerability in the overlapping of sources 
of transfer payments and sources of direct income (see Chapter 9)*
It was C.R,Malaker of I.S,I, Calcutta who first really 
encouraged me to use the 1961 Census, And an academic interest 
in unstable populations, plus an interest in migrants, that 
turned me towards urban demography. It waB not apparent at 
that time that some of the issues would be of such social 
and economic significance that I now believe they are. And 
it was M.Bapat of C,D.S,A. in Poona who first stimulated my 
interest in housing conditions in developing cities, and
steered me in the direction of valuable literature in that 
field* including her own contribution.
I firmly believe that in the 1961 Census there are 
more data, and probably of no worse quality, than could be 
got from anything other than numerous survey case studies.
In a sense, it is a set of case studies, I would agree 
(from my own survey work, in a different field, in Poona) 
that some mistakes are made through an imperfect local 
experience; but as many mistakes are made through an inadequate 
perspective arising from an insufficient familiarity with 
a wide range of data. This the 1961 and 1971 Censuses and 
the Labour Bureau Industrial Worker Surveys provide $ both 
sources had been underutilised. I have combed through most 
of the ten volumes of 1961 Census material for each of the 
five States studied, in addition to the special volumes for 
four of the Cities. Practically every table I present is 
a derivation or manipulation of Census data (and I have not 
troubled to indicate this fact at the foot of each table).
The data are still being published for 1971 (as also for 1 9 8 1). 
The continuing nature of the data makes it imperative that 
one stop somewhere and report.
Nearly every Chapter has been subjected to seminar 
and presentation given before colleagues and students, in 
India and in England, too numerous to mention by name.
Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged* Their critique 
has been invaluable.
My Supervisor, T.J,Byres, gave the work a perspective: 
he sensed what I was after, and encouraged me to draw it 
out more explicitly.
But what is offered here, for good or bad, remains 
basically my own.
This thesis is dedicated to my Father and to the memory 
of my Mother; for they encouraged me more than anyone else to 
bring the study to fruition.




Introduction and Empirical Overview
A Summary of the Argument and Discussion
Here we try to encapsulate within the confines of 
a single shell what this study is about# We offer a survey 
of the literature and discussion that has taken place, up to 
the time of writing, on demographic aspects of industrialis­
ation# It is pointed out that academic economists, on the 
one hand, have looked at the effects of population growth and 
dynamics on the aggregate economies of developing countries; 
but we wish to emphasise here how these effects may be much 
more dramatic on the economies of localities within those 
countries, especially when some localities are industrialising 
rapidly while others stagnate# Practical planners, on the 
other hand, indeed have focused on sub-national populations, 
but have usually failed to study the dynamics of local - 
demography as they develop through time# Our study concentrates 
on the effects of very rapid local urbanisation, accompanied 
by a huge wave of migration, on the evolving population structure- 
that follows, with its sympathetic waves of future generations 
of workforce (descendants of the migrants), and on the likely 
employment and income opportunities, and provision of munic­
ipal services, that face individual families caught up in the 
inexorable repercussions, as it were, of a stirring in the 
calm of the demographic sea#
The second part describes the economic and demo­
graphic development of the region of India that first 
prompted the author to investigate this problem - the 
iron and coal belt, sometimes called the Chota Nagpur 
Crescent. We find that a substantial proportion of the 
Second Five-Year Plan’s investment v*as concentrated on 
a small number of localities, especially the integrated 
iron and steel towns. We also find that huge populations 
are involved, growing from a few hundred to a hundred 
thousand in a single township in the space of a decade 
or less. We also note that this economic momentum was 
not sustained for a further decade in complementary, 
or "accelerator"-type industrial investments, since the 
industrial structure changed towards oil-based manufacturing 
located in the West of the country.
To help focus this empirical study of economic 
demography, a hypothesis is suggested. Its most incisive 
component reads as follows: that modern technology in
combination with factor proportions typical of a developing 
country gives rise to local population structures that 
are unusual if not unique in history, and that carry with 
them over time exceptional economic welfare implications 
for localities and households.
Setting of the Problem in the Context of existing Scholar­
ship and Planning Policy: Neglect of the Demographic 
Dynamics Implicit in Industrialisation
This thesis is a study in the recent historical
demography of an industrialising oriental country. It
is about local people caught up in the broad process
of industrialisation. It focuses on the growth of the
factory manufacturing sector and its implications for
local demographic formation; in particular it concerns
itself with the spearhead of this industrial advance -
on the basic industries that experienced so large a
share of India's national investment after Independence,
(an experience shared in the development strategies of
other countries). The effect of industrial recruitment
or attraction of labour, the streams of migration, the
demographic characteristics of the migrants, and the
resultant demography of the population agglomeration in
the vicinity of the industry - these have all been
remarked upon by many scholars* Perhaps the earliest
comparative study of this nature was done by Adna Weber on
1
the 19th Century industrialisation in Europe and America.
A.Weber, The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century, 
1 8 9 9, reprinted 1 9 6 3* Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and New York. The comparative theme has been taken up more 
recently in E.A.Wrigley, Population and History. Weidenfield 
and Nicolson, London, 19&9*
IB
Many of the more detailed economic-demographic studies 
have been monographs on individual cities: Bombay,
Jakarta, and Shanghai, to name a few from Asia* These 
studies are essentially exercises in comparative statics 
(as far as their demography is concerned): they do not
explore in any detail the evolution of demographic 
characteristics that occurs as the towns develop, that is 
as the industry expands, diversifies, or contracts, and, 
more crucially in the short run, as the population cohorts 
drawn in by the first round of industrial investment, 
marry, reproduce themselves, and grow old*
Turning to consider India more specifically, I find 
that the comparative approach has not to date fulfilled 
two descriptive-analytical objectives I set myself* It 
has not been able to disaggregate to the degree necessary 
to compare and contrast industrial type within the 
manufacturing sector - cotton textiles, agro-processing,
1 See H* and V* Joshi, Surnlus Labour and the City: A Study 
of Bombay-, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1976;
S BV 0Sethuraman, Jakarta: Urban Development and Employment* 
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1976; C.Howe (ed*), 
Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 19^1* A classic 
study in the social demography of an industrial city in 
England is R*Glass, The Social Background of a Plan: A 
Study of Middlesbrough, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
19 -^8.
1 9
heavy engineering, etc*, (in this context consider, for 
example, the economic-demographic studies of A*Mitra or 
A*Mamood) ; nor has this approach pursued a dynamics 
path at the level of the town, or groups of towns,
(the comparative statistical work of A,Bose, for instance, 
is mainly a study in comparative statics) * Equally the 
few studies made of the evolution of individual towns 
over time have been less concerned with matters demographic 
(c*f* the excellent contemporary study of Poona by M*Bapat)^* 
These weaknesses are particularly true of monographs of 
industrialising towns of the kind that have taken my part­
icular interest: for instance the Indian Labour Bureau studies 
of industrial worker families (in Jamshedpur and Asansol, 
among M-0 other towns) , the Planning Commission and other 
officially sponsored studies (which include Ranchi, Jamshedpur,
1 A.Mitra et al., Indian Cities, Their Industrial Structure* 
In-migration^ and Capital Investment. 1961-71 , Abhinav 
Publications, New Delhi, 1980; A Mamood, ''Patterns of 
Migration into Indian Cities and their Socio-Economic 
Correlates - a Multi-variate Regional Analysis", M*Phil* 
thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, 1975.
2 A,Bose, Studies in India's Urbanisation 1901-1971* Tata 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co*, New Delhi 197^ (2nd* Ed* 1978)*
5 M.Bapat, Shanty-town and City: the Case of Poona* Pergamon, 
Oxford, 1982; (and Ph*D* thesis cited in Chapter 5 below)*
k Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Rehabilitation, Family Living Surveys among 
Industrial Workers. 1958-59, Delhi, 1 9 6 8*
30
Dhanbad, and Nagpur) , and other monographs relating to 
the newly developing urban areas in the North (for instance
those of M.Mohsin on Chittaranjan, S.D.Badgaiyan on Bhilai,
2
and the Census monograph on Rourkela) all experience this 
defect. Most recent of all, the study on New-towns, 
undertaken by the Secretary of the Calcutta Metropolitan 
Development Authority, K.C.Sivaramakrishnan, explicitly
■3
neglected this aspect.
This approach to case-study or regional material 
reflects the pre-occupation of theoretical analysis in 
the regional planning schools. This pre-occupation is with 
the size of demographic agglomerations (as in the work of B» 
Berry, for instance, in his world-wide comparative study, 
or of R.P.Misra or the authors of the Stanford-Delhi-
1 For a summary analysis of these see J.F.Bulsara,
Problems of Rapid Urbanisation in India. Popular Prakashan, 
Bombay, 196 ,^
2 M.Mohsin, Chittaran.jan; a Study in Urban Sociology,
Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 196 ;^ S,D,Badgaiyan,
"A Sociological Study of the Effects of Industrialisation 
of Bhilai on the Surrounding Villages", Ph,D, thesis,
Dept, of Sociology, Delhi University, 197^; Government 
of India, Census of India 1961, Social Processes in the 
Industrialisation of Rourkela, (Special Monograph), New Delhi.
3 K,C.Sivaramakrishnan, "New Towns in India: A Report on a 
Study of selected New-Towns in the Eastern Region", Indian 
Institute of Management, Calcutta, 1976-7* He told me 
personally that he had no brief to cover demography, and 
thought that my study and his would be complementary (1976),
'I
Hyderabad studies on India) • That is to say, there has 
been a neglect of that other essential element in 
demographic analysis, time. For it has to be remembered 
that size is achieved through growth, and as is well-known 
to demographers, many of the interesting features of 
populations (for example, their age structures and changes 
in relative cohort sizes) derive largely from growth rates. 
It is striking that only in 19&1 have the early papers of 
the Indian Census publication contained ranking of cities 
by growth rates as well as by size. Yet any observation of 
the link between the new industrialisation, often centred 
on New-towns, and local demography, would have prompted the 
observation that the Calcuttas of tomorrow are only medium­
sized (but fast growing) towns today: surely they should
2command our attention. Perhaps the worst example of thas
1 B.Berry, The Human Consequences of Urbanisation:
Divergent Paths in the Urban Expansion of the 20th Century« 
Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1973$ R*P» Misra (ed.), 
Regional Planning. Concents. Techniques. Policies and
Case Studies.Prasaranga - University of Mysore, Mysore, 19^9$ 
Stanford Research Institute (California), School of Planning 
& Architecture (New Delhi), Small Industry Extension 
Training Institute (Hyderabad), Costs of Urban Infra­
structure for Industry as related to City Size in 
Developing Countires (India Case Study). 1 9 6 8.
2 A point made to me by D.K.Bose of the Indian Statistical 
Institute, Calcutta, who had himself worked in planning 
for the Government of West Bengal, and agreed there was 
a lack of demographic dynamics in the analysis.
static thinking and planning is indicated in the future 
picture that was officially envisaged for the public 
sector Steel Towns: that Rourkela, for example, should
'I
aim at a population target of 100,000, By when, exactly 
this should be achieved, and what should happen then, were 
not suggested: in actual fact by 1981 (only 20 years after 
its inauguration) the town was a third of a million (321326) 
in population size (despite no expansion in steel capacity).
This thesis, as was stated above, is a study in 
aspects of India’s recent demographic history (from 
about 1955 to 1975 with emphasis on the years preceding 
the 1961 Census), But its scope is, hopefully, beyond that.
It is a major contention of the author’s that the evolution 
of local urban demography, induced by specific types of 
Industrial growth, has important”economic implications*
In a broad sense these implications have been adequately 
recognised by economists working at the level of the national 
aggregation of economy and population. Pioneers in the field, 
who incidentally worked on India, were A,J,Coale and E,M,Hoover
1 The same target-setting was apparently practised in all 
the public sector steel New-towns: see V.Prakash,
New Towns in India, Duke University Monograph No,8, 1 9 6 9* 
(Appendix C),
2 A,J,Coale and E.M,Hoover, Population Growth and Economic 
Development in Low-Income Countries. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1958,
Important modifications and refinements to their argument 
have been incorporated in a contemporary study of India’s 
population and economy as a single conceptual entity, the 
excellent work of R*H,Cassen, In some ways my own study 
is an attempt to focus these arguments and empirical 
discussion on the urban sector (which Cassen left, explicitly, 
relatively under-researched). The crux of the relevant aspects 
of the Coale-Cassen theory would be that the highly dependant 
age-structure that emerges from a rapidly growing population 
will, or may, restrict the investible funds that are 
channelled toward high-yielding projects* Schools, housing, 
medical and health-promoting infrastructural services, whose 
main component is sometimes viewed as current consumption, 
enjoyed once and for all, rather than investment for future 
continuous consumption, and whose investment component is 
in any case a long time maturing, all make greater claims on 
the resource allocation if the youth or aged predominate 
(although, of course, this is only true if those claims are 
met: as Cassen emphasises, they may be simply ignored).
My point is that if this is all true of a national population, 
how more so must it be true of a local population, as in a 
town, whose age-structure may change dramatically in a 
quinquennium or a decade, New-towns may fill rapidly with
1 R,H,Cassen, India: Population Economy. Society. 
Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 197&,
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productive workforce, rapidly acquire a young dependant 
population, stabilise, then age as growth declines; these 
are the sequences that I seek to explore in theory and in 
fact, and their implications for local social expenditure 
and planning.
But the demographic-economic theory takes us further 
than this* The more unstable the population structure, 
the more rapidly the labour force changes in character: 
the importance of its turnover rate for innovative potential - 
what has been described as its "metabolic rate" - has been 
noted by 25UB*Ryder, and the implications for job-seekers of 
their relatxve cohort sizes have been outlined by R.A.Easterlin. 
I am particularly interested in addressing the possibilities 
of a mismatch between the dynamic demand for new entrants to ' 
the labour force, and their dynamic supply: the mismatch 
emerges from the evolution of a town that once grew rapidly, 
and now stabilises or declines. The sociological 
implications of this mismatch in terms of alienated youth, 
and especially the ethnically divisive characteristic of this 
process in multi-regional societies like India's have been
1 N.B.Ryder,"The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social 
Change", American Sociological Review* 30:6, Dec. 1965$ 
R.A.Easterlin, "The Conflict between Aspirations and 
Resources", Population and Development Review. 2:3 &
Sept, and Dec* 1976.
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suggested by M.Weiner; but the possible demographic 
determinants of this political atmosphere, due to 
differential changes in age-structures among the social 
groups, need exploring (which he did not do)*
The empirical scope of this study could easily 
get out of hand, I wished to avail myself of the 
opportunity to use data down to 19^1 from Independence, 
and especially the rich Census data from the 1961 Census*
I wished also to view India in a comparative context, 
to pinpoint the distinct contribution made to this demographic 
process through the current factor proportions being what they 
are in the economy, and the currently known technologies 
being what they are (and their use in India, appropriate or 
otherwise, being taken as it is)* To enable the complexity 
of the analysis to be handled, I concentrate rather on heavy 
industry, and, as a special case, on the development of the 
iron and steel industry (often regarded, whether 
appropriately or not, as a spearhead to Industrial 
development)* This has enabled the comparative approach 
to include an analysis of some regions of England in the 
industrial revolution, and some of England’s "de-industrial­
ising" localities of the 1970s, once again concentrating on
1 M*Weiner, Sons of the Soil? Migration and Ethnic Conflict 
in India. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978*
Steel Towns*
Now the study of these towns has raised a further
theoretical issue, which is the subject of a later Chapter*
For a time-at least, heavy industrial towns tend to be
1
’’mono-industrial”* In such a potentially risky environment
how far can (and do) the individual families safeguard their
source of income by spreading the risk, by having their
adult members participate in a wide range of employments?'
This particular economic implication of demographic
formation due 'to the concentration of a specific industrial
type (industrial ”monoculture” to coin a phrase) has not
been explored before, although the question of family
income diversification has been raised in the context of the
2
familial mode of production, in a recent paper by M.Lipton.
It is an extreme form of A.Sen’s identification of wage-labour
vulnerability that emerges during the early development of 
3
capitalism* It is also an extreme case of the overall
1 This term was apparently first coined in the 1930s: see 
A.Lttsch, The Economics of Location. 1939, reprinted by 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 193^*
2 M.Lipton, ”Family, Fungibility, and Formality: Rural 
Advantages of informal Non-farm Enterprise versus the 
Urban-formal State’-’, International Economic Association 
meeting held at Mexico City, August, 1980* Family income 
composition has been discussed most recently in Y.Ben- 
Porath, ed*, ’’Income Distribution and the Family”, suppl* 
to Population and Development Review* 8:3, Sept., 1 9 8 2*
3 A,Sen, Poverty and Famines. Oxford University Press,1 9 8 1#
an?
argument that industrialisation determines dynamic 
demography din a manner that has economic implications, 
often neglected at the level of the locality. It is 
further to be noted that there are not only future 
implications for the towns that grow, but also current 
implications for those that stagnate or decline.
Of course, ‘’monocultures" are not confined to 
Steel Towns with their single massive plant sizes. 
Particular localities may be dominated by textiles for 
instance, but with numerous small units in simultaneous 
operation. For comparison and contrast we shall analyse 
some of these also. Our particular interest in the heavy 
industrial towns is due to our belief that both the scale 
and character of the difficulty in providing sustained 
and secure employment over time are currently unique,
A combination of current internationally traded technology 
and local labour endowments in developing countries of 
Asia (and elsewhere) renders these socio-economic 
phenomena particularly interesting (and the potential 
long-term problems particularly acute).
Essentially, this is intended to be an objective 
analysis. But it is not without relevance that the 
industrial demography and resultant social economy of 
cities are subject to various degrees of planning in most 
countries of the world, I shall restrict my study and say
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rather little about the viability of planning for the 
particular industry under discussion or its specific 
location in the first place. These objectives I have 
taken as largely given* But I will consider what may 
usefully be said about the phasing-in of new industry 
over time or diversification in a given locality. 1 
will also have some regard for what may be said about 
demographic planning to meet the problems outlined above, 
though this is a highly esoteric field into which only 
the Chinese seem to have ventured to any significant 
extent. Finally, and more mundanely, the important 
implications for economic planning to meet the requirements 
of the evolving populations, the appropriate financing and 
provision of social infrastructure (particularly housing) 
for individual cities, be they growing or stagnating 
(juvenating or aging), will all be reviewed, particularly 
in the Indian context, albeit under the assumption that 
the political will is there, at least in part, to meet 
those needs. To whom these analyses and suggestions are 
addressed I will not here specifically indicate. Suffice it 
to say that I believe a wider knowledge of the situation 
may be of use to parties concerned from local community to 
central government.
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Overview of Growth Patterns, Industrial and Demographic, 
in Eastern India; and the Introduction of Hypotheses 
for Exploration and Examination
We will start with an overview of the region of 
India that will he the main focus of this study - the 
coal, iron, and steel industrial belt known as the 
Chota Nagpur Crescent (Figures 1*1 and 1*5)* It was 
a passing familiarity with the characteristics of this 
region that first induced the author to formulate the 
demographic hypotheses on which this study hinges# It 
will perhaps highlight this inductive process if the 
historical and economic context is first surveyed#
What is striking about the region known as 
Chota Nagpur is that it was the focus of one of the most 
ambitious industrial development plans in any largely 
agricultural developing nation having recently gained 
independence: about ten years of concentrated investment 
in heavy industry. At the All-India level net investment 
rates rose from around 6% to around 13% from 1930 to 19^5 ! 
the major rise occurred from 1955 to 19&0, the Second Plan 
period. Disaggregation reveals the regional concentration#
1 Economic data in this chapter are culled from one of the 
most recent secondary sources (unless otherwise stated): 
P.Chaudhuri, The Indian Economy: Poverty and Development. 
Crosby Lockwood Staples, London, 1978.
In i960 11% of industrial production was in basic metals 
and machinery: over the previous five years the former
had doubled and the latter tripled. Over the subsequent 
quinquennium those growth rates were repeated (Figure 1.3)* 
increasing the contribution to industrial production to 
around 1^ +%. Most of that growth occurred in the Chota 
Nagpur Crescent. Additionally, mining, counting for 10% 
of industrial production, grew by a third in each quinquennium 
iron ore and coal are again largely the product of this 
one region, and hence the rationale behind siting the 
steel and heavy engineering industries here. In short,
Nehru's vision of building up the heavy industry both to 
maximize the long-term growth rate and (a rather separate 
point) to ensure self-reliance in the essential ingredients 
of growth, dictated a regional concentration in the first 
phase of industrialisation.
We can now disaggregate further, and, to take a 
specific example, we concentrate on steel. During the 
decade 1950 - 1960 finished steel output doubled from
1 .0  to 2,h million tonnes, doubling again to ^ . 5  by 1 9 6 5.
1 This is derived from P.Chaudhuri, The Indian Economy.., 
(cited in note 1 previous page), Table 1^f on page 6 6 .
In the Second Plan (1955-60) 11% of the total outlay went 
towards Iron and steel. That level of steel production
sufficed for 90% of domestic consumption and exports
2 ^(which were 2,6 m.t, in 1960 and 9 m,t, in 1 9 6 5)*
The remarkable feature to note is that this level of output, 
supplying a manufacturing industrial sector that soon
if
became the tenth largest in the world in sheer size , 
was fabricated in just five major plants, with a combined 
capacity of six million tonnes, four of the five being 
rated at one million tonnes each. That is to say, this 
enormous expansion in steel output was focused on five 
localities; and three of them were villages at the start 
of the Second Plan, It is immediately apparent that 
national industrial strategy may have remarkable social 
implications at the level of the locality, something Nehru’s 
vision may not have quite encompassed,
1 See WoA„Johnson, The Steel Industry of India, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1 9 6 6,
2 See S,D0Kshirsagar, "Growth in Consumption of Steel in 
India", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), August 
1977 (Review of Management), page M101,
3 By 197^ production stood at t^-,9 nut., 8^ f% of consumption 
and exports*
A- This is taken from estimates for the late 1970s, In the 
mid-1970s India, was supplying about of Asian steel prod- 
uctionj but note that the manufacturing sector is less than 
of the total Indian economy, see Tata Services Limited, 
Statistical Outline of India 1976. Bombay, 1976 , Tables 9&11
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How do the social implications come to stem from 
the size of industrial capacity and investment? This 
is to be explored in detail through the chapters that follow* 
But, put graphically, the picture is this* Hindustan Steel 
(the public sector producer), investing in the three 
plants on "green-field" sites, employs 13-1 5 *0 0 0 men
per million tonnes of output, a number sufficient in itself
1 .to form a small town. Ancillary and induced manufacturing
employs another 10-15*000. With steel output reaching 
between 1 ,5  and 2 ,0  m.t, by 1 9 7 0, the total population 
of these New-towns had attained in each case a minimum 
of 200,000 (taking Durgapur and Bhilai as examples), 
that is within fifteen years of their birth. Such in 
outline is the demographic component.
It is difficult to know on what quantitative 
criteria to judge the demographic importance of Steel 
Towns, At Independence the urban population of Eastern 
India, by which I mean the current States of Bihar, Orissa, 
West Bengal, and the Eastern Divisions of Madhya Pradesh,
1 See W,A.Johnson, The Steel Industry of India*,, cited 
in note 1 on the previous page.
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1 2were dominated by Calcutta "like a colossus", 1 Calcutta's 
aggregate working population engaged in manufacturing 
was about 8 5 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 6 1; the five integrated iron 
and steel-making localities together employed about one 
fifth of that number in manufacturing in 1 9 6 1, and by 
1981 the adult male workforces of all the Steel 
Towns (with the addition of Bokaro, which was built in 
the 1970s) amounted to 22,5% of Calcutta's workforce in 
size. We are not talking about trivial numbers of people 
(but we would agree that India's manufacturing workforce 
as a whole is numbered in millions at this time, not 
mere hundreds of thousands: f^O million in 1981 is the 
Census estimate of male urban workers according to their 
"main" employment, with 600,000 in the integrated Steel 
Towns),
Of course the case of industrial location on 
"green-field" sites is the exception rather than the rule.
An urban base was already established in West Bengal by
1 This was the colourful expression used by Moonis Raza of 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi* (1976),
2 For reasons discussed in an Appendix on Homogeneity at the 
end of this chapter, we restrict much of our analysis to 
only 26 Districts in the Chota Nagpur region (Figure 1,1), 
But to put the figures in perspective we refer here to all 
the Districts in the region.
the time of Independence; Burdwan and Singbhum Districts 
(in West Bengal and Bihar) were the homes of the original 
steel and engineering industries of the massive scale# 
Smaller-scale factory manufacturing and processing was 
already established in such towns as Cuttack in Orissa, 
Patna and Gaya in Bihar# But the exceptional demographic 
result of the First and Second Five-year Plan strategy 
is illustrated in Figure 1.^ a# The distribution is 
noticeably skewed to the right of the All-India mean 
(which is a growth rate in urban population of 3 +^%, 
close to the modal value of our distribution of urban 
growth rates in the Eastern region, but well below our 
mean of 61% )# Our distribution displays a notable peak
at the very fast growth rates (above 130% per decade)*
During the Third and Fourth Plans, including the 
"inter-regnum", a sea-change was experienced in the Indian 
economy (from 1960 to 1975 or thereabouts)# Not only did 
the rate of investment level off at around 13%» but the 
compodtion of investment changed too. The growth of the 
heavy industries based on the resources of iron and coal 
was much reduced (from 10% to 7% annual growth)# For
1 See P.Chaudhuri, The Indian Economy,., (cited above), 
Table 16, For a graphical presentation of the change 
in the composition of output see our Figure 1,3 and note 
the contrasts in slopes of the various industrial growth 
curves before and after the mid-1960s.
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reasons now clear this industrial sea-change will impinge 
on demographic growth specifically in the Eastern region,
(and, to take an example, engineering employment expanded 
in West Bengal from 236,000 to 303,000 during 1961-3,
'i
but was still 293,000 in 1969) • Now let us observe 
Figure 1.^ a again: the distribution of growth rates
in urban populations has shifted leftwards. In fact 
the modal value is below the All-India mean of 37% 
decadal growth (as adjusted for redefinitions of "urban").
But during the Third and Fourth Plans the industries 
that expanded were oil-based (growing at 8%, nearly twice 
the rate of overall industrial growth), and the growth in 
consumer durables also prevalent in that period was to 
some extent enabled by the plastics and chemicals expansion 
related to that oil base. Indeed the changing base of 
consumer demand, arguably symptomatic of a changing 
politico-economic power structure, could be regarded as 
another facet in the change in the heavy industrial 
structure, most noticeable after the mid-1960s (Figure 1$3)*
Oil is found in the Gulf of Cambay (Figure 1.2). And 
hence if we observe the demographic growth in areas of the 
Western region we will expect to see a reversal of the picture 
in the East, To parallel the 26 Districts in our Eastern
1 Data from Indian Chamber of Commerce, Background Paper 
for I,C,C0 Conference on Calcutta - 2 0 0 0, "A Demographic 
and Economic Profile of the Calcutta Metropolitan District'} 
I.C.C., India Exchange, Calcutta, 1976.
sample we record the growth rate of the 26 Districts in 
Maharashtra. Both aggregate urban populations number 
about 11 million. First we note from Figure 1*4- b'that 
the distribution shifts rightward not leftward from the 
first to the second decade in question: the modal value
shifts from below to above the All-India mean. Secondly 
we note the relative absence of Mgreen»fieldn sites, 
or, more precisely, of urbanisation in Mgreen-fieldM 
Districts. The rapid expansion of the chemical industries 
indeed gave rise to very fast~growing towns, but on the 
whole these were in Districts where industry had already 
been established (and note that the data here presented are 
for the aggregate urban populations of each District),
The grafting of the chemical industry on to the textile 
industrial base in Bombay, and the chemical industry at 
Pimpri on to the engineering industrial base at Pune are 
examples, A fairly straightforward point emerges. If a 
broad industrial base has been established at the District 
level, rapid expansion of new industry has a less dramatic 
local demographic effect: and conversely, as we will argue 
later, severe contraction in an industry has less dramatic 
social consequences.^
1 For a politico-economic analysis of the industrial change 
see S ,L.ShettyStructural Retrogression in the Indian. 
Economy", Economic and Political Weekly. Annual Number, 
February 197$. For the economic effect on the Eastern 
region see D .Banerjee," Industrial Stagnation in Eastern 
India: A statistical Investigation", E,P.W., Feb. 20, 1982,
The forthcoming analysis devotes attention to the 
area I am describing as the Eastern region of India, or 
the Chota Nagpnr Crescent with the addition of Calcutta 
(Figures 1.1,1.2,1*3). Its unifying characteristic is that 
its industrial development is heavily dependent on the rich 
iron ore resources and more variable coal resources 
(including some of metallurgical grade). With the exception 
of the Calcutta Metropolitan region and the pre-Independence 
Steel Towns of Jamshedpur and Burnpur, the industrial base 
was not well-established in 1931* As a seat of industrial 
capital Calcutta was already losing place to Bombay; this 
process was hastened by, and possibly contributory toward, 
the local industrial unrest that was to develop especially 
in the late 1960s* There were thus indigenous reasons for 
stagnation that must be distinguished, in examining their 
local demographic implication, from the national economic 
malaise, and restructuring, referred to above* A further 
characteristic important to note is that in 1951 the region 
was prominent in its high incidence of agricultural labour 
(as recorded in the Census) in what was in any case a largely 
rural population, an incidence that was apparently to increase 
faster than the Indian average over the subsequent decades* 
Finally we note that we are dealing with a population that 
is ethnically differentiated: much of the region is Hindi­
speaking, but industrialisation has resulted in migration
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of some of these people into the Bengali heartland*
The Districts I have chosen for observation sum to 
between one half and two-thirds of the population in this 
region, depending on precisely where you draw the 
boundaries. We will now describe them in a little more 
detail (Figures 1,6 and 1,7 a- )•
A major growth centre in the Chota Nagpur Crescent 
lies in the Damodar valley amid the rich higher grade coal 
seams that stretch from Karanpura to Raniganj,(Figure 
It is the closest that India comes to an industrial belt, 
though by the mid-1970s, when the author travelled through 
the region by train, it still amounted to no more than an 
array of smoke-stacks among the palms, Burdwan is the District 
comprising Burnpur Steel Town, and the Second Plan steel 
plant at Durgapur and associated engineering works; there is 
also the town of Asansol of mixed engineering including the 
production of railway wagons, and Chittaranjan, the new 
locomotive works. The growth of the urban population 
reflects these developments clearly, with increases of
1 My "Eastern region" does not coincide with the Eastern 
Region or Eastern 3one as they are officially defined: 
these include Assam and exclude any of Madhya Pradesh,
The closest official classification to mine would be the 
South East Resources Development Region drawn up for 
pLanning purposes by the Government of India,
The criterion for selection of Districts in our study is 
discussed in the Appendix to this chapter.
3©
sJid. 59% in the three post-Independence decades 
(Figure 1.7 a ). The surrounding Districts are largely 
agricultural-based# Midnapore, Birbhum, and Bankura 
have old-established rice mills: their urban demographic
growth rates are therefore more modest, averaging below 
30% per decade, in line with the scale of these scattered 
processing industries* Their enhanced rates of growth 
during the 1 9 5 1 -6 1 decade will be in part due to the derived 
growth in demand for their consumer products (a multiplier 
effect), a prosperity not to be sustained through the 1 9 6 1 -7 1  
decade: indeed the aggregate urban populations came close
to stagnation, with net out-migration occurring in some of 
the individual towns.
Travelling Westward up the Damodar valley and on to the 
plateau between the Hazaribagh and Rajmahal Hills we are in 
the coal-mining District of Dhanbad whose rapid urban 
expansion in the 1950s is clearly derived from the demand 
for coking coal for iron production, as well as being due to 
the construction and enlargement of the fertiliser plant 
at Sindri# The demand for coal is also high in the 1970s 
and beyond,due to the expansion of the existing iron and 
steel plants, and partly due to the industrial expansion 
related to the siting of the next steel mill at Bokaro 
(which was due on stream by the early 1970s). Hence the
urban growth ±n the District remains rapid though much 
reduced# The machine-tools and heavy engineering 
equipment required for the steel plants (among other 
users) were fabricated at Ranchi, though not until the 
mid-1 960s, and despite shortfalls in production this has 
remained the major centre for such requirements as long as 
the continued growth of national output (albeit with 
fluctuations) called forth additional investment in 
industrial capacity (on the “accelerator*1 principle); 
the earlier growth in Ranchi District, however, relates 
to aluminium and cement manufacture#
Between the Damodar and Ganges valleys are a 
number of large towns of earlier foundation# The 
Districts of Gaya, Patna, Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Shahabad 
are mainly engaged -in food and raw materials processing# 
Patna and Monghyr have additionally produced and repaired 
transport equipment, and Shahabad is a source of limestone, 
an essential ingredient in the purification of iron#
Urban demographic growth in all these Districts of Bihar 
has remained fairly constant without fluctuations through­
out the three decades, though the largest towns (Patna 
excepted) have experienced sluggish growth: any regional
"multiplier11 effects must have been barely felt# At the 
same time Bihari labour has tended to migrate Eastward 
within Bihar, and into West Bengal in general and Burdwaii
District in particular# Singbhum District, also in 
Bihar, is the home of Indian steel-making: Jamshedpur
was already producing a million tonnes at Independence, 
but a significant expansion took place in the 1950s, 
doubling the capacity# The town was also the homeland of 
heavy industrial and transport equipment, a broad 
manufacturing base thus having been achieved already by 
the 1960s# Urban demographic growth was again in this case 
sustained at at least one third above the rate of natural 
increase throughout the three decades#
The neighbouring State of Orissa is among the most 
rural in India# The new steel mill of the Second Plan 
built with West German collaboration was founded here on 
an entirely "green-field" site, at Rourkela in Sundargarh, 
and the demographic growth was explosive (800%)» The 
same District includes other New-towns: cement production 
created Rajnagar for instance, limestone quarrying created 
Birmitrapur# The springing up of new settlements in 
neighbouring Districts is related to the opening of ore 
mines (Figure 1#5)» again in previously undisturbed lands. 
But in addition Orissa has traditionally had a textile - 
industry# Textiles have been the slowest growing manu­
facturing sector since Independence (Figure 1#3)* with 
capacity barely expanding between 1956 and 1968 In the 
industry that is the largest single employer of all Indian
industries# Mayurbanj, a small centre of the industry, 
owed its sudden demographic growth to the establishment 
of a power station at Baripada# Cuttack, a large centre 
of textiles, engages more generally in manufacturing, 
with more steady demographic consequences# Other Districts 
in Orissa are raw-material based, with rice-milling in the 
rich green coastal plains South in Ganjam, and saw-milling 
on the forested slopes of the Eastern Ghats, as in Bolangir# 
These areas enjoyed little expansion, indeed Bolangir 
clearly stagnated, untouched by the Second Plan; by 
contrast both enjoyed the local prosperity of projects in 
the 1960s# The influence of industrial development in 
neighbouring Districts can be observed in the fate of 
Baudh-Khondmals: traditional household manufacturing was 
unable to retain the local labour force over the first two 
decades#
Inland of Orissa, high on the central Indian plateau 
known as the Deccan, in Eastern Madhya Pradesh, lies an area 
of industrial activity best depicted as something of an 
outlier from the centre of the iron and steel belt (Figure 1*5)# 
The District of Durg is the home of the integrated iron and 
steel plant at Bhilai (or Bhilainagar), whose rapid expansion 
is reflected in a demographic growth rate of 200% over the 
1951-61 decade; (below we shall take this Steel Town for a 
special case study in employment dynamics*) The whole sub-
region we talce as a control against which to compare the 
more complex picture in West Bengal, looking more fully 
at the surrounding Districts to assess their demographic 
reaction to the rapid growth of this isolated locality;
(we shall also make some comparisons with a similarly 
isolated iron and steel -making town in 19th Century 
England.) All three of the contiguous Districts were 
characterised hy agricultural product processing, and 
Bilaspur and Bastar also by the manufacture of local 
cigarettes (beedis). All three Districts witnessed a 
growth in their urban populations that was well above the 
likely natural increase, during the period when the steel 
works were being developed and to a lesser extent through 
the subsequent decade, though in the latter period the 
differential growth between different towns is particularly 
marked. In Bilaspur District lies the source of the coal 
that was- initially used to fire the furnaces of Bhilai.
The failure of this whole sub-region to diversify further 
(at least until the late 1 9 7 0s) has provided a good case 
through which to study the demographic and economic dynamics 
of rapid growth followed by relative stagnation (taken up 
in Chapters 6 and 9 below).
This overview should conclude with a reference to 
the comparative region and selected Districts of Western
India that we refer to in the course of this study (Figures
is
1 .1  and 1 .7  b). This/traditionally the home of the textile 
industry, being also a major area of cotton production.
As was mentioned earlier, later developments in oil in the 
Gulf of Cambay, among other factors, have led to the 
diversification of the region, with new growth centred on 
Bombay and its New-town developments in Thana District 
(with sustained growth rates between A-0% and 70% pe^ decade) 
related industrial expansion has taken place in Poona 
District (where again an industrial base of a varied 
nature had already been laid). By contrast, the old inland 
textile-manufacturing District of Sholapur has continued to 
decline (without diversifying), with urban demographic 
growth below the rate of natural increase, whereas, further 
North, in Gujarat State, the famous textile City of 
Ahmedabad has modernised its technology (though also without 
much diversification) and maintains a healthy growth rate 
throughout the period* (The development of the textile 
industry in the different socio-demographic setting of 
19th Century England is analysed below.)
Four Hypotheses
This completes our overview of the experience of 
an industrialising region in Eastern India, in comparison 
with other industrialising regions of rather' different 
character in Western India (and later we make further
comparison with industrial localities in England,
both contemporary and historical (especially in Chapter 2))#
The point of comparison to be developed throughout the work 
is as follows# Localities are affected demographically 
and socially by the establishment and fate of specific industries, 
and by the health of industry generally. The rate of 
investment levelled off in India during the ten years 
1965-75! but that will have affected Western India as well 
as Eastern India. The more specific switch in the industrial 
Gontent of what investment did take place will have affected 
the two regions differently. Thus Western India can be 
taken as a control against which to observe the demographic 
effect in the East of the country. The differential impact 
under different demographic pre-conditions is observed by 
regarding an industry with identical technology in 
contemporary Britain; and another differential is observed 
by regarding somewhat similar demographic conditions under the 
influence of a very different technology in the same industry 
in 19th Century England, though of c.ourse there remain 
contrasts within the comparisons, and some of these we 
shall exploit in our analysis.
From this overview four inferences were drawn, 
four hypotheses formulated, not for direct rejection or 
support so much as to bestow a more incisive quality, and to 
provide an analytic frame in the following economic-demographic
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history of industrialisation in a region of India since 
Independence, They are these:
1 # Industrial strategy determines demographic structure 
in terms of age, sex, and migrant characteristics 
and their development over time#
2# Current technology is responsible for unprecedented 
demographic features, not experienced in earlier 
industrial revolutions#
3# The macro-economic-demographic relationships proposed 
in models founded on the Coale-Hoover tradition are 
acutely observed, and fundamentally important, at 
local levels of demographic aggregation, in the town 
or city#
*f# In addition to, and maybe more important than, the issues 
raised in the models just referred to, there are 
implications in the urban demographic dynamics that 
follow from industrialisation for the current and 
future social and economic health of urban societies, 
particularly relating to continuing employment opportunities#
These four hypotheses may be summarised in a rather 
stronger hypothesis quoted in the Abstract: that modern
industrial technology in combination with factor proportions 
typical of a developing country gives rise to local population 
structures that are unusual if not unique in history and that 
carry with them over time exceptionally complex economic 
welfare implications for the localities and households involved#
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Figure 1,5
Map showing major Mineral Resources in the 
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Figure 1.6 continued 
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Figure 1.7 a
Diagrammatic Map indicating Decadal Growth Rates of 
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Appendix 1.1 Selection of the Study Sample
The Indian Census data are fullest for the largest 
cities in 1961: in our region Calcutta is the sole example
(though we do make use of some comparative data for other 
major cities, notably Bombay)» A good intermediate category 
consists in the towns of 100,000 or more (One "lakh") people, 
of which there are a number in our region (Figure 1.2).
Below this size the data for individual towns are rather 
meagre, the purely demographic data being available on 
size of male and female population and broad age groups only. 
There are no 5~year age group data, marital status data, or, 
worst of all, migration data® These statistics are available, 
however, for the urban populations of each District taken as 
a whole (the Urban District). It is possible therefore for 
a researcher interested, say, in towns of Class Three in 
population size (20-50,000 people) to select those Districts 
that are dominated by towns of that size: whose urban
population has a majority of -frds, for instance, in towns 
of that size class. My study relates not to size per se, 
but to the speed and character of the growth of towns*
The "character" of growth stems from migration characteristics, 
and hence can only be diagnosed at the Distx-ict level of 
aggregation. Growth rates alone, however, are to be had 
for individual towns. I have tried to select those Districts 
where either there is a city of 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 population size (for 
which we have fairly full separate information), or at least 
■frds of the towns were growing at approximately similar
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rates from 1951 to 1 9 6 1, so that it becomes possible to 
describe the District as consisting in towns and cities 
Min stagnation" (0-30% decadal growth), or "of modest 
growth"(3 0-55%)» or "of fast growth" (over 55%)» and so on.
An arbitrary cut-off point on the acceptable coefficient of 
variation of growth rates was taken as follows: if the
mean for the District is ^0% or below, 1*5 is the maximum 
tolerable coefficient of variation; if the mean is above 
-^0%, 1.0 is the maximum acceptable. The growth rates 
of New-towns in 1961 were calculated from their rural 
constituents in 1951 • On this basis 26 Districts from 
the Eastern part -of India (described in the text above) 
were chosen (Figure 1.1). The sample is therefore systematically 
biased, it is not a probability sample. For some purposes 
particular inclusions or exclusions are made (Calcutta 
is often excluded), and for comparative purposes, for 
instance in presenting data for Maharashtra, similar 
procedures are not adopted. In each case the possible bias 
involved in such comparisons will be indicated.
Generally speaking it should be noted that this sample 
tends to over-represent the heavy industrial towns within the 
region, just as the region itself is more heavily 
industrialised than India as a whole. Hence for example 
the growth of the urban population in the 26 Districts is 
61% over the 19 5 1 -6 1 decade (and 98% if you exclude the
1 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean.
Districts incorporated in Calcutta), as against the All-India 
average of This high figure is strongly influenced
by the inclusion of all three "green-field" Steel Towns*
In the Appendices to chapters that follow we have 
undertaken statistical regressions to provide a check on 
the observations we make in the text (and occasionally to 
estimate parameters). In some cases we use a sample of 
large cities (described below), in other cases the sample 
Districts (just described, and sometimes referred to here 
as the "homogeneous sample" or "study sample"), and at times 
we use a sub-sample of either of these. We emphasise that 
the basic requirements of random sampling are not met: our 
results therefore tell us more about heavily industrialising 
urban areas than about other types. Our interest has always 
been to focus on the extreme cases, the large and fast 
growing New-towns, and the large but stagnating old towns 
for example.
A brief Overview of Chapter 1
In a review of the literature on demographic- 
economic relationships we conclude that studies have too 
often focused on aggregate problems, whereas the more 
serious implications of too rapid or too slow a population 
growth occur at local levels; and secondly that studies of 
urban populations focus mainly on their size, and fail to 
analyse their growth and changing demographic structure 
over time (despite the more serious economic implications 
of the latter). In an overview of Eastern India we 
highlight how national investments during the Second Plan, 
being concentrated on heavy industry, and especially iron 
and steel production, were channelled towards a few 
localities, with significant and unforseen consequences 
for local population growth, structure, and migrant 
composition.
CHAPTER 2
Technology of Scale and its Demographic Correlates
A Summary of the Argument
Here we begin to build a more detailed theory from 
the foregoing observations: to examine the hypotheses 
through comparisons and controls. The scale of investment 
in individual plant is the result of vast economies of scale 
exploitable in modern technologies. To examine this idea 
a little more closely we look back in time to the formation 
of the iron and steel industry in England when the supply 
of labour was also relatively plentiful as in India today.
We find small plant and small townships and lower demo­
graphic growth rates by comparison. We also observe the im­
pact of contemporary technology in current England, over a 
period when labour supply was growing less rapidly than in 
India, and again the localities are found to be small and 
growing more slowly. We look at economies of scale in other 
industries. At the plant level, they are either much smaller 
(as in textiles) or highly labour-saving (as in chemicals), 
though in the former case economies of agglomeration are also 
noticeable (both historically and today). None of these 
comparisons suggests that the future will necessarily replicate 
the problem I am outlining in so acute a form as in heavy 
engineering, and especially iron and steel making; however, 
a less dramatic, more secular problem of similar kind can arise 
in the case of agglomeration economies in closely related 
industries. All these comparisons indicate that the maximum 
repercussions will be occurring over the current decades, 
owing to the current peak in the Indian labour supply.
In these two senses the problem I outline may be historic - 
it never occurred before and may never occur again on such 
a scale. But it Is currently of considerable significance, 
and the repercussions will be felt long into the future as 
industrial restructuring takes place*
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The Development of the Iron and Steel 
Industry in England and India
Although this work is intended to he an historical
study of industrial and demographic inter-relationships
during the first twenty years of India's Independence,
It is written with a number of specific questions in mind,
with the intention thereby of sharpening the analysis
and increasing its contemporary relevance for understanding
the continuing character of that economic-demographic
relationship© This was made clear in the first chapter*
The object in this chapter is to examine how the industrial
demographic relationship might differ under the conditions
of changing technologies on the one hand, and varying initial
demographic positions on the other* A problem of contemporary
interest would be to gauge the future inter-relationships
under a number of assumptions regarding the technological
and demographic future. To provide guidelines in this approach
we pursue an historical review; and to provide some degree
1
of control we adhere at first to a single industry.
1 The method is still that of selected case studiess 
in our judgement the detail in which one can pursue 
such an approach compensates for the lack of wide 
representation; it is hoped that the contextual aware­
ness which we try to maintain will tend to mitigate the 
latter defect.
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The home of modern iron and steel making was very 
much the North-East of England in the 19th Century. The 
important determinant of that location was the presence 
of the Cleveland ores (Figure 2.3)* Although the major 
centres established from the middle of the century were 
in the vicinity of Middlesbrough, the site that both 
typifies our examples of the Indian green-field plants 
(Bhilai above all), and exemplifies in an extreme way 
an industrial monoculture perpetuated as such down to the 
present day, is that of Consett*
High on the Durham moorland, on what was believed to
be a rich source of ore, Consett was foisted on the local
folk much as Bhilai was planted on the tribals of the
Eastern Deccan* Consett was regarded as a huge plant at that
time (early 1850s), but its output was only of the order of
100,000 tons* Tracing the size of the associated township
over time is not easy, but the population of the Lanchester
locality, described in the Durham Chronicle at the time
*1
as consisting of people dependant on the iron works ,
2>
numbered 2 0 ,0 0 0 by the late 1850s , considerably less than 
a quarter of whom will have been employed directly or 
indirectly in the industry of iron-making* The point to
1 Durham Chronicle, 9th July 1 8 5 8, quoted in A,S.Wilson,
"The Origin of the Consett Iron Company",Durham University 
Journal, 1977*
2 British Government, Census of England and Wales 1 8 6 1, Tables 
of the Ages.*.*of the People (Northern Counties), London*
The total population of Lanchester is given as 2233$* males 
aged 20-60 number 5393* The township of "Conside-cum-Knitsley" 
numbered 2777 in 1851 (1589 males), and 195 in 19^1*
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emphasise is this. The technology of industrialising 
Britain dictated local demogi'aphic features of a completely 
different magnitude; less plentiful labour resources 
(than India's today) enhanced that difference; so that 
a local population of a mere 2 0 ,0 0 0 grew up over a couple of 
decades as a result of an investment in plant of the largest 
economic scale then known in the industry concerned (Table 2*1),
The limited size and growth rates of these local 
populations in iron-making areas - (Lanchester expanded 
at the fairly modest rates, in comparison with Indian Steel 
Town Districts, of 103% and 41% respectively over the decades 
184-1-51, 1 8 5 1-6 1 ) - reduced the planning problems related to 
green-field siteSj and the dynamic population fluctuations 
that followed were modest, partly due to the relatively 
balanced sex ratios among the migrants, and partly due to 
their modest number (by Indian standards) in relation to the 
total local population (Consett*s sex ratio in 1851 was
about 750 females to 1000 males; see Table 2.1 for
contrasting population age structures that follow from these 
technological and demographic differences). On this we have 
more to say below. Furthermore, even modest industrial growth
1 By 1864 the 18 blast furnaces had a capacity of 150,000 
tons of pig. By 1875 it was the largest iron plate works 
in the world. See II,W.Richardson and J.M.Bass, "The Consett
Iron and Steel Company", Business History. 7s£, July 1 9 6 5.
In the earlier period Consett is said to have employed 5-"6,000 
men (50% of whom were Irish), To judge from the size of the 
working population of Lanchester in 1861 this must have been 
about 75% of the local workforce (migrants included). The 
figure is likely, to include the Company’s service sector.
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rates (by modern developing country standards) were
more likely to shift the population in proportional terras
from rural to urban locations, given a slower rate of
rural natural increase (much less than India’s 2% per
annum, and generally around '1%% in the 19th Century),
thus relieving some of the demographic pressure on rural
economies, and reducing the relative attraction of urban
non-core manufacturing sector employment. Hence the local
multiplier effects of the new industry seem much reduced
in comparison with those in contemporary India* However,
a minority of rural migrants at least would be attracted
from more backward regions (no doubt actively encouraged
as a source of cheaper labour) and hence a picture of ethnic
diversity (similar to that in Indian Steel Towns - see Chapter
6 below on Durgapur) follows: "the influx of many new workers
of diverse origin into the infant towns such as Middlesbrough
and Barrow created social problems for which there was at first
1
no adequate machinery*"
From here we should turn to the origin of the steel 
industry in modern India, In 1911 the Tata Iron and Steel 
Company (TISCO) was founded in the District of Singbhum 
on a site in the jungle close to a vein of singularly pure ore:
1. J.CoCarr and W.Taplin, History of the British Steel 
Industry. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 19&2; see 
also the previous note.
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the township that emerged was christened Jamshedpur (after
the entrepreneur JamshedjC Tata)* What is significant from
our point of view is the fact that the technology sought
was the best currently available in the world, obtained
not from England but from the United States. The relative
labour and capital factor proportions in the two countries,
India and America, seem not to.have been a consideration.
Technical expertise, the physical eqiiipment embodying the
advanced technology, the skilled and semi-skilled labour,
were all inevitably to be imported from overseas (Germany
was an important source of labour and also manufactured the
furnaces)* Capital it seems was forthcoming on the Indian 
*1
market. Despite the costs of importing skills and 
technology, the plant was exporting steel by 1912. The very * 
high quality of the ore must have rendered India a 
competitive steel producer in those days, as in more recent 
times, despite other disadvantages, though how far importation 
of unmodified Western technology was justifiable is open to 
question, and indeed in the 1 920s the‘industry needed 
protection at the rate of 33% in the face of world over­
capacity. By 1915 the plant produced 100,000 tons per annum,
p
and by 1921 170,000 tons with a workforce of 26,000. By that 
date the town had reached 5 7 *0 0 0 (which was comparable with 
only five other towns in Bihar and Orissa at that time, Patna
1 J.L.Keenan, A Steel Man in India, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
New York* 19^3* is a fascinating source of information here.
2 S.K.Sen, The House of Tata(1839-1959). Progressive,Calcutta, 
1975.
alone being substantially larger at 120,000), By the time 
of Independence scale economies in the industry justified 
a million ton production unit: this was achieved at Jamshedpur
with a workforce of 2 5 *0 0 0 (less than in 1 9 2 0) as the 
result of an expansion programme to be completed in 1 9 5 5* 
prior to the erection of the public sector plants of the 
Second Five-Year Plan, The city's population was now heading 
for a quarter of a million.
While the giant Indian mills of the Second Plan
were being expanded or erected in the late 1950s, a remarkably
similar thing was taking place elsewhere: for a comparative
case we look again at the United Kingdom, Both at Corby
(in Northamptonshire) and at Consett (in Durham) renewal
and expansion of iron and steel plant were taking place,
2
to take the capacity to the one million tonne mark. Scale 
economies were such that unit costs would rise by about one 
third between output levels of 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 and 1 ,0 0 0,0 0 0 .^  
Essentially the technology was the same as in India, with 
open-hearth furnaces in the case of both Corby and Durgapur; 
indeed Britain built Durgapur, What is remarkable is the
1 Government of India, Census of India 1921, Bihar and Orissa, 
Patna*
2 From this period the metric tonne becomes the more frequent 
accounting measure. Fortunately the ton and tonne are 
similar in size, the latter being 0 ,9^^ of the former,
5 See, for example, B.Balassa et al., The Structure of 
Protection in Developing Countries, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore and London, 1971•
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size of the labour forces. At Corby in the late 1960s about
6 ,0 0 0  men were employed in the integrated iron and steel works
by British Steel; at Bhilai about 17,000 were employed by
1 2Hindustan Steel, and 20,000 at Burgapur. *
1 Bata from Master Plan for Corby published in 1975* It is 
fiendishly difficult to standardise production labour forces 
across different plants and in different countries. Iron
and steel production workers at Corby numbered ^753 (excluding 
those in the tube plant). We should add to that a section 
of the general staff in the employment of the British Steel 
Corporation totalling 3216, who will have been employed at 
both plants. The figures are for 1971 when capacity was 
1 million tonnes.Comparability is further confused by the 
difference in the final product: data rarely refer to the
ingot stage (indeed in continuous casting processes this will 
become a meaningless cut-off point). But the finished or 
semi-finished product may be rail, plate or billet, each 
requiring different processing. I have tried to exclude 
labour involved in any further processing than this (for 
instance in tube production), but inevitably some non­
comparability remains. For India, data are from Hindustan 
Steel Limited, Statistics for Iron and Steel Industry in 
India 1970. Ranchi. They indicate the employment of 17270 
process, service and maintenance workers at Bhilai, and 
200^ -3 &t Burgapur (excluding those in the alloy plant).
This is for 196*1- when the plants were fully on stream 
and each rated at 1 million tonnes capacity or so (actually 
production rose to 1-^r m.t. - 1-J m.t. in thatlyear),
2 W,A,Johnson, The Steel Industry of India. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,19 6 6, suggests that 13,000-
1 5 ,0 0 0  were employed, but that the target labour force at 
Bhilai was between 6000 and 8000; and a figure of 7500 is 
given as the standard for the three public sector plants
in the Times of India Yearbook for 1959. It cannot be said
The second point to note is that both Corby and 
Bhilai conspicuously failed to diversify (see further 
Chapter 9 on Bhilai). Employment in manufacturing was
17,000 in Corby in 1966, with 12,000 in the whole of the 
British Steel plant (including the tube mill), and an 
estimated 6 -7 0 0 0 in the integrated iron and steel mill, 
about 70% and k0% of manufacturing employment respectively. 
In Bhilai about 70% of the manufacturing workforce (26000) 
are also in iron and steel. The whole of the manufacturing
note 2 continued from overleaf
that pure market forces operated in dictating the manning 
levels in any of the cases under comparison; all were 
carrying excess labour, owing to political pressures.
The figures we quote refer to operatives, maintenance, 
and service workers permanently on site, Construction 
workers inflate total labour force figures enormously 
during initial fabrication, and subsequent expansion 
phasesi 63,000 at Bhilai, 22,000 at Durgapur, *1-5,000 at 
Rourkela are the figures given in Iron and Coal' Trades 
Review, A Technical Survey of the Durgapur Works, undated 
but apparently i9 6 0 , page 2. It is difficult to dismiss 
(also to manage) such large forces, especially when expansion 
phases are in sight, and it is reported that construction 
workers get carried on in the overall workforce; (press 
reports in India in 19^1 claimed that the Bokaro plant 
had held over some *f000 workers in construction between the 
inauguration and the expansion phases).
and. services labour force supports a local population of 
about *1-0,000 in Corby (by the mid-1970s) and 39,000 in 
Consett (at the million tonne stage), whereas at Bhilai the 
figure is between 8 6 ,0 0 0 (1 9 6 1) and 1 7**,00 0 (1 9 7 1), that is 
about 120-150,000, or four times the size of the United 
Kingdom populations at roughly comparable production levels. 
Here the factor endowment and demographic contrasts between 
India and contemporary England are displayed to the full.
In a single-industry town the core-manufacturing labour 
force in India is three times the size of the United Kingdom 
equivalent, and the total labour force is three to four
i
times the size. The size of the total dependant population
depends on how many urban workers were supporting rural
families in each case. The Indian dependant population
2is probably five to six times the size# Strictly open 
unemployment rates do not differ much in the two towns, but 
in India the massive labour force is absorbed in commerce, 
transport and services, like water in a sponge.
1 It is difficult to make comparisons between towns such 
that they represent similar degrees of maturity (following 
investments in a core industry), especially as steel 
capacity in India is continually being expanded. To 
compare like with like we should probably exclude the tube 
mill at Corby and estimate figures for Bhilai as of the 
early 19&0s. The labour forces compared would be 15-20,000 
and 6 0-7 0 ,0 0 0 respectively.
2 India has about k dependants per adult worker, England has 
about 3. Bhilai’s skewed sex ratio (.80 f:m) in 1971 
suggests more absent dependants than was the case in Corby.
For reasons to be discussed below an identical 
technology has been adopted in these two economies* But 
owing to the different circumstances of labour supply, the 
demographic implications can be sharply contrasted. In the 
case where labour is relatively abundant the core industry 
itself carries more labour per unit of capital, and the 
industries that grow up to provide the local goods and services 
carry far more labour than in the case where labour is 
relatively scarce* Labour—force in-migration rates are 
therefore far higher* In the labour-abundant country family 
size is also larger (due to higher fertility without 
compensating high mortality, which has of course ensured the 
relative abundance of labour), so that total in-migration 
rates are also higher. These are reflected in a very sharp 
acceleration in the growth rates of the towns over a decade, 
and a very large local population at the end of the decade.
The problem of planning social services and continuing full 
employment in such situations is discussed in detail in later 
chapters of this study. When the technology was different 
so that optimal scale of plant was smaller, the acceleration 
in growth rates was naturally smaller. At a time when Western 
economies were themselves relatively labour-abundant, in the 
mid-19th Century, optimal scale of plant was considerably 
smaller* The net effect of more abundant labour but smaller 
scale was to result in slowex* urban demographic growth, and 
smaller cities at the end of these periods of acceleration0
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(It is true that natural growth was slower, since birth­
rates were a little lower, and deathratas higher than in 
contemporary developing countries, but differential natural 
growth rates are not important components in overall growth 
rates of these magnitudes - natural growth is swamped by- 
in-migration rates*) These illustrations indicate our 
grounds for belief that the experience of the 1960s onwards in 
India is probably unique.
The argument may be pursued relentlessly; the
epilogue is as follows. The increasing economies of scale
in iron and steel manufacture face no clearly forseeable
limit today. Currently the minimum efficient scale of an
1
integrated plant xs six million tonnes. The next plant 
to be established in India will be of 3*2 m.t., destined for 
Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh. The township, built on 
a green-field site and given current factor ratios in
1 See S.V.Char, ’’Viability of Vizag Steel Plant", Economic 
and Political Weekly. 10th Nov. 1979* He claims that 
6 m.t* ensures that 9 0-95% of scale-dependent economies 
are reaped. Eight to nine m.t. seems to be the maximum 
size before we can be sure diseconomies will set in, 
(technically they currently set in when blast furnaces 
head towards 5 m.t. capacity each, owing to cooling and 
maintenance difficulties). See W*F.Cartwright, "Comp­
arison of the Blast Furnace BOF Route with its Alternatives", 
in the Iron and Steel Institute , Alternative Routes to Steel, 
A.G.M. Proceedings 1971? J.Aylen," Plant Size and Efficiency 
in the Steel Industry: an International Comparison", 
University of Salford, 1 9 8 1.
industry and commerce, can expect to absorb something in excess 
of 2 5 0 *0 0 0 people in a decade (and perhaps well in excess of 
that for the six million tonne plant'ultimately hypothesised). 
But economies of scale are clearly going to become labour- 
saving in character; it would be absurd merely to extrapolate 
in this way. Suffice it to say that growth rates will be 
larger than experienced before in India (or in Britain), 
until the day when labour supply tightens significantly, 
follow!ng declines in natural increase, and factor proportions 
change.
A continuing increase in the economies of scale and
improvements in labour produc tivity are indicated in the
more modern U.K. plant. By 1971 Consett was using two blast
furnaces and two L.D. converters (not Open Hearth, as at
Durgapur and Bhilai) to produce 1.*f m.t. with 3 605 operators
from a local population that had fallen to 36,015 (from 39,000).
Durgapur had reached a capacity of 1.6 m.t. by the late
19?0s, employing about 2 3 ,0 0 0 men in the iron and steel
works (excluding the alloy plant) withalocal population
2
of around 305000 Returning finally to Cleveland in North 
East England where we began the comparison, one of the most 
advanced plants in Europe has now been established. In the 
whole of the Teesside Division (including Consett before
1 British Steel Corporation, Teesside Division, Steel Times, 
Technical Survey, Sept. 1979*
2 Government of India, Census of India 19^1, Paper 3?
New Delhi.
closure in 19^0 ) the iron and steel-producing labour force 
numbered only 2 5 ,0 0 0 and made 6-£ m.t, of steel ingots 
(5 m.t* in the Redcar-Cleveland complex after Redcar came 
on stream). Hence even if India were faced with U.K. 
long run factor proportions and a growth in labour supply 
reduced to zero (hardly a picture to be envisaged before 
the first half of the next century), new local populations 
based on local industry limited to steel-making would still 
be likely to number around 1 5 0-2 0 0 ,0 0 0 with each new 
investment made* To continue the argument further we 
would need to estimate whether India is likely to be a world 
steel producer over the coming decades. What we can say is
'I
that the industry has recently been competitive, it seems, 
(though some doubts have been cast here regarding the capital 
costs of a plant the size of Bokaro), and given the resource 
position of a reserve of technically skilled manpower 
(in the requisite medium-level skills) and the continuing 
high-grade ore output, this happy situation is likely to 
continue. How far pressure from the State governments is 
likely to lead to smaller plants being established in more 
diverse locations depends on the currently uncertain outlook 
on the balance of State and Centre power. But certainly
1 D.Lal, Prices for Planning: toward the Reform of Indian 
Planning, Heinemann, London, 1 9 8 0, Statistical Appendix 
to Chapter Table S,A,1, gives supporting evidence on 
this point.
plants in the 2-^ m.t* range are the smallest likely, 
and anything less than 1 m.t, would be prohibitively 
costly in unit cost terms. These new plants are likely 
to be raised on coastal sites, having regard to export 
possibilities (to both developed and developing nations),
1 Until the building of the Redcar complex individual 
plant size has been small in the U.K. compared to West 
Germany and the U.S.A. The upper quartile of plant by 
employment size.averaged 4220 men in the 1970s in the U.K., 
but 85.OO in Germany and 12000 in the United States (see 
Table 2.3)*.
In the 1960s unit costs fell 30% between ^ and 1 m.t., 
and a further 10-15% between 1 and 4 m.t. Estimates for 
Bokaro suggest that a fall of around would be experienced 
between 1.7 and 4.0 m.t. See F.M.Scherer, The Economies of 
of Multi-Plant Operation, Harvard U.P., Cambridge (Mass.), 
1975, and P.Desai, The Bokaro Steel Plant. North Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1972, Chapter 7, Table 4, (also B.Balassa cited 
earlier in this Chapter).
Currently (early 1980s) the best productivity 
capability in the world is supposed to be 7 manhours 
per million tonne of output, i.e. about 1 2 ,0 0 0 men on 
a 3 M.t. integrated plant (see, for example, a report in 
Middlesbrough Evening Gazette. 16 January 1 9 8 1). Indeed 
the Consett workforce was down to 3 6OO by date of closure 
in 1980 (producing partly plate and partly billet),
(British Steel, Annual Report and Accounts 1979-81).
In India we would expect at least 40,000 men on a 3 m.t, 
plant (if we maintain the inter-country ratio of 3*1 as 
up to now). India is not alone among oriental steel 
producers in using labour so generously; China is 
reported to employ 3 0 ,0 0 0 at 2 m.t, capacity (see 
Financial Times (U.K.) Supplement, 14 December 1 9 8 1).
In fact the economies, given current technology, are
??
For reasons outlined in a note at the end of this 
Chapter I, expect a gradual worldwide convergence on the more 
technically efficient plant sizes despite differing factor 
price ratios for labour and capital. Clearly there will be 
leaders and laggards: but that does not imply that India
will be a laggard. Indeed in the inter-War period the
average size of German plant was three times that of II.K. 
plant in the upper quartile range: and at that time India
was installing German technology at Jamshedpur, to make that 
complex the largest in the British Empire. But then, as now,
and for the decades to come, the demographic implications
were far more dramatic for the relatively labour-abundant 
country. '1
footnote continued from previous page
most noticeable in the capital, not in the labour, use, 
though m  the case of the blast-furnace the economies are in 
maintenance and down-time. A rule-of-thumb calculation sugg­
ests that capital costs fall by about a third, but labour 
costs by only a quarter as you move from 1 to m.t. size 
plant. Jumbo blast-furnaces and huge L.B, converters 
(in contrast to the O.H, furnace) are already largely 
mechanised by the time 1 m.t, is reached: this is due to
the fact that labour operatives cannot handle the necessary 
throughput in the confined physical space without mech­
anisation (see W.Alexander and A.Street, Metals in the 
Service of Man, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 19^0, pp. 155-7)*
But labour may be used more intensively In the loading and 
unloading of materials at either end of the process, and in 
maintenance (and construction),
1 A completely new technology could change the whole picture
footnote continued from previous page
so laboriously presented in the previous note* The 
Direct Reduction - Electric Arc Furnace route at 
present exhausts economies of scale at about -g- a 
million tonnes* A technical breakthrough in the 
construction of the Reduction kiln could change this.
But currently the high cost of electricity in this process 
makes it unlikely that the mini integrated Direct Reduction 
plants will become widespread in India before the end of 
the century, by which time they may well cease to be 
mini. Direct Reduction seems to pave the way for a 
more direct and continuous process of iron-making 
and steel-making, less amenable to dividing up into 
stages, that can be carried out in different countries 
according to their differing factor endowments*
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Scale, Agglomeration, and Demography 
in Other Industries
It has already been suggested that Increasing 
economies of plant size are unlikely to be of great 
significance in India in a number of the processing and 
manufacturing industries that have more to gain from the 
intensive use of cheap labour. Hence towns that form on the 
basis of such enterprises are unlikely to be subject to the 
same demographic characteristics as those of the Steel Towns 
described above* But are there other industries that exhibit 
similar characteristics to the steel industry?
For an answer to this question, we would expect first 
to look at the heavy engineering industries most closely 
related to iron and steel: these were an integral part of
India's Second Plan, and were also conceived on a "grand 
scale", a notable case being the Russian-aided plant at 
Ranchi in Bihar, As the Ranchi complex did not reach 
capacity production until the mid-1960s, data from the 1971 
Census are the major source of information. By that date there 
are two distinct plants in the field of metal products in 
the District, with a total it was claimed of 17*6^8 on the 
payroll. This means that there must have been a maximum of
80
1
882*f at the larger of the two plants. Both are now 
Included in Ranchi Urban Agglomeration (including the New- 
towns called Doranda and -a premonition? - Jagannathnagar), 
which numbers 2 5 5 ,0 0 0 people, an increase of 82% over 1 9 8 1.
Another important engineering plant in the area, dating from 
the earlier decade, is the Chittaranjan railway workshop, 
whose labour force had reached 5000 by 1 9 6 1, resulting in 
a local population growth of 79% in the New-town built for 
the works, attaining a total of 29P00 by 1 9 6 1 .^  These are 
select examples from the area of our study* Taking the 
country as a whole we might consider the average size of 
factories in the engineering industry in the upper employment 
size range. In plants employing above 5000 employees in 1971 
the average employment per unit (factory) worked out to be 
7000 in machine-tools, 8000 in transport equipment,
1 Government of India, Census of India 1971, Bihar,
Establishment Tables, New Delhi, Table E III. These figures 
are collected from the industrial establishments themselves. 
Hence they are likely to be minima, not fully accounting for 
casual labour, (and indeed a cross-check on the steel plants’ 
personnel data from the alternative sources supports this view). 
Ten thousand would be likely to be a more comprehensive
figure in this case.
2 M.Mohsin, Chittaran.ian: a Study in Urban Sociology. Popular 
Prakashan, Bombay, 1984-. Here the multiplier effect must 
have been felt more in nearby Asansol-Burnpur• The male 
workforce at Chittaranjan numbered 8620 in 1 9 6 1, with 
machinists and welders accounting for 5705, (Government of 
India, Census of India 1961* West Bengal, General Economic 
Tables, New Delhd).
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1 2 ,0 0 0  in electrical machinery (compared to 1 1 ,0 0 0 in basic 
metals, according to the sane source). In the U.K.,
West Germany, and U.S.A. mechanical engineering factories 
contain on average between 1000 and 2000 employees, and 
electrical engineering between 2000 and 3 0 0 0, in the upper 
quartile range of the employment size distribution 
(compared with *f000 to 1 2 ,0 0 0 in iron and steel) ,(see 
Table 2.3). The rank order is roughly the same, though the 
ratios are different. But in Europe and the United States 
the motor-vehicle, ship-building, and aerospace plants 
enjoy much more significant economies of scale to judge from 
the same data, apparently ahead of those experienced in 
iron and steel. India has yet to penetrate these industries 
to any significant degree.
During the Third and subsequent Plan periods 
a switch of emphasis occurred (as we recorded in Chapter 1) 
towards products based on synthetic manufactures of the chemicals 
and oil-based industries. Would this new trend have different 
implications for local demography also? The largest chemical 
or chemical products plant in the country employed nearly
1 3 ,0 0 0  men in 1 9 7 1? the next largest was below the 5000  
mark. This scale is still not comparable to that of the
1 Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, 
Statistics of Factories. Chandigarh, 1977#
2 S.J.Prais, Productivity and Industrial Structure (forthcoming).
3 Again allowing for the divergence between official factory 
statistics and the actual number of daily employees we 
could expect this figure (1 2 8 8 9) to be inflated to 1 5 *0 0 0.
steel industry, but the margin of difference is not great* 
European and American experience is extremely divergent on 
this point, underlining the operation of local economic
'I
and non-economic factors (on which see Scherer ), but, 
of interest to note, West Germany (which may enjoy a 
young capital age structure, and hence be more representative 
of minimum efficient scale) produces chemicals in plant 
larger by a small margin than its steel plant. The largest 
downstream plant in the chemicals industry in India (that is 
in rubber, plastics, and petroleum products) was emptying 
only 6000 men in 1971• To complicate the picture, there 
are far less powerful economic forces attracting the heavy 
chemicals industry to green-field sites. Industrial or 
commercial economies of agglomeration (that is economies 
external to the plant) are likely to be of greater importance* 
This complication is taken up below in respect to the textile 
industry. Its immediate demographic implications are 
indicated in an earlier diagram (Figure 1**f) contrasting speed 
of growth of urban areas in Maharashtra with those in Eastern 
Indiao These large industrial investments affect the local 
demography rather less if they are attracted to already 
developed industrial localities, like Bombay or Poona* 
However, an agglomeration of similar industries renders
1 F.M.Scherer, The Economics of Multi-Plant Operation. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1975*
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the local population, generation upon generation, more 
vulnerable should there be a change in the wind#
If we are to predict where the Indian economy is
going, insofar as it affects the populations in our sample
of Eastern States, we might glean a few seeds of information
by examining progress during the only decade for which we have
adequate comparable documentation as yet (19^1 - 1 9 7 1)•
Restricting ourselves to factories employing more than
100 men, let us see what happened to the average plant size
in that range# Data availability also forces us to con-
-]
centrate on West Bengal (Table 2*2). Plants where average
size increased were in chemicals, rubber, petroleum and
coal production (products), and in basic metals* Large
plants in capital and intermediate goods production seem
therefore to be moving toward the optimal scale economies
(in this State of India at least)* The scale effect has
dominated any effect of capital for labour substitution#
From an earlier analysis of the size structure of the factory
sector undertaken by Ishikawa (Figure 2*2) it is clear that
in 1955 India was already moving toward a factory size
structure comparable to that of the U.S.A, and Japan in the
2
machinery and basic metals sector* I have updated these
1 Government of India, Census of India 1961* 1971« West Bengal 
Establishment Tables, New Delhi, Table E III. This is the 
only State that quotes the number of employees in the upper- 
size categories in both Censuses# Refer to Table 2#2 for caveats#
2 S,Ishikawa, Economic Development in Asian Perspective.
Kinokuniya Bookstore Co#, Tokyo, 19&7*
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comparisons with data from India in 1971 to indicate the
continuing trend. A priori there is no reason to expect
any difference in the case of heavy electricals or
chemicals (which Ishikawa did not compare). By contrast,
at that point in time (1956) at least, other South and East
Asian countries were lagging behind.
One industry that we expect to grow in the current
global economic situation is petroleum refining. Here we
have a case, however, where capital substitution seems
clearly to dominate the economies of scale. For all the
difficulties involved in valuing capital across industries,
we can fairly confidently assert that the petroleum refining
industry is more capital intensive in India than any industry
so far described. In Europe and the U.S.A. the largest
plant averages 1500 to 2000 employees, with capacity between
210 and 15 million tonnes. The largest Indian plant, at 
Trombay (outside Bombay), with a capacity of 5*2 m.t.,
3
employs only 1000 men. Expansion here has rather little 
demographic implication for the locality. At the same time 
it implies very little transfer of population from rural to 
urban.
So far we have been looking at the heavy goods industries, 
particularly those producing investment goods* True, it is
1 See Statistical Abstract of India (various years), published
by the Government of India’s Central Statistical Office, Delhi*
2 Britainte newest plant, in Kent, has a capacity of 10 m.t.
3 Times of India Yearbook. 19?S, section on Petroleum.
here that we expect to find most significant plantwise 
economies of scale, with few advantages from proximity to 
consumers, but where most transport economies are secured 
instead by proximity to sources of raw materials* In 
consumer goods industries giant plant is generally rare, 
but units in the 5 -7 0 0 0 employee range are to be found..
A similar size relationship seems to hold for consumer 
compared with investment or intermediate goods in European 
manufacturing. In the U.K. food-processing is undertaken 
in some of the largest plants in the consumer goods sector,
1300 being the average employment size in the upper quartile 
(Table 2.3)* Figure 2*2 shows clearly the humped distribution 
for food factories in contrast to the step-wise distribution 
for basic metals, with India having a similar distribution to 
its neighbours in 1 9 5 6, that is less employment concentrated 
in plant above 1000 employees. The pattern is not so clear 
by 1971 (partly because the data are not so complete)j the 
case of West Bengal suggests Ithat food and beverage Is something 
of an exceptional group in that the average factory size 
(above the 100 employee mark) has grown significantly (66%) 
over the 1961-71 decade. In most other consumer goods 
industries, in marked contrast to the heavy industries, 
there has been a substantial fall in average employment size 
of the large factory. Although retrenchment in a difficult 
period is a possible explanation (not to mention statistical 
inconsistencies in the data source) the substitution of more 
mechanised processes in the larger plant must have been a 
c ompounding fac t or.
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Crucial, however, to the discussion on consumer
goods in India is the part played by the textile industry,
historically the strength of her industrial development,
and still the largest aggi'egate industrial employer in
the nation. In 1971 this was the single industry with the
largest number of factories employing more than 5000 workers
in the country* In this respect cotton outshadows jute.
As far back as the 1950s the employment distribution was
skewed markedly towards the large-scale enterprises, in
direct contrast to South Korea, and more in line with the
U.S.A., Taiwan and Japan taking an intermediate position,
(Figure 2.2, and reference to Ishikawa noted there). In 1971
the employment size of plant, however, averaged only 6 7OO
for cotton manufacturing in the largest size range (that is
more than 5000 men). The Indian industry is currently based
on natural fibres; but there is an increasing investment in
the synthetics branch. In synthetics, the core Western
technology is capital intensive, with important scale
economies, and its adoption in India has meant large-scale
plant with larger labour to capital ratios than in the Western
economies, The New-town of Ulhasnagar in Maharashtra, for
example, has grown on the basis of this industry and the town’s
manufacturing force was dominated by the 5 » 5 0 0 employees at 
2the plant. Though technically a green-field site,
1 Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, 
Statistics of Factories. Chandigarh, 1977*
2 Government of India, Census of India 1961« 1971«
Maharashtra, Establishment Tables, New Delhi. The figure 
is 5 5 9 -^, and recorded as exactly the same for both 1961 and 
1971 (symtomatic of the inherent unreliability of these data).
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Ulhasnagar is in close proximity to the major centres of 
Bombay and Thana, on a corridor of industrial expansion 
and diversification from the coast to the inland city of 
Poona* It is less alarming to note therefore that between 
25% and 30% of the growing industrial labour force were 
employed in this single plant*
Much more isolated a town is Sholapur, whose
fortunes were also founded on the textile industry, in
cotton-growing country, in pre-Independence days. This
case brings us to an important development in the main
argument of this work. For Sholapur’s manufacturing
labour force is similarly dominated by the textile workers.
However, these are distributed in a large number of factories:
2000 handloom workshops and 18 powerloom. In Sholapur
District’s urban areas (of which Sholapur City is the
largest by far) there are ko large handloom factories
employing more than 100 men each. By contrast Bombay has
only 116 handloom workshops --.altogether, but 39 powerloom
-1
factories (at this date, 1961), The demographic
1 Government of India, Census of India 1961. Maharashtra,
Cities of Maharashtra, Establishment Tables, and Special 
Tables for Bombay, New Delhi. (Note that by a curious 
oversight Table E III was never published for the Cities, 
hence we have to use the urban District data).
Ahmedabad City had 155 powerloom and 163 handloom 
factories in an urban economy that is similarly dominated 
by the textile industry, (see Chapter 8 for further comparisons 
between Ahmedabad and Sholapur),
implications are clearly different from those of the 
massive single steel plant dominating the locality: the 
growth of a textile town is unlikely to have been so 
precipitous;' and it is likely to have been more balanced 
in terms of male and female workers, (though this is a 
very complex matter referred to later)# But, once 
established, the population is equally dependent on the 
fortunes of a single industry, with severe local social 
implications if an industry-specific recession sets in0 
The implications are not, however, compounded by demographic 
fluctuations of the kind we associated with a heavy industrial 
monoculture#
What has been the historical experience in regard to 
technical and demographic relationships in the textile 
industry? As in the case of iron and steel we propose 
to investigate this a little more closely, and this takes 
us initially to the slopes of the Pennines in North West 
England, where we focus on a pioneer locality in the cotton 
spinning country, - Oldham in Lancashire (Table 2#*f and 
Figure 2#3)#
Oldham was never a green-field site, strictly speaking# 
It was an agricultural village with a population estimated in 
171^ at 1732#^ In 1776-78 the first six small cotton mills
1 No period in Sholapur’s growth was as fast as that of
the steel towns, as far back as 1921 at least#
2 From the Annals of Oldham# quoted in E.Butterworth,
A Statistical Sketch of the County Palatine of Lancaster
18A1 . Longmans, Manchester, 18A1*
were established, 3 water-driven, 3 horse-driven# Thirty
spindles were used to employ ten men and two donkeys (in
the case of the "horse1 -powered technology) and 250 spindles
employed 50 men in the case of water-driven machinery#
(Note incipient economies of scale, although the scale is
still minute)# Another poptilation count in 1792 recorded
9A8O people. That must have seemed like a population
explosion in the wake of an industrial revolution# But
clearly its industrial base was an agglomeration of tiny
units - "within its area (in 179*0 were at most a dozen 
2small mills".. - seeking the advantage simply of appropriate 
environmental features that coincided more or less at that 
point: that is to say, fast-flowing streams off the
Pennines, sufficient humidity on the sheltered West-facing 
slopes, and proximity to the source of imported raw materials 
together with the minimum existing infrastructure, or amenity 
of the village# Chapman notes that small-scale was advantag­
eous for jenny-spinning since selection of skilled operatives 
was important# Tight control over labour supply is crucial 
if the skill component is high. But the innovation of twist
1 S*J.Chapman, The Lancashire Cotton Industry. Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 190*5-? Oldham and District 
Historical and Antiquarian Society, The Cotton Mills of 
Oldham# Oldham Libraries, 1979«
2 Oldham and Its Industries# Official Handbook of 
Corporation (undated)#
spinning reduced the skill component* Economies of scale
were enjoyed up to an employment of JOO operatives per
plant (with one large Manchester mill having 600 men),
1
though the average was below 100, By the second half 
of the 19th Century a textile plant would reap major economies 
at the level of 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 spindles (as compared with 250 in the 
late 18th Century), Oldham was principally a centre for 
the spinning of coarse cloth, and on the basis of this modest 
scale of plant size its population growth rate peaked 
to a modest A0% per decade (A2% between 1801 and 1 8 1 1),
Between 75% and 100% of that growth will have been due to 
migration, since at that date urban birth rates rarely 
exceeded urban death rates by more than 10 per thousand.
The absolute addition to the population was a mere 5000 
during the first decade of the century. This may be 
contrasted with the initial expansion of Middlesbrough, 
which was founded upon the iron-making industry, and added 
1 0 ,0 0 0 and 2 0 ,0 0 0 to its population during two adjacent decades 
(starting from a population size comparable to Oldham's),
At this early date we can safely say that the vast majority 
of the manufacturing employment in Oldham was in textiles 
(mainly in spinning), a picture similar to that in Sholapur 
in India today,
1 S .J.Chapman, cited in note 1 , previous page,
2 R,Smith, MAn Oldham Limited Liability Company -1875-18 9 6", 
Business History, A:1, Bee, 1961,
If we take spinning and weaving together as a 
single integrated industry for the moment, it is clear 
that the economies of scale have not taken employment 
levels per plant very much higher over the subsequent 
150 years* The median plant size in terms of employment 
was only 290 in England in the 1970s (^30 in the United States 
and the upper quartile median only 530 (880 in the U.S.A.), 
(Table 2,3)* We have already commented on the only modest 
size of the large textile plant in India in comparison 
with basic metals (6 7OO employees compared with 11,300 in 
the 5000+ class). These economies of scale in textiles 
furthermore are relatively labour-using. But the change of 
technology has induced investments in newer vintage capital 
that already does exploit large and capital-using economies 
of scale, that is the technology involved in the spinning 
and weaving of synthetic fibres. In England the median plant 
size in these man-made fibre industries was 2A60 in the 1970s, 
with the upper quartile median reaching 3730 (or 6000 in the 
United States). But as these economies are relatively capital 
using, permitting little labour-capital substitution, the 
plant-wise employment levels in. the labour-abundant countries 
will not grow significantly larger (as is witnessed in the 
case of Ulhasnagar near Bombay, referred to above).
The case of Oldham is worth pursuing further.
For it soon ceased to be solely a textile manufacturing town. 
And yet, in a sense, it remained monocultural. The town 
proved to be fairly and squarely sited on a steam-coal
outcrop. With the innovation of steam-powered machinery 
(first used in Oldham in 1798) the exploitation of the seam 
began. By 18M5 there were 62 collieries and 1300 miners.
The fast growth rates of the town in the 1820s and 1830s 
(between 35% and 5% . a:-decade) were partly due to mining 
development. It was the siting of these collieries that 
gave Oldham so dreadful a reputation for.'aypolluted environment. 
Taking the social-environmental evidence into account it is 
unlikely that the death rate fell below that of Manchester 
during the 19th Century, which means that the growth rate 
continues to be predominantly due to in-migration, not 
natural increase.
More significantly perhaps, Oldham began to develop 
(in the 1830s) what became the largest textile-machinery 
manufacturing enterprise in the world, with 2 0 ,0 0 0 employees 
by 1900. Now this is clearly a diversification, for whereas 
coal-mining could only be undertaken profitably on a limited 
scale (and was very much tied to the local demand for coal), 
textile machinery manufacture was an export industry
"I
(exporting 75% of production in 1 9 0 0) , and could remain
wholly independent of the local demand. -The engineering 
plant was evidently employing over one third of the
1 Oldham at Work, Exhibition and Booklet produced by 
Centre of Local Interest, Oldham, 1981.
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workforce in 1881. This was a welcome diversification,
and was subsequently to lead to a wide range of small
engineering production, when, in the 1920s, the bottom
fell out of the cotton market* The particular vulnerability
of Oldham lay in its continued production of coarse cloth,
a speciality most readily adopted for manufacture in India
and elsewhere. Between 1931 and 1931 the labour force in
engineering began to outnumber that in textiles. By 197t
less than ten per cent (9 *0 ) of the economically active
were employed in the latter, over twenty per cent - (2 1*1 ) of
2the male workforce being employed in.engineering. Despite 
this, the rundown of so major an industrial employer as 
textile manufacture has rendered Oldham a depressed town, 
like Gonsett and Corby actively promoting itself as a new 
growth centre, and with a high rate of unemployment (though 
without so sudden an increase as in the former towns, this 
being the social advantage of an economy operating on a 
multiple plant basis, as well- as the ..fruit of some degree
1 From these few quantitative reports, I estimate that by 1881 
not much more than >^0% of the male wor-king force could be 
engaged in cotton cloth manufacture: "for there would be 
1 2 ,5 0 0 working males, with about- 2000 in mining, and f^OOO 
in machinery manufacturing. The Census does not categorise 
the population by occupation-at the urban_sanitary district 
level at this date*
2 British Government, Census of England and Wales, relevant 
years,.North West Counties, Occupation Tables, London.
of diversification.)#
These overall employment figures hide a crucial
feature of the change we have described# The textile
industry was an employer of women - 1*f0 to every 100
men among the operatives in the late 19th Century,
according to Chapman ;(this was actually lower than for
other towns in the North West)# By 1881 the region was on
average employing 130 women per 100 men in the industry;
by 1971 the ratio had become 107 per 1 0 0, which was still
high by industrial standards. In contrast, engineering
now employs about 600 men to every 100 itfomen (568).
Given the relative decline in the textile industry the
2loss of female jobs has been enormous*
1 S.J.Chapman, The Lancashire Cotton Industry. Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 190^ -*
2 The demographic implications of this are discussed in 
Chapter below*
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A Note on Industrial Technology! 
Theory and Practice (Figure 2 *1 )
Why is the technology adopted in the case of
Indian heavy industry, and particularly in the steel
industry, identical to that in the already industrialised
nations? Can ae predict a convergence, that is to say,
can we predict that the demographic features we analyse
will become more widespread, and unbalanced or unstable
populations more typical, with contrasts between localities
more frequent (and more intensive)., and social implications
of industrialisation and de-industrialisation more severe
throughout the developing world?
There are a limited number of conditions that will
induce a labour-abundant country to invest in massive scale
of plant* It is rare for internal economies of scale,
i.e. at the level of the plant, to be reaped in labour-
intensive manufacturing, so the usual inference would be
that we are considering capital-intensive industry when we refer
to internal economies of scale* The first obvious sufficient
condition for this capital use is that factor prices are
-1
distorted. There is evidence of this xn India. I know
1 See for example D.Lal, Appraising Foreign Investment - 
in Developing Countries. Heinemann, London, 1975* Part
of no reason why this situation should worsen (or indeed 
improve). Not a dissimilar argument relates to the 
"effective" prices of factors as perceived by the 
industrialist (be he public or private). For though 
labour may be nominally cheap, it may be regarded by him 
as unreliable and hence not actually so cheap (whether 
or not this is in fact the case). The larger the labour 
contingent on any one plant, the less reliable it may be 
(the more likely it is to unionise, for example). The 
more sophisticated is the plant, or the more continuous the 
production process (as in modern steel manufacture where 
only a minimum cooling is allowed between the stages of 
production) the more crucial the reliability of the labour 
force becomes* Thus the supply price may be low, but the 
potential price, allowing for costs of possible disruption, 
may be high. Hence the factor market may look not dissimilar 
to the industrialist in Britain and in India, and the 
adoption of the most capital-intensive plant, which 
carries with it enormous economies of scale, becomes 
economically rational. (This choice is made of course in the 
knowledge that political pressure may well require the employ­
ment of a minimum labour force in excess of what would be 
Required for profit maximisation for any given technology).
1 On this we elaborate in Chapter 5 below.
This leads to a second set of a>xditions for 
large-scale plant adoption. For it is not suggested 
.here that such an. Industry must be competitive on the world 
market. Labour'may be unreliable the world over, and more 
so In some nations than in others, but capital is still 
generally cheaper in industrialised nations. What then 
would be the motive for investing in (and hence protecting) 
an uncompetitive industry? There is always evident a 
nationalist fervour for owning your own basic industrial 
capacity, coupled with a fear of being vulnerable to 
international sanctions and leverage if you do not.
This self-sufficiency argument taken as a universal 
objective implies that only the largest industrial 
economies (like India and Brazil) will adopt the largest 
plant. Steel, for example, would have initially to be 
produced in smaller than ^-million tonne plant in the 
emerging African nations. Given that a nation intends to 
make steel anyway, it then views the alternative techniques. 
This, ceteris paribus, would lead a labour-abundant 
nation to utilise labour intensely, which in turn would allow 
investment in several small-scale plants. However, we assume 
in that argument that a continuous production function 
exists, with labour and capital being substitutable 
throughout the range of scale available to the industrialist
1 See for example the Government of India's Third 
Five-Year Plan pronouncements.
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(for any given quality of output). In practice a number of 
modern basic industries may show their highest productivity 
and profit rates (in a closed economy) at levels of 
output for which only a limited range of technical 
possibilities has been developed. The core process in 
oil-refining for instance can only be efficiently carried 
out within a very narrow range of factor ratios, so that 
whatever the factor prices (within a wide range), the core 
process has to be capital intensive. In summary then, 
self-sufficiency and technical discontinuity form a second 
set of condition's*
This leads us to the third set* Granted that in the 
real world there are more than two distinguishable factors 
of production, an industry may be competitively located 
in a developing country even though the core process may 
be capital intensive (whether to embody the latest innovations 
or to reap the available economies of scale). Complementary 
factors - semi-skilled labour, or raw materials, for example 
(like high-grade iron ore in the case of the Indian steel 
industry) may be relatively abundant, but only intensively 
exploitable in conjunction with a particular capital-using 
technology; while at the same time certain ancillary activities 
can be made more intensive in the use of unskilled labour 
with very, .little complementary capital. In which case 
the non-labour factors, taken together, may be relatively 
cheap, and raw labour relatively costly, even in a developing
country#
In some industries of course it may be possible to 
divide the production process into stages and to carry 
out the different stages in different countries# But 
if the newly developing technology makes this less easy 
(as with continuous steel casting for instance) or transport 
costs are high (as with the transport of iron ore) it may 
be more profitable to export the finished product (rather 
than any intermediate product) despite the fact that a country1 
factor endowments would not favour the carrying out of 
some of the intermediate processes in that country (could 
they be isolated in this way)# If the country is particularly 
well-endowed with one out of the many factors of production, 
that fact alone may dominate the international location 
decision#
Figure 2 .1
Production Possibilities in an Industry
General Note: Individual plants are aggregated to
give the industryfs output (Q) under 
different technological regimes (T);
Labour is measured horizontally,
Capital vertically;
For illustration we take the iron and steel 
industry.
Interpre tation:
1* Earlier Technologies (Tq) enable the production 
of iron and steel with various combinations of 
capital and labour. Increased production levels 
would be achieved with equi-proportional increases 
in the two factors (no scale economies). The nation 
produce's its optimal output on for instance,
say 2 m,t.,. in plants of m.t* each. Limited 
technological know-how prevents the use of larger 
plant.
New Technologies (T^) enable increased output to be 
produced over a range (limited) of factor combinations 
at lower unit cost: the new technologies relate to
plant scale (i.e. they are internal to the unit of 
production) so that fewer plants can produce the same 
output as before* (Each plant is limited by know-how 
to, say, 4 m*t•)•
The nation decides to increase its output to 
, say m.t*
A labour-abundant economy might adopt the old 
technology (and produce at A, given its factor-
price ratio of <k/l)", in % m.t* plants with heavy use of 
ancillary labour}.
The same economy, if factor prices are distorted, 
may adopt the new technology, producing at B say, 
in a single ^ m.t. plant, with rather less use of 
ancillary labour (and much less use of production 
labour). Indeed if wages are higher than (k/l)* there 
will be a shift to the new technology with .B preferred 
to C.
The 2 X 2 diagram fails to capture the case of 
the complementary inputsi but here is an approximation:
If K (capital) and R (a raw material) are absolutely
complementary, and R is relatively abundant to K, i.e.
its true price is low, we can collapse R and K into
a new variable K*, price k*. In this case production
takes place at B say. (This is an extreme case and the
reader can readily consider the implications of relaxing
the rigidity of complete complementarity).
Figure 2*2 •
Employment Size Distribution of Factories in Selected Industries 
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Map of England indicating places referred to 
in the Comparative Analyses
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Growth Rates and Age Structures in 19th Century Steel 
Towns in England (with a contemporary Indian comparison)
Decadal Growth given as Percentage 
(Selected Population Totals in brackets)
184-1 1851 1861 1871 1881
Lanchester (7783) 103 (15814-) 4-1 (22358)
(incl. Gonsett)
Consett 1831 (130) est. . (5961)a 20 (7165)
Conside-cum-Knitsley (2777) 78 (4-953)
Middlesbrough 33 138 111 (395 63 )38
Proportion of Population
in each age fcroup bv sex — At Initial Investment Phaae*
LANCHESTER 1851 (15814-) MIDDLESBROUGH 1871 BHILAI 1961
Age male female (39563) (86116)
0-14- .20 .19 .19 .20 .13 .12
15-34- ♦ 21 .16 .22 .16 .4-2 .16
35-59 .11 .09 .12 .09 .11 .04-








.19 '.20 ,22 .20
.21 .15 .19 .17
.12 .09 .13 .06
.02 .02 - .02 .01
Notes:a1871 is the first date when the town is given a separate 
identity in the Census, ^Growth from 1961 to 1971: 102%,
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Sources for Table 2*1: British Government, Census of England 
and Wales (relevant dates), tables on Ages and Civil 
Condition of the population, London, (tabulated under 
Northern Counties); B.R,Mitchell with P.Deane,
Abstract of British Historical Statistics. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1962; Government of 
India, Census of India. Madhya Pradesh, (relevant 
dates), General Economic Tables, Table B II, New Delhi; 
for other estimates see text and references cited therein*
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Table 2*2
Change in Average Employment Size of Large Plant 
in West Bengal 1961 - 1971









































































*of plants employing more than 100 employees
Notes! Calculations not performed on non-comparable data;
Failure to include repair sector separately in 1961 is 
source of bias throughout.
Sources for Table 2 02 : Government of India, Census of India
1961« West Bengal, Establishment Tables, E III,
New Delhi; Government of India, Census of India 
1971. West Bengal, Establishment Tables, E II, New 
Delhi o:
Table 2.3
Scale of Manufacturing Plant in Contemporary India with 




Chemicals and products 
















Average number of employees at 










upper 25% in size 
distribution 
Calculated from 
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Sources: (for U.K. and U,S.) from S.J.Prais, Productivity and 
Industrial Structure (forthcoming);
(for India) Government of India, Ministry of Labour., 
Labour Bureau, Statistics of Factories* New Delhi, 1977o
ill
Table 2.4
Growth Rates aad Age Structures in 19th Century Textile 
Towns in England (with a contemporary Indian comparison)
Oldham
Decadal Growth given as Percentage
(Selective population totals to nearest thousand)
1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891
42 29 45 34 23 36 15 34 18
(1 8 0 1: 1 2 0 0 0) (1891 : 1 3 1 0 0 0)
Manchester 19 42
(1 8 0 1: 7 3 0 0 0)
44 29 29 12 4 32 9
(1891 : 5 0 5 0 0 0)
Proportion of Population





(1 2 0 6 0 0 1)a
0-14 .17 .1 8 .1 7 .1 8 .2 0 .1 8
15-34 .17 .19 .1 8 .1 9 .2 0 .16-
35-59 .11 .13 .1 1 .13 .13 .0 8




.02 .03 .0 2 .0 2
Notes: aGrowth between 1951 and 1961 was 38%. before rounding.
Sources: As for Table 2*1 above (with British Census data
tabulated under North-Western Counties, and Indian 
Census data for the State of Gujaarat).
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Table 2.5
Population Size and Age Structure of 20th Century 
Steel Towns in England (with an Indian comparison)
Population Steel Capacity Core
1951 1961 1971 (1960s) Workforce
Consett 39^80 36015 1 m.t. *f0 0 0-
Corby 16735 *1-7990 1 m.t. - 1 .*f m.t. 5000
Bhilai 86116 17^370 1 m.t. - 2 m.t* 1 7 0 0 0- 
25000
Proportion of Population in
each age group by sex
CONSETT 1971 BHILAI 1971
Age male female
0-1*1- .1 2 .1 1 .2 2 .2 0
15-3^ .13 .1 2 .19 .17
35-59 .1 6 .1 6 .13 .0 6










clNotes: For definition see text and footnote.
bOwing to rounding, proportions will not always sum to 1.00. 
Sources:.As for Table 2.1 above.(with British Census data tabulated
under County Reports for Durham and Northamptonshire).
A brief Overview of Chapter 2
Here it becomes clear that economies of scale 
are a major consideration in modern industry, and 
especially in important sectors of heavy industry; this, 
in conjunction with a relatively abundant labour supply, 
results in the rapid demographic growth of local centres, 
which is the object of our analysis, and which can be 
held responsible for the problems of labour market equilibria 
and provision of welfare infrastructure associated with 
declining areas as well (especially when they too were the 
result of earlier growth of large-scale heavy industry).
At no other point in time did technology and demography 
conspire to such an extent to this effect, and there 
are reasons for suggesting they will not combine again 




A Summary of the Main Indications of the Model
The preceding demographic observations prompted the 
construction of a simple simulation model of local population 
structures and their development over time* This incorporates 
various contrasting patterns of migration to aid our 
understanding of how urban populations do develop as time goes 
on, and what underlies the changes we observe, and how changes 
in the periodic phasing of labour demand might modify the 
pattern described earlier* We find that the peculiar 
de-stabilising effect of migration to a "green-field1* site 
is due to the adverse adult sex ratio being rapidly 
equalised in conjunction with a fertility-promoting age- 
structure* The resultant severe fluctuations in the aggregate 
number of labour force entrants can be seen over time* 
Equilibrium is not improved by further migration during the 
troughs in the supply of entrants to the labour force: future 
disequilibrium is made worse* But simply spreading the labour 
demand over a longer period irons out fluctuations* The 
proportion of children builds up rapidly if demand for female 
labour equalises sex ratios earlier* (And we go on to show, 
with an illustration in Chapter 9 below, that more rapid 
growth in that dependency occurs in the town itself, if, 
as in the Steel Towns, the young male migrants are already 
married and subsequently bring their wives and children to 
the town*) Conversely, declining towns, having sex ratios, 
but not age structures, favourable to fertility, have both 
high young and old age dependencies.
By keeping the initial populations and new migrants 
cohorts separate, we can trace the relative sizes of the 
two groups: apart from the obvious sensitivity to differential 
fertility, the growth-promoting effects of the migrants1 young 
age, or favourable sex structure are also significant here.
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The aim in constructing and operating a simulation 
model at this stage in the investigation is severalfold.
But one feature combines all the objectives: the need to
understand the real world more clearly. Without that 
feature the simulation becomes a mere toy. Furthermore, 
the costly temptation to elaborate a model to beyond the 
point where valuable insights can be seen to be forthcoming 
from it has been resisted# The risk of irrelevance becomes 
too great. It was hoped that in simulation some of the 
processes and implications of human population formation 
would become clearer than they are apt to be in the eyes 
of an observer of the empirical data. Some of the questions 
a simulation might help answer are as follows. Why are 
birth rates so low in rapidly industrialising areas?
And how long can you expect that experience to last in the 
absense of fertility change? Are changes in the growth rates 
of particular age cohorts, or changes in their proportionate 
size in the total population, the more important of the 
effects of different migration rates? And how do these 
depend on the age and sex structures of the migrants?
How are they affected by different fertility and mortality levels? 
These models are not supposed to be used for long-term 
population projections: rather they have a didactic
purpose, for they show the kind of population disequilibria
that can occur (beyond, I think, those that are intuitively 
obvious)* Hence the focus here is on the intermediate 
time span, up to the next twenty-five years at the outside, 
and particularly on the next ten to fifteen years, from the 
initiation of a project and onset of major inmigration*
To maintain the sense of relevance, insights 
obtained specifically from the model and not from the data 
will be indicated as such in addition to those that 
confirm the more readily intuitive observations from 
the data* More importantly, allusions will be made to the 
empirical importance of some of the observations, allusions 
travelling back to our fore-going analysis on technology, 
and forward to our discussions of the social implications 
of industrial strategy*
To help fix the basic patterns in our mind, first 
we outline the models. We can thence compare them more 
easily as a group* The basic model represents the 
demography of the average Indian town, in that it adopts 
approximately the recorded aggregate urban growth rate 
in the 1950s (in the region of 30% per decade): one of the 
lessons of this whole thesis is that such towns represent 
only one among a whole range of experience in urban 
demographic formation or dissolution, a fact easily
1 These are presented in detail in Table 3 *1* But three
representative major types are presented, with the indices 
essential to our dynamics argument, in Table 3 *2 , and 
Figure 3*1 is a graphical illustration*
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disguised in the aggregate figures (or, to put it another 
way, these towns represent the modal experience of our 
1951-71 growth distributions for the region illustrated in 
Figure 1.*0 . In this basic model inmigration is 1% per 
annum, and natural increase 1-J to 2% (depending on the 
fertility and mortality parameters used)* For our various 
comparisons we take the version with natural increase of 
1-J% (or 15 per thousand) implying an urban mortality and 
fertility close to rural levels (though with fertility on the 
lower side), with a birth rate of around 38 per thousand 
and death rate of around 23 per thousand of the population*
This reflects the correct parameters as far as we can judge 
for the mid-1950s, (see Chapter k for further discussion)*
We call this the‘Base11 migration model (Table 3*1 )*( or the 
"Balanced Growth" example in Table 3 *2 )*
Then we have the models labelled "1" (Table 3 *1 » or 
"Concentrated heavy industry" in Table 3.2 ). These 
represent decadal growth of 55% and upwards. The heavy 
engineering towns fall into this category, Model "1 c" 
is an extreme case,.typical of New-town growth - with a fivefold 
increase over a decade. An ■: immediate implication here is that 
the migrant population quickly dominates the local population, 
an important and neglected consideration in demographic 
analysis (neglected because at the national urban level
aggregate internal migration is never significant enough 
in Asia for this domination to occur in so short a space 
of time, nor indeed does it do so in the major cities).
Model "1 bM describes a fairly heavy growth of around 
70% over the decade. The "primed" model ( "1 b*") introduces 
a more heavily bunched migration age structure - fewer children, 
more workers - a characteristic more apparent in the less 
local migration streams. Model "1 a" has 50% more women 
than is typical (see further discussion 'below-). All the 
Type "1" models have heavy net inmigration concentrated in 
just five years: 1,500 males per annum in the cases "1 a",
"1 b", "1 b f", 15,000 males in M1 c", migrating into an 
urban area of 1C£)00 males. Female migration, consisting 
of spontaneous (occupational) and induced (marriage) migrations 
is derived from regressions relating female to male 
migration streams (see further Chapter-5 below), and the 
initial female population in the urban area numbers 8*f10.
This sex ratio and the initial urban age structure are identical 
to the all-India figures for the urban areas in 1961 (but 
we test some of the migration models on stable age and 
sex structures also).
Next we have the models labelled "2". These have 
urban population growth rates of around 50% per decade.
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The principal didactic purpose here is to show what happens 
if the same number of migrants as in model "1" are spread 
out over ten years instead of five, with 750 males migrating 
per annum instead of 1,500. This would imply that the 
component plants in an engineering project came on stream 
over a longer period, or that blast furnaces in an iron 
works were phased in gradually# But the model is also useful 
in describing the effects of a more mixed industrial 
development, both less "lumpy" and more diversified in 
its investments* The "2 a" version again (like "1 a") 
increases the number of women migrating, this time by 30%;
(the need to introduce these "a" variants only became apparent 
when we tried to explain the empirical evidence of high 
female to male sex ratios in some fairly fast growing towns 
in Eastern India)#
Finally the models labelled "3" are representative 
of the more depressing case of the towns that have become 
net losers of population, or outmigrating towns (described 
as "Lightly industrialised localities" in Table 3*2 #
As with the above-described models, a graphical presentation 
in Figure 3*1 highlights the migration dynamics in Panel A.
For comparative purposes the underlying fertility and 
mortality were kept the same and constant over time for all 
these cases# Then, in..order to examine the relative sizes
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of migrant versus non-migrant population, these parameters were 
systematically varied in line with what probably took place, 
in a few alternative models.
Observe first in Table 3*1 how the age compositional 
effects of migration influence the birth and death rates.
There is virtually no difference in the birth and death 
rates projected between the "Base" population model (decadal 
growth of 2 9%) and a stable population closed to migration 
(decadal growth 16%, outlined in Table 3*1 alongside the "Base")
'I
with the same parameters;' i.e. taken in aggregate, urban 
growth in India is so slow that the age structure effects 
on fertility and -mortality can be ignored* But take now 
the extreme case of "1 c" (decadal growth of 527%) and we 
can see that the birth and death rates are markedly reduced 
(the former from 59 to 30 per thousand). This was not 
quite expected, since migrants are bunched in the reproductive 
ages (Table 5*1 below). However, the enormous deficit in 
the sex ratio, resulting from," lagging the female migration 
behind the male migration (as further detailed in Chapter 5 
below), is responsible for this, and the model is approximately 
in line with observed sex ratios observed in some of the 
rapid growth towns of India (Table 6.1 below). Only in the 
more mixed industrial towns, which are growing more steadily,
1 A "stable" population is simply that which emerges if 
mortality and fertility have been unchanging for a 
reasonable length of time (50 years or so); (economists have 
a parallel in "steady-state" growth that emerges from an 
unchanging savings rate).
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is the deficit reduced (as illustrated in model "2").
The cases of U1 b" and M1 b*" (with decadal growth rates 
in the region of 70%) again show rather small age- 
structural effects on birth and death rates (a few 
percentage points)* This is quite simply because, first, 
the migrant flow per annum is less than 10% of the 
initial population, and second, the age composition of 
migrants, though concentrated on the working ages, is not 
wholly "unnatural11, that is to say it includes children and 
old people. Clearly an extreme case of all migrants being 
aged 25 to 35, like an extreme case of a 1:1 sex ratio 
among migrants (no lag between male and female streams), 
will raise the birth rate, as we had expected, but the 
cases are rare in Eastern India (though we isolate an example 
of very balanced sex ratios in Chapter 6 below). We shall 
have more to say about dynamics shortly, but observe for,the 
moment that birth rates recover from immediate shortfall 
within five to ten years (as the women follow the men).
A sustained migration, (like any other sustained demographic 
phenomenon) results in a permanent displacement of the age 
structure and hence transformed birth and death rates;
1 In an advanced "Western11 type population with a far older
age structure the same migration composition will go 
much further toward reducing the death rate.
as Lotka taught us to realise, the population will recover 
from a shock: but over the initial years (or quinquennia)
of recovery the dynamics behaviour of particular cohorts 
may be quite dramatic, and it is here, as I am eager to 
stress, that social and economic implications are crucial.
The cases of n2 bu and "2  a" (with decadal growth rates 
of around 50%) of course show very little age-structure effects, 
Note also that in spite of a 50% increase in female migration 
the birth rate is only one per thousand higher as a short 
term result (it was 2 to 3 per thousand higher in the 111 a" 
variant over ” 1 b”)• The empirical evidence we have that 
points to quite heavily distorted birth rates (discussed 
below) must result from significantly increased female 
migration streams (which prompted our creation of the "1 a" 
variant), or much higher fertility among migrants than 
among the pre-existing urban population.
Cases of declining or stagnant populations subject to 
outmigration, as in model ,l3"« register rather high crude 
birth rates, since the pre-existing skewed sex ratio in
2favour of males is equalised by male-selective outmigration, 
Death".rates are slightly higher (25 per thousand after 15 
years compared with 23 per thousand in the populations
1 A, <J.Lotka, "A Contribution to the Theory of Self-Renewing 
Aggregates, with Special Reference to Industrial Replacement 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 10:1 , 1939*
2 I^gardless of migration, a skewed sex ratio is expected due 
to differential mortality in Northern India*
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subject to inmigration) mainly due to the ageing of the 
population, but also, in a high mortality population, 
due to the presence of infants (increased with the higher 
birth rates)* In a society where local consumption, 
of the poor at least, is largely determined by local production 
and employment, the age-structural effects on welfare may be 
quite severe,.: the incidence of the elderly population's
dependence on the active population increases, and the 
active labour force declines absolutely (at over 2% per annum 
in model"3" while outmigration continues, despite a 
positive natural increase: see additionally part C of Table 
3*2)# This is a fairly extreme case, where net outmigration 
rates are of the same magnitude as the inmigration rates 
assumed in model "2 b" (leading to an;overall decline in 
decadal population of -16%)* The "Zero Base" model 
illustrates the effect of stagnation (with decadal growth 
of 13% resulting from no migration in conjunction with the 
pre-existing Indian urban age structure - indicative of 
net inmigration in the-past).
The age structure phenomenon, as we have discussed 
it a.bove, is only significant for the provision of social
1 Here the subsequent developments of the age structure will 
depend purely upon the initial age structure (plus any sub­
sequent change in fertility or mortality)* The low percent­
age under 3 day denote a previous fall in fertility, and the 
adverse effects on the labour force structure can be seen in 
year 10 (when the 15-19 cohort declines)*
services specific to the young and old# Our interest in the 
birth rate is that it tells us something about the size 
of the very young cohort (as well as the services required 
at birth)# The birth rate in the female population alone, 
which is indicative of the future proportions of infants 
to mothers, has additional implications for child care# It 
is of interest that in the sex-skewed populations the female 
birth rate is higher than the male (not illustrated in the 
tables): that is to say, although inmigration may reduce 
birth rates, it may do less to reduce child-to-women ratios* 
(indeed if female migration is sufficiently bunched in the 
peak reproductive ages it will raise them). Similarly, 
old-age dependency ratios have family care implications# 
Initially inmigrant flows improve (i#e# decrease) the young 
and old dependency burdens taken together# Later they 
lead to an increase (Figure 3*1 * panel B)#
We have shown that only in fairly extreme cases 
would Indian towns and cities be radically affected by 
distorted age structures* Greater distortions occur in 
populations whose migrant age-structures are more in 
contrast to their resident local population structures, 
which is typically truer as modern (i.e# older) age structures 
develop, while the migrants continue to be concentrated in 
younger age groups. The distortions are enhanced if sex 
structures, on the other hand, are more alike in both
i Z 5
resident and migrant populations; again this is more likely 
to be true in more developed societies where autonomous 
migration is less sex selective (in favour of males)#
The feature that deserves more investigation is 
a more truly dynamic one (illustrated in Figure Jit, 
panel C). If the age structures of inmigrant populations 
\*ere very close to that of the resident population, all 
age cohorts would expand at a similar rate, say 10% per annum 
while migration continued* If,however, the sex ratio 
of the adult migrants is skewed in favour of males, this 
picture will be modified in that the birth cohorts will 
grow initially at somewhat less than 10%, and then sub­
sequently, after the cessation of male migration, at somewhat 
more than the rate of natural increase, assuming that female 
migration continues and the adult sex ratio improves. However, 
if there is a hollow in the migrant age distribution in the age 
groups 5-9 and 10-1^ for example, there will come a.time when 
the sensitive 15-19 age cohort (the age of labour force 
entry) grows less rapidly, subsequently to pick up strength 
when the birth cohorts of the initial wave of migrants reach 
that age# This effect is clearly observable in the ” 1 c,r ,
1 It is a well-known characteristic of ’'stable1' populations 
(subject that is to unchanging mortality and fertility and 
with no migration) that each age cohort grows at the rate 
of natural increase#
or "New-town" model; (note especially the result of using a 
stable population base, where declines of 7*1 and 1,6% 
are: followed by increases of 1.7% per annum, and declines 
of 3*3% by increases of 7*1% per annum). What is perhaps 
of more social significance can be seen if we relate the size 
of the inmigrant 15-19 cohort to that of the native-born 
cohort, and if we continue to observe the relationship 
over time, as we will below* It should be noted that the 
power of this sudden growth of the age group about to 
enter the labour force depends on how few children arrive 
with the original migrants: the more children aged 5-1k
they bring, the more gradual the growth over the quinquennia9 
which is a crucial factor in the stabilising of the labour 
market. If the delayed arrival of female migrants results 
in a sudden growth of births, a further spurt' will occur in 
the growth of the 15-19 cohort up to 20 years after a 
project's initiation (as we have illustrated for the case 
of "1 cM above). The major social problem attributed to 
the sons of the migrants can thus be delayed by up to 20 
years, or it can occur at once (if the .migrants bring 
a large number of 15-19 year olds with them). In the ~
case of "1 b" the de-stabilising effect of migration 
is more successfully damped by the’ steady growth of’ the 
base population. Generally speaking if a lower z'ate of
1 The simulation built on the actual urban age structure 
of .‘India as reported in the 19^1 Census over-emphasises 
this effect, since there is a considerable hollow, or
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migration is sustained over a longer period of time the 
fluctuations in the age composition are swamped by the stability 
of the natural growth* This can be clearly seen in Figure 3«1 
where the "Balanced growth" industrial investment option 
results in more stable dependency ratios and more stable 
growth in labour force entry cohorts. The implications for the 
labour market, for investment policy, and for social 
welfare are discussed in Chapters 6 to 9 below* Examination 
of static age structures, or indeed vital rates, did not 
clearly reveal this phenomenon. We could view it further in 
the light of how fast the labour force is being quitted via 
old age, but remembering that old and young workers are 
by no means simple substitutes. We do this by observing the 
rates of male labour force growth* Ironically the more 
concentrated migration cases ("1 b" rather than "2 b") 
can mitigate the effect of rapid labour force entry rates 
since very large cohorts also age out of the labour force 
in later quinquennia (the older members of the original 
migrant stream), so that the labour force growth rate is 
subdued* It should be emphasised that duch an observation
footnote continued from previous page
undercutting of the base age distribution, in the 0 -4  
age group. This underlines how other-changes (which would 
result in the 0 -4 age group suddenly declining in proportion 
to the rest of the population) can enhance the effect of in- 
migration by reducing the native-born 15-19 cohort pre­
ceding that of the migrant-born 13-19 cohort* To see this 
compare the effect on the "1 b" model of using both stable and 
actual initial age distributions.
depends crucially on the age structure of migrants and the 
length of working life: for again the workforce could delay
shedding its largest cohorts until five years after the entry 
of the largest cohorts in the 15-19 age group# In all these 
cases, how easily a society can accomodate such changes 
without precipitating changes in its own organisation 
(administrative or political) is likely, inter alia, to 
be a function of the instability and the size of the 15-19 
cohorts, and both instability and size generally decline 
as one proceecfe through the models from "1 c" to "2 bn 
and "Base"# The other ingredient in the dynamic social 
implications, the relative size of migrant and non-migrant 
cohorts (in the same age groups), we will now go on to 
discuss# ^
Whereas societies may well react to changes in age 
and size of their total populations, the differential changes 
among the different groups or classes Is likely to be of 
more significance# In the present context, let us consider 
migrants in comparison with the native or locally born 
population# This is a first approximation to a more
1 The relative importance of differential mortality and 
differential fertility is indicated in an appendix to 
Chapter 4# In summary, a 50% decrease in fertility 
reduces the size of the labour force entry cohort by 
50%, but increasing life expectancy by 43% increases 
that same cohort by between 29 and 36% only, depending 
upon the mortality pattern assumed within plausible limits#
subtle disaggregation, but given that different migrant 
streams are representative of different social and 
economic groups (see further Chapter 5 ), the approx­
imation will do: for example, the initial heavy inmigrant
stream we describe is largely wage labour, skilled and 
unskilled, whereas the following or continuing undercurrent 
of migrants is more generally non-wage labour. In 
considering the political dynamism of the 15-19 age group, 
it is particularly important to focus on the migrants and 
non-migrants separately# Aspirations have to some extent 
been formed by occupations secured by peers and elders 
in the same population groups, and prospects are determined 
by the size of the competing population groups* Clearly 
the fluctuations in the size of the cohort become more 
intense when we exclude the stabilising demographic effect 
of the native-born (of more than one generation)# Let us 
focus attention on the "1 bn population. For ten years after 
the initial inmigration the 15-19 cohort declines absolutely# 
In the thir.d quinquennium a dianatic reversal takes place.
This is partly the pure "second generation migrants" effect. 
For these are the sons of the initial migrants, born 
before they arrived and migrating with them, and their 
cohort grows at rates in excess of the natural increase 
owing to the fact that the earlier cohorts were so much
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smaller than they would be in a stable population (for 
the initial migrants aged 5-14 were few in number), and 
there was no supplementation of their numbers by continuing 
migration on the same scale beyond the first quinquennium#
As we have noted, a further reversal takes place
between 20 and 25 years later when the sons of the migrants
actually born in the city reach labour force entry age#
By contrast in model "2 b" there is the supplement of 
continuing migration for a second quinquennium: hence 
the absolute decline in the 15-19 age group is delayed 
and the later increases are more gradual, (those in the sixth 
quinquennium, though for reasons discussed above those in the 
foirth are not)# The extreme sensitivity of these effects 
to the age pattern of migration is illustrated in model 
"1 b ,tf: the age bunching of women (into the high fertility
ages) in the quinquennium both contemporary with and 
following the initial male migration induces a baby boom 
that reaches the labour market in quinquennia starting 
year 2 0, as well as year 25. A similar result occurs if 
female migration is increased by 50% (compare "1 a " with 
"1 b11)# It would be an ironical response to these 
fluctuations if a second wave of young migrants were 
encouraged in the quinquennia starting years 5 and 10 
to fill the hollow that is causing a slack in the labour
supply, and thus exacerbate the excess supply that will 
occur in the subsequent quinquennia# Labour market 
signals may be quite deceptive unless accompanied by a 
knowledge of demographic dynamicsI
The overall social effects of these and similar 
observations must presumably depend on how large is the 
migrant population in relation to the native-born, and how 
this ratio changes over time# We investigate this in Table 
3#3 (Figure 3*2 ), counting the descendants of the main 
migration stream (recorded in the first quinquennium) as 
migrants, and counting the continuing undercurrent of 
migration as local and therefore equivalent to native-born# 
Starting from a migrant to native ratio of 0 »5 :1#0 in the 
"1 b" model, the subdued rate of natural increase in 
the migrant population (due to its initial sex structure) 
tends to reduce this ratio (and age the migrant population
'I
faster). In 20 years the ratio has fallen to 0.4 :1#0 #
A slightly less substantial decline is sustained in the 
migrant population if fertility is enhanced by the sex 
structure of the migrants (as in "1 a")* A more evenly
1 If fertility is enhanced by the age structure within 
the migrant population, as in "1 b tn (not illustrated) 
the proportion of migrants will start and finish larger 
(i.estarting in quinquennium 3-10 when migrant children 
are first born in the town).
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distributed migration (not illustrated) will obviously 
start with a lower proportion migrant, and at the same 
terminal date have a substantially lower proportion 
migrant (including descendants) due to the shorter period 
of natural increase among the migrant families in the town 
(compared with "1 b" , where all the migrants arrived together 
at the start). In the extremely unbalanced case of New-town 
development ("1 c11), where the initial migrant population 
is five times the native-born, the decline reaches L3*7- 
times the native-born over the 20 year period. As before 
it has to be pointed out that if age-specific fertility 
were higher among migrants the ratio would have a tendency 
to rise rather than fall, at least until migrant fertility 
began to decline. Small (but probably typical) differentials 
in fertility do little to offset the effect of population 
sex differentials (Table 3*3)* _Conversely, if the native 
population grows "faster owing to lower mortality offsetting 
lower fertility, the migrant population - falls even faster 
in relative size. In all these cases of unsustained migration 
the ratio of migrant to native population falls rather than 
rises (which we show below in Chapter 6 is a fair reflection 
of what has happened in the areas of rapid migrant inflows 
associated with industrial expansion in. the Second Plan period).
Figure
Demographic Effects on a Locality 
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Figure 3*2
Age Structures and Proportions of 
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The Models of Urban Demographic Growth and Structure;
Populations sub.iect to various Patterns of Migration
Notes and Overview of^Parameters
Initial Age Structure: All-India urban average as
recorded in 19^1 Census (unless otherwise stated)*
Fertility: Total Fertility Rate of 5*1•
Average fertility for each five-year age group as 
follows, from 10-14 to 45-49: (.0 0 6 9,.1 3 6 1,*2 5 9 0, 
*2445,,1 8 7 1,.1252,,0542,*0 0 7 0) from Coale-Trussell 
models (see Chapter 4 below and Figure 4*2)* 
(Variations noted where they are made*)
Mortality: Female Life Expectation at Birth of 40
years* Survivorship pattern as in Princeton 
Model Life Tables, West Level 9 ♦ paired with 
male level and pattern as therein (see Chapter 
4 below and Figure 4*1)* (Variations noted as 
appropriate*)
The reader may care to note that Table 3*2 
offers a summary of three major variants 
(illustrated in Figure 3*'l); Figures, 4,3 and 
















Male Labour Growth (ages 15-59) a 
3*1 3.2
Male Age Group (15-19) Growth a 
>•9 3.3
Dependency Burden 






































3 8 . 5
2 3 . 3
Notes? a Simple annual average per cent for the quinquennium.
In projection the net in-migration streams were
cumulated into 5-year totalsf which became part of
the urban population for the next 5 years on. Both sexes.'




Year 0 5 10
Project
Initiated
MMR 8 .1a 1 . 0
NI 1 . 6 1 .^ 1.5
Decadal Growth 71.6
BR 39.3 35.6 37.0
DR 23.1 2 2 . 2 2 2. 3
MLG 15.8 a 2.5 1.7
15-190 21 #7 a ••1 -1.3
15 20 25
MMR 0*7 0 . 6 0 . 6
NX 1 .k 1.3 1.3
BR 36A 3 8 . 2 3 6 .5
DR ' 22.7 2 3 . 0 2 3 . 5
MLG 1 . 8 1 0 .7
15-190 3.3 0 .^ 1 . 8
Note: a As stated above, these are simple (arithmetic)




Year 0 5 10
15-190 2 1 . 7 -*f.O -1 .1
15 20 25
15-190 5.0 1.5
Note: This is as 1 b but with the male migrat
more heavily concentrated in the young
1 b STABLE|
Year 0 Ej 10
MMR 8.7 1 .1
NI 1 .6 1 .^+ 1.5
Decadal Growth 75.3|
BR 3 8 .6 35.8 37.8
DR 23.2 2 1 .6 22.3
MLG 1 9 .2 2.7 2.3
15-190 19.7 -1 .8 1 .A-
-15 20 25
MMR 0.7 0.7 0.7
NI 1.5 1 .^ 1.
BR 37*^ 36.9 3 6 .8
DR 22.7 2 3 . 0 23.3
MLG 1.9 1 .6 0 . 8
15-19G O.A- 0 . 7 2 . 0
Note: This is a projection from an initial stable,
not Indian urban, age-structuref - see Figure *f.3.
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1 a|
Year 0 5 10
— — —.
MMR 9.1 1.3
NI 1 . 6 1 . 6 1.7
Decadal Growth 81 *6 |
BR 39.3 37.9 39.6
DR 23.1 2 2 . 2 2 2 . 8
MLG 15.8 2.5 1.7
15-190 2 1 . 7 -1 .A- ‘ -1.3
13 2 0 25
— • ——
MMR 0.6 0 . 6 0 .6
NI 1.5 1.5 1 .*f
BR 38. 37.7 37.8
DR 2 3 . 0 23.1 23.^
MLG 1 . 8 1.7 1 . 0
15-190 3.3 2.3 2.5
Note: Female migration is raised By 
1 b. In-Migration Rate (MMR)
50% in 1 a ove 
is for both se
A O
1 0
Year 0 5 10
Project
Initiated
MMR 8o»6 1 . 8
NI 1 .6 1 .1 1.5
Decadal Growth |527.1|
BR 39.3 29.7 35.6
DR 23.1 1 8 .8 2 0 .8
MLG 1^ «  3 1.5 0 . 8
15-193 191.6 -7.0 -2.3
13 20 25
MMR O02 0 . 2 0 . 2
NI 1.3 1 . 2 1 .1
BR 3^.5 33.8 3^.3
DR 2 1 .6 2 2 . 2 23.1
MLG 0.7 -0 .1 0 . 2
15-193 2 . 6 -3.^ 7.0
M  c s t a b l e ]
Year 0 5 10
15-19G 1 8 6 .8 -7.1 -1 . 6
15 - 20 25
15-190 1.7 -3.3 7.1
Note: This is a projection from an initial stable,
not Indian urban, age-strueture, see Figure f^.3 .
9
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Year 0 J? 10
Projects ,..*.Initiated
Migration . • • • Continues
MMR 2.9 2.4
N I 1.6 1.6 1 . 5
Decadal Growth 15 0 . 2 1
BR 39.3 38.4 3 8 . 0
DR 23.1 2 3 .0 22.7
MLG 6.3 5.3 2.0
15-190 9.1 Zf.if -1.9
11 20 25
MMR Oo9 0o7 0.7
N I 1.5 1.4 1 .4
BR 37.8 37.1 37.2
DR 23 oO 23.1 23.4
MLG 2.2 2.0 1.0




N I 1.6 1 .6 1 . 6
Decadal Growth 53.4
BR 39.3 3 9 . 0 39.0
DR 23.1 2 3 .0 22.9
15-190 9.1 -1.9
15 20 25
MMR 0 .9 0 . 7 0.7
N I 1 .6 1.5 1.4
BR 38.7 38.9 37.7
DR 2 3 .2 2 3 .2 23.5
15-190 4.3 2.5 0 . 8




Year 0 5 10
MMR 0 . 0 0 . 0
NI 1 .6 1 . 6 1 .6
BR 39.5 39.1 39.2
DR 23.3 23.6 23.7
MLG 1.5 1 .8 0 . 9
15-196 ^ • 1 2 . 7 -2 . 2
Decadal Growth |1 3 .2
13 20 25
MMR 0 . 0 0 . 0
NI 1.5 1.5 1.5
BR 38.9 38.9 39.2
DR 23.9 2*f.1 2^.3
MLG 1.3 1 . 2 1 . 2
15-196 3.1 1 .A- 1 . 6
Note; This is a projection without migration, 
from the Indian urban age-structure*
m
Year 0 5 10
MMR -2.9 -3.2
NI 1 . 6 1.5 1 .^
Decadal Growth (Decline) -1 6 . 0
BR 39.5 3 8 .6 5 8 . 2
DR 23.3 2^.1 2^.6
MLG -2.2 -2.3
15-196 —O.^ f -0.5 -6.9
DB 6 9 .6 72.2 6 8 . 5
15 20 25
MMR -5.5 0.0 0.0
NI 1.2 1.3 1.5
BR 37.8 39.0
DR 25.5 25.5 2 5 .6
MLG 1.3 1.3 1.5
15-196 6.5 1.1 1 .1
DB 75.0 72.6 7 2 .6
14 6
Table 3.2
Three Cases of Contrasting Urban Models
Examples: a. Concentrated Heavy Industry on new site
b. Balanced Industrial Growth at existing centre 
c* Decline of lightly Industrialised locality
A Net-Inmigration Rate (annual average % per quinquennium)
Quinquennium
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6 th
(e.g 1953-60) (e.g. 1 9 8 0-8 5 )
a* 86.3 1*8 0.2 0.2 0.2
0•0
b. 1 . 0  0 . 9 0.9 0 .9 0.8 0.0
c. -2.9 -3*2 -3.5 0.0
0.0 0.0
B Difference between Growth of Male Labour-force and
Growth of Total Population (annual average %)
a. 85.4 -1.4 -0.8 -0 . 8 -1.4 -0.8
b. 0.5 0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4
c. -0 . 9  -0 . 6 -1.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
C Growth of Labour-force Entrants (males 15-19* annual av. %)
a. 186.8 -7*1 -1.6 1*7 -3.3 7.1
b* 4.9 3.3 -0.9 3.1 1.4 1.6
c. -0.4 -0.5 -6 . 9 6.5 1.1 1.1
Source: Simulation Model (Table 3.1)*
a, = 1 c Stable, b. * Base, c• =*
This table is graphed in Figure 3*1
Table 3.3
Ratios of Migrant to Original (or Local) Population




1c 5 .2 0  b.67
1b 0 .V 7  O.bZ
1b low fertility and mortality among migrants and locals
0.46 0.4-1 O. 3 8 0.34 0 .3 1
1a 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.40 0 .3 8
b
1b with high fertility among migrants only
0.47 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.35
Notes: a A continuing modest migration stream from
local areas is assumed as in the "Base’' model 
and this is counted in with the native-born 
to form a group called ’’locals”.
Sons of the main migrants are counted as migrantst 
wherever born©
b Low fertility: T.F.R.-4.7; Low mortality: ej(fem)=43. 
High fertility: T.F.R»=5*7*
Source: Simulation model derivations (Table 3•1V
10 15 20
4 . 3 4  4 .0 1 3 .6 9
0.38 0.35 0.32
A brief Overview of Chapter 3
From this analysis we can say that demographic 
characteristics of new fast-growth towns will exacerbate 
the future labour market’s ability to equilibrate supply 
and demand (other things being equal). This is pre­
dominantly due to the large population size accumulating 
over a very short period, and the rapid equalising of the 
adult sex ratios. The age-structure of migrants has a 
secondary effect. The demographic character of slow 
(or negative) growth towns will exacerbate their ability 
to find resources for maintaining local welfare, owing 
to their loss of adult men but retention of women and 
dependants (both young and old). The determination of 
the (short-run) relative sizes of competing migrants 
and local sub-populations is outlined*
PART TWO
Exploring the Empirical Evidence
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CHAPTER k
Discussion of the Parameters used in the Model 
and Exploration of the Fertility Factor
A Summary of the Main Empirical Points
The speed at which a second generation population 
(the future, locally-generated, workforce) is created, 
depends in part on the fertility of the first generation 
migrants. Similarly the subsequent size of various pop­
ulation groups, of different origins, with their individual 
aspirations towards achieving specific types of employment, 
depends on earlier and current fertility levels. There are 
three components here affecting the urban populations: 
marital fertility, proportions of population married (by age), 
and the presence of spouses. It is found that lighter 
manufacturing towns (e.g. textile towns) sustain higher and 
unchanging proportions of children in their populations, 
whereas heavy industrial towns experience rapid increases in 
the proportions of children (as existing families join the 
initial male migrants), but exhibit the socio-economic potential 
for a subsequent rapid fertility decline through later marriage 
or marital fertility control. This contrasts with experience 
in other societies (e.g. historical England), where we find 
light industry attracts single female labour, so that despite 
more balanced sex ratios overall, the proportions married and 
the proportions of children are lower than in India. Hence 
we infer that increased opportunities for female labour will 
currently enhance the birth rate in Indian cities, but need 
not continue to do so if the age at marriage rises (as it is 
clearly doing in all categories of towns). Finally we show 
that some migrant groups remain as split families (as we 
observe in Bombay, but find less in the heavy industrial towns), 
and hence will not necessarily retain their relative strength 
over time in the urban population.
151
Overview of Parameters
Although it is hoped that the model just discussed 
will have wide application and usefulness in interpreting 
the changing structure of urban populations in other 
economies and at other periods of time, the fact that we 
intended to use it here in the analysis of data from 
contemporary India prompted the choice of parameters we 
used# Initially our ambition was to use mortality and 
fertility schedules that were particularly appropriate 
to the Eastern region of India under discussion. This 
ambition was abandoned for a number of reasons. First the 
value of the mortality tables prepared by the Registrar General 
for the decade 1951 to 1961 has been seriously questioned: 
for although the Registrar General did not indicate his 
method of calculation, it is clear that regional life-tables 
can only be prepared from censuses after adjustments have 
been made for migration between the regions. Estimation 
of the latter, however, cannot accurately be made on the 
basis of place of birth data collected in the 19&1 Census 
since, among other things, we need additional information 
on the place of last residence, and we need to allow for
1 Notably by Professor K* Dandekar, of the Gokhale Institute 
of Politics and Economics at Poona, in a personal interview*
misreporting of duration of stay, though it is true that for 
some regions at least a reasonable approximation might be 
made. The alternative then is to use census-survival 
methods to estimate the migration, but that of course 
requires using regional life-tables, which is what we are 
trying to construct in the first place. In the light of 
this argument it seemed pointless to indulge in the
1 K.E.Vaidyanathan, "Population Redistribution and Economic 
Change in India 1951-19^1", University of Pennsylvania, 
19^7 (mimeograph), reported a similar problem in trying 
to construct estimates of urbanward migration by 
census-survival methodology. Briefly described, census 
survival methods entail observing an age-cohort,
2 0 -2 5 say* in the first census, and following it 
through to the second decennial census, when it will 
be aged 30-3 5 # I£ we have age-specific survival rates 
(obtained from Life-tables) appropriate to the area 
of the country (in default of complete deaths 
registration) we can estimate the number of people 
who will have died in the 10-year interval and 
subtract them from the original 2 0 -2 5 age-cohort, 
thus reducing the expected number aged 3 0 -3 5 at the 
end of the interval. Any excess over that expected number 
is then to be attributed to net inmigration. The method 
is very sensitive to the survival rates we use*
153
sophistication of using local mortality data for model-
1
building purposes* Recourse was had accordingly to the
2
Princeton Model life-tables* The "West" variant was 
used (following the argument of Professor A. Coale that
1 For the 1961-1971 decade the introduction of the Sample 
Registration System of birth and death recording enables 
a more valid reconstruction of State-wise life-tables; 
but see also T.Dyson1s attempt (and commentary) using 
census-survival techniques: "Mortality Estimates for the 
States of India", Centre for Population Studies^ London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1980 (mimeo)*
2 If- there is a reasonably complete registration of deaths, 
and age reporting is fairly accurate, it is possible to 
convert these mortality data into the probabilities of 
dying between the ages of 20 and 30 for example, and hence 
obtain the probabilities of survival. When such data do not 
exist (a» in the case of India) the probabilities of survival 
obtaining in other countries (e.g. Western Europe in the 
19th Century) can be used instead. Sets of these have been 
grouped together and averaged (by Coale and Demeny, at Princ­
eton University), the result being labelled the "West" model 
life-tables. These are graded for overall expectation of 
life at birth - A-Oyears, 50 years, 60 years etc# Knowing 
which level to take to apply to India is not easy, but - 
techniques have been developed to check the accuracy of 
one*s choice against the population age structure (in
broad terms) and decennial growth rates that would be 
implied by particular levels, (so long as the national 
population is closed to migration and is subject to un­
changing mortality and fertility over time, * all roughly 
true of India in the 1950s). A.J.Coale and P.Deaaeny, 
Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968
we know insufficient about Indian mortality((in the 1950s) 
to justify using anything other than this admittedly "residual" 
table)* and the level chosen was " 9 %  giving an expectation 
of life at birth close to what is thought to be the case 
for India in the late 1950s, namely about 40 years for women.
I have illustrated the Eastern Regional table (of the Registrar 
General) and the Princeton West model in Fig* 4*1.
A priori the sharp decline in survivial of women in the 
Registrar General's table (and to a lesser extent of men) 
around the ages 25-55 could be regarded as suspect, though 
in the case of women it could derive from exceptional 
adverse nutrition in the child-bearing ages, and in ..the case 
of men the high Incidence of tuberculosis and other respir­
atory diseases may make adult survival worse than it was in
2
Europe in the 19th Century. A possible error an the 
Registrar General's tables could be that too many net in­
migrants were adjusted for in the earlier ages (for, as we 
shall see more closely later, it is not accurate to take 
the age distribution of migrants-to be the same as that 
in the general population); but a more general error may 
be that age misreporting (shifting numbers into the older 
age groups specifically) has notrbeen sufficiently allowed 
for. In that context note the better survival beyond the
1 Personal communication with Professor Coale at Princeton 
University (1975).
2 See N.R.Crook, '"The Changing Character of Mortality in 
the City of Poona"(manuscript), School of Oriental &
- African Studies, 1983*
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age of 6%  A second reason for not using the Eastern
Region (or Zone) mortality table of the Registrar General
is that the region itself is heterogeneous. Registration
data for the 1960s are hopelessly unreliable, but If we have
regard for the rather more satisfactory Sample Registration
System (SRS) data for the late 1960s and early 1970s we see.'
a notable variance in crude death rates for the different
States in the region (a picture confirmed by life tables
constructed from the two Censuses 1961 and 197'1)»
For instance, the urban death rate for Orissa is 11*4
as against 6 .3  in West Bengal. Rural death rates are
about 50% higher, though, as we shall discuss below,
this is not the case uniformly throughout the age groups.
Presumably such variances held in the 1960s (early) and
late 1950s; indeed they might be expected to be larger in
a period when fairly rapid falls in the deata rate were
2
still bemng experienced. It seemed therefore useful to
1 Government of India, Sample Registration System Bulletin .
Office of the Registrar General, various years, Rew Delhi.
2 A major drawback with non-Indian models is that the male to
female mortality differential is inappropriate. In India,
at most ages female mortality exceeds the male. But the 
regional contrasts are quite large and our region is hetero­
geneous; nor do we know much about urban mortality sex 
differentials. The bias resulting from using the "West" 
model sex differential is that we have probably projected 
too large a female population at most ages*
take a single model of fairly broad application (i.e.
"West" level 9) &n.d to indicate, as the investigation 
proceeds, the effects of using slightly different levels, 
or different models (including some differentiation 
between migrant and non-migrant sub-populations in these 
respects), as we have done in Chapter 3*
There was never any question of using regional 
fertility schedules for 1 9 6 1, although vital statistics surveys 
including fertility information were carried out during 
the 1961 Census: the data would need considerable
manipulation. Again, the Sample Registration System data 
suggest inter- State variations within the Eastern region.
Again therefore recourse was had to models, though this; 
time they are arguably a little more Indian in character*
The Coale-Trussell Princeton fertility model was fitted 
to the National Sample Survey age-specific fertility schedule 
for 1958 (All-India). Following estimates made by Veena Soni 
a total fertility rate of 5 *5 0 was assumed to be approximately 
correct; but even as early as 1961 a rural to urban fertility 
differential is likely to have existed, and perhaps a 
differential between migrant and non-migrant populations 
(discussed further below), the effects of which are borne 
in mind in Chapter 3, so that for most of our simulation
'1 As with mortality, the under-reporting of vital events, and 
the inaccurate recording of people's ages, make it desirable 
to use a model schedule of fertility by age, derived from 
populations with better data.
model a level of was taken, which is close to the 
National Sample Survey figure for urban India in 1964,
4.88'. The result of the fit is illustrated in 
Figufce 4.2.
As it was by now apparent that All-India rather than 
specific regional parameters would best be used, with some 
qualitative observations on local differences, an All- 
Indian urban base population, was also adopted, using the age 
distribution as reported at the 1961 Census, without adjustments 
(as these are only readily carried out on fairly stable 
populations not subject to migration). Particular problems 
arising from the use of unadjusted data are discussed 
below, and (as was seen in Chapter 3 above) we use stable 
age distributions in alternative projections by way of 
control. The sex ratio adopted was 8 to 10 , females to 
males (which is close to the average urban sex ratio in 
India) . 2
1 The actual fitting was done for me by Basia Zaba at the 
Centre for Population Studies, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine. The method is such that certain 
parameters characteristic of the Indian population are 
observed. The earliest age of marriage and survey estimates 
of the level of total fertility per woman are the principal 
parameters used.
2 At the State level these are given in 1961 as follows:
Bihar 811 women per 1000 men, Madhya Pradesh 8 5 6 , Orissa 
8 0 8, West Bengal 701, (all for urban areas). Government 
of India, Census of India 1961. General Population Tables, 
Delhi.
A Note on the Age Distribution
The urban age distribution revealed in the 1961 
Census was used in some, but not all, of the simulations.
It was felt that the attempt to simulate the peculiar effect 
of welding migration on to an already distorted population 
was worth making. But at the same time it is well-known 
that age misreporting and under-counting (especially in the 
0-4 age group) would artificially distort the figures 
revealed in the Census: the problem with all unstable 
populations is to distinguish the artificial from the real. 
The shortfall in the All-India (rural plus urban) 0-4 group 
has been well discussed by Tim Dyson, who believes that, 
of the 12$ or so omitted from that group, about ■£■ has been 
shifted into the 5 -9 group, and about ■§■ omitted from the 
population altogether. This phenomenon may affect the 
female population more than the male. When we look at the 
urban population separately we find the 0-4 male cohort is 
particularly small, 1 2.8$ of the male population (whereas 
females 0-4 are 14.7$ of their own population), but this 
is due to the large number of adult males in a population 
subject to sex selective, age selective, inmigration 
(Figure 4.3). Both are of course significantly below
1 T.Dyson, "Analysis and Adjustment of the 1971 Indian 
Age Distribution", Demography India. 5s1 & 2, 1976.
what we would expect in a stable population (of appropriate 
mortality level and with fertility characteristics that 
coincide with All-India demographic experience over the 
decade; Figure 4.3)* This is confirmed by observing the 
sex ratio by single years of age: throughout 0 -9 the urban
areas have excess males, (and a greater excess at each age 
than in the rural areas), but with the excess worsening 
further in the 5 -9 age group, (though to a smaller degree 
than in rural areas, so that the rural-urban difference 
begins to narrow). The male urban age distribution is 
actually undercut in the 0-4 agsgroup (there are more 
males aged 5-9 than 0-4). How has this come about? It 
is unlikely that age displacement or pure omission are 
worse in urban areas than in rural* We do not know of 
cultural reasons why survival rates for boys would be 
better in urban areas vis-a-vis those for girls than they 
are in rural areas; on the contrary, we might expect the 
more educated population to be less likely to neglect girls. 
The National Sample Survey Migration Survey (and the 19&1 
Census data on migrants migrating within the last twelve 
months to Bombay, which are .cross-classified by age) 
suggest that boys outnumber girls in the age groups 1-4.
The NSS suggests that girls outnumber boys among infant 
migrants (under 1 year old) but the 0-4 age group as a.whole 
turns out to be slightly male-dominant (f:m sex ratio 
of .954 versus .992 in the All-India population)# This 
probably indicates that boys are a little more likely to 
accompany their fathers (or elder brothers) if the latter are 
migrating alone, than are girls: they will stay with
their mothers in the rural areas# Declining fertility in 
urban areas (with their higher socio-economic class 
composition), if not in rural areas, is likely to have 
taken place during the 1950s, and hence the small size of 
the 0-4 cohort* All the States in our region have aggregate 
urban populations with the 0-4 cohort smaller than the 5-9 
(for both sexes) with the exception of Madhya Pradesh#
Fertility Differentials: Evidence 
From Bombay
It is well-known that fertility rather than 
mortality differentials are by far the more important 
determinants of natural growth rate differences in 
contemporary populations (and particularly of national 
sub-populations), and hence also of their relative sizes# 
Mortality differentials would modify, but always be dominated 
by the fertility effect in populations of our experience*
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(see below Appendix to Chapter *f). Furthermore, differential
age structures are largely determined by fertility, not
mortality. Xn our initial model-building we assumed
for clarity a single fertility schedule, derived from the
data collected as representative of All-India. In actual
fact our urban populations are significantly more complex.
Not only may migrants have different fertility behaviour
from non-migrants, but migrants of different regional
background may have different fertility (and in India
those differences, even if we hold constant socio-economic
2 3characteristics, turn out to be considerable). ’ Similarly, 
migrants of different socio-economic status would be expected 
to have different fertility, given that, by the 1960s at least, 
family limitation was clearly being practised, especially in 
urban populations. In theory we need to distinguish migrant 
types, and also the tvro major social components in overall 
fertility per woman: the pace and ultimate extent of entry
of the female population into marital union, and the control 
of fertility within marriageo
1 See A.J.Coale, The Growth and Structure of Human Populations. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972.
2 T.Dyson,"India's Regional Demography", London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 19&1 (mimeo).
3 S *J.Jejeebhoy, "Status of Women and Fertility: a Socio­
cultural Analysis of Regional Variations in Fertility in 
India", in IC.Srinivasan and S.Hukerji (eds.), Dynamics of 
Population and Family Welfare 1981. Himalaya, Bombay, 1981*
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However, City-wise or District-wise data on 
marital fertlity are non-existant, though we do have Census 
data on marital status* As an index of total fertility 
we have of course child-to-woman ratios (but unfortunately 
these are confounded, as is well-known, by differential 
child mortality, a not insignificant problem (see Appendix to 
Chapter 4)). As for differentials between migrants and 
non-migrants, further conceptual problems arise, discussed 
below, and we have to rely on evidence from two major Cities 
for which special tabulations were done in 1961; Bombay and 
Ahmedabad. Despite these limitations, it seemed worthwhile 
to investigate this evidence directly, in order perhaps to 
provide further insight into the shortfall in the number 
of children recorded as aged 0-4 in the 1961 Census (just 
discussed). In particular we may discover how far such 
a shortfall, insofar as it is real and not a mere undercount, 
could relate to differences in the marital status of the 
migrants (as compared with the rural or urban non-migrant
1 The 0-4 death-rates differ more noticeably than do those at 
adult ages. However their effect on the Child-Woman Ratio 
differentials between the States of India should not be 
exaggerated* For example, male rural death rates in the 
age group 0-4 are 41 .6  and 72*6 per thousand for Maharashtra 
and Gujarat respectively (SRS data), implying, cet. par., 
only . 3% in CWR due to child mortality differences. The 
Maharashtrian rural-urban difference in child mortality is 
only 1% of the child population* Note that in some of the 




We can see from Table that for males there is
really very little difference in the singulate mean age of 
marriage (SMAM) I have calculated between migrants and 
native-born# For males it is difficult to detect a consistent 
trend, though it is universally observed that urban-urban 
migrants marry later; this reflects that they are more 
likely to be of middle-class status, in managerial 
occupations,(though not all will fit this description)#
Our interest, however, must focus on women, since, in the 
simplified demographer's approach, only women are responsible 
for the birth of children (so that only the absense of 
women is a limitation on the birth rate)# The SMAM of 
females rises slightly with duration of residence, but, 
more significantly, is highest of all for the non-migrant 
population: that is to say, there is no evidence that those
currently migrating (or with less than one year's duration 
of residence in the City) are more likely to be single than 
their urban peers#
This latter is a very important point# It would 
seem from detailed examination of case studies (see further 
below) that migrants to green-field Steel Town sites
1 This is the average age at which first marriages take place.
are very heavily male-dominated for the first two to three 
years* But it also becomes clear from the rapidity of 
family formation subsequent to those three years or so 
that a majority of migrants are already married on migration 
(this is confirmed by some detective work on Bhilai in 
Chapter 9)* and simply brought their fertility history 
with them (as it were), thereby rapidly pushing up the 
child-adult dependency rates in the city# The evidence 
from Bombay seems to confirm this# There is however a 
notable difference between the urban and rural migrants 
(according to origin)# It appears that female migrants 
whose move is urban to urban, and who are more likely to 
be joining husbands (or rather subsequently marrying 
men) of managerial or professional status will have 
lower fertility (by virtue of a later age of marriage); 
and they, as we shall see, are a more important demographic 
component in the industrial sectors of heavy industrial 
towns (around 20% of factory sector employment) than in 
other towns, thus offsetting some of the boost to the 
numbers of children in these cities given by the 
influx of young married migrants, but enhancing the 
significance of the class differentials in fertility in 
the city# Some qualifications have to be added in 
extrapolating from the Bombay data in thisuway, which 
we will do shortly#
A more drastic simplification we made in model- 
building was to assume that the same fertility behaviour 
would characterise migrants moving to join husbands 
(the umarriage--responsen migrants as those moving in search 
of employment (the ■'•autonomous" migrants), the argument 
being that even the latter were generally speaking 
migrating as part of a household (and often as a marriage 
partner) and not as individuals, even though the actual 
decision, or timing of that decision, to come to the town 
was influenced by work opportunities# Some light is shed 
here from the useful tabulations on marital status and 
labour force participation: .again the evidence is for Bombay# 
There are nearly 6 years between the ages of marriage (SMAM) 
of working and non-working women of urban origin (and the 
working women marry nearly years later than those in 
the general city population including native-born; again note 
the qualifications on interpretation that follow)# These 
will be the relatively sldXLedl working women in tbs.non 
manual trades* The rural working migrants marry nearly 
3 years later than the' non^Vorkj.ng- and 3* years later 
than rural women generally, but 1 -year younger than the 
general population in Bombayt (Table *f#l)#
These observations-should not be extended too~ 
readily to imply differential marital, and hence differential
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fertility, status of subpopulations in any town or city*
Working women migrating to Bombay are heavily represented 
among migrants from Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and the Southern 
States in general# And: we know that the average mean age 
of female first marriages for all social classes together 
is higher in these particular States, viz# 20 years in 
Kerala, din contrast to 15 years of age in Bihar#
Cultural components cut across the purely economic,
(a point more clearly demonstrated when we consider
contrasts between English, Japanese, and Indian textile
<■]
labour below)#
An additional source of information on differential 
fertility is the child-woman ratio (CWR), available for 
Bombay for migrants of different origins# Let us 
first clarify the nature of the evidence* What is recorded 
is simply the migrant children present in the City* Assuming 
we have constant mortality, very low CWRs could imply two 
things: first they might imply the existence of absent
sons and daughters (who may migrate later), and not 
necessarily low fertility; second, assuming we can control 
separately for duration of residence and hence isolate 
migrants who have been in the city a long time, we might 
infer from low CWRs a divided and hence impermanent family
1 Cultural characteristics may also determine the speed of
any fertility change, given a change in economic circumstances 
takes place: N#R#Crook, n0n Social Norms and Fertility 
Decline11, Journal of Development Studies, July, 1978*
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(with migrants likely eventually to return to family of 
origin) and hence not one to contribute to the long-run 
differential growth and size of regional groups within the City* 
On the other hand, very high CWRs might imply (in addition 
to the opposite of the two possibilities just mentioned) 
the presence of young children with lone fathers, (whose 
wives may be back in the rural home)* Finally, and most 
important, in a migrant population we cannot actually 
relate children to their mothers from the Census data: 
children born in the city should be, and often are, 
recorded as native population, a bias in comparative work that 
can only be partly mitigated by restricting the analysis 
to recent migrants only (those arriving within the last year), 
and children up to 5 years old, most of whom must have been 
born before arrival and hence classified as migrants#
The picture is as follows, (Table ^*2). Migrants 
of between of between 1 and k years duration, from other 
towns and cities within Maharashtra, have higher CWRs than 
the general Bombay population*'* We have already noted the 
earlier age at marriage for those non-working migrants 
from urban areas (and might additionally note their high 
f:m sex ratios). The picture is one of permanent and 
fertility-enhancing local migration. On the other hand, 
migrants from rural areas of Maharashtra have lower CWRs
than the general population# This is also true of 
rural migrants from every major State, despite their 
younger age at marriage# Why is this? It would seem 
unlikely that the whole of the differential is due 
to lower marital fertility# Taking Maharashtra alone we 
note a 10% CWR differential between rural and urban#
But birth rates, in the late 19&0s at least, were 
higher, not lower, in rural compared with urban 
Maharashtra# The perverse reverse differential could 
be partly attributed to a longer inter-birth interval 
during the period of migration when spouses may be 
separated (except for infrequent visits) for up to 
three years before finally settling in.ihe City 
(and note that Bombay has about 10% of its households 
consisting of single males)# A further part of the 
differential could be due to higher child mortality: 
over a third of the difference could be explained by a 
difference of five years in life expectancy at birth, a 
plausible rural-urban differential at the low average levels 
of life expectancy experienced in the late 1950s.' We 
should also allow for the fact that of the migrants of
1 - k years duration of residence a proportion will have 
had one, and a smaller proportion two, children since arrival 
in Bombay - and these children will have been classified 
as non-migrants* Quantitatively this can easily account 
for low CVJRs, but it cannot easily explain differentials*
The other expanations therefore remain interesting#
And when we observe in Table *f#2 the very skewed female 
male sex ratios among the migrants (even for those from 
rural Maharashtra we have #6 2 , among the adults *5 2 , 
and taking the rural and urban together #70 as against 
#82 in Bombay) the clear indication that families are 
split makes it plausible that not only adults, but also 
children, are being left behind. Correlation of low 
sex ratios (especially low adult sex ratios) and low 
CVJRs favours this interpretation*
There might appear to be some evidence of women 
bringing their age-specific fertility with them, as it 
were. CWRs among both rural and urban migrants are lower 
in Karnataka than in Gujarat# This might be thought to 
reflect the fertility differentials later observable in the 
two States# But again the migrating adults have very 
different sex ratios, so what may differ is the degree of
1 By 1970-72 the birth rates are as follows; (SRS): 
Karnataka rural 55*9» urban 27#0; Gujarat rural ^-2.1; 
urban 5 5.6 #
divided families (children included)* From the point of 
view of the local labour market the demographic distinctions 
are less important; it is the children alive and present 
in Bombay that count# Interestingly the political conflict 
in this multi-ethnic city has been largely between 
Maharashtrians and migrants from the South (especially 
Tamil Nadu (Madras))* But in fact the Gujaratis are the 
most likely to increase their share in the Bombay population 
insofar as natural increase (rather than migration) is 
concerned#
There is a distinct characteristic among migrants from 
the North, mainly Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which is of 
particular interest in' as much as these migrants feature 
significantly in our Eastern region studies# There are 
very few women (Table A-#2). Thus despite the higher 
fertility that we would have expected among migrants from 
Uttar.Pradesh for example (to judge from later SRS data), 
albeit partly offset by higher childhood mortality, yet 
the “dominant factor here in determining the birth rate in 
-Bombay is bound to be the adult sex ratio. In fact, 
in the case of the rural' migrants the CWR is very low 
also# These migrants are distinctly impermanent* There 
are barely two adult women to every ten men among migrants
1 Conventionally the birth rate is measured as births to
the total male and female population (which will be very low 
the sex ratio is very male dominant); whereas child-woman 
ratios refer to surviving children and female adults only.
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of under five years* duration, and the ratio does not improve 
with duration of stay! the overall adult sex ratio among 
these rural migrants is as low as #127» The possible social 
causes, and some implications for economic security, of 
this experience, are to be discussed in Chapters 5 and 
8 below# We will note here, however, that without 
a continuing migration, the Bombay sub-population tracing 
its origin from these Northern States would rapidly 
decline in proportion to the rest#
These findings are tempting to use in model-building 
and projection for analysing the demography o§ other cities# 
However, our analysis in Chapter 5 below shows that a 
construction worker migrating to Bombay or Sholapur may be 
a very different person in a social and economic sense 
from a steel operative migrating to Durgapur or Jamshedpur, 
even though in both cases he may come from Bihar or Uttar 
Pradesh# The character of the wage labour demand, and whether 
a provision of housing-or other amenities is included in the 
implicit wage, is bound to affect fertility through the 
-intermediate processes just described# Ec-onomy modifies, 
if it does not create, culture#
But with these reservations in mind, we may still hazard 
a reconstruction of migrant and non-migrant fertility behaviour 
from the much less detailed data we have for the other urban 
areas in the study.
17 2
Fertility Differentials in the 
Region under Study
A glance at Table will reveal that the heavy 
engineering towns of the Chota Nagpur region have low
child to population ratios (which we take, ceteris paribus,
-
as being indicative of low birth rates)# We can explain 
this phenomenon largely through the low female to male sex ratios 
observed in those towns, and we also show below that this 
distortion is only temporary# But what can we say about the 
women who are already in (or subsequently will migrate to) 
these towns, as far as their marital status and fertility 
are concerned?
The broad picture is as follows# In 19&1 the 
recently industrialising areas, especially those involved 
in heavy industry, had relatively low CWRs vis-a-vis the 
urban areas in their respective States (thus re-inforcing 
the effect of the adverse sex ratios, or at least adult 
sex ratios, on the birth rate, i#e# depressing it further 
still); note especially in Table ^#3 the cases of 
Durg, Sundargarh, and Dhanbad, (Burdwan's CWR being on the 
high side, a case we discuss in more detail below).
1 Child to Population ratios, like. Birth Rates, are
particularly influenced by age and sex structure# They 
have the additional disadvantage of incorporating child 
mortality: the 0-^ age group are the survivals of the 
previous five years' births. The bias becomes severe 
when we are forced, owing to data availability, to take 
0-9.as the age group proxy for accumulated births*
There is evidence that these low birth rates are a 
transitory phenomenon. Detailed study of particular towns 
has suggested that the rapid uniting of. .families (already 
formed) in these urban areas leads to the equalising of 
the sex ratios, and to an increase in CWRs, (see further 
below, and the case study of Bhilai in Chapters 6 and 9)«
Why these two change together we cannot know for sure, 
but our study of Bombay above has cast doubt on all the 
hypotheses save that of split families: in those urban
environments where few men have been accompanied by women, 
those few women are less likely to be accompanied by their 
children. Table ^.10 shows how in Burdwan, where fertility 
seems hardly to decline between the Censuses, despite the trend 
in the rest of the State, the major contrast with neighbouring 
Districts lies in the improvement of the sex ratio among 
adults* There is also evidence that engineering towns whose 
major expansion was prior to the Second Five-Year Plan 
period of 1955/6 - 6 0 /6 1 had high CWRs once they too had 
passed the phase of initial rapid expansion: hence pre-
Independence Jamshedpur has higher CWR than average for cities 
in Bihar (Table ^.5) and Asansol-Burnpur has higher CWR than 
average for towns in Burdwan District by 1961 (Table
As we have said, if we are right in supposing that these 
heavy engineering towns start with low CWRs and evolve into 
towns with higher CWRs (even higher*.than average), the
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fact warrants some explanation. Despite the Bombay evidence, 
we will advance a hypothesis that may be more relevant to 
the unique experience of these rapidly industrialising 
areas* On:.the establishment of a heavy engineering 
centre or Steel Town the workforce contains a large 
component of construction workers (not all recorded as 
resident in the urban area,-see below), and of white-collar 
technical and managerial staff (the project designers and 
supervisors)* The latter form a link over time between the 
departure of the ; construction workers and the arrival of 
the plant operatives (insofar as they are entirely separate, 
for in practice construction workers often stay on)*
The white-collar workers have a higher age at marriage 
and hence lower CWRs (if not also lower marital fertility).
The subsequent influx of blue-collar workers, the majority 
already married, is dominated by young adults* Their wives, 
who follow later, are also young (probably younger than the aver­
age population, see Chapter- 5 below for the age-structure of 
males in various occupations). Thus the age-structure alone 
could raise the CWR (and it may be this that can raise it 
above that of surrounding towns, where age-specific 
marriage and fertility rates may be similar). It is also
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possible that these migrants have lower child mortality, 
being a self-selected, and hence possibly atypically healthy 
group, moving into an environment that also offers some 
protection from disease; (compare the lower adult mortality 
rates implied by the low widowhood rates observed in these 
heavy industrial areas, and see our evidence on amenitiea- 
supplied by employers in heavy industrial townships)#
Whether fertility or mortality is the cause, the effect is 
the same: larger cohorts leaving childhood and approaching
labour participation and childbearing ages#
By contrast, the urban areas of light industry, and 
the stagnating Districts seem to have high fertility in 
1961, as well as high sex ratios and hence high birth rates 
(inferred from Child-population ratios); we refer to places 
like Midnapore, Bankura, Ganjam, and Bastar, in Table ^#3, 
but the picture iB certainly not clear-cut# Despite 
the fact that some of these areas provide employment for 
women more extensively than do heavy engineering areas, 
the age-specific marital status data reveal that women in these 
areas are generally speaking married, not single# The 
scenario seems to be as follows: married women are more 
likely to join their husbands if there are jobs for them, 
and the married women who are more likely to offer themselves -
1 N*R.Crook, 'The Economy of Mortality Decline", paper read at 
SSRC Development Group Seminar, held at London School of 
Oriental and African Studies, January, 1979, (mimeo); 
relevant table reproduced here as Table /+#9«-
for work (as for example from the Southern States of India) 
are more likely to migrate with their husbands and place 
themselves on the labour market in these circumstances#
We find continuing high fertility, often particularly high 
fertility, in these towns over time# For instance, in 
1931 Sholapur was a high fertility City in the Bombay 
Presidency, and in 1961 it was still a high fertility City 
with high proportions married in the 15-2^ age group in 
comparison with other Maharashtran* Cities, (Table A - # ? ) *
In summary, the demographic types become hard to 
distinguish over time. But there are striking differences 
in their evolution* In the short run the heavy industrial 
towns are subject to sharper fluctuations in these 
fertility-related variables, thereby further enhancing 
the de-stabilising effects of distorted age structures#
In the long run their higher social and economic status 
may promote more rapid fertility decline# The clear 
evidence of differential birth rates in the short run 
between sub-populations in these cities indicates the 
potential for ethnic conflict, due, for example, to 
competition for jobs as the second generation of migrants 
and locals, Bengalis and Biharis, enters the labour market# 
The contrasts and comparisons with other cultures in these 
respects are followed up below in a review of the engineer­
ing and textile towns of 19th Century England#
177
Alternative Cultural Traditions;
Similar Industry, similar factor endowments
The experience of England in the last Century was
remarkably different for reasons wholly unrelated to
industrial technology (which indeed was different) or
the abundance of labour or the behaviour of capitalists,
but purely due to the cultural character of that labour
supply# Controlling therefore somewhat for the .industry and
for the factor endowments, we may consider the cultural
effect alone. As in the case of Japan it was socially
acceptable for women to offer themselves for employment
in the textile (and other light manufacturing) industry#
In that sense the process of sexual liberation had progressed
far further than in India, even than in India today. In the
early decades of this century Japan was employing nearly
four women.to.every man in the textile industry, India
2
four men to every woman# And there was a second crucial
1 I am not wishing to enter a debate here on whether culture 
determines economy or vice-versa. But the major cultural 
characteristics to which I refer were, if not exogenous, 
formed at this date by the pre-existing agricultural economy#
2 G#Saxonhouse and Y.Kiyokawa, "The Supply and Demand for 
Quality Workers in the Cotton Textile Industries in Japan 
and India", Papers and Proceedings of the Conference on 
Japan’s Historical Development Experience and the Contemp­
orary Developing Countries, International Development Centre 
of Japan, Tokyo , October 1978#
difference in the labour supply* The women in England were 
single# Hence if we look at figures for a region of 
textile manufacture, Lancashire in North West England, 
in 1861 (prior to the major fertility decline), we find 
high sex ratios (female:male) combined with low Child-Woman 
ratios, and low Child-Population ratios, indicative of low 
Birth Rates, (Table ^.8 )* Compare that with mining and 
iron manufacturing areas across the Pennines* County Durham 
has low sex ratios, but high Child-Woman ratios, and very 
few of the women present are single# Such broad regions 
are rather heterogeneous, but town-wise data are not avail­
able for the towns of our interest until 1891, by which 
time fertility has begun to decline throughout the country# 
Nevertheless analysis of some data from that latter date 
is instructive, (Table *f#8 )# Talcing Middle&rough as 
representative of heavy engineering and iron and steel 
making par excellence, we find higher fertility than 
is observed in the County of North Riding generally#
The cause of such low fertility can be clearly related to 
the low proportion of single women, (only 2 9 *5% by ages 
25-29). The sex ratio is only slightly depressed in favour 
of men, so the net effect is to raise the Child-Population 
ratio (13*8%)# In the textile town of Oldham, where female 
employment is far more dominant, sex ratios are over one 
to one in favour of females, and as many as half (5^*3%) 
of women aged 25-29 are single# The differences in CWRs
are clearly therefore not only due to a differential fall 
in marital fertility between the two areaB, though this may 
have added to the result; all these effects (and others) are 
compounded in the Child-Population ratio (11**f%)« there 
can be no doubt that cultural differences cut across economic 
ones, in the short run at least, in the determination of 
urban demography*
In a nutshell, in England heavy industrial towns, 
after their initial expansion, apparently stabilised with 
higher fertility than light industrial towns, mainly due to 
the larger number of single female employees in these 
latter towns, in marked contrast to the case in India;
(and there were more gradual fluctuations on the road to 
stability than in India, due to the more modest scale 
of migration)*‘
Case Study: Burdwan District
We will now look at the Chota Nagpur region in 
a little more detail, focussing on the District of Burdwan. 
Our index of fertility, the CWR, has in this case to 
be restricted to the 0-9 child age group* The highest 
CWBs are to be found in Asansol and Hirapur, where the 
workers in the Indian Iron and Steel Company foundries 
live (CWRs of 1*5 and 1*^ respectively, Table
The other mining and industrial townships in the area 
have high ratios* The exceptions are Durgapur (and 
Kulti) with CWR of 1*2* The large City of light processing 
and manufacturing, and administrative centre, Burdwan 
Municipality, also has a low ratio (1*2)# In this City,
57% of women aged 1 5 -1 9 and 81% aged 2 0-2A* are reported 
as married, compared with 60% and 90% respectively in Asansol, 
a generally lower pace of entry into marriage; in both cases 
virtually all females are married by age 50* The socio­
economic class structure of these towns may be responsible 
for these differences, and Table gives an indicator here, 
using education as the measure of status* Unfortunately for 
our ■ analytical purposes, Burdx^ an is a heterogeneous City: 
we cannot tease out separately any information on the females 
employed in the light industry for instance, for comparison 
with those whose husbands are employed in the administrative 
occupations# But it does not appear to be the case that 
Burdwan is a City of low socio-economic status*
The engineering town of Chittaranjan, the site of the 
locomotive factory established in 19^8 , has a high proportion 
of married women aged 20 and over, but large proportions single 
below that age# Our reconstruction would be that these women 
are the daughters of the original migrants,- well-endowed
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with high levels of education (Table 4.6). If this is 
so, the implication for the future will be a fall in 
fertility in Chittaranjan# By contrast Durgapur, a 
more recent New-town has already a large .proportion 
of its 15-19 population married, and judging from the skewed 
adult sex ratio a large addition to the adult female cohorts 
is still to arrive (in the most prolific child-bearing 
ages), accompanied by their existing children# This 
will have the effect of both raising fertility (or offsetting 
any decline), as well as raising the child-population 
ratios# The family composition tables (Chapter 8 below) 
point to a contrast between towns in nearby Birbhum District 
and those here in Burdwan, confirming the picture outlined 
above. Currently (1 96 1) there are smaller households, 
and fewer married daughters and other relations in 
Burdwan, but more married sons# Table 4.10 indicates that 
Burdwan was not the highest fertility District in 19&1; 
ten years later, however, it was# This is despite 
the fact that in 1961 the socio-economic status of the area 
(the increase in high-level manpower) might have suggested 
it was ripe for a fertility fall of substantial size.
To check the components in this quite mild decline 
in CWR (and new status at the top of the CWR league) we 
examine the differences between Burdwan and other Districts 
in West Bengal, (Table 4.10). Burdwan has become increasingly
a heavy industrial area by 1971, with Burdwan Municipality 
itself taking diminishing demographic importancef 
whereas Birbhum and Midnapore retained their characteristics 
of being primarily rice-milling Districts# Given that 
fertility decline apparently takes place throughout the State, 
why is it least in the most rapidly industrialising 
District? Burdwan1s Singulate Mean Age at Marriage
rose less than the average for the other Districts in the 
State, from 18#1 to 18*6, less than a year compared to the 
average of 3 years# The District’s proportion of single 
women rose in the 15-19 age group (from below that in 
neighbouring Birbhum to 20% above)# This may well indicate 
the potential for fertility decline in the future# But 
for the purposes of explaining fertility in the 1961-71 
decade, the following age group (regarded generally as a higher 
contributor to the-fertility rate per woman) is of more interest* 
In this (20-24) age group the proportion single increased 
less than in Birbhum (or Bankura), though by 25-29 roughly 
the same proportions were still single in all the Districts 
under study# But what did change dramatically were the age- 
specific sex ratios, improving in favour of females by about 
one. third in the higher fertility age groups in Burdwan, 
but by less than a quarter in Birbhum (where they were 
already at a high, i*e. well-balanced level)} the improvement 
is from 0#61 to 0#87 in the 20-24 age group# If as we argue 
female migrants bring children with them, increased proportions 
of female migrants (during the early 1960s) must have raised,
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or countered any fall in, the child to population ratios in
the towns of this District (which of course is all that
concerns us in our analysis of future growth of the labour
force, or of dependency ratios); it may also have increased
the CWRs (or retarded the fall) if migrant women are younger
(or have higher age-specific fertility than the already
resident population). The contribution of a differential
improvement in child mortality was probably slight: it is
true that adult mortality (as far as can be indicated by
widowhood) did reduce faster in Burdwan than in Birbhum,
but at the same rate (though from lower levels) as in Midnapore.
But it is hazardous to infer child from adult mortality.
What unequivocally distinguishes Burdwan is the improvement
in adult sex ratios. Altogether the evidence is suggestive
that continuing female migration to heavy industrial areas
may raise fertility as well as raising the birth rate, -
at least in the short run, with the likelihood of a decline
1
m  the. longer run; but the precise mechanism is complex.
Finally it is of interest to note from Table 4.4 
that the mining towns have only moderate CWRs but high 
proportions married in all age groups. High child mortality
1 A further attempt to tease out the factors involved is 
made, using theoretical models, in the Appendix. Note- 
that an improvement of 5 years life expectancy could result 
in a CWR falling from 0 .6 6 to only O.6 3 , rather than O.5 8 , 
when Total Fertility falls from 5*0 to 4.4*
among miners1 children is a likely explanation for 
subdued CWRs* But the hypothesis of split families 
is also plausible: children would remain to be looked .
after in rural areas in those cases where their mothers 
have migrated to be employed as surface workers in the 
mining towns# In Chapter 8 below we find that second 
earners in mining families are rare, but usually wives, 
not children as in other towns*
Comparative Study of Selected 
Districts in Maharashtra
For a comparison with the more detailed study of 
Burdwan District, we take a look at the State of Maharashtra 
with particular reference to the Cities we discuss elsewhere 
in this study (and for which special tabulations were made in 
the Census of 1961). Maharashtra is a State with not dissimilar, 
though somewhat higher, levels of fertility than those obtaining 
in West Bengal, and with not dissimilar changes over the 
decade, though they are somewhat larger# Notably the older 
interior urban localities-of the Deccan plateau have higher 
CWRs than the new industrialising coastal regions in proximity 
to Greater Bombay# These interior localities are small 
marketing towns, and their-high fertility (apparent at the 
District level) reflects that of surrounding rural areas#
The contrast also exists, however, between the. long-establiBhed
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textile City of Sholapur, with a CWR of 0*697, and the 
New-towns of Thana, Ulhasnagar, and Nasik (0.592,
0.652, and 0.675), and, at the other end of the social 
spectrum, the more cosmopolitan and administrative Cities 
of Poona (0.608) and Bombay (0.552), (selected examples 
in ®able^*7)» What are the components? Sholapur has 
few single women aged 15-29 (54.8% in the 15-19 age-group,
11.4% of age 20-24). This contrasts with the New-towns of 
Thana and Ulhasnagar (60.4% and 19*0% respectively in Thana, 
and 57*5% and 45.9% respectively in Ulhasnagar). Ulhasnagar 
is a City engaged in manufacturing the new synthetic textiles. 
There is high female literacy, but only modest participation
p
by women in industrial (blue-collar).occupations. It 
would appear that the large single female cohorts aged 2 0 -25  
and above are the sisters and daughters of the earlier male- 
migrants (compare the case of Chittaranjan described above).
The employment of women as industrial labour is far higher 
in Sholapur City (mainly in cotton textiles). This has not 
affected their marital status (nor apparently their marital
1 As data on the larger Cities suggests lower than average 
urban mortality among infants, we can be reasonably sure 
the figures largely reflect genuine fertility differentials.
2 It is also largely a refugee New-town, as was Chittaranjan. 
The data are derived from Government of India, Census of 
India 1961. Cities of Maharashtra, Delhi, Tables B V
and C II for the relevant Cities.
fertility). The large component of local migrants has 
evidently ensured that local (i.e. rural) fertility 
conditions prevail (as occurred in 19th. Century England, 
with precisely the opposite effect). Industrialisation 
as a mechanism of social change is irrelevant in the 
traditional (and stagnating) textile towns.
Now let us consider the components in the change 
1
over time. The crude changes in CWR are roughly speaking 
inversely related to the level in 19&1 , the largest 
fall occurring in Sholapur District, the smallest in 
Bombay (Table 4.11). The fertility reduction in Sholapur, 
and to a lesser extent in Poona, is attributable to rising 
proportions remaining single in the 2 0 -2 9 age-groups (and 
indeed in the 1 5 -19 age group, where the proportions rose 
from 35 to 52% in Sholapur), as well as to possible declines 
in marital fertility. These contrast notably with Thana 
District (containing the modern towns of Thana and Ulhasnagar) 
where the 20-24 cohort (which, due to migration, is large 
in relative size) undergoes virtually no change in the '
1 Here we have to compare the urban areas of each District 
taken together, since data for the Cities themselves are not. 
published for 1971* It was a curious idiosyncracy for them 
to be published for the State of Maharashtra-alone in 1961. 
See Government of India, Census of India 196 1. 1971, 
Maharashtra, Social and Cultural Tables, Delhi, Table C II.
2 Again we assume no offsetting differences in the rate of 
improvement of child mortality; indeed we would expect -
a higher level and rate in Sholapur. - ,
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already high proportions still single (22%). To judge 
from the rather modest fall in CWR there was little change 
in marital fertility either, despite the modern industry 
that was introduced into the area; and seeing that there is 
no perceptible change in sex ratios there is no reason to 
suppose there have been arrivals of migrant women with 
their high fertility, or young age structure, offsetting 
any tendency for the pre-existing female population to 
experience fertility decline.
It remains true that much of the fertility change 
in industrialising regions has come about (in the 1960s 
at least) through increased age at marriage, and that 
some of these changes are most noticeable in the moderately 
industrialised well-established towns (not the New-towns), 
where the age of marriage was especially low. It might be 
argued that the potential for further change (e.g in 
marital fertility) now lies, however, more in the more 
sophisticated industrial cities (often New-towns) with 
their proportionally higher skilled labour forces, more 
literate, aspiring towards middle-class values, and with less 
to gain from their children's participation in the informal 
labour force from an early age (or less economic compulsion 
to encourage such participation). Particularly low proportions 
married in the 1 5 -19 age group may be an indicator of this 
incipient trend: we have to follow those cohorts through
time to be sure* The New-towns in particular are experiencing 
a fertility evolution# This reflects the changing social 
composition of their people# During the 1960s their 
informal non-wage sectors began to develop* These sub-groups 
are more likely to retain rural fertility characteristics* 
Equally, particular migrant streams may continue to reflect 
fertility levels in their region of origin, though the 
evidence suggests that the socio-economic background is at 
least of equal importance* These short or medium term 
fluctuations, reflecting structural changes in population 
composition, are the most interesting features of such 
towns from the point of view of this study#
Figure
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Table *f.1
Marital Status of Migrants in Bombay
Mean Age at Marriage among the Single ("SMAM11), 196*1
Migrants of 1-4 years Migrant and Non-Migrant
Duration______________  Population ("General P.u )
Female: 
Male:







Proportion of Female Migrants single, by Age
Working Women
Rural Origin Urban 0 .
10-1*1-
CO00. • 96
1 5 -1 9 .*H .75
2 0-2*f .50 .58
25-29 .07 .2 6
3 0-3*1- .0*f .15
35-*^ .0 2 .07
*1-5-59 .0 2 .05
(Number of
Women) (96*l-5) (6303)
SMAM 1 8 .2 2 3 .0
Source: Derived from Governme:
Non-working Women 

















(6 7H 1 ) 
17.2
Maharashtra State, Bombay: Special Migration Tables, 
Table VI.
Control: SMAM for the rural female population of Maharashtra 
is 1*f.8
Table 4.2





























Rural (134226) .508  ^ .619 }
, .734 }.919
Urban (8 9 3 0 6) .6 6 6 3 .821 3
GUJARAT
Rural (39228) .708 , .721 \
f .912 } .952
Urban (30675) .8 8 1 3 .8 5 8 3
UTTAR PRADESH and BIHAR
Rural (63138) .336 j .202 7 ■
f .466 L .973
Urban (14902) .5 9 0 3 .3 3 3 -J
KARNATAKA
Rural (22935) .530 7 .577 7
> .735 J .983
Urban (15358). .549 * .759 3
TAMIL NADU
Rural (14791) .462 7 .5 1 8 1
f .827 \ .987
Urban (8489) .6 0 3 * .644 3
KERALA
Rural (16323) .533 ) .316 }
\ .734 ) .8 8 5
Urban (6 1 5 6) .532 .449 3
Notes: Children aged 0-4, Women aged 15-44j f. : m.
Source: As for Table 4.1 above, derived from Table II* 
Control: CWR for Bombay = .553
Table *f.3
Indicators of Birth Rates in Sample Districts
Per Cent of Male Child-Women
Population under Ratio
5 (1 9 6 1)
WEST BENGAL
Calcutta 7.2 .^ 8 8
Howrah 9.6 .6 2 7
Parganas 10.5 • 6 ^9
Hoogley 10.5 .6 2 5
Burdwan ; 1 0 .3 .6 3 1 See Table
Midnapore 12.5 .611
Bankura 13.6 .6 8 2
Birbhum 13.1 .693
BIHAR
Patna 1 2 .8 .7 0 0
Gaya 13.5 .719
Shahabad 13.0 .6 8 9
Bhagalpur 12.7 .7 1 2
Monghyr 1 ^ .2 .737




Singbhum 12.9 .7 0 0
ORISSA
Mayurbanj 1 2 .6 .711
Sundargarh 9.3 .5 5 6 Rapid Growth - Heavy
Cuttack 1 1 .0  - .6 6 1 Industry
Baudh-Kh. 9.3 .509
Bolangir 1*f. 2 ♦ 637
MADHYA PRADESH
Raigarh 13.7 .6 2 0
Bilaspur 13.5 .329




RAPID GROWTH - HEAVY INDUSTRIAL areas (and State averages,)
o b
% Males C.W.RV % Young Females Sex Ratio
under 5 Single
Dhanbad 1 0 .2 • .689 3.4 .646
All Urban 
. Bihar 12.7 - .7 0 8 3.9 .8 1 1
Sundargarh 9.3 .556 7.5 .6 3 0
All Urban 
Orissa 11 .2 .6 0 3 4.7 .8 0 7
Durg 11 o2 .614 7.5. .7 0 6
All Urban 
M.P. 14.5 .739 3.8 *8 5 6
Notes:^Per Cent Single in age group 20-29; ^ f : m*. 
Sources: Government of India, Census of India 1961.Social
and Cultural Tables, Tables C II, C III, (for 
relevant States), New Delhi*
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Table *f.*f
Indicators of Fertility in Burdwan District Towns
Town
(1 9 6 1 population 
female)
ASANSOL
C.W.R.' Industry ^Females married by

















Manufacture *f6 92 97
KULTI
(3 0 1 8 1) 1 .2 1 Coal Mining 77 94 92
RANIGANJ 
(1 3 1 2 6) 1.38 Coal Mining 71 92 96
ONDAL




57 81 ’ 89
Notes: aC.W.R. here calculated as Children aged 0-9 as ratio
Women aged 15-^*
■j^
Urban sector of ‘'Police Station" areas*
Sources: Derived from Government of West Bengal, Census 19&1« 
Burdwan District Census Handbook Volume II,
Table C II, Calcutta*
Table *f*5
Pre-Indenendence Child-Women Ratios in Cities of Bihar
PATNA GAYA JAMSHEDPUR 
.515 f a 1* .532
C ,W.R., 1931
Note: a Children 0-**-, Women 15-^9.
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1931. Bihar & Orissa,.
Age, Sex, and Civil Condition Tables, Patna*
197
Table A.6
Educational Differentials among Burdwan. District 
Urban Populations
Per Cent Literate Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
Only (All ages, Educated to Educated to Educated
M + F, 1961) Primary Level Secondary L. to Any L<
Burdwan City 2 9 .0 1 3 .8 3.9 51.8
Raniganj 2 8 .1 13o7 2.3 ^3.9
Burnpur 18,5 28 o1 7.*f 58.7
Outer Burnpur 2 1 .0 1 5 .5 3.7 Vi. 7
Asansol ^2.9 ^•3 k.8 55o3
Chittaranjan 3 2 .8 1 7 .6 8 .0 61.9
Durgapur 
Steel Town 2 7 .0 1 6.^ 1 0 .3 63.9
Coke Oven T . 37.^ 7.5 11.5 6^*9
Districts of Light Industry for Comparison
MIDNAPORE 22.7 15.6 A-6 .6
BANKURA 1 9 .0 17.4 3.5 A-2.4
Sources: Government of West Bengal, Census 1961. District
Census Handbook Volume II, Table B III, Calcutta, 
Government of India, Census of India 1961^ State 
of West Bengal, Social and Cultural Tables, Table C IIIf 
New Delhi#
Table 4.7
Marital Status in Selected Contrasting: Urban Localities












42.5 17.6 6 .8
(City)
.551
DURGAPUR 40.6 8 .8 4.2 n.a.







(Urban District) 15.6 1 2 .8 1 .0 ,6l4
BILASPUR








5^.6 19.1 5.5 .6 0 8
THANA
(City)
60.4 1 9 .0 6 .1 .592




Sources: Government of West Bengal, Census 1961, District
Census Handbook (Burdwan), Vol II, Calcutta;
Government of India, Census of India 1961.
Maharashtra, Cities of Maharashtra, New Delhi;
Madhya Pradesh, Social and Cultural Tables, New Delhi; 
Tables CII and CIII in all cases* ~ -
Table 4.8
Marital Status and Fertility Indicators in
Contrasting Urban Localities in 19th Century England
C.W,R.a Sex Ratioa % Women Single Child3-
1861 2 0 - 2if 2 5 " 2 9




LANCASHIRE .5 9 9 1*0? 64.6 35*9 1 2 .6
CHESHIRE .501 1 .0 6 67.9 39.8 13.4
North-East Counties 
(Coal, iron, and steel)
N.RIDING .5 7 9 1.01 68.5 38.8 13.6
DURHAM .641 0 .9 6 53.4 24.1 14.1
1891








Notes: a Child-Women Ratio comprises age groups 0-4, 15-49;
Sex Ratio is f:m; Child-Population Ratio= Sunder 5. 
Sources: British Government, Census of-England and Wales.
(relevant dates), Tables of the Ages and Civil 
Condition of the People, London.
Table *f.9
Indicators of Mortality in Contrasting
Urban Areas
Percentage of Ever-married women widowed 
in age groups 3 5-3 9* , ^ 5 - ^ 9  ; 
arithmetic average 
Predominant Industry








Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961.
Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, 
Social and Cultural Tables, Table CII* 
(Sample consists of the 26 study Districts)
Table 4.10
Changes in Fertility Indicators between 1961 and 1971 
In Urban Areas of West Bengal
C.W.R 1961 C.W.R. 1971 % Change
Howrah .6 2 7 .521 -1 6 .9
Hoogley .625 .51** -1 7 .8
Calcutta .488 .**13 -15.4
24-P •  6^9 .512 -2 1 .1
Burdwan .6 3 1 .6 1 0 -3.3
Birbhum 0693 .597 -13.9
Midnapore .611 .5 6 6 -7.**
Bankura • 682 .5 1 2 -24.9
Per Cent women Single by age group
20-24 25-29
1961 1971 1961 1971
(Sex ratios f:m bracketed)
Burdwan 1 0 .8 14.5 3.9 3.5
(.6 1 1) (.8 6 8) (.599) (.755)
Birbhum 13.1 19.1 2.7 4.0
(.813) (.916) (.807) (.969)
Midnapore 1 6 .7 1 7 .8 4.6 5.0
(.8 6 9) (.855) (.790) (.9 0 0)
Bankura 5.3 19.3 2 .2 4.1
(.8 8 5) (.893) (.847) (.989)
Sourcei Government of India, Census of India 1961.1971* 




Changes in Fertility Indicators between 1961 and 1971 
In Urban Areas of Maharashtra
C.W.K. 1961 C.W.R. 1971 % Change
Gt• Bombay • 55^ #539 -2.7
Thana .640. .607 -5.2
Poona .644 #597 -7.3
Sholapur
i
• -0 O _A .6 3 0 -1 0 .1
Per Cent women Single by age group




(Sex ratios f:m bracketed)
Gt * Bombay 22.1 29 06 8.2 8.0
(.591) (.6 2 1) (.57*0 (.6 3 8)
Thana ZZ 0 3 21.7 4. 4 5.2
(.807) (.792) (.777) (.7^9)
Poona 16.5 2 0 .0 4.6 5.4
(.829) (.8 2 0 ) (.989) (.798)
Sholapur 1 0 .0 1 3 .8 1.7 3.3
(.99*0 (.855) (1.003) (.973)
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961<1971«
Maharashtra, Social and Cultural Tables, Tables 
CII and CIII#
Appendix *+.1
Sensitivity to Changes in Demographic Parameters
(i) Effect on Cohort Size of Changes in Fertility and Mortality 
by age 2 0t

















7^,10  ^ 7 6 ,9 9 0 ^ 3 7 ,0 5 2




increase by ■ . .... ... decrease by
15 years half
(ii) Effect on proportional Cohort Size of Changes as above
Cohort 15-19 as % of Stable Populations 
GKR = 3.2 GRR =  1<A
Life Expectation 
At Birth
"South" 35 10«1 7.0,
^ (+0.2) k-3* 1)
50 10.3 7.5
Note: GRR = Gross Rate of Reproduction
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(iii) Sensitivity of Child-Women Ratios to Mortality 
and Fertility Changes in Stable Populations:
At e° = hO 2806 0Vf6o
("West")3, a Bat© of ^3o3 implies a CWR of *7^ 5
*f8.6 .84^
GRR = 2.15
e° a ko o
GRR = 2.15 
CWR = .579 e° s lf5 CWR = .625
o




[ + -08 in CWR]uof a.birth J
GRR = 2.^5
e° a lto G m  =
GRR = 2.^5
eO = k3 CWR = .709 
o
£ + 5  years in e°; + .05 in CWR] improvement in
survival
Note: a in part (iii) the "west" model is used throughout.
Source: calculated from A.J.Coale and P.Demeny, Regional Model 
Life Tables and Stable Populations. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 19660
A brief Overview of Chapter k
Fertility can only modify the effects of migration 
gains or losses of the scale described in local 
populations# But differential fertility may have a sub­
stantial effect on the relative future size of population 
groups (with implications for social tensions) and of 
cohorts of the same age but from different regional 
background (with implications for the future competition 
for the most prized industrial jobs)# Empirically there 
are clear indications of such differential fertility 
and differential fertility change.
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CHAPTER 5
The Migration Component Explored
A Summary of the Main Empirical Points
The characteristics of the migrants to towns and 
cities of differing industrial structure are examined as 
an indicator of the effect of labour demand (and especially 
wage-labour demand) on the demography of the urban areas#
There is some evidence of particularly young (adaptable) 
labour forces being favoured in industries with new 
technology; and of female labour being favoured in certain 
processing household-based industries. It is overwhelmingly 
clear that heavy industrialisation has promoted long-distance 
migration, and hence towns of mixed linguistic composition: 
but the rather high average component of urban-origin labour 
among migrants in our area (retarding effectively an overall 
rural to urban population transfer), is less easy to relate 
to industrial composition. It seems that heavy:industrialis­
ation is not the major cause. Nor do heavy industrial town 
areas draw disproportionately from stagnating urban areas 
(though, being large, merely to take their proportionate 
share is to make anon-ftrivial', impact).- We argue, as a 
working hypothesis, that wage-labour migrants are a fairly 
distinct social category (likely to have possessed small 
land-holdings, and, a small proportion having retained 
divided families - especially those employed in more traditional 
industries), in contrast with the local "multiplier^-type 
migrants, less often working as wage labourers, (and likely 
to be landless, and-, in'part, forced into-migration, and 
moving usually as a family whole).
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The Migration Schedules
Central to the thesis are the age-specific migration 
schedules, and to these we now turn. The level of male 
migration is a variable in the model. It is this that we 
seek to change over a wide range in order to indicate the 
demographic result of decisions on industrial strategy, 
the size, and the time-phasing of projects. But the age 
distribution of the schedule is taken to be rather more 
of a parameter,, Our basic source for this is the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) of 196^ on Internal Migration (Table 5*1). 
Initially we can concentrate on the rural to urban male 
migrants1 age profile, as from the 1961 Census it is clear 
that at least frds of male migrants in our region are of 
this kind (Table 5 #10). The Survey of course records 
gross in-migration (there being separate tables on gross 
outmigration). The Census also tells us that, on average, 
the place of origin of migrants is fairly evenly divided 
between the "same District", "another District" and 
"another State" (West Bengal being an exception at the 
State level of aggregation). So the schedules used for the 
model were made to be an arithmetic average of the age profiles 
of these three streams. We then had to re-arrange the data
2 0 8
into age groups appropriate to population projection, 
i.e. 5-year cohorts (from the idiosyncratic grouping 
adopted in the NSS report), and this re-allocation was 
done "by eye" to obtain the reults illustrated in Figure 
5.1.
Now it was our initial assumption that most female 
migrationwas due to male migration: what required
estimation, we believed, was the appropriate lag 
structure. To obtain this, female migrants of less than 
one yeai^ s duration were related to male migrants of less 
than one year's duration, one to five years duration, 
six to ten years duration, in a linear regression.
The data used were from the sample Districts in the Eastern 
region. Interestingly, only 2/5ths of the squared variation 
(R ) in female migration on a District-wise basis could be 
explained by male migration. Low though this explained 
variation may be, it should be noted that the National Sample 
Survey of female migrants conducted in 196^ found that 
only 12% migrated for marriage purposes and 30% to join 
family members (including husbands presumably) so that 
altogether only 62% of female migration could be linked 
directly with male migration. Appendix 3 presents the 
statistics of our regression. As a check on^  this a 
similar regression was done for all the Districts of Maharashtra, 
with similar results. The male migration of 6-10 years
previous was not significant in determining female 
migration flows. The other two variables (less than 
one year, and 1 -5 years) were highly significant.
They indicate that the coefficient of response (as we 
may call it) is about 0 .3 2 (unlagged) and about 0 .1 7  
(for a lag of between 1 and 5 years): that is to say,
an increase nf 1000 in male migrants to a town would elicit 
a response of 320 female migrants in the same year, and 
a further 170 over the next five years. The response 
function, then, would be of a declining exponential 
kind (not unimodal, or lagged in the strict sense, for 
in that case the response would have been greater in the 
following five years, not less). Again a check using 
the data for Maharashtra substantiates the order of 
magnitude of these coefficients. For the purposes of 
the model autonomous female migration, like the male 
migration, is regarded as a variable, that is we can change 
it at will in different models, or model variants.
However, there is reason to believe that a proportion 
of this female migration must relate to the demographic 
structure of the non-migrant population: perhaps a 
proportion that are reported as migrating for domestic 
purposes (in the NSS) are joining or marrying the native- 
born. These would not be explained by our female migration 
"response" equations*
A further explanation for the apparent "autonomous" 
migration of females may lie in the large variation in 
male migration. If the latter relates specifically to 
the variation in impermanent (or "turnover", or seasonal) 
migration, that would not precipitate a female response, 
then the female migration may be more fully explained 
by the permanent male migration alone, of men whose jobs are 
pre-arranged, or at least of men who have come to stay. 
Unfortunately there is no accurate method of estimating 
the proportion of male migrants^-who are of the latter 
category, nor of knowing how far they were included in 
the Census count in urban areas. We can make estimates 
of the long-term split-family migrants, but they are very 
much in a minority (see the discussion on Bombay in Chapter 
k above). But we do not have estimates of different degrees 
of "marriage response" (as we shall call it) according to 
the occupation or class of migrant: in the course of this
study we follow through the argument that factory-employed
1 It is also universally observed that the sex ratios 
among recent*migrants are higher (more women to men) 
in migration streams from urban to urban areas. Split 
families are less likely to be maintained for more than 
a brief interval in these cases (partly because of the 
high cost of maintaining two urban dwellings (Table 5.1 3)•
migrants, who are typically from small-farm owning
backgrounds, bring their wives into the town after
a short time period once their position is secured
(or in a minority of cases remain as a split family),
whereas other migrant workers, especially those in
the non-wage sector, who are more likely to be landless,
1
migrate with their wives in the first instance* It 
follows that the sex ratio among migrants will, over the 
short run of five years at least, be variable^dependant 
upon the pi’edominant characteristics of the migrant 
streams: we try to predict this from the industrial
composition of different urban areas, though clearly 
the condition in the rural areas (especially of the same
1 This is supported by a survey recently undertaken 
in Bombay that indicates that 79% of females who 
joined other family members (largely husbands) 
in the factory sector did so once they had secured 
employment, and only 11% came before a job was 
secure, whereas in the case of casual workers 60% 
joined joined husbands with jobs, and 33% came with 
them in speculation. See L.K.Deshpande, "The 
Bombay Labour Market" (unpublished), Department of 
Economics, University of Bombay, 1979*
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District) is an important determinant here too* The 
differences in sex ratio that persist in the long-run 
among migrants are of more demographic significance 
in the eventual population composition of the town, 
once some degree of stability is achieved (and these 
were discussed above in Chapter *0.
1 A survey with which the author is familiar, carried 
out in Poona, throws some light on the economic back­
grounds of migrants in different urban industrial 
employments or occupations: a slum settlement in 
which over 2/3rds of the household heads surveyed 
were in formal industry, municipal service, or working 
as skilled labour, contained bk% of migrants who still 
had land, one half of them, however, owning less than 
two acres. In a contrasting slum settlement where 
over 2/3rds of household heads were in petty trade 
or casual service only 12% had land (though 87% had 
previously been employed in agriculture). This was 
■ despite the fact that a higher proportion of the latter 
migrants were local. See M.Bapat, 11 Occupational and 
Spatial Mobility among Shanty Dwellers in Poona,"
Ph.D. Thesis, University College London, 1979#
Similar findings come from the survey carried 
out in Bombay (referred to in the previous Note) by 
L.K.Deshpande. The population was divided into factory 
workers, casual workers, and those in small establishments. 
Of the factory workers, 72% owned land in rural areas, with 
an average holding of 2 .7  acres, whereas of the casual 
workers, at the other end of the scale, 5 1% owned land 
with an average holding of 2.1 acres. These surveys are at 
least consistent with what we have inferred from demographic 
indicators: that factory manufacturing workers are more
likely to own land than other (non-white collar) workers.
We have devoted some time to explaining the variance 
in female migration when related to male migration* For 
all this, there will be a small proportion of women who 
migrate alone for jobs or further education, as revealed 
in the Sample Survey (where about 15% were so categorised)* 
Initially, for the purposes of model-building, these 
women will be ignored;, their inclusion is one of the more 
important varations we make in the model (see Chapter 3)*
The "turnover” and seasonal male migrants are also ignored. 
And the women who join the native-born are also left out; 
they would be partly balanced by an outmigration of women 
who join rural husbands, in any case* Hence the 
response coefficient will be taken to suggest the absolute 
size of the female in-migrant flow* To repeat, 1,000 
males will be followed by 320 females in the same time 
period, and 1?0 in the following quinquennium; in some 
variants up to 250 additional females are allowed to migrate*
From this starting point a more elaborate hypothesis 
will be adopted. The age distribution of these migrants 
has to be heavily reconstructed. Insofar as female 
migration is a response, its age distribution is related 
to the past male migration history: i.e. the NSS female 
age profiles are only appropriately related to a combination 
of the male migration streams that preceded, and those that 
took place during, the NSS reference period (one year).
1 Some areas of the country, especially in South India, 
experience net female outmigration to urban areas.
Given the age differential at marriage (about 5 years in
•i
1 9 6 1) , a five-year lag would be needed to give a similar 
male and female age distribution (cet# par*) among migrants. 
These phenomena are compounded in the NSS data# First 
I will offer an explanation of these data, and hence I hope 
to justify the age-specific female response migration 
schedules I have constructed (Figure 5*1)* To anticipate, 
the effect of reconstruction is to make the current female 
migration profile that relates to current male migrants 
alone rather younger than the NSS age profile#
Hestricting ourselves still to rural-urban movements 
we see first a higher proportion of female infants among 
female migrants (than male infants among male migrants), 
though the absolute number of males is a little higher 
than females in this age group (as is the case in the national 
population also) due to superior survival# The next 
age group has a distortion of the same kind# The 5-17 age 
groups are roughly similar in the "Same District” category 
but the female percentages are higher for the other cat­
egories# Male ”turnover" migration will be concentrated 
in the earlier years of age and also is likely to be pre­
dominantly local, hence females fail to dominate this first 
category significantly* The female proportions in this 
age group among the non-local female migrants are high, 
and this illustrates the incidence of marriage migration, 
either to join residential males, or of females migrating
1 C.R.Malaker, personal communication on material from 
his Ph.D* thesis on Nuptiality in India, still in 
progress when this Chapter was prepared, Demographic Unit, 
Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta*
contemporaneously with migrant males: in both cases the 
age differential at marriage accounts for the dominance 
of females in this: age group. The l8-2*f group of females 
is also proportionally quite high, combining those 
responding to male migrants migrating when in the 25-3*+ 
age group (and recorded in the NSS male stream), together 
with those joining male migrants who migrated a few years 
earlier (not recorded in the NSS)# Disentangling these 
sub-groups in order to construct a female response migration 
schedule is not possible on a rigorous basis* The schedules 
we present are the result of first re-grouping the NSS 
data into 5-year age groups and smoothing the result; 
then talcing the mode of the new female schedule that we 
construct to be 2 0-2 -^ years of age for those in the 
1 -5 year lagged response group,(who will have been 
1 5 -1 9 when they married), and 1 5 -1 9 years of age for the 
unlagged response. (By applying the weights suggested by 
the regression coefficients to these two groups 
we can reproduce the NSS female migrant age profile again 
as a broad check on the validity of the method). Clearly 
there is a crudity here: the regressions were not
age-specific, and there must in fact be a lagged and 
unlagged "response" of pre-marriage migrant females to 
male migration; and additionally the pre-marriage male 
migration is itself a response to the migration of married 
males and females* But further sophistication would be
1 Some degree of autocorrelation in the error term will 
have resulted.
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pure guesswork without age-specific Census data on 
current migration flows* Proceeding now to the tail- 
end of the schedules, the migration of the *+5+ group 
is insignificant quantitatively, and I have adopted a 
fairly arbitrary smoothing procedure* But interestingly 
these elder migrants are a not insignificant proportion 
of the elder total population (native and migrant), 
particularly in the case of females. I suspect they 
are female widows, and aged couples whose ^oung 
folk have migrated, leaving an unviable family farm 
as the parents age**1
Age and Education in the Structure 
of the Industrial Workforce
In the economics of production, age is only 
significant in respect of the command it implies 
over the means of production. If an economy is expanding 
rapidly into new industries, or adopting radically new 
technology in the old ones, and if this implies an 
increasing need for new skills and new learning for 
which a secondary education is a sine-qua-non, then 
only the younger age groups in an economy are employable*
It is a paradox that, in this sense, the stock of labour 
in India (as also in England today) is too old, not too
1 More information on age and marital status of migrants
has now been published in the 1971 Census, and is consistent 
with this particular hypothesis* See M.K.Premi,
"Aspects of Female Migration in India", Economic and 
Political Weekly* April 12, 19^0*
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young, since it has a disproportionate number of people
over fifteen years of age who are illiterate, and a
disproportionate number over twenty-five who are without a
•1
secondary education* These people will be more costly 
to train than the younger cohorts* A steady supply of 
pre-school children plus 100% primary education is 
necessary to provide the required future labour force 
in a technically modernising economy#
It is conceivable that a modern industrial estate 
or New-town would actually seek (i*e* demand, in the economists 
sense) a younger local age structure than the national#
The neo-classical economist imbued with comparative statics 
will argue that this is irrational. If the skills are 
so scarce, then industrial specialisation .should not proceed 
in those industries that.are skill-intensive. This argument 
fails to address the question of the next generation, and 
fails to provide guidance on the question of how natural 
resource endowments change over time (whence would follow 
a change in comparative advantage). Indeed it relegates 
all education to the rank of consumption goods#
1 Data on literacy are available from the Indian Census down 
to 1981. Restricting ourselves to males only, even as late 
as 1981 crude literacy in Bihar is only 38%# In 1961 it was 
only 30%* and ^3 »5% in the 2 0-2*f age group (compared with 
^9*8% for All-India)# In 1971 crude literacy rates were 
still generally below 50%: Bihar 31%* Orissa 38%, M.P* 33%* 
West Bengal ^3% and Maharashtra 51 %• Government of India, 
Census of India 1961* 1971. Social and Cultural Tables, Delhi.
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It is possible, though not easy, to see how far 
particular industries select young labour forces deliberately, 
since the age structure of the occupations 1b recorded for 
a particular sample in the 19&1 Census: the sample consists
of large towns (above one lakh, i.e. 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 in population 
size, conventionally referred to as Cities), where these 
statistics are available for migrants only# I have selected 
about 20 cases comprising virtually all those from the Districts 
under study in Eastern India supplemented with a number 
from Gujarat and Maharashtra (and one from Western Madhya 
Pradesh). The idiosyncracies of the Census-taking and 
publication mean that not all the Cities are equally well 
documented#
Interpretation of the data must proceed warily#
Older industries, if they fail to expand at the rate of 
supply of the labour force, will develop an older age 
structure than the average# The only way to check this 
is to examine the data in the special migration tables 
for Bombay, Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur and Dhanbad, where 
duration of residence is cross-classified by age in 
particular occupations, and by levels of education#
For the purpose of this analysis we need to exclude those 
occupations whose age structure is dependant on promotion 
through seniority; the administrative and managerial classes
1 In a detailed survey of factory labour in Poona, R.D'.Lambert 
came to the conclusion (too hasty in the view of the author 
of this thesis) that differential age structure was solely 
due to this cause. See R#D.Lambert, Workers. Factories 
and Social Change in India. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 19&%
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are likely to be both more educated and older* In fact we 
will restrict ourselves to concentrate on the manual 
employee groups, workers in transport and communications, 
production workers, and service workers (to use the 
National Occupation Classifications)* Miners will be 
referred to later* From Table 3*3 it can be seen that 
production workers are more heavily represented in the 
younger age group, i.e. 15-3 *^ than are other workers.
This remains true when we standardise (as we can only in the 
case of the special sample mentioned above) for recency 
of arrival* This is broadly consistent with our hypothesis 
that in the new or modernising industries (which are all 
well represented in many of these Cities) young recruits 
are preferred.
It would be better, however, to have information 
for particular occupations within that large industrial 
category of production or manufacturing workers*
Unfortunately this limits us to one City, Ahmedabad 
(Table 3*2). Of the six production occupations we have, 
two are characterised by higher literacy rates (and a higher 
incidence of secondary education): tailors and tool-makers 
(and makers of precision instruments), and indeed these two 
groups are characterised by a younger age structure at both 
durations of residence recorded, including current migrants
-j
(Tables 3*2 and 5*3)* Of course these data are only broadly
1 Textile workers generally are in large part factory workers* 
Tailors are more likely to be self-employed small business­
men* Hence presumably the importance of literacy.
in line with our expectations, and anyway Ahmedabad could be 
a special case*^
1 A regression on this small sample attempts to attribute 
the age structure quantitatively to both forces, 
recency of recruitment and educational attainment* All 
occupations reported, except the administrative and 
professional^are included. We find that the two factors 
between them explain only of the squared variation
in age structure (R )• Education is wholly insignificant.
This indicates: ;a number of things in regard to the sample* 
First, although we set it up as though it were a demand 
schedule, clearly it is not, since the measured characteristics 
are those that cleared the market (supply and demand 
interacting). We have come across this phenomenon in other 
cities inhere a high local supply of educated labour 
resulted in high levels of education appearing in the 
residual (largely casual) worker categories* Secondly, 
and more substantially, the relationship can be expected to 
be discontinuous. There are a limited number of occupations 
where the demand for young labour is determined by 
educational requirements (in theory); these may be 
restricted to the spearhead of modern industry*
The other variable, duration of residence, is 
highly significant. A 10% addition to the proportion of 
recent (1-3 years) migrants raises the proportion aged 15-3^ 
by 7%* This underlines the importance of duration as an 
over-riding determinant of age structure, taldng all occup­
ations together+ and hence also of the speed of expansion 
or contraction of the industry in question* Lamberts 
contention would seem to be vindicated (see note above).
But we (and he) are concerned principally with the manufact­
uring industry (and the sample was too small to confine the 
test to those occupations alone). Table 5*2 (and Table 5*3) 
would suggest that duration alone loses its explanatory 
dominance in the analysis of age structures within the 
manufacturing industry.
With the caveat of a likely bias introduced 
through recency of recruitment kept in mind, let us look 
now at the recorded occupational age structure in the 
City sample (Table 3*3)* I have selected for illustration 
occupations that are representative of the industries under 
study* In particular this means that tool - makers and 
other metal - workers feature predominantly in the Eastern 
States, whereas textile - workers predominate in the 
Western States. The average age of the former two 
occupations is below that of the latter, and the education 
level is higher, but clearly this relates partly to the 
age of the industrial capital stock. Less ambiguously the 
occupational group of electricians is significantly 
younger in all areas (and their educational level higher). 
It is particularly instructive, however, to look down the 
columns in Table 3*3 under particular occupations. It is 
noticed for example that a particularly young age structure 
is found among the textile workers in Ulhasnagar near 
Bombay: this new industrial development incorporates
the latest technology (and the largest scale of plant, 
as noted in Chapter 2 above). Consistent with this, 
the proportion of secondary school matriculates in that age 
group is far higher than in the rest of Maharashtra's 
textile workforce (and illiteracy lower). The other newly 
developing industry of the Western States is the chemicals
industry, which was still at a very early stage of development 
in 1 9 6 1s here again Thana and Baroda have a highly qualified 
v/orkforce in that occupation to judge from age-specific 
education rates, and a very young age structure. The high 
qualifications of tool-makers and their young age structure 
is clear in the new industry at Ranchi, and the metal- 
making industry will be discussed in more detail below 
in the case of the only modern integrated steel plant in our 
City sample, at Bhilai (Durg-Bhilainagar Town Group).
It is. .also worth discussing the exceptions, and 
this leads us to look along the rows in Table 5*3 rather than 
down the columns. One City that seems to be a consistent 
exception to any hypothesis is Jamshedpur, the private 
sector Company Steel Town. Here the educational qualifications 
are particularly notable, yet the age structure is 
curiously old. The latter can be related to the paucity 
of migrants during the 1951-1961 decade, in comparison 
with some of the other heavy industrial Cities. The 
foundation of the industry here pre-dates the Second Plan. 
Exceptionally (in their day) the Tatas recruited a migrant 
labour force for work in their mills and then trained it 
on the spot to a high level of skill. Subsequent capital 
expansions were carried out with less further labour 
recruitment (and, more recently, no doubt with the sons of 
the labour force already there and educated in the local
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schools•) With the establishment of public-sector training 
centres, near emerging industrial localities, this 
phenomenon is likely to be repeated, and in this repsect we 
refer to the City of Ranchi again below* We deliberately 
included Bhopal (in Madhya Pradesh) in the City sample to 
discover whether a centre with a newly developed modern 
electrical or engineering industry would also put a 
premium on education* In fact it illustrates one of the 
best-educated cohorts in the Table, and almost all the 
electricians are in the younger age group; in a State with 
a low education record (noted above) this is clearly not 
the result simply of a supply of youthful migrants, but 
a feature of demand requirements* We cite specific example in 
the section that follows to indicate the care with which
1 Daily employment at the Tata Iron and Steel Company
was on average 2 2 ,6 6 2 in 1 9 1 6 -2 3 (with output • at 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  
tons). From 1935-39 employment was reduced to 19*309
(while output rose to 700,000)* By the time of the 1961 
Census the mill was rated at 2 million tons, double pre­
war capacity, but its labour force was only 3 0 ,0 0 0.
By then its ever-migrant labour force of 25,000 was no 
larger than in 1926-7* What had changed was the white-collar 
contingent in the work-force: its increase had perhaps
contributed towards the ageing of the employees (i.e. 
with capital-using expansion there was relatively more 
labour recruitment (or less retrenchment) at the senior end 
of the scale* See S.K.Sen, The House of Tata (1859-1959). 
Calcutta Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1975? and 
Government of India, Census of India 1921. 1951< 19^1,
State of Bihar (& Orissa in 1921), Delhi (Patna in 1921), 
(Special Tables for Jamshedpur in 1961)*
the post-Independence heavy industries selected their labour 
forces*
To point up the contrast I have illustrated the thesis 
with a very traditional occupational group* millers, bakers, 
and brewers* Here, on average, only 55% of the workers 
are in the 15-3^ age group (as against 68% in the case of 
electricians). Needless to say, secondary school matriculates 
(data not provided here) are uniformly a very low proportion, 
illiterates (Table 5*3) a uniformly high one. Of course 
this reflects the fact that bakeries have always existed 
in thetowns even before the impact of modern industrialisation* 
However, there will have been a local multiplier effect, or 
at least an increased local demand for manufactured food and 
drink, and yet the resultant migration or absorption of 
resident labour has not selected noticeably the younger 
cohorts. This can be seen strikingly in the New-town 
area of Durg (containing Bhilai Steel Town) where the proportion 
of young millers, though above average (61%) is still below 
the proportion of young electricians (7 2%)*
Finally it is instructive to look at the residual column, 
that is those labourers ’’not elsewhere classified” (in the 
Standard Occupational Classification); this will probably 
consist predominantly of casual labour whose occupational- 
’’mix" defied the Census investigators. It is a large 
category. It tends to have an older age structure, but
this also relates quite closely to the rate of growth of the 
town in question# In a few exceptional cases it has a 
notable proportion of matriculates (i#e# 3% rather than 
1% or less), as in Gaya, Asansol, and Jamshedpur in 
particular (Table 5*8)# These latter two are Cities that 
acquired their modern industry at an earlier date; steel 
at Jamshedpur and also at Asansol's twin town of Burnpur, 
and hence built up an educated labour force# The Second Plan 
period of expansion of these existing plants failed to 
absorb this stock of qualified labour, and hence follows 
its comparatively high representation in the residual 
occupational categories# How far this story may be repeated 
for the new engineering towns when their well-educated 
cohorts come on to the labour market in the 1970s and 
1980s remains to be seen, but some indications of this 
emerging problem are illustrated below*
The overall age distribution of the work-force in a 
town will clearly be dictated, in most cases, by its 
duration of residence# The declining industries, and 
the tertiary sector (a labour absorbing sector) will have 
the older structures# The new industries will have young 
structures, though quickly ageing if subsequent expansion 
is accompanied by substitution of capital for labour#
On the green-field, or greenish, industrial sites local 
industrial workforces are likely therefore to be younger
in all economic sectors initially, but especially so 
if the industry is of high technology# Skill-specific 
demand is likely to turn out to be age-specific 
(given the increasing illiteracy with age in the Indian 
population)# We would probably be right to "bunch11 our 
migrants specifically into the younger working age groups 
when illustrating the effects of migration to newly 
industrialising sites (as in our Model "1 b,u in Chapter 
3) (which exacerbates future instabilities in the labour 
market)# As we have argued in Chapter 2, only in the case 
of iron and steel and heavy engineering is this phenomenon 
likely to coincide with very large local work-forces.
In other modern plant capital substitution tends to out­
weigh the effects of scale alone as far as the individual 
plant is concerned, though it still may be the case 
that economxes of agglomeration are significant#
1 Attributes of the work-force in a single industry are
by no means standard across societies# We have noted this 
in Chapter above principally in regard to the employment 
of women# In a very careful comparative study of the 
textile industry, Saxonhouse and Kiyokawa show how 
Indian and Japanese mills differed in this respect 
over a similar period (and despite crude technical and 
demographic similarities). It is worth quoting their 
conclusion in full: "The high productivity, high turnover, 
high absentee.,closely supervised, largely female Japanese 
labour force can be contrasted with the low productivity, 
lower turnover, also high absentee and loosely supervised, 
mostly male Indian labour force* It is evident that the
A Case Study from 
Eastern Madhya Pradesh
We discuss here the sub-region of the new Steel 
Town development at Bhilai# As we noted above, older 
industries, if they fail to expand at the rate of supply 
of the labour force, will be inclined to have an older 
age structure than the average# For that reason alone, 
workers in transport, trades and communications, are 
often older than their industrial colleagues in the newly 
developed industries for there were passenger buses before 
the steel workers arrived. The age Structure of an occupation 
represents an interaction of demand and supply, whereas our 
current interest is to focus on demand# If we confine our 
observations to a single industry we tend to overcome that 
bias# The iron and steel industry at Bhilai employs both 
furnacemen and electricians, the latter on average being
footnote continues^
acquisition of a mature, stable labour force does not 
necessarily result in industrial success#" G.Saxonhouse 
and Y. Kiyokawa,"The Supply and Demand for Quality Workers 
in.the Cotton Textile Industries in Japan and India",
(Paper from a Conference on Japan’s Historical Development 
Experience and-the Contemporary Developing Countries, Feb. 
1978), International Development Centre of Japan, 1978.
The Japanese textile worker was also more highly 
educated (they note): $3% being literate in 1 933 and 30% 
having post-primary education#
more skilled (and less illiterate): we see from Table
(derived from the 1961 Census) that the age structure among 
migrants is slightly younger among the latter* The 
contrast with the age structure of the construction 
workers, whose skills are much less specific to the 
plant, is clear; yet they were recruited at approximately 
the same time - only three years earlier.
The future implications of this are important*
The young work-force cohorts in modernising industries 
will tend to remain with those industries over time: 
their chances of recruitment into another industry elsewhere 
will diminish as they grow older. If a steel or engineering 
plant becomes outmoded it will cease to recruit new labour.
Its labour force will age. If it faces closure its labour 
force will seek employment in industries whose demand for 
labour is not specifically toward the young. Thus the older 
the population age structure the more serious are the effects 
of an industrial monoculture when it goes into decline.
1 What is interesting is that this remains true if we consider 
the illiterates alone. They are slightly younger in the 
case of electricians than furnacemen, and in both cases 
clearly younger than illiterate construction workers.
This is consistent with the argument that the potential 
for trainig can best be found in the younger groups.
It is not simply a question of having to recruit young 
men if literacy is lequired as a qualification. Furnace­
men, for example, are being recruited young so that they 
are trainable in the operation of the most modern equipment. 
Construction workers, on the other hand, need little 
specific knowledge of the technology of the plant,
(a point brought out strongly in the context of Jamshedpur 
steel plant in the next section).
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On a recent visit to Corby (United Kingdom) the author
found it reported in the local press that the steel
workers now made redundant, on the closure of most of
the integrated iron and steel works, were unlikely to
find employment in the county of Northampton (Figure 2*3).
There is industrial growth in this County, but the new
industries, light manufacturing and electronics, favour
a younger work-force# The sons of the steel-workers
will have the opportunity in nearby Kettering and
elsewhere to find employment in these expanding industries.
Similar opportunities do not exist in the case of the Steel
Town of Consett, also recently closed down, where the
locality, in the generally more depressed North Fast of
England, has no neighbouring growth centres. In a country
like India with a "younger age structure, these particular
problems are less severe for the present: if layoffs must
occur during stagnation, they will be of a less aged, more
redeployable, work-force# But in the young age structure we
have a more serious problem regarding the second-generation
workforce: the_sons of the migrants will not only be more in
than
number/in the United Kingdom , but may be fired with stronger 
aspirations, given the novelty and promise of industrialisation#
T The comparative case-studies were pursued in some detail 
in Chapter 2 above#
This requires more rapid expansion of new industries, 
failing which, cet# par# the potential frustration will 
be stronger.
We turn here to look briefly at sex structure in • 
employment in the same region of Madhya Pradesh# Again 
it can be argued that wre have an interaction of demand and 
supply, in the sense that since the supply of women through 
migration to an urban locality is not wholly, or even mainly, 
called forth by the demand for their labour, the actual employ­
ment of women is not a simple case of a specific industrial 
demand# A significant feature will be that women are absorbed 
in the non-factory sector simply because they are aleady in 
the urban locality and will be seeking additional household 
income even for a considerable amount of effort expended 
or loss of leisure.
The District-wise sex ratios for workers, available 
from the Census, are thus difficult to interpret# More 
enlightening is their disaggregation# For this purpose we 
look at contrasts in Durg and Bilaspur Districts# Both 
are subject to high rates of inmigration (from 1951-61): 
the former depends largely on the steel industry, the latter 
is more diversified# In the case of Durg, men preceded the 
women. The demand for labour could, a priori, be regarded 
as male biased; furnacemen and other steel workers will 
be recruited for their physical strength potential#
We note from Table 5*5 that the sex ratio (f:m) in metal 
goods production is 0.023, which is very low* By contrast, 
tobacco manufacture or textile manufacture can more easily 
be done by women, which induces industrialists to select 
women specifically5 for the level of training is low, 
so that instability in the work-force can be tolerated, 
and this facilitates the payment of low wages; but more 
importantly, with the possibility of a nputting-outM 
system, manufacturing work is not incompatible with 
household occupations, which facilitates piece-rating 
and even lower remuneration. The very elastic supply of 
female labour makes it easy to adopt a differential pay 
policy, effectively, albeit not explicitly, awarding women 
lower wages. We observe that the sex ratio in textiles 
is around 1.1 (f:m) in household industry; in tobacco 
manufacturing, the making of "bidis" (a^local cigarette) 
is mainly household-based , and the sex ratio is around 
1.5. In the non-household sector it is of course lower 
(more men are employed). One quarter of the household- 
sector female work-force in Bilaspur is employed in­
tobacco manufacture, and -frds in textiles; and the household 
sector is far larger than the non-household sector as an 
employer of women, in Bilaspur. Xt is true-that both-sectors 
may attract female labourers from outside the towns, or 
encourage their earlier migration (than would otherwise have
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occurred) to join husbands in factory employment.
But it is also apparent that whatever the attraction, 
once the pool of female labour is present, there is some 
evidence here that the female labour available but not 
absorbed in the female-intensive industries is taken up 
in the less-specifically female intensive industries: 
hence in the household sector of manufacturing the female 
labour coefficient (f:m sex ratio) is higher in nearly 
every branch of manufacturing in Bilaspur than in Durg. 
Similarly in services the female labour coefficient 
is again higher in Bilaspur than in Durg. Unfortunately 
a re-definition of what constitutes economic activity plays 
havoc with the recorded female participation, and in 
household industry especially, so that we cannot pursue this 
analysis forward over time to the 1971 Census.
Sources of Migration and Recruitment
It has been emphasised from the outset that there is 
no simple model of the industrial migrants' demographic 
characteristics. These are determined by an interaction 
between demand for and supply of labour; perhaps too much 
academic analysis has concentrated on the supply side, on 
migrants looking for jobs, rather than on jobs (or jobbers)
1
looking for migrants# Different types of jobs seek 
different types of migrants, but it- is not equally true 
to say that different types of migrants seek different 
types of jobs. The landless labourer or small-scale farmer 
would be eager for employment at the right wage (on his 
criterion) whether in bakery, textiles, or engineering 
industry: but the three industries would select their
. labour, sometimes quite carefully, each on-' rather different 
2
criteria# These points have been made and the practice
1 The most recent and readable exposition of this thesis 
is by M,P,Todaro, ’’Rural Urban Migration, Unemployment, 
and Job Probabilities in recent Theoretical and 
Empirical Research1’, in A,J.Coale (ed.) Economic Factors
in Population Growth. Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1976#
My main criticism of this approach is that it ignores 
rigidities and constraints that were and still are the 
very essence of the Indian labour market# The probability 
of getting an industrial job is very slight indeed for 
a villager with no urban contacts# It is very high for 
a villager whose area is visited by an agency recruiting 
for TISCO (see further below)# Hence the urban unemployment 
rate is likely to be a very weak indicator of job prospects 
in industry (especially in unstable populations).
2 The work-force for one of the first post Independence 
industrial enterprises, the Chittaranjan locomotive works, 
was decribed as being a ’’large contingent specially recruited 
from various parts of the country”, by M.Mohsin, Chittaranjan: 
a Study in Urban Sociology. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 196^.
Only 8% of the work-force was local, from within Buidtfan Distict. 
Similarly in the Bihar coal-fields there was a ’’long tradition 
of systematic recruitment of individual workers from outside 
Dhanbad region ”, (mainly from Uttar Pradesh): Rothermund D.,
et al# (ed^), Urban Growth and Rural Stagnation: Studies in 




documented in some detail by M.D.Morris, and the .whole
issue of labour commitment has been surveyed and debated
2critically in this light.
Morris pointed to the distinction between the 
advantage to employers of a floating labour force in the 
textile industry (where the industrial work ethic was 
relatively unimportant, and commitment could be" a positive 
problem by encouraging unionisation) and the advantages of 
a more permanent work-force in iron and steel(where skills 
acquired on the job were crucial to the smooth functioning 
of the production process). At this point it should be noted 
that commitment is equally important a disadvantage in the 
iron and steel industry, as the early strikes at Jamshedpur 
surely indicate. Although documentation is difficult, it 
would seem that' management might seek to obviate this 
problem in rather different ways therefore in the steel and 
engineering industries, and, to extend the argument further, 
especially in the more continuous-process industries, like 
oil and chemicals production in the current era. Labour’s 
disruptive power becomes acute: one break in the. chain
and the whole process halts - it is not even easy to 
accumulate stock further down the line. Worse still, 
stoppage may cause damage (as in iron-ore refining if 
furnaces are allowed to cool rapidly), or danger
1 M.D,Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in 
India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills
Oxford University Press, Bombay, 19^5#
2 S. Munshi,’’Industrial Labour in Developing Economies”, 
Economic & Political Weekly. (Review of Management), 
August, 1977.
■1
even. One natural response to all this is to reduce the
\tfork-force per unit of capital. That is to say, even in
a poor country, the full cost of labour (including these
risks of disruption) may be sufficiently high in some
industries to .be an inducement to capital substitution
2
(despite the monetary cost), A second possible response 
is deliberately to recruit a work-force that is more likely 
to be "tame", Recruitment of labour from afar may suit 
this purpose: hopefully the unemployed local people,
T,sons of the soil", will fight it out with the in-migrants 
in the streets, not on the shop.floor. If economies of 
scale exist at the plant level, and if large plant labour 
forces are especially risky (on which point some European 
evidence seems to be emerging), then the inducement to
1 The effect of a stoppage by the blast-furnace crane 
operators at Jamshedpur (a small group of specialised, 
but technically unsophisticated, workers) is documented 
in J,L,Keenan, A Steel Man in India. Duell, Sloan,
and Pearce, New York, 19^3* Substitute crane-operators 
from elsewhere on the site were recruited and productivity 
fell about five-fold,
2 The argument is by now familiar to analysts in the 
field o£ Indian agriculture; the parallel was 
first suggested to me on reading T.J,Byres, "The New 
Technology, Class Formation and Class Action in the Indian 
Countryside", Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 :^ , July, 1 9 8 1,
■1
substitute is strengthened. Written documentation of
such a conscious policy is, for perhaps rather obvious reasons,
hard to find. Selective reading between the lines is
risky, but part of the hue and cry on the conflict
between locals and migrants (the "sons of the soil"
issue) can surely be seen in that light. Management
clearly resented being told whom to notify of jobs
(despite not being told whom to recruit): witness the
Chairman of the Indian Iron and Steel Company (who own
the Burnpur works in Burdwan District) deploring the
new legislation regarding local employment exchanges
on the grounds that it was "fostering the evils of
provincialism" instead of promoting the "mobility of
industrial labour....of benefit both to workers and to
2
their employers."
1 See S.J.Prais, Productivity and Industrial Structure, 
(forthcoming). As far as India is concerned some recent 
surveys have supported the suggestion that_the increasing 
ancillarisation of Indian industry (farming out engineering 
jobs to small-scale factories, for example) is prompted by 
the desire to avoid the accumulation of large plant-based 
labour forces. See for example J.Harriss, "Two Theses
on Small Industry: Notes from a Study in Coimbatore,
South India" (Proceedings of 7th European Conference on
Modern South Asian-Studies-held in London, July, 1 9 8 1,
forthcoming in edited collection, eds* D.Taylor and K.
Ballhatchet). Harriss notes "the most commonly stated
reason for starting new small-scale units rather than
building up one unit is, broadly, this factor of labour control".
2 Economic & Political Weekly, "From the Chair: Chairman of 
IISCO", 26 Nov., 1960.
Whatever the motives or compulsions facing the
management, the rapidly growing heavy industrial towns of
Eastern India have always recruited labour from outside
the District. In the early days, the Tata Iron and Steel
Company (TISCO) at Jamshedpur used new local firms as
contractors to recruit labour directly from Mayurbanj and
Sambalpur Districts of Orissa, as vfell as from Manbhum and
Singbhum Districts in Bihar, thus establishing the precedent
-1
of multi-ethnicity in the Steel Town. Forty years later
the Orissan steel plant atRourkela (in Sundargarh District,
neighbouring Sambalpur) was to recruit or attract labour
from urban Bihar (Table 5*8). Jamshedpur would take
labour from rural Bengal. Durgapur, Chittaranjan, and
Burnpur in West Bengal would take labour from rural Bihar.
Durg, the site of the steel industry in Madhya Pradesh,
acquires labour from rural Andhra. These practices of
inter-State migration become fuel to the fires of the
2"sons of the soil".
Naturally shortages of educated or skilled labour 
may require searching far afield. This was clearly the 
case in the early days at Jamshedpur, where special 
construction skills needed in the erection of the furnaces,
1 S.K.Sen, The House of Tata(l8:59-1931). Calcutta Progressive 
Publishers, Calcutta, 1975*
2 M. Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict 
in India. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978*
were obtained from among the ship-builders of Bombay 
Presidency. In addition, white-collar workers came from 
Bengal, Bombay (Parsees), and Madras. Skilled and semi­
skilled labour in the production process came from the 
United States, Germany, and South Wales. The pattern was 
to repeat itself with the new generation of steel plants 
built post-Independence, scarce skills being provided by 
the Russian work-force at Bhilai, the West Germans at 
Rourkela, and so on. Unfortunately the Census data do 
not allow detailed investigation of skills in particular 
occupations according to the origin of migrants. But we can 
make some headway by restricting the analysis to the larger Cities 
in our area. Jamshedpur is particularly well-documented 
(with special tabulations in the 19&1 Census). The 
integrated steel plant had been expanded in output to 
two million tonnes by i9 6 0. The stock of migrants as of 
1961 represents a history of labour migration (18% claiming 
to have arrived during the period of expansion). Of all 
manufacturing workers, 83% are migrant (Table 5*6) and
k8% came from beyond the boundaries of Bihar, 38% from
1
rural origins beyond the State, It would not be apparent 
in this case that recruitment from afar has by now much to
1 For all worker categories urban labour tended to come 
from West Bengal. It is reasonable to link this with 
skill requirements: Bengalis are generally more highly
educated than their neighbours in Eastern India. The 
manufacturing and commercial sectors used the most 
long-distance rural migrants. Their origins were chiefly 
Orissa and Uttar Pradesh,
do with searching out skilled labour. In fact Jamshedpur had 
come to acquire its skills by technical training in a captive 
Institute, established in 1921, (which can be viewed as part 
of the tactic of ensuring good labour relations by 
training the unskilled in the Company Town). Looking at those 
long-distance migrants employed in manufacturing industry, 
we can see (Table 3*7) that 62% of those rural migrants 
were employed in iron and steel making, and 33% of the 
urban migrants in the same, making an .average of 61%,
This compares with only 32% of all manufacturing migrants, 
that is including migrants from shorter distances. West 
Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Orissa are the major 
sources of supply. Even in the case of West Bengal, 
three times as many migrants were rural as urban in 
origin* There seems to have been little selection 
specifically for migrants from urban localities* There is 
a caveat, however. These data are for place of birth, not 
place of last residence. The only control we have over this 
obvious defect is by observation on the 1971 Census, only 
partly published, and the picture that emerges is not one 
of rural to urban to urban movements ("stepwise migration") 
in India, That is to say, it seems on balance that the 
large majority of rural migrants (by place of birth) 
are rural migrants by iplace of last residence also, but
verification on such a level of disaggregation as industrial 
group within a City would have to await further information*
We cannot analyse the other Steel Towns in quite 
the same detail (Table 5*6). But working from the District 
level urban figures we can say tha;t between 2/3rds and 
V*5ths the manufacturing populations were drawn from 
outside the locality with 35% or more of both the working 
and the specifically manufacturing population coming from 
other States. In the case of Durg (the home of the Bhilai 
steel plant) the proportion of the male population from 
another State reaches 58%* Bhilai is in the heart of 
Madhya Pradesh, a region of Scheduled Tribes and Castes 
(the lowest socio-economic group in the community). Its 
labour force was obtained from the South (Andhra Pradesh)
1 See Table 5•'16 , drawn from Government of India, Census of 
India 1971* Special Monograph No. 1, "Birthplace Migration",
‘ New Delhi* Outmigration from urban localities is increased 
by only 8 .5% if last residence is the criterion for migration 
status, rather than birthplace, in the case of intrar- 
District migrants; for those crossing State boundaries 
the difference falls to only 3 *0%* i.e. on average our 
estimate of the proportion of inter-State migrants from 
urban areas should increase by only 3% to account for 
"stepwise migration", provided that (i) the 1961 differences 
would be similar to those of 1 9 7 1* and (ii) the heavy 
engineering towns (in this case) are not exceptional in 
this respect.
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and the West (Mahaisshtra) predominantly from rural back­
grounds* A similar picture holds for all the Steel Town 
areas (Table 5*6), in marked contrast to our control,
Burdwan City, a mixed manufacturing and administrative 
centre* inter State migration is dominant* But the urban 
areas of Sundiargarh District, where Rourkela steel plant 
is located, are exceptional in having obtained the 
majority of long-distance migrants from urban areas, 
especially from urban Bihar and West Bengal. This 
phenomenon (not apparently a statistical error) may be 
related to the West German management of the plant. It 
was reported that little effort was made to seek out the 
necessary skills (not even those of carpenters, who were reported 
to be unobtainable in India!) , migrants from West Germany 
being readily resorted to. With such an attitude of mind 
would go the tendency to recruit in urban areas (where 
necessary skills might be thought to lie). Whatever the 
motivation in this .case, the point is thereby underlined 
that demand characteristics are quite important in explaining 
the origins of these huge work-forces. For there can be no 
reason to explain a greater supply of urban Biharxs to 
one steel plant, and of rural Biharis to another, both in 
neighbouring States to Bihar*
1 This anecdote is reported in a column in Economic and 
Political Weekly, Special Number, June i9 6 0.
In fact whether supply or demand features the 
more powerfully in explaining the distant (and usually 
rural) origins of these labour forces is of little concern 
to the basic argument: the point I am demonstrating
is that large industrial complexes promote the emergence 
of a multi-regional or multi-ethnic urban locality, with 
its potential for conflict in the future labour market 
(depending in part on differential proportions of children 
in the populations)* But idiosyncracies of demand may
'I
accentuate these effects*
1 It should be noted of course that the designation 
of "Other State" in the Census need not imply a 
particularly distant origin* Both Singbhunr District 
(Jamshedpur) and Durg District (Bhilai) border on 
neighbouring States* But what it does imply in the Indian 
context in many cases is a foreign origin in linguistic 
and cultural terms*
A stable labour force was clearly isquired for these 
public-sector steel plants* For a considerable investment 
was made in the men themselves. The target labour force 
had been 7,500 per plant. About l/7th were engineers', 
given preliminary training at Jamshedpur, then overseas.
The skilled workers and operatives were also given train­
ing, at existing steel or engineering works* In these 
circumstances a fairly careful recruitment scheme is to 
be expected. In other public sectors of heavy industry 
captive training schools were established in the late 1950s; 
the heavy electricals at Bhopal and heavy engineering at 
Ranchi are examples. About 10% of investment in the heavy . 
sector is for these training schools.
In contemporary Europe there is evidence that rural 
labour is favoured for new manufacturing plant owing to 
its relative docility. This is made explicit in replies to 
a survey (late 1960s); see F.M.Scherer et al», The Economics 
of Multi-Plant Operation. Harvard U.P., Massachusetts, 1975*
The time-honoured textile Cities of the Western.
States, Ahmedabad, Bombay, and Sholapur (to take three
notable examples) have not been drawing their labour from
so far afield# This is what we might expect from the
detailed historical work of Morris on the Bombay textile 
1
industry. But those fewer migrants who have travelled 
from afar are, as in the cases documented above, from 
rural backgrounds. The remaining Cities,in the sample 
we took,experienced even less long distance migration#
The reasons for this, however, are by no means uniform, 
and it is certainly not the case that they are all towns 
requiring only unskilled labour (available locally).
Asansol for instance is a modern manufacturing town, 
producing chemicals, glass, and bicycles; Poona has 
a mixed tradition of modern and less modern manufacturing, 
brass metal working and small-scale engineering#
It might be argued that an indicator of the demand 
for educated labour would be the proportion of migrant 
manufacturing labour coming from any urban area (more 
local, and distant). This we have graphed against a measure 
of education, basic literacy (Figure 5#2f* and Appendix 5 B),
1 M#D.#Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force s 
A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills 185^— 19^ -7, OUP,Bombay, 1
2. The City Sample is not random (as we indicated above).
Hence X have refrained from discussing statistical analysis 
in the body of this text. The pre-conditions for such 
work are simply not fulfilled. A major concern of this 
whole study is to focus on those cases that are at the 
spearhead of development, the crucial exceptional rather 
than the unimportant average experience. However, in the 
Appendix we do present the major statistical results.
The relationship is not a close one (the simple correlation 
between literacy and urban origins is 0.3)* At this date,
1 9 6 1, the weakness of the relationship is unlikely to 
be so much due to characteristics on the supply side 
(as it may become later), namely that literates would be 
offering themselves for jobs not inquiring literacy, 
having been brought up in a town and gained the 
qualification of literacy simply because there were more 
schools there. We shall see below that the picture is 
different by 1971* and certainly so by 1 9 8 1# We would 
conclude that recruitment of migrants from urban origins 
is necessary largely because of the skills required, or 
basis on which to create those skills, namely literacy; 
but that this is only a component in explaining urban to 
urban migration flows.
Since our interest is to develop an understanding 
of the overall demographic effect of industrialisation, 
we should ask what if any is the relationship between 
manufacturing workers and the urban work-force in general, 
including the trades and service workers* Are the former 
a typical group? Here some interesting observations arise. 
First (Figure 5*3)* generally speaking workers in manufacturing 
are no more likely to be migrant than are non-manufacturing 
workers* Furthermore, this relationship extends to the 
question of the source of labour supply in that manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing migrants from other States of origin
also correlate, across the Districts and the Cities under 
study (Figure 5#^; and for both these observations, Figures in 
Appendix 5B,1 and 2).
It seems clear that the larger the manufacturing 
content of the work-force in a given city, the larger 
its migrant content is, and, as we have just seen, 
the larger is the migrant component in both broad 
sectas of the work-force (manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing)* It seems that the desire and the need 
to search further afield are promoted by the onset of 
industrialisation, and especially heavy industrialisation, 
and in the process a source of labour supply is mobilised 
for all work-force sectors* This is the strongest con­
clusion to arise from our regression analysis (Appendix 5B).
An externality of industrialisation, one might argue,
is the development, if not the creation, of a labour 
1
market. To summarise then, the increased likelihood of 
multi-ethnicity (implied by distant origins) is promoted 
by rapid, and particularly by heavy, industrialisation.
Now beneath these -generalisations is revealed a 
more disturbing feature from some points of view. The 
Indian population has remained approximately 20% urban
2
throughout the twenty post-Independence years of our study.
1 And hence the relevance of the Todaro model referred to 
critically above may be enhanced the more indjEfcrialised an 
economy becomes: better information ensures a freer flow of 
labour.
2 In 1951 1 7.6% urban, 1961 18.3%, 1971 20.2% ; (in 1981 a 
clearer shift occurred: 2 3*7%)#
But its labour force in our industrialising region 
at least, when drawn from beyond the locality itself, 
has been drawn disproportionately from urban areas 
(according to birth), the mean values being 3 5*6% 
for the urban Districts in our study (and 28*5% for 
the City sample). This readily illustrates how India 
managed to remain close on 20% urban for two decades. 
Broadly speaking, industrialisation did not promote 
a transfer of labour from rural to urban areas in 
proportional terms, despite a rural natural increase 
that was only modest by traditional population growth 
standards, at between 2 and 2 annually). However, 
if we take the newly industrialising towns separately, 
the tendency is for the workforce to be more predominantly 
rural in origin, and especially so in the case of 
heavy industrialisation. This is because rapid growth 
on nearly green-field sites reduces dramatically the 
proportion of local urban self-recruitment that is 
possible in the labour force* But it is certainly not 
clear that the migrants to these engineering towns 
are substantially less than average (less than 2 0%) 
from urban origins, as Table 5*6 on Steel Towns indicated. 
There are two counter forces, to recap the argument.
The requirement for skills (or at least for literacy) 
and the substitution of capital for labour both encourage
less re-allocation from rubai to urban areas, whereas the 
desire for a captive and potentially passive labour 
enclave may favour a continuing transfer* The substitution 
will continue as long as the price of capital is kept, 
or is perceived to be, relatively low (or so long as the 
value of its product, shielded from world markets, is 
kept artificially high)*
As we have shown, the age structure of current 
migrants is not uniform., The generalisation that the majority 
are aged 20-3^ hides variation. We have already discussed 
to what degree those variations are determined by 
differing occupational requirements. In the late 1950s 
a modern industry favoured the younger end of the 
age-group# Seen in conjunction with policies on recruitment 
outlined above, the influence of distance alone on 
age-structure is a combination of factors. According to 
the National Sample Survey (Table 5*1) adult migrants 
from far afield turn out to be younger than those who 
travel a shorter distance. The same is true of adult 
migrants from urban origins of afar (though urban migrants 
are generally older than rural migrants). This is all to 
be expected if the more local migrants are attracted in 
by the developing opportunities, to work in the non-wage
1 M. Weiner has suggested that the potential for ethnic 
conflict may worsen as the rapid urbanisation increases 
the volume of migrants. If however the rate of urbanisation 
stagnates, the proportion of native-born rises. But the 
sons of the migrants are typically regarded as migrants still 
(in v/hich case differential fertility, sex, and age structure 
are what matter). M.Weiner, Sons of the Soil,Princeton, 1978 
(noted above).
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sector, often from the poorest backgrounds, and without
land; they will be young and old alike. But all these
would be insecure grounds on which to predict the
demographic effects of any particular industrial 
1
investment. There can be no substitute for a knowledge 
of recruitment policy and local labour market conditions.
The seeds of change were sown in the 19^0 to 1970 
decade. The disproportionate advance in secondary 
education affected the supply of labour significantly.
The graduates of "captive" training institutions began 
to multiply, reducing the need to search beyond the 
locality for literate labour. This, if no other reason, 
might account for the fall in migrant manufacturing 
workers (see below); given that supply does not readily 
respond to changing demand conditions, the fall may be 
less in other worker categories. Aggregate All-India data 
indicate a dramatic increase in registered non-manufacturing 
employment in urban areas during the decade., especially 
in the public sector. Manufacturing employment on the other 
hand only crept up, and in the private sector did not register 
any change at all. Whereas the urban population increased 
by 3 7*9% over the decade, the number of urban-dwellers
1 Rather bold inferences on the migrant composition of an 
industrial project are drawn by D.Lal on the basis of 
aggregate regressions: D.Lal, Prices for Planning, Heinemann, 
London, 1 9 8 0.
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claiming to have been born elsewhere increased by only 
3 0.8%, and those from rural areas alone by only 2 8 .3%.
Although misreporting of place of birth, and differential 
fertility and mortality, make direct comparison difficult, 
this evidence strongly suggests that the rural to urban 
transfer was stagnating (Table 5*9)* Furthermore, the 
State of West Bengal (and to a lesser extent Madhya 
Pradesh) seems to have born the brunt of stagnation 
as far as the region of our study is concerned*
Orissa, Bihar, and in Western India Maharashtra, have 
continued to experience tangible transfers of population 
from rural to urban areas (Table 5 *1 0). More detailed 
figures now available for Maharashtra indicate the decreased 
migrant component most clearly in the category of manufacturing 
(data also available for Gujarat), even in some of the cases 
where the manufacturing work-force was increasing proportionally 
to the rest (as in the Cities of new industry, like 
Baroda, Thana, Ulhasnagar, and Poona). To aggravate the 
excess supply there are always periods of severe agricultural 
conditions. The droughts in Maharashtra of the late 1960s 
help account for the increase in migrants among the workforce 
in the cases of Poona and Sholapur, despite their conspicuous 
absence in manufacturing industry (Table 5*3)# Only very grad­
ually do these people succeed in competing with the rest for
a
jobs in the latter, generally favoured, sector. Such
1 See further in Chapter 8 below an analysis of inter-sectoral 
mobility. The case of the drought refugees is documented 
in M.M.Bapat, "Occupational and Spatial Mobility among 
Shanty Dwellers in Poona", Ph.D. thesis, University College, 
London, 1979*
migrants are by necessity predominantly local, and 
generally of all ages (i.e. representative of the rural 
age structure) except that the weakest, be they young 
or old, do not survive to reach the haven of the City.
The problem of adjustment to a greater supply of 
not always appropriate education was already being faced 
locally in the late 1950s. Above we have commented on the 
high proportion of secondary school matriculates employed 
in the residual manufacturing categories, or in non-skill 
intensive activities (like milling and baking), who are 
resident in centres of higher education and training 
(geared to the expansion of heavy industry) like Ranchi 
in Bihar* By 1970 the sons and brothers of the migrants 
are beginning to matriculate (though it is not until the 
late 1 970s that the full effects of the migrant cohorts 
will begin to become apparent). A glance at the proportions 
of matriculates in the various occupations in the case 
of Bihar (Table 5*1^), or in the various industries in 
the case of Madhya Pradesh (Table 5.15)» indicates the 
extent to which the process has gone. Ranchi District 
still stands out. The production workers have “quadrupled 
their educational achievement over the decade. But at 
the same time the residual workers increased theirs too
in contrast to other Districts in the State* Furthermore 
the Service occupations witnessed a doubling in the 
proportion of matriculates. From first-hand experience 
Weiner comments on this phenomenon in Ranchi City:
"An afternoon walk around the movie houses in Ranchi 
....reveals where most of the unemployed matriculates 
hang out. They constitute not just a reserve labour pool, 
but a reserve political pool as well." He is thinking of . 
the disturbances in Calcutta in the .late 1960s. His own 
study in the Chota Nagpur region indicates clearly how
2
the migration process ends up in potential ethnic conflict. —  
In the mid1970s the Chief Mechanical Engineer of Chittaranjan 
Locomotive works told me how that town too was suffering 
from an over-expansion of education among the young.
We might add here that the pent-up energy could more 
usefully be channelled elsewhere than in the direction 
of ethnic conflict. In the 1920s at Jamshedpur Sikhs 
and Biharis joined hands versus the management; many 
of their demands were constructive: the new civil township
was built following the—disturbances (though the. connection 
between the two would require careful investigation).
But the overall effect was to render labour more costly
1 M,Weiner, Sons of the Soil, Princeton, 1978, cited in 
note above*, page 18 -^.
2 Note my qualification on that judgement in note on 
M,Weiner above.
in the eyes of the management* The crucial test of the 
long-term constructiveness of such frustration would be 
if it led to the promotion of increased real investment in 
the regions concerned. The short-term effect is unfortunately 
the opposite, as the case of stagnation in West Bengal 
eloquently testifies. The District of Singbhum in 
Bihar, however, seems to have used its matriculated 
labour more efficiently, . in •' . that it has reduced
the proportions of matriculates in the residual category. 
Turning finally to Madhya Pradesh, all the industrial 
sectors expanded their use of matriculate labour at 
least as much as did the manufacturing sector; and the 
residual sector nearly doubled its percentage of these 
secondary school graduates* In an atmosphere such as this 
the new migrant sees his prospect of employment diminish.
And the older migrant becomes less likely to see his sons 
follow in their father’s footsteps at the spearhead of 
the industrial labour force. The prospects of migrating out, 
with a special skill to offer, from Bihar to Gujarat 
(for instance) are as remote as are the days when the 
Gujarati shipbuilders built the furnaces of Jamshedpur.
A Note on the Relationship between the 
Fastest and the Slowest Growing Areas
It would be of interest to know whether, other 
things like accessability being equal, the fastest 
growing urban localities tend to draw a disproportionate 
amount of their population from the slowest growing urban 
localities* In Chapters 7 and 8 we point to the problem 
of maintaining urban infrastructure in towns that lose 
their potentially most productive members (typically 
young males in the Indian culture). If these outmigrants 
tend to go to the new growth areas, and to form their 
families there, they incur the costs of new dwellings, 
and this may reduce their ability to support the urban 
family of origin (typically the older members). They 
also incur the risks of an uncertain future in a town that 
has yet to establish itself on a secure diversified base. 
For a time this family nexus between new towns and 
declining towns would be especially insecure in that 
neither side could easily assist the other.
It is not possible to trace migration flows 
between towns. But the Census does enable us to 
construct migration flows between the aggregate urban
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areas of Districts where the State Census authorities 
have undertaken these tabulations* So far this restricts 
us to Bihar in 1961, and Orissa in 1971, which we 
s t u d y  (Tables ^ 11 and 5»12; data are also published for 
Maharashtra in 1971)* There is no question of an extreme 
concentration of migrants from slow-growth areas making 
their presence in fast-growth areas. For example 
(Table 5*11* and refer to Figure 1.7) Dhanbad has 
taken 2 ,5 0 0 of its migrants from Patna and Gaya together, 
1000 from Monghyr, and 600 from distant Shahabad (all urban 
Districts): over time this has amounted to less than
1% of Gaya's 1961 population, or 17% of its life-time 
outflow, and about -J-% of Shahabad's and of Monghyr's, 
or 11% and 18% of their outflows respectively* Only 
Patna in our sample has attracted percentages as large 
as these (taking 23% of Gaya's outflow and 3^% of nearby 
Shahabad's; Patna is of course the State capital, is 
well diversified in economic activity, and until the 
1951-61 decade its District's urban population was far 
larger than Dhanbad*s. Ranchi and Singbhum, the other 
fast-growing Districts take a similarly small percentage 
of Gaya's urban population as does Dhanbad.
For Orissa the data date from 1971 j by which time 
the Districts have lost their homogeneous qualities, 
for which they were originally selected for study; 
also by this date there are no slow-growing Districts 
as such. The best we can do with the material is to 
express the in-migration flows as a percentage of out­
migration flow from a District. We note that Cuttack, 
Bolangir and Ganjam lost most population, Cuttack contains 
the State capital and has always had a large urban 
population. But the other two localities were based 
on agro-industry and were fairly slow-growing in the 
1 9 5 1 -6 1 decade. Sundargarh (the District of Rourkela Steel 
Town) takes a substantial proportion (13*7%) of Bolangir's 
outflow (but not surprisingly in view of its proximity), 
and 1^.5% of Mayurbanj's. But Cuttack takes proportionally 
more (despite its less precipitous development than the Steel 
Town area) with Zk% of Mayurbanj's and 20% of Ganjam's out­
migration heading there*
To reiterate, there is not an extreme concentration 
of migrants from any one District of origin in the heavy 
industrial Districts. They do tend to attract slightly 
higher proportions of the outflows of the declining 
Districts than do other areas generally with the 
exception of the State capital Districts, which contain 
large diversified towns. And there is a lack of
concentration around the diagonal in Figure 5*11 that 
would occur if pure proximity were a dominant determinant 
of inter-District migration. The question that we cannot 
answer is whether 15% of a Districts urban outflow is 
indicative of high degrees of concentration at the level 
of the town: is 50% of a single town's out-migration
concentrated on a single destination like Rourkela for 
example? Only more detailed disaggregation than the 
Census allows would reveal whether there is a network 
of vulnerability stretching back from the monocultural 
centres of production and spreading out to the weakest 
towns, without the moderate-growth and more diversified 
towns playing a mediating role.
Figure 5*1
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Figures 5*2 to 5*5
The Relationships between Migrant Workers, their Origins, 
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gable 5.1
Profile of Current KiKrauts to Urban Areas
Kale migrants 
from rural origins 
(Number in brackets,
with % of all male Age Distribution (%*)
migrants to urban 1 1«4 5-17 18~24 25~34 35“^ -4 45+ *
areas)
From
3 4 .3 0 20,2? 14.38
2 8 ,9 2 23.05 16 .81
27 .81 23.69 18 .2 2
Same District 3*13 8 .1? 33,28 18.?4 20,04 9.18 7*36
(2127 33*0$)
Another District 3*27 7.70 1 8 .5 6 37.37 18,42 9.77 4.91
(1134 17.6*0
Another State 1 .6 6 5.43 17,72 33.26 2 3 .1 6 11.45 7 ,3 2
( 655 10.30
The same repeated for females 





Male migrants from 
urban origins 
From
Same District 4.07 13.03 26.93 13.34 23.22 11.93 7.48
( 850 13.2*0
Another District 1.46 8.81 22.92 2 3 .2 5 2 2 .5 5 12.13 8 ,8 8
(1063 16.5£)
Another State 2.30 9*99 24.34 2 2 .5 3 22.40 10.79 7.65
( 567 8.8*0
All male migrants to urban areas (in sample) *
(6450 100.0*5) Rows BUm
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Dept, of Economic Affairs,
National Sample Survey No, 182 (1964), Tables with Notes on 
Internal Migration, New Delhi, 1972.
2 6 1
Table 5*2
Age Distribution of male migrants by Occupation 
in Ahmedabad City C 1,961)
Age Distributions recorded for two age-groups (by occupation) 
only: 15-34, 35-59* Percentages for all age
groups would sum to 100* Recorded for one age group (by industry).
Duration of Residence Duration of Res*











































































Trade 15-34 68 72
Not Described
15-34 69 75
Sources: Derived from Government of India, Census of India 1961.
Gujarat, Special Migration Tables for Ahmedabad City,
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to the Durg Steel Town Area
Age Distributions (%) (male migrants 1 9^1)
all durations
Furnacemen illiterates literate but uneducated
0 -1 if 00 00 00
1 8if 77 83
35-59 15 22 17
60+ 00 00 00
number
5090 100&* 10t$* 10Q&* •subject to
^illiterate 27.3 rounding
Construction Workers
0-1*+ 01 02 00
15-3^ 72 69 72
35-59 25 27 26
60+ 03 02 00
number
2339 100 100 100
^illiterate 51.^
Electricians
0-1  ^ 00 00 00
15-31* 86 79 8i+
35-59 1^ 20 16
60+ 00 00 00
number
3069 100 100 100
^illiterate 13.7
• c-> re» £= 9 e* e- **■ ■*» e» c* tm M
Source: Derived from Government of India, Census of India 1961
Madhya Pradesh, Migration Tables, New Delhi, Table D IV*
Table 3 .5
Sex Ratios in Industries in Bilaspur and Durg
Bilaspur District (urban) Durg District (urban)
Sex i^ atio (f:m) of workers Sex ratio of workers
Household Non-household House* Non-house#
Industry
All workers (number in brackets)
0.795 0.257 0.595 0*193
(m5010 f398if511137295 f9573 m3374 f2008511185138 f16454)
Tobacco 1.476 0.581 1.647 1.418
Construction - 0 .2 1 8 - 0 .2 7 0
Cotton Textile 1 .0 9 8 - - 0 .161
Misc. Textile 0*32? 0.047 O.138 0 .051
Leather Goods 0.336 0 .2 6 0 0 .281 0 .221
Metal Goods 0 .2 3 6 0 .0 2 0 0.131 0 .0 2 3
Source: Derived from Government of India, Census of India 1961, 
Madhya Pradesh, General Economic Tables, New Delhi, 
Table B IV C.
Table 5*6
Areas of Origin among Migrants to Steel Towns
27 0









Numbers 59342 83566b 122185 88624 29326
Proportion
Migrant 0*71 0 .8 6 0.74 0.84 0.65
From within 
the District: 
Urban areas 0*0 6 0 .0 1 0.03 0 .0 2 0.03
Rural areas 0 .0 8 0 .11 0.13 0.09 0 .1 0
From another 
State:
Urban areas 0 *2 0 0 .1 7 0*08 0 .11 0.04
Rural areas 0 .1 8 0.41c 0.27 0.33 0 .1 3
(the rest 0.19 0 *16 0*23 0.29 0.35)
Notes to this section: a excludes Asansol and Burdwan Cities;
includes Burnpur Steel Town area*
b Total Male Population, and proportions 
thereof, throughout this column,
(due to data limitations)*









































0.14 0.57 0.50 0.59 0/5i
Notes to this section: a workforce data n/a, only male population
data.
b including intra-State migrants, not 
recorded above.
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961. relevant States,
Migration Tables, New Delhi, Table D VI for Orissa, Bihar, 
and West Bengal, Table D V for Madhya Pradesh.
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Areas of Origin among Steel-workingph— r— is i nim in i     i« itiwi j ■ ipii i Mi winwu I ■! iinni t1 ■■iimrmnTi—irr-*-^-
Migrants to Jamshedpur
Migrants from Outside 
the State of Bihar:




Number in Iron 
& Steel 12>83
Iron & Steel Migrant 
workers as # of 
Manufacturing Migrant 
workers 62#,












Iron 8c Steel Migrant 
workers as % of 
all Migrant workers 37# 31#
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961.
Bihar, Special Migration Tables for Jamshedpur, 
New Delhi*
Secondary Education among Unclassified Labourers
in Industrialising Cities (Migrants)
West Bengal Proportion Maharashtra
Matriculate
Burdwan 0 .0 1 Thana 0 .0 1
Asansol 0.05 Ulhasnagar 0.04
Howrah 0 .0 1 Nasik 0 .0 1
Calcutta 0 .0 0 Sholapur 0.03
Bihar Nagpur 0 .0 1
Poona 0 .0 1
Gaya 0 .0 6 Bombay 0 .0 1
Patna 0 .0 0 Gujarat
Jamshedpur 0 .0 5
Ranchi 0 ,0 1 Baroda 0 .0 0
Madhya Pradesh Ahmedabad 0 .0 1
Durg 0 .0 1
Bhopal 0 .0 0
Source: Government of India, Census of India 19&1. 
Migration Tables, Delhi, Table D IV.
Table 5*9
Urbanward Migration in India; Comparison of two Censuses
Lifetime migration according to place of birth; 
numbers in millions, % decadal change in brackets
Male Female
1961 1971 1961 1971
Rural
to
Urban 10*3 13.0 (26.2) 9o1 11.9 (30.8)
Urban
to
Urban 5.3 7.1 (34.0) 5.5 7.5 (36.4)
(Urban to Rural
1 .8 3.0 (66.7) 3.0 5.1 (70.0 ) )
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971.
Special Monograph No. 1, Birth-Place Migration, Delhio
Table 5.10
Migration and Areas of Origin in Five States under Study: 
Contrasts between the Censuses
MAHARASHTRA
% born:
In Same urban 
Area

















1 0 0 .0

























Urban Population Place Distribution of Migration 
of Birth (males) Streams (males)
1961 197^  1961 1971




Area 59.0 65.9 R-U 15 17
In Same U-R 2 2
District 14.2 10 .2 U-U 3 3
In Another 







TP. 23.3 2 8 .8
ORISSA
% born: R-R 84 83





District 17.8 17.3 U-U 4 2
In Another 100 100
District 12.4 15.6 N. 1.3 1.9
In Another 
State 1 2 .0
1 0 0 .0
1 2 .2
1 0 0 .0
TP. 8 .8 1 1 .0
WEST BENGAL
% born: R-R 76 78
In Same Urban 
Area 45.5 6 2 .7
R-U 15 11
In Same U-R 2 4
District 6 .1 3.5 U-U 7 5
In Another 100 100
District 9.3 6.7 N. 5.5 5 .1
In Another 
State 2 3 .0 15.1
TP. 1 8 .6 2 3 .5
1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0
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Urban Population Place Distribution of Migration
of Birth (males) Streams (males)

















• • 00 *u7
TP.1 6 .6 2 1*'k
p
Notes: millions, and similarly for all rows N. and IP*
R = rural, U = urban
N* = Absolute number of male migrants
TP* = Total male population of the State
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971§
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Sex Ratios among Recent Migrants
Census 19&1 (f' tm) 










0 .^ 9 6
(3916)
Urban-Urban O.8 1 6 0.911 0.999
(792) (1791) (2if8 0)
Note: Census figures in thousands
Sources: NSS - National Sample Survey (see Table 5.1 )
Census - Government of India, Census of India 19&1. 
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Table 5 .1 6
Migrant Origin According to Place of Birth and 
Place of Last Residence
1971 Number of outraigrants from Urban Areas 
(in millions)
Males % difference Females 
between PB & LR
difference 
between PB & LR

























Notes: PB - place of birth
LR - place of last residence
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971 .





Appendix 5A, The Regression to Explain 
Female Migration
The following was obtained from 29 'observations of the 
Study Sample of Urban District areas in Eastern India;
Average unweighted data from the sample:
male migration rate (current) 6 ,7*+% sex ratio current _
average male migration rate over
previous 5 years (1 -5 duration) 3 .12% sex ratio of
Female migrants of less than 
one year’s duration 9 6*+ 0 ,3 2*male migrants of lessthan one year’s duration
+ 0 ,1 7*male migrants of 1 -5 years 
duration
0 ,0 6 2  male migrants of 6 -1 0 years 
duration,p
IT  -  0.32
* sign, 0,05
migrants 0 .6^  (f:m)
sex ratio population (urban)
0.802
migrants (1-5) 0.7*+7
Note: see Figure 1.1 for sample.
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Appendix 5*B Statistical Analysis of Male Migration 
Patterns# Discussion on Methodology
Strict random sampling has not been undertaken for 
either the City sample or the Homogeneous District sample#
Hence the validity of variance analysis and significance 
testing is open to question# The City sample was chosen 
in such a way as to maximise the contrasts in the industrial 
and occupational characteristics of the populations. The 
District sample on the other hand is distorted only in the 
sense that only those Districts were included that fulfilled 
our requirements of homogeneity, or contained a City of 
100,000 people or more (as explained in the Appendix to 
Chapter 1), This distortion is not so serious. But in addition 
it must be remembered that our study region focuses on an 
area of heavy industrialisation, and hence is not represent­
ative of All-India#
The employment patterns we observe are a product of 
both supply of and the demand for labour, A simple supply 
function would be such as is illustrated in Figure 5B,Ma).
In any particular District the demand for non-agricultural 
labour would shift rightward depending in particular, we 
would postulate, on the size of the manufacturing sector 
in general and the size of the heavy industrial sector in 
particular (for these together have spearheaded the non-
agricultural growth in our region and our period, whereas 
expansion in commercial activities has tended to follow 
rather than lead that growth). Demand on this scale would 
soon exhaust the supply of local labour at low wage levels, 
so that the same analysis extends to other Districts in the 
same State, and to other States (Figure 5B,*+(b)), If we 
disaggregate further, we postulate that the demand for 
labour of specifically urban origin would also shift 
rightward (Figure 5B,*f(c)), depending on factors related 
to the character of the industry in the District(i)* 
we have postulated that a rightward shift occurs if high 
levels of education are required in manufacturing industry, 
and, in the extreme, that no shift occurs if they'are not, 
or if the potential malleability or docility of a rural 
workforce is actually preferred, (this consideration also 
might determine the shift to other States of origin, in 
addition to insufficient supply). It is postulated that the 
latter considerations will tend to dominate more in the case 
of heavy industry (in basic metals production and engineering) 
than in manufacturing generally: there will be more rural
labour and it will be from further afield.
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We throw some light on these hypotheses by observing 
the size of the correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ) 
and the significance (and value) of regression coefficients 
qualifying variables that can be derived from the Census 
data. These variables amount to: the male labour force 
engaged in manufacturing, and, of that, the component in 
heavy engineering; the proportion of the labour force that 
is migrant, and those from other States by birth, and the 
component that comes from urban areas (again by birth); 
for the City sample we have data on the literacy of migrants. 
How shifts in labour demand just described will affect the 
expected corfelations between these variables is illustrated 
in Figure 5B,*+(d), It is hypothesised that there will be 
more migration if there is more manufacturing industry in 
the urban economy, and there will be more migration from 
far afield in this case, and especially if there is heavy 
industry; there will be more migration from urban areas if 
there is manufacturing industry, but heavy industry may 
promote the use of rural labour; and urban migration will 
be associated with literacy.
The greatest risk with this methodology is that the 
assumption of identical supply functions in each District 
or each State may not hold good. For within these aggregate 
supply functions there will be different components of
1 It has been necessary to exclude Madhya Pradesh from 
some of the tests due to a peculiar data deficiency in 
the publication of the 1961 Census volumes on migration 
for this State,
2labour from different backgrounds, more Backward Classes 
in some local areas than in others for instance, and perhaps 
more enveloped information networks in some areas* If these 
supply schedules are not similar, then our observations on 
changing composition of the labour actually employed are 
not based on the changing composition of demand alone, but also 
on the changing composition of supply* Estimation of 
coefficients becomes impossible. Worse still, the supply 
schedules, if not similar, ms,y not be independent of demand, 
in that better information networks, for instance, may 
exist in areas of heavy industry, in which case the coefficients 
in the equations we estimate will be biased. The root of 
these difficulties is the identification problem (and the 
possible bias is illustrated in the model in Figure
The other problem of interpretation is that of the 
^ecological fallacy”. Just because manufacturing towns are 
associated with long distance migrants does not mean that 
manufacturing migrants themselves come from long distances, 
or, if they do, that they alone do so. Where possible the actual 
industrial employment of the migrants themselves is considered 
in the testsj the possibility that manufacturing and non­
manufacturing migrants come from similar origins arose in the 
course of analysis, giving rise to further tests also reported 
below.
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Finally we should not wish to attach too great a 
significance to the predictive value of the intercept in 
the regression. We have too few observations close to the 
origin (i.e. in the range of 10% of workers in manufacturing 
for instance) to be confident how any relationship may 
behave in this region: the assumption of linearity may 
simply break down. We cannot confidently say, therefore, 
if the intercept suggests that 2 0% of workers are migrant 
(when there is no manufacturing), that this represents 
exogenous supply, that is those subject to rural push factors 
or urban natural increase alone*
Analysis: the following correlations can be reported:
Correlation Coefficient
The proportion of workers in manufacturing
by the proportion of workers of urban origin - * 6 3 5  (D)
-.572 (C)
The proportion^of manufacturing workers in
heavy industry by the proportion of workers
of urban origin -*M+5 (D)
The proportion of workers in manufacturing by
the proportion of migrants of urban origin + .3 7 9 (Df)
(Figure 5B.3)
The proportion of manufacturing workers in
heavy industry by the proportion of migrants
of urban origin +.176 (D')
(Fig. 5B.3)
The proportion of migrants in manufacturing
by the proportion of migrants of urban origin +.030 (C)
The proportion of migrants who are illiterate 
by the proportion of migrants of urban origin -*310 (C)
Mean value of urban origin of migrants 35.6% (D)
2 8.5% (C)
(Fig. 5.2)
The growth rate of the urban population 
(male and female) by the proportion of 
workers in manufacturing + .12*f (D) 
+.1*f8 (D‘)
The growth rate of the urban population
by the proportion of manufacturing workers
in heavy industry +#579 (D)
+#527 (D»)
The growth of the urban population by the
proportion of workers in heavy manufacturing
industry +*^05 (D)
The proportion of manufacturing migrants from 
another State by the proportion of non­
manufacturing migrants from another State +#92^f (D)
(Figure 5B.2)
The proportion of manufacturing workers who
are migrant by the proportion of non-manufacturing
workers who are migrant +#832 (D)
(Figure 5B.1)
Notes: a The male population is referred to throughout
unless otherwise specified. "Migrants"-"Working men".
D This is the "Homogeneous District" sample (Chapter 
1 Appendix)| Figure 1.1.
D' As D, but omitting Madhya Fradesh (see text above).
C This is the "City" sample (see Chapter 5 above):
Figure 1#2*
b Manufacturing Industry excludes Household
Manufacturing, and Heavy Manufacturing Industry 
includes rubber, petroleum, & coal products, chemicals 
and products, structural clay products & cement, 
basic metals & products, machinery, & transport equip.
A Summary
The new, largely manufacturing, areas derive their 
workforce from a predominantly rural background due above 
all to the small existing urban base in these manufacturing 
areas, making it impossible to recruit from the urban natural 
increase alone: this is especially true of heavy industry.
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There is little clear determination of the origin, whether 
rural or urban, of the migrants themselves, but, by All- 
India standards, they are generally over-represented in 
the category of urban origin (i.e. more than 20% are from 
such origins). But although manufacturing areas have large 
proportions of migrants from urban areas, the migrants 
themselves in those cases are not particularly likely to be 
employed in manufacturing. And in the case of heavy manu­
facturing areas, there is virtually no association between 
the large numbers of heavy industrial workers in those areas 
and the urban origins of the migrants. Furthermore, manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing workers are highly correlated both in 
respect of migrancy and in the distance of that migrancy 
(i.e. proportion from another State). This suggests that 
migrants who are responding to a direct demand for manufacturing 
labour (that is neither met by natural increase in the towns, 
nor from within the same State) encourage the migration of 
others from the same origins to find employment in the trades 
and services sectors. An information network is thus 
established; (and this throws into doubt the true independence 
of the demand and supply schedules).
2 8 2
Analysis: the following regressions were undertaken:
% workers of urban birth = 7 1.2 ** -6 2.5** % workers in ^
manufacturing (D) R .40
» = 7 0.6 ** -64.4* " (C) R2#53
" - 6 6 ,0** -25,4* % manufacturing workers
in heavy industry (D) R *2 0
% migrants of urban birth = 2 9*2** +6 6 .8 (*) % workers in
manufacturing -4,3 % manufacturing workers in heavy 2
industry (D) R *16
% migrants of urban birth = 48.6** -120,5(*) % migrants 2
who are illiterate +3 8 ,5  % migrants in manufacturing (C) R *1 6
Mean value of urban origin of all workers: 57% (D)
Mean value of urban origin of all migrants: 38% (D)
% workers who are migrants from other States
= 40.1 +77*4** % workers in 2
manufacturing (C) R *66
% migrants who are from other States
- 8 -^ *0 ( * ) +5 9.6 * % workers in 
manufacturing +1 8.2 (*) % manufacturing workers in 2
heavy industry (D1) R ,55
% migrants who are from other States
_ -18,5** +1 0 2,2** % workers in 2
heavy manufacturing (D1) R .49
Notes: as for correlations above, and 
** significant at level ,01  
* significant at level .0 5  
(*) significant at level .1 0
Summary
The significance of manufacturing industry as a 
determinant of rural migration to urban areas in our region 
is confirmed, with a suggestion that it is chiefly heavy 
manufacturing that accounts for this, and that other 
manufacturing would be as likely to acquire recruits from
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urban centres, particularly if literacy were required* 
Manufacturing is also significant in promoting long-distance 
migration, and again this is probably more likely if the 
manufacturing is heavy. The reliable coefficients have 
values (indicating elasticites) of between •§■ and 1: for
example, if one doubled the proportion of heavy industry in 
employment in a town, one would double the proportion of 
migrants from other States, and if one doubled the proportion 
of manufacturing in general, one would reduce the .urban-born 
proportion of the workforce by about two-thirds (through vastly 
increasing migration generally, not through selecting rural 
migrants specifically, except perhaps in the case of heavy 
industry). If there was little manufacturing, and hence 
little migration, it seems that over two-thirds of the work­
force would be urban-born (mainly within the same town) but 
that a small proportion would still be migrant from rural 
areas (as one would expect in poor agricultural areas like 
parts of Bihar): but we argued above that the constant terms 
are not quantitatively reliable. Finally it must be remembered 
that our interest is on the demographic effects of industr­
ialisation: we do not wish to argue that all demographic
effects are due to this cause, and indeed in our regressions 
only between -J and •§■ of the dependent (demographic) variable's 
squared variation is explained by the manufacturing component
in the Districts1 urban areas. The strongest single 
conclusion is that heavy industry has promoted inter-State 
migration*
It should be clear from elsewhere in this study that 
migration is regarded as an important social phenomenon in 
itself* It is the uprooting of a way of life, whether 
temporarily or permanently, and, with the ageing of the migrants, 
often irrevocably* But migration is also symptomatic of other 
social phenomena: it has been suggested that migrants from
urban origins, migrants from distant origins, and migrants 
from local origins, may fall into three fairly distinct social 
groups in terms of education and other assets* A completely 
new data set would need to be created in the field, to examine 
the relationship between industrialisation and these more 
definitive categories. Hopefully we have at least pointed 
interested researchers and census takers in that direction.
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Figures 5B*1 to 5B*3
The Relationships between Migrants, their Origins, and 
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Figure 5B**f
The Migrant Labour Model
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Table 5B.1
































Proportion from each origin,
Same District, Other District, Other State; 
column sums to 1 .0 0
Proportion from Urban origin in each row; 

















































Midnapore SD 0.51 0.32




Durg* SD 0.27 0 .1 1
OD 0.13 0.44
OS 0 .6 1 0,31
0 ,2 8
Bilaspur SD 0 .4-4 0 .1 2
OD 0 .2 1 0.45
OS 0.35 0.53
0.33
Raigarh SD 0.33 0 .1 1
OD 0 .3 0 0.29
OS 0.37 0.41
0.27
Bastar SD 0.31 0.14
OD 0.23 0 .5 8
OS 0.46 0.46
0.39
* For within-District 




Patna SD 0.39 0 .2 6
OD 0.^9 0 .2 0
OS 0 .1 2 0.56
0.2?





SD 0 .1 6 0.15




SD 0 .2 8 0 .1 6
OD 0.^3 0.35
OS 0 .2 8 0 .5 2
0.3*f
Dhanbad
SD 0 .1 1 0 .3 1










OD 0.25 0 .2*f
OS 0.17 0.33
A B
Other urban areas in Singbhum
SD 0.31 0.3?
OD 0.25 0 .2 8
OS 0.^3 0.33
0.33
Other urban areas in Ranchi
SD 0 .^ 6 0 .2 0
OD 0.35 0 .2 8





























O .1 3 0.50
0.31
0.^9 O .0 5
0 .2 8 0 .2 0
0 .2 0 0.23
0.13
0.54 0.38
0 .3 1 0.49
0.14 0 .6 8
0.45
0*46 0.35
0 .2 3 0.43
0 .3 0 0 .5 0
0.41
0.39 0 .0 0
0.55 0 .2 6
0 .0 5* 0.52*
(0.17)
0 .2 7  0.3^
0.18 0.39




Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961.
(relevant States), Migration Tables, Delhi*
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Table 5B.2
The Urban Origins of the Urban Workforce
% of Total Male % of Total Male Ratio of Urban to
Workers who were Workers who were Rural among Male
born in an Urban bom in another Workers bom in
Area State another State
WEST BENGAL
24-Parganas* 42.4 2 6 .0 0 .2 6
Calcutta 40.1 31*1 0 .2 3
Howrah* 39.6 41.2 0 .1 2
Hoogley 39*5 39*8 0 .2 0
Burdwan* 44.5 30.9 0 .31
Birbhum 51*8 15.3 0.24
Bankura 6 7 .5 6.7 0.45
Midnapore 6 5 .2 11.5 0.33
BIHAR
Patna 64.3 5.3 0 .9 1
Gaya 71.1 3.4 0 .7 2
Shahabad 66.1 7.8 0 .3 8
Bhagalpur 73*8 3.8 0 .7 0
Ranchi* 61.4 13.7 0 .81
Dhanbad* 2 7 .2 24.4 0 .2 5
Singbhum* 36.5 40.7 O.3 6
Monghyr 74.0 4.1 0 .7 0
ORISSA
Ganjam 71.9 17.2 0 .9 0
Sundargarh* 6 1 .9 38.3 1 .0 8
Cuttack* 71*2 55.5 1 .0 0
Majurbanj* 48.0 15*0 0 .2 6
Bolangir 70.7 7.0 2.48
B-K 6 2 .9 2 .9 0 .7 8
Note:* 1951-1961 decadal increase in urban population over 50#
Sources Government of India, Census of India. 1961. (relevant States), 
Migration Tables, Delhi
A brief Overview of Chapter 5
From this Chapter we can say that migrant origins, 
near or afar, rural or urban, and migrant age and sex 
composition, are all in part the result of recruitment 
strategy; these factors reduce further the ability of 
future labour markets to equilibrate supply and demand 
in rapidly growing towns of the present, due to the 
resultant inflexibility (barring major outmigrations) 
in future labour supply. Indirectly at least the new 
growth areas contribute to the loss of urban population 
in the stagnating areas.
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CHAPTER 6
The Region of Eastern India's Industrial Belt: 
Demographic Structure and its Development over Time
Empirical Overview
The short-run evolution of our Eastern Region of 
India is looked at in dynamic demographic terms over the 
1961 - 1971 decade: comparisons and contrasts with the
predictions of the models are noted* Two or three points of 
some importance emerge: first the rapidity with which
females become attached to the initial male migrants 
in the rapidly growing New-town areas (like the Steel Towns); 
secondly the large proportion of migrants that have arrived 
within the last twelve months (preceding 1961), especially 
in the more slowly growing mature towns, suggesting high 
rates of "turnover" migration! thirdly, even in a population 
like India's of moderate natural increase, the age structure 
developing in the most stagnant urban centres, with some of 
the characteristics of depressed localities (e.g. an 
increasingly old age structure), as currently experienced in 
England.
We also note how the lowest caste groups among migrants 
(probably of local origin) have failed to.penetrate the 
manufacturing sector in the newly industrialising areas, 
and are well represented in the stagnating towns and in 
mining areas. Finally we note that the rise in the proportions 
of, for example, migrant Biharis in developing areas of West 
Bengal is largely attributable to family formation, not to 
continuing male migration in response to industrial demand, 
and is unlikely therefore to become a significant phenomenon.
Interpretation of the Demographic 
Structure and its Development
In Chapter 1 we gave an account of the 1951-71 
period of industrialisation and subsequent stagnation, 
and of its demographic manifestation, in an overview 
of urbanisation in the Eastern region of India 
characterised as the Chota Nagpur Crescent. We now 
proceed to fill in some of the demographic detail.
To anticipate slightly, we will find some guide to an 
interpretation of that detail by looking back at the 
simulation models, though that of course must not prevent 
us from challenging the sacrosanctity of the model; 
rather, a dialectic should occur: let the model help 
us interpret the facts, and the facts help us question 
the model*
To start in the East of the Study region, the 
Districts of West Bengal are dominated by the urban 
agglomeration of Calcutta, and Calcutta is in some ways 
unique. The central District, Calcutta City, grew very 
slowly down to 1 9 5 1, and almost stopped growing at all 
after that date. Yet the rate of gross inmigration, 
recorded as 3*0% in the last year before the 1961 Census, 
was about k times higher than the overall population
growth rate, an annual average of less than 0 ,8%,
(Table 6,2). Calcutta’s growth fits between our 
’£ero Base” Model and our Model ”3", and in the former 
the net migration (that is gross in-migration minus 
gross out-migration) was 0% while in the latter it was 
-3$ Per annum. Since the (arithmetic) average recorded 
gross in-migation for the previous five years was also 
around 3% (net of mortality) the implication would, 
at first sight, seem to be that there have been fairly 
heavy rates of out-migration. Furthermore, the gross
1 The data I have recorded from the Census rely upon 
correct recall of time of entry. They are also 
deficient as an estimate of annual gross in-migration 
in that those who have entered the city and sub­
sequently died before the Census are excluded: 
this error clearly compounds the further back 
in time the entry occurred. In-migrants who stay less 
than the reference period used in recall (whether 1 
year or ;6 years) are similarly unrecorded. In Table
6.2 I have computed the recorded gross migrations as 
proportions of the Census population (expressed as 
annual averages). Where the gross in-migration is 
an annual average of the recorded migration from 
1 - 5  years prior to the Census, the correct population 
to use as a denominator would be that estimated 3 years 
prior to the Census. The bias in not doing so is only 
acute if rapid rates of growth are experienced per annum 
We can illustrate with an example: suppose the urban
population is 100 thousand in 1 9 5 1, 200 thousand in 1958 
and 400 thousand in 1 9 6 1, i.e. doubling every five years
in-migrant stream is more heavily dominated by males 
than was the case in our Model (see Tables 6.2 and 6.1a), 
and this must have been equally true in the past, since the 
overall sex ratio (f:m) is at most -frds what it would be in 
a steady migration model at this low level of growth.
footnote continued
Decadal growth is 300%, average annual (compound) growth is 
15%, 2% of which we assume to be natural increase. Then the 
1961 population would have reached 220 thousand due to 
natural increase alone since 1 9 5 6, and the rest of the 
quinquennial growth (2 0 0 - 20 = 1 8 0) would have been due to 
net in-migration. Ignoring mortality and out-migration 
and assuming accurate reporting, 180 of the 1961 population 
would claim to have migrated over the last 5 years, an 
arithmetic average of 180 f 5 = 36 thousand per annum. 
Expressed as a percentage of the 1961 population this gives 
a gross migration rate of 9%. Expressed as a percentage of 
the 1956 population it gives a growth rate of 18%. And we 
know the real rate is 15% - 2% = 13%* In the text I assume 
a natural increase of about 2%. Hence, in this illustration, 
if the last year’s reported migration rate was 13% and 
decadal growth was 3°0% we would argue there was approx­
imately 0 gross out-migration. If the reported rate had 
been 15% (and the past five years average 11%) we would 
have surmised an approximate rate of outmigration of 2%, 
and so on. This methodology serves perfectly adequately 
for the kind of qualitative comments we wish to make.
But this characteristic gives the City's central District 
very few children, well below the replacement of the 
labour force (7 *2% of the male population is aged 
below 5 , ia contrast with 14.9% i& the moderate growth 
Model "2" for instance, Table 6.4). Such a low birth rate, 
as implied by such a low child-population ratio, indicates 
that net migration may be higher than we thought, gross 
migration being less. For instance, in tie.extreme, 
natural increase could be 0 , gross in-migration 3 2%, 
and gross out-migration about 3% per annum. The continuing 
stagnation in demographic growth of the following decade 
(an annual average of less than 0 .8%) implies continuing large 
outward flows, unless there has been a sharp decrease in 
inward flows, or alternatively ageing population and 
increasing death rate, (see Table 6.4 for the potential 
future ageing of Calcutta's population). The problem of 
economic support for this dependent population in a very 
poor economy will be discussed later. An inner City 
demographic problem of this nature and on this scale 
is virtually unique in India, though it may well be the 
writing on the wall for other great Cities still in their
1 We always have to assume that child mortality is not 
dramatically worse than in the Model.
prime. Bombay may be a case in. point.
Taking the Calcutta Metropolitan area as a whole 
(included in the Districts of Hoogley, Howrah, and 
24-Parganas), the City flourished, then declined, in 
our period. Howrah, similarly, had low sex ratios, 
but in contrast, there is clear evidence of higher net 
in-migration here (the growth rate of 4.7% per annum 
is twice the likely rate of natural increase of between
2.2 and 2.5%). High in-migration with moderately skewed 
sex ratios would explain the low birth rate implied by 
the relative size of the 0 - 4  cohort, as indeed in the 
Model (Tables 6 .1 and 6.2). This could be predicted to 
improve marginally, given a slow-down in migration and 
equalisation of the sex ratios, though, as we have argued 
above in Chapter 5, we do not know with much precision 
what determines the sex ratio of migrants, and the relatively 
favourable ratio.of the latter experienced in Howrah 
in 1961, in marked contrast with the District of Calcutta, 
would seem at odds with its overall sex ratio (and its some- 
"what depressed implied birth rate).
By contrast again, 24-Parganas and Hoogley Districts 
had high female in-migration rates and population sex ratios 
(as compared with our Models) with 24-Parganas, however,
heading in the reverse direction by 1 9 7 1: the latter
development would be consistent with increasing "turnover11 
migration, that is in-migration of less than one year's 
duration (for in "turnover" migration male migrants 
always tend to predominate, as families are only formed 
with settlement). It might be added that of the three 
non-central Districts of the City, Hoogley seems to 
provide most female employment, which may be an added 
attraction to female migrants (Table 6.3). A further 
interpretation of these high female to male sex ratios 
might follow from the consideration that the largest 
City is a refuge in times of decreasing prosperity, 
and the outskirts are entered first if you come by road. 
During the 1961-71 decade the general slow-down in 
economic growth and crop failures in the late 1960s 
may have driven complete families (men and women) into 
the City. But Hoogley District does not share equally 
with 24-Parganas in that characteristic. Both start from 
a position in 1961 where 10% of the male population is 
under five, equally low for both. But the implications 
for the two areas from there on are divergent. Hoogley 
with increasing sex ratios in 1971 is destined to add to its 
burden of youthful dependency (and, ceteris paribus, to
overfulfil its labour requirements in the future), 
and 24-Parganas with decreasing sex ratios in 19<71 
faces the reverse consequences. The disbalance could 
induce intra-City migration, though labour markets do not 
necessarily equilibrate in this simple fashion.
From the unique City of Eastern India we should 
proceed to a more representative view of the empirical 
evidence of the types that are underlying this analysis.
We have grouped the Districts according to their similarity 
with the various simulations (Table 6,1b): Model "1" 
heavy inmigration, "2" modest in-migration, "Base" or "3" 
stagnation or net out-migration, (Table 3*1 for further 
details). Focussing still on West Bengal, we see that 
the iron and steel producing and engineering District of 
Burdwan approximates the sex ratios we would expect 
(for Model"!") though still we notice too many women and 
too few children. We will comment on this later.
The migration rates (gross in-migration of 4.5% and 
overall growth of 5 *6% and average in-migration of 2 ,9 % 
over the previous 5 years suggests little "turnover"
-I
migration) imply little out-migration. _of any kind;
1 An estimate of "turnover" migration is obtained by 
comparing the migration rates recorded over the last 
12 months with the annual average recorded over the 
previous 5 years. If the former exceeds the latter by 
a long way, out-migration of migrants who spend less than 
5 years in the city areas is suspected.
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the migrants are, we know (Chapter 5) more long-distant, 
less speculative, and rather more certain of jobs,
(and this may also account for the high sex ratio 
among the recent migrants, despite the continuing growth of 
the area, in that they feel it safe to bring their 
wives sooner, reducing the lag between the male and female 
migration streams). The other heavy engineering towns 
are mainly in Bihar, in the Districts of Singbhum, Ranchi, 
and Dhanbad. The latter two are fast growing (Model "1") 
types (though in the case of Dhanbad the recorded migration 
rate over the previous 5 years is too low) . In Ranchi, 
females were also migrating at a high rate, a fact not 
unrelated to the presence of the textile and pottery 
industries. The high level of youth dependency that 
will occur particularly rapidly in that District as a result 
during a period of rapid overall demographic growth may 
have serious implications for labour market competition 
and hence social harmony (issues discussed further in Part 
III of this study). Singbhum District falls only marginally 
into the Model M1u category, its continued more balanced 
growth, really characteristic of Model "2", being
1 In-migration rate over the previous year is given as 8.#8%, 
and the average over the previous 5 years as 4.2%, taking 
the 1961 population as the denominator, whereas the growth 
rate of 294% over the decade would imply migration rates 
of 13*8% and 8*2% (with 1961 denominator), assuming a 
natural increase of 2%.
due to the more diversified structure of industry 
within Jamshedpur having prevailed over a longer period 
of time than in the new Steel Town areas. The high sex 
ratio of recent migrants may he evidence of low "turnover" 
or simply of the fact that the expansion in the Steel 
Town took place rather earlier than elsewhere, so that the 
peak male migration will have occurred earlier in the decade. 
Outside of Bihar and West Bengal the heavy industry is 
confined to Sundargarh in Orissa and Durg in Madhya Pradesh. 
The former qualifies as a case of "1 c", but again with 
more than the expected number of females present. This 
tendency is confirmed by the rapidly improving sex ratio 
over the decade. In Durg District the improvement in the 
overall population sex ratio is also faster than predicted, 
and the initial level of the ratio is again too high.
The migrant sex ratio is lower than in Sundargarh, 
which is unexpected if male migration is slowing down, 
but Sundargarh is exceptional in the proportion of 
migrants coming from urban areas (see Chapter 5 above) 
and this will account for the higher proportion of women, 
since urban to urban migration streams always have high 
sex ratios. This concludes analysis of the heavy 
engineering areas in the sample$ but it does not
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exhaust the instances of rapid urban growth, for Bilaspur 
District fits the "1 a" Model quite well and a well- 
established household industry in cigarette manufacture 
accounts for the presence of a large proportion of women 
and high sex ratios among migrants, in contrast to neighbouring 
Durg (see also Table 6.3)* Mayurbanj is a peculiar case 
also of rapid growth, related to the installation of 
a power-generating plant in an almost '&reenM District.
Already by 1961 a number of urban localities 
had achieved the balanced demographic growth associated 
with a structure of mixed industry, or industry not so 
clearly subject to vast economies of scale (agro-processing 
industries being a typical case where fewer scale economies 
prevail). These resemble our "Base" or Model "211 type.
Gaya and Patna Districts are typical of mixed industrial 
urbanisation. Their current in-migration rates are 
about ^  to too high (i.e. above the trend net rate 
implied by decadal growth), pointing to out-migration 
of fairly high proportions: annual growth is 2 .7%, net 
migration will be between 0 .5  and 0 .7%* but gross in- 
migration is recorded as 4 -.5%, so that gross outmigration 
may be as high as 5% per annum. Heavy outmigration is 
to be expected, though it has not been quantitatively
documented in the literature, in the diversified, 
but only moderately expanding , municipal localities,
(and intra-State outmigration was documented here in 
Table 5*11 above); aspirations of in-migrants are simply 
not fulfilled. The sames feature of disappointment may 
yet become the norm in the currently fast-growing towns.
Gaya has more women than might be expected: but it also 
has more employment opportunities for women, being 
without a heavy engineering industry, whereas Patna 
produces transport equipment among its manufactures*
The implied birth rate is appropriately higher in Gaya, 
and that will be maintained into the 197°s given the 
relative stagnation of that locality* Cuttack in Orissa 
is of similar industrial structure, though textiles 
are a predominant sector here, and the demographic 
growth is rather faster. The contrast here lies in the 
high rate of recent migration (7 *4 %); given that the 
growth rate falls slightly and sex ratio rises slightly 
by 1 9 7 1* it appears that very considerable "turnover" 
migration is being experienced (in support of which we 
may note the very..low sex ratio among the current migrants, 
440 l to a thousand (women to .men). The effect of this 
is to depress the numbers of children in the population, about 
1 2% below age 5 * as against the 13% to 15% expected, a 
proportion that will probably rise over time. Cuttack is
on the borderline between our Model u1u and "2”,
The more balanced towns whose basis of industry 
is the processing of agricultural materials are typically 
populated by more women (as in our M2 a" rather than 
"2 b" Model: Ganjam District, the rice-milling area in
Orissa, similarly Birbhum and Bankura in West Bengal, 
and Monghyr District, the bidi manufacturing area in 
Bihar, all clearly have a higher female migration 
component than other areas of similar growth (Table 6,2), 
related to, if not determined by, their higher female 
employment ratios as compared to other Districts in the 
State (Table 6.3). This partly determines a higher overall 
sex ratio, which in turn determines the higher child- 
population ratios recorded for these areas (Table 4.3).
This does not exhaust all the examples in our sample, 
but is sufficient to indicate the empirical patterns 
(and the relevance of our Model) in these particular growth 
categories.
To consider now the Model ,,3U or "Base" type urban 
areas, i.e. those that show signs of net out-migration 
(or at least lack of net in-migration), it is difficult 
to attribute demographic stagnation directly to industrial 
composition. With the obvious exception of Calcutta,
those localities that failed to attract investment, 
or to enjoy the multiplier effect of investment elsewhere, 
were in the economic sectors of the processing and 
handicrafts industries (similar to those found in the more 
steadily growing urban areas of the Model "2" type).
The lack of in-migration accounts for the high sex ratios. 
But the lack of the usual urban age-structural bias 
towar. young men and women, associated with in- 
migration, should result in fewer children than would 
otherwise be expected; or so predicts the Model.
Shahabad District in Bihar and Baudh-Khondmals in .^ Orissa 
are among the examples; the latter is an sctreme case of 
an out-migrating area, with overall growth under half what 
would be given, cet, par* by natural increase, (an annual 
growth of only 1%). The skewed age structure typical of 
an out-migrating area counteracts the sex ratio favourable 
to fertility, and births are therefore very depressed,
(see Table 6*4 for the "hollow" in the adult male age 
distribution). The reported gross in-migration rate 
of nearly ‘ 2 '% indicates a balancing gross out-migration 
rate of 3 .0% (if natural increase is 2 .0%, or of 2 .0% if 
natural increase is only 1.0%). The social implications 
of severely out-migrating localities (with no growth areas 
in proximity) are acute, especially in a country with few
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material welfare services provided from resources raised 
outside of the declining community itself. In the case 
of Baudh, the rapid change in prospects during the 
following decade will jack up the young population 
dramatically. The poor representation of complete Districts 
subject to urban out-migration in our sample should not 
blind us to the reality of this problem within the 
stagnating Districts (of which there are several, 
like Bankura, Bolangir, and Gaya), where smaller towns will 
be in decline (see Chapter 7 below), not to mention the 
problem outside the Chota Nagpur Crescent altogether: we
will comment on Sholapur District in Maharashtra in 
Chapter 8 below.
Observations on the Relationship between the 
Empirical Evidence and the Simulation Model
The Model was based on empirically estimated 
parameters. But the process of estimation often itself 
involved some modelling: there is clearly room for error
here. There was also the construction of migration 
schedules to render them suitable for replication, 
and again the procedure may have been inadequate or the
1 A selection of these District's towns have been singled 
out for visual illustration: age and sex structures are 
plotted as familiar "pyramids" in the four broad age groups 
for which there are comparable data, in Figure 6 *1,
simplifications too cavalier. Some of the parameters
were estimated on an All-India basis, whereas our sample is
of a region in Eastern India only. We tried to simulate
some variance on the basic assumptions, and hence for
instance we jacked up the sex ratio of the migrants
by an arbitrary 30 or 5 0 per cent in "a" variants on the
Model* We would hope that the real variables observed
empirically would be distributed reasonably evenly around
1
the mean values we predict for each Model type* There 
is of course a possible source of error in the observed 
variables: the Census data themselves have been imperfectly
collected (and we have commented upon the likely undercount 
of women in 1971 in Chapter'4, and on deficiencies in 
recall of migration duration earlier in the current 
Chapter)* But with this by way of general introduction, 
can we make some general observations on the relationship 
between the simulated and the observed ? And do these 
observations help us to refine the Model or re-interpret the 
data?
The first point to make here is that the sex ratios 
in the urban populations, though generally in line with 
the Model, tend to be on the high side (females to males),
1 By this we mean that, having categorised the empirical 
(as types "I", !,2nt M3M etc*) on the basis of decadal 
growth rates, we would hope that the other empirical 
variables, like child-population ratios, or overall 
population sex ratios, would cluster around the values 
predicted in our Models*
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As we have seen, young female cohorts are particularly 
under "-reported in the empirical data, so the cause of 
the discrepancy lies not in our taking too low a fertility 
rate in the Model, or too male-selective a survival rate 
at the young ages (indeed quite the reverse)# It could 
he then that our idea of a typical migration schedule 
contains insufficient female migration (our ”b” and "cn 
variants are wrong)# Is it that autonomous migration, 
or response migration, of females is higher than we 
estimated? The most clear indication of an error comes 
from the sex ratios of current, and recent, migrants: 
these are persistently higher than in the Model types, 
but especially so in the fast-growing towns# If our regressions 
were estimated correctly, then the source of the error lies 
in the "unexplained” variation in female migration (amounting 
to over 60% of total R )• We chose to ignore those female 
migrants because we could not predict them properly, but 
of course they do exist# It is also possible that the 
male recent and current migration rate is understated 
in the Census (thus biasing up the sex ratio) owing to
1 Higher fertility rates would mean, cet. par#, more 
children in the population, and as children have 
more balanced sex ratios in an urban population 
(subject to sex-selective adult in-migration), 
the tendency is for the overall sex ratio to improve, 
the higher fertility is#
temporary migrants overstating the duration of their 
stay*
Our Model net-inmigration sex ratios were derived 
from data on gross rural-urban in-migration flows. But 
only ^rds of gross in-migration is from rural areas.
Both NSS and Census * data indicate (Table 5*13 ) that 
urban to urban migration streams have higher sex ratios: 
urban to urban migrants migrate as a family, or form their 
families quicker# It is this feature of the Model that is 
least satisfactory, and the "a" variants are more appropriate 
more often than would be predicted from the sex ratio 
of occupations. But as we argued in the previous Chapter, 
it is the urban to urban component in migration that is 
the least easy to predict, and at times (if we remember the 
contrast between Rourkela and Bhilai) utterly capricious.
A fairly persistent disparity also observed is 
between the proportion of children of under five years of 
age in the Census and that indicated by simulation.
For reasons discussed in Chapter **■ above we can fairly 
safely argue that the data are deficient here. This makes 
it all the more striking when the data do give a proportion 
near to that of the Model (take the case of Bankura 
District in West Bengal for example): in such cases we 
should probably explain why the Census proportion is so 
high in comparison with the Model, and higher fertility 
seems a likely examination*
Finally we should note that in a few cases the 
reported in-migration rates of current migrants are too 
low, especially in the fast-growing towns. So too are the 
annual rates averaged from the 1-5 years duration data 
in those cases, (though mortality will have added a slight 
downward bias here). The fast growth may have been 
concentrated at the beginning of the decade, but in the case 
of most of the Steel and heavy engineering towns we know 
that it was not; quite the contrary in fact. Both current 
and recent migration may be under-reported; there could be 
deliberate falsification if security is felt to depend upon 
stating to the authorities (whoever they may be) that 
you have been resident longer than you actually have.
Illegal squatters thus feel they have a stronger claim
to legality. Selectively that might be more true of men* 
After all, women are expected to be migrants (and not to 
stay in their place of birth) for purposes of marriage, 
in India.
But the raw data disguise another important 
phenomenon in the case of the fastest growing urban areas: 
enlargement of the physical area of the towns. In this 
case contiguous villages are incorporated in the expansion, 
and the incremental population is neither in-migrant nor 
native-born in the town as it was. They will be most likely 
to state themselves as native-born, however, so that the 
migration statistics and the plausible natural increase 
will together be insufficient to explain the experienced 
rate of aggregate growth. Furthermore, the sex ratio 
of such incorporated villages will be balanced, pulling 
up the overall sex ratio (though not the sex ratio of 
current migrants).
On the other hand, the reported gross in-migration 
rates of the slower growing areas are too high (to 
account for their only modest decadal growth rates).
This, as we have shown, points to the important phenomenon 
of out-migration (and simultaneously high rates of both 
in and put-migration, probably of the same people, who 
came and went, equipped with inadequate knowledge of the 
labour market in cities now past their prime).
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Neither out-migration, nor incorporation, were 
immediately apparent, on the scale experienced, without 
the exploratory device of model-building. Inconsistencies 
were then made apparent. Our attention has been drawn 
to deficiencies in our understanding of the 
demographic process of urbanisation, as well as some 
deficiencies in the data recorded for urban areas. 
Interesting as this is, it is also rather sad* It 
reduces the value of a model for supplying the missing 
details to supplement meagre raw data0 In particular it 
lowers their predictive value. We have to compromise.
It may be that the didactic and interpretative qualities 
of simulation exercises outweigh their more grandiose aims.
Eastern Madhya Pradesh 
Analysis of a Sub-region
The reason for looking at the development that occurred 
around the installation of the massive steel works with 
Russian collaboration at Bhilai, in the District of Durg, 
is that this is one of the most controlled "green-field" 
developments that we can find. For although Rourkela 
is clearly also a green-field site, yet not far North 
from there we find the industrial development in Singbhum 
District (at Jamshedpur), in Dhanbad, and later Ranchi, 
which obviously muddies the clarity of sub-regional demography. 
But Bhilai is truly isolated.
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Over the 19^1-1951 decade, Durg District experienced 
an urban population growth that only modestly exceeded 
the rate of natural increase, 30% over the decade, (Table 
6.2, and Figure 6.2 for a map of the area). The 
surrounding Districts in Madhya Pradesh had a similar 
experience, with Bastar and Bilaspur being notably low 
in the growth of urban population (whether due to de- 
classification, out-migration, or low natural increase 
in a time of high mortality). The Second Plan steel 
investment began to take shape in 1957? by 1958 the 
first coke oven was lit, and by 1959 the first blast
“I
furnace came on stream. During that decade the growth
of urban population in Durg District was 200% (15% per
annum). In the Steel Town Group it was over 550%,
and obviously the growth was tightly bunched into
the last three years of the decade. For reasons already
explained, this was an unprecedented demographic expansion,
even if we allow for the re-drawing of urban boundaries
22to include once-rural populations. The New-town 
itself (within the Town Group) was called Bhilainagar 
(or Bhilai for short), and reached 86,000 in just years,
1 Madhya Pradesh, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Socio-economic Survey of Bhilai Region. Part 2, 1987*
2 Survey data (quoted in previous reference) suggested 
that 75% of the population was migrant, and the 1961 
Census records that 67% of males (56% females) had migrated 
within the last 10 years. These are probably under-estimates 
since only 7J.100 of the 86,000 population can be traced
to the New-town's constituent villages.
(up to 1961, by which time the plant was producing
736,000 tonnes of pig-iron)*
Where did the migrants come from? Being iron 
and steel and heavy construction workers they were 
predominantly men (see also Table 6 *3 ); the sex.ratio 
in Durg Districts towns fell from 1*017 to 0*706, and 
in Bhilainagar Steel Town proper it was 0*^86, about 
two men to every woman. Most of them (72% of those to 
Durg Town Group) came from outside the State, and very few 
(15%) from within the District, and, being largely unskilled 
labour, nearly ip (72%) were of rural origin (Table 6 .3 )*
We move on to observe the demographic effect of 
a backward linkage in the industrial complex, that is 
a New-town whose investment was also necessary to sustain 
the future intended expansion of the steel plant in the 
next decade, and for that reason referred to here as an 
’'accelerator" town: the Jaran Dalli Rajahara Ore Mining
Colony (to give it its full multi-lingual name)* This is a 
town of 2 3 ,0 0 0 people and its more balanced sex ratio 
(0.650) reflects the relatively high employment of women
2
in the ore-mining industry, presumably as surface workers*
1 Hindustan Steel Corporation Ltd*, Iron and Steel:Statistics 
for Iron and Steel Industry in India* 1970. Ranchi.
2 We have more to say about the (often depressed) social 
background of miners that may account for the supply of 
female labour, below* The sex ratio in the industry as 
a whole is 0*5^7* See further, Government of India,
Labour Bureau, Women in Industry. Simjia, 1975* Chapter 2*
We now turn to assess how other towns in the District 
were reacting to these dramatic changes in the economy#
The other large town is Rajnandgaon. Its principal exports 
are cloth, size-wood, and pulses (additionally it manufactures 
cement piping and curtains), but its growth of 92% during 
the decade clearly indicates its dependence on the growth 
of Bhilai. Its manufacturing sector was well established 
(it was of the male work-force) , and it was evidently 
not a mere dormitory town, but had reacted to the rapid 
increase in demand for consumables in the locality#
We shall call it a "multiplier11 town (Table 6*6).
Elsewhere in the District the towns stagnated or declined, 
providing their labour to the growth centres# Again 
from the Census we can infer that most of the labour 
employed in the towns apart from the Steel Town was 
local in origin (Table 6#5)j 50% of the migrants were from 
within the same District# There was no question of 
searching for appropriate labour from further afield either 
to obtain the type or size of work-force required#
The object of carrying out this detailed study of 
a sub-region is to ascertain the indirect effects of a new 
industry on the surrounding work-force and population 
structure# A glance at the map (Fig. 1.7a) shows the 
spread of urban population growth in neighbouring Districts 
in the same decade# The most outstanding District from this
point of view is Bilaspur. This contains the ill-fated 
Korba coal field; the New-town of Korba grew to
1 2 .0 0 0 in response to the required input to the iron
and steel industry of coking coal* But the District capital, 
Bilaspur City, also flourished, growing to a town of
87.000 by 1 9 6 1* Its manufactures, consisting of bidi, 
soap, bronze and brass utensils demark it as a "multiplier" 
town, with a modest manufacturing sector established by 
1961 (Table 6 .6 )* As in other Districts of this type, 
male migrants are mainly local (Table 6 .5 ), 65% from within 
the State, hk% from within the District, and mainly from 
rural areas in the case of the locals, but not in the case 
of those from afar. But Bilaspur town (as it was in 1 9 6 1)
is worth studying for different reasons: by Indian standards
it is a notable employer of women. This is due to the 
establishment of household-based bidi manufacture and 
cotton spinning, partly in operation before the industrial 
boom in the area, but expanding in its response, and 
continuing to attract a female work-force (Table 6 .3 ).
The immediate effect is more rapid family formation, 
illustrated in the high sex ratio maintained despite the 
rapid growth of male migrants. The origin of the female 
migrants is .more local than in the case of the heavy industrial
town (51% in Bilaspur District as against 28% in Durg District 
coming from within the District, figures not dissimilar 
from those for males - see Table 6*5)* It was argued above 
(in Chapter 5) that these migrants are not wholly 
attracted by job prospects but are more likely to follow 
their husbands (or other family members) if job prospects 
exist, and hence their presence in larger numbers in
Bilaspur than in other rapidly growing towns*
The other mining locality in the area is Surguja 
District, which is strictly speaking outside the study 
sample (being heterogeneous)* The fate of the collieries 
has been very unstable as prospecting has shifted from one
place to another* The general economic problem is that the
region does not produce quality coking coal for iron manufact­
ure, but the intention was to blend it with better grade 
coal from the Burdwan coal fields for use at Bhilai* In 
Surguja District both Chirmiri and North JK Colliery 
were revived in 1961* The slightly larger towns of 
Manandragarh and Ambikapur flourished but purely as 
trading or commercial centres, in the former case 
prosperity being closely related to the output of coal.
Two further "multiplier" towns were selected for 
observation (in the 15-20,000 population size range):
Champa in Bilaspur, and Jagdalpur the principal town 
in Bastar District. Both grew by about ^0% over the
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decade, produced cloth and metal-ware, and traded in 
agricultural products# The towns of Bastar District 
follow the path outlined above: J>0% of their migrants are 
local, and those that are less local are more urban.
In both repects they contrast with those to the 
heavy industrial towns.
We now want to trace what happened to these towns 
during the crucial decade of the 1960s, when the steel mill 
was fully on stream, at its first-phase rated capacity, against 
a background of economic depression setting in from around 
1965 (when the plant had been expanded toward the 2-J m.t# 
capacity stage, but with production of pigjron levelling 
off at around 2 m.t. It should first be noted that Bhilai 
was affected less by industrial problems than were its 
sister mills, being as it was very much a pace-setter.
Its output was simpler to fabricate (heavy sections), 
and apparently easily disposed of, at least until the onset 
of the depression (perhaps by resorting to dumping) 5 
but it is clear that the severe decline in consumption of 
non-flat products after 1965 set back the plant.
Similarly the decline in demand for other locally- 
produced industrial items (like the cement piping) 
or raw materials (like timber) afflicted these towns.
1 See W.A.Johnson, The Steel Industry of India. Cambridge, 
Massachusets, 1966.
2 See S.D.Kshersagar, "Growth in Consumption of Steel in 
India." Economic and Political Weekly. 2?th August, 1911 •
Finally there were specific problems in coal production, 
requiring prospecting for more suitable grades in the Korba 
region.
Thus we may distinguish three economic features 
that determine the stagnation of the local industry in 
Eastern Madhya Pradesh. One, a twist in the industrial 
structure away from heavy industry; two, an overall 
recession; three, technical-economic set-back in the plant 
itself. It is not always easy to distinguish the effect 
of each on the sub-region. But some attempt to so do 
has been made here by investigating a sub-region with 
a ..'different industrial base (compare Poona District in 
Maharashtra, in Chapters 1 and 9), and a sub-region with 
different technical problems (compare Burdwan District 
in West Bengal, later in this Chapter). The major thrust 
of the investigation, however, is to compare the effects of 
modern technology (specifically large-scale plant) per se 
in such a crisis following upon the period of prosperity 
just described.
How did this era of economic change (and lack 
of it) manifest itself in demographic terms? The 
fuller social implications we leave until later in this Chapter. 
Here we focus simply on the economic structure of the incremen­
tal population and migratory movements of the male labour 
force.
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Bhilainagar grew rapidly* doubling over the decade* 
with male growth at 67% and female growth - implying 
family formation - at 175% (Table 6.6). But the manufacturing 
male labour force grew at only 22%. This differential 
raised the question of future employment prospects as 
the younger cohorts enter the working ages. A fall in the 
ratio of manufacturing males to the total male population 
need give no cause for alarm* but the size of the fall 
in so short a space of time might well do so (4-3% to 31% 
in 10 years). In this context it would be important to 
observe neighbouring urban areas. Durg Municipality 
is a town that could be expected to diversify and expand 
in manufacturing activity, combining multiplier and accelerator 
effects, in response to the steel industry growth pole.
But the story is a sad one. The growth in manufacturing 
population was negative over the decade. Taken together* 
the Durg-Bhilai agglomeration experienced a growth of only 
13*6% in its manufacturing force. Rajnandgaon, the other 
multiplier town of the 1950s stagnated too* the urban 
agglomeration (retaining comparable boundaries) grew at 
only 25%; the incremental population contributed only 5% 
to the manufacturing labour force* that is less than 
per year. Here we see the seriousness of the check in 
terms of production-labour growth, in the wake of a dramatic 
expansion. It is the quality and enormity of the change
1 Later we show that workers in the iron and steel
industry increased by about one third with the increase 
in capacity (i.e. well above the average for manufacuring 
generally).
that carry seriously and arguably unique demographic and 
hence social implications. A glance at Table 6.6 reveals 
a similar picture throughout most of the sub-region.
At Bilaspur the actual size of the manufacturing 
labour force hardly changed (and that from an only 
modest base of 11% of the work-force). However, the coal 
town of Korba grew more rapidly (coal-based manufacturing 
included) though from a very small base of 12,000 so that 
there was no question of this compensating, on a sub-regional 
basis, for the overall stagnation. Its mining labour force 
increased by only 21%. Similarly Ambikapur and Manendragarh 
in the coal-producing District of Surguja expanded their 
manufacturing sectors (albeit from minute bases). Ironically 
the prosperity was probably built on the over-production of 
coal, in the sense that the Bhilai plant was being fuelled 
with inferior grades in much higher proportions than was 
technically desirable, leading to further increases in 
down-time.
In summary, there was an enormous injection of capital 
into the area during the Second Plan} its physical manifest­
ation were the steel mill and iron works at Bhilainagar.
To sustain an expansion of output from thsmill required 
further investment in the industries supplying the raw 
materials, in coal mining and ore mining in the sub-region 
(with other inputs coming from outside). To sustain output
elsewhere in the economy (for instance in the steel-using 
industries) required further investment also: however, 
little or none of this seems to have occurred in the subregion. 
•'Accelerator" towns then are limited to Bhilainagar itself 
and to the raw-material producing localities. They are 
so closely related to the steel industry that their fate 
is decided by that of the industry. The second part of 
the decade saw a major stagnation in India's industrial 
development, but especially in the heavy industries*
Steel is a barometer in recession. Thus the state of the 
macro-economy can be held to be reflected in the fate of 
these townships. However, had they been diversified, 
so that accelerator effects were related to the progress of • 
the economy as a whole, their fate would not have been so 
grim: the chemical and oil-based industries and luxury 
goods producers did not suffer so seriously in the 
stagnation, and their market remained relatively b^byant 
during the slow-down in aggregate growth. The incomes 
created by the Second Plan investment sought consumer 
goods, and hence most of the towns that had expanded 
in the late 1950s were multiplier towns. Stagnation in 
the late 1960s affected them also. Locally what we see is 
a crystalisation of the effects of the failure in the macro­
economy.
The initial investment and the accelerator 
effects that followed from increased industrial growth 
filled the industrialising towns with able-bodied men.
They were followed by (if not accompanied by) women, 
and families were created. The young now dominate their 
age structure. The other towns attracted migrants also, 
and their families, but they additionally attracted 
hopeful young men who would have seen their incomes 
grow had the multiplier effect been sustained by
1 See Figure 6.1 for Bhilai (and compare Durgapur) where 
the developing age structure is strikingly portrayed, 
and Table 6.7 where the increase in the under-15 
age cohort is noticeable not only in the core 
Steel Town (where its proportion in the total 
population increases from 25% to k2% over the decade), 
but also for instance in the Korba mining and industrial 
manufacturing and processing agglomeration (an increase 
from 30% to 39%)* This Table also illustrates how 
respectable demographic growth rates can mask the fact 
that more than 50% of the growth is accounted for by 
the growth of the female population, relating to the 
earlier in-migration of men*
continued growth in the sub-region. They were dis­
appointed. Some of these towns expanded in the trades 
and- services sector, but not in manufacturing. The 
young migrants' incomes must have fallen short of 
expectations. Still other towns failed to expand in 
economic terms at all in the second decade, after an 
initial boost in the Second Plan period. People left them, 
some to go on and try their fortunes in another town, 
and probably some returned whence they came* Families 
were not formed. As a whole, the industrial region was 
nipped in the bud. Yet, here and there, the sap is still 
rising, for the youngest cohorts are maturing. The 
1980s, for better or worse, will witness the result.
Burdwan in West Bengal 
Analysis of a District
The North of the Chota Nagpur Crescent is the
industrial heartland of India, among the palms and
dark waters of West Bengal. In the District of Burdwan 
India's second large private-sector steel works was 
erected, at Burnpur, in 1936, and expanded from a million 
tonnes from about half a million over the course of the 
Second Plan period (1955-60). The work-force was 
partly established in the adjacent town of Outer Burnpur.
1 This scenario is investigated, in some detail, in the
form of a projection model, in Chapter 9 below.
During the same period the adjacent City of Asansol 
undertook a range of manufacturing and servicing activities 
related to the heavy industry: liquid oxygen, glass, 
and locomotive manufacture, locomotive repairs and motor 
vehicle servicing. Additionally, both Burnpur and ABansol 
(together called Asansol Town Group or Urban Agglomeration) 
produced lighter manufactures, textile garments, and liquor, 
and processed rice and flour, while Outer Burnpur was a centre 
of sweetmeat manufacture (Table 6 .8 ). Asansol Town Group 
was therefore a combination of a diversified accelerator 
and multiplier town, with a modest proportion of its 
labour force engaged in manufacturing. Its growth was 
rapid, ?8% during the decade (to reach 169»0 00 by 1 9 6 1): 
the migrant component, amounting to nearly -frds of that 
growth was notably from outside the State (5^%), a pattern 
we have observed elsewhere in heavy industrial areasf 
and the disturbed sex ratio (0.6 6 *0 is indicative of 
selective male migration of the kind we are used to also. 
Indicative of the migration, 30% of the population was 
recorded as Hindi-speaking (and as high as 61% were non- 
Bengali speakers) in a Bengali District; 10% were Muslims,
1 Unfortunately, the Census classification for migration 
purposes distinguished Asansol Municipality separately, 
and combined Burnpur with the other smaller towns in the 
District and with Durgapur. This makes Table 6 * 5 a little 
difficult to read in this respect.
1
the refugees from East Bengal.
The major investment in the District, also in the 
Second Plan period, was a brand new integrated iron and 
steel works (built with British collaboration), the 
second of the million tonne trio. This was at Durgapur, 
something of a contrast with the plant at Bhilai in being 
grafted on to an already industrialising area, but, like 
Bhilai, actually constructed on a greenfield site* The 
first output of steel was in 1960-6 1, A-20,000 tonnes of 
pig iron, by which date the new township bad grown to 
A-2,000 people. The migrants initially were men, and to 
judge from the only migration data that include Durgapur 
as a major component, around 30% came from other States, 
mainly from rural origins (Table 6 .5 ); ^3% of the population 
was non-Bengali speaking. At this time nearly half the 
male work-force was engaged in manufacturing, most of it 
in the massive steel plant. The other town that sprang 
up in this decade on a greenfield site was Chittaranjan, 
the centre of railway locomotive manufacture (to which, of 
course, steel is the major material input). This was much 
earlier than Durgapur, and its male population was also
1 Government of India, Census of India 19&1. West Bengal, 
District Census Handbook, Burdwan, Volume II, Calcutta, 
Tables C V and C VII.
2 M.R.Chaudhuri, Indian Industries. Development and
and Location. Oxford University Press, Calcutta, 196 6; 
Hindustan Steel Corporation Ltd., Iron and Steel, cited in 
note above.
ky/o non-Bengali speaking (a similar proportion to that in 
Hirapur locality where Burnpur Steel Town is situated).
This is the centre of India’s coking coal region, 
and the other towns in the North-West of the District 
are mainly coal-mining towns; they displayed the same 
erratic growth that we witnessed in Madhya Pradesh, 
in response to two factors - dramatic change in the demand 
for coal, and the working of new seams. Ondal declined, 
then grew very rapidly, doubling in the decade, Jamuria 
and Kulti lost population despite earlier growth,
Raniganj continued to stagnate (see Figure 6.3 for 
locations). Their populations were also heavily dependent 
on migration from Bihar,
Further down the Damodar valley we find a contrasting 
town of the type characterised by our Model u2iu : the old 
administratice centre of Burdwan City itself. The town 
enjoyed the prosperity of the District that occurred with 
the expansion of steel and engineering, and its growth rate 
increased to a modest kk% over the 1951-61 decade. But 
functionally, as far as its industry was concerned, it 
remained a multiplier town, producing flour, rice, 
sweetmeats, textiles, jewelry, and silverware in response 
to the local increase in demand,. ; and, in any case,
manufacturing was only a minor activity, involving less 
than 10% of the labour force. Migrants were mainly local 
(only 36% from outside West Bengal) with the population 
predominantly Bengali speaking (80%), and, in line with 
its administrative function (and white collar labour force) 
over ■} of its migrants came from other urban areas (Table 6.5)*
The following decade witnessed, as in Madhya Pradesh, 
first a sustained, then a decreased demand for heavy 
industrial products. Durgapur began as a success story.
Not only did it reach the million tonne target by the 
middle of the decade, but industry diversified, and the 
prospects of avoiding a brittle industrial ’'monoculture11 
seemed promising. An alloy steel plant was established, 
also a mining machinery plant, and other engineering concerns.
A major fertiliser plant was set up. This activity manifested 
itself in a rapid population growth in Durgapur. The male 
population nearly quadrupled (276% growth) and the manufact­
uring population more than doubled(l2?% growth), with the 
male work-force growing rather faster 041%) ; the female
1 There is a problem in that the urban boundaries were 
much extended to incorporate what had been previously 
described as a rural population. If we take the whole 
locality of Durgapur (urban and rural) at both Censuses, 
the figures become: male population growth 98.4%, male
working population 43*4%, and male manufacturing labour 
6 5 *5% growth.
population multiplied five-fold. This implies a slight 
fall in the proportion of the working population 
employed in factory manufacturing (from 60% to 56%)# 
Stagnation in this proportion, given its high initial level, 
need not cause alarm. The very rapid increase in the non­
adult male population is quite anotherm matter, and poses 
the question as to whether economic activity, and 
particularly manufacturing, can be sustained at a level 
high enough over the following decades to employ this
future work-force locally. In actual fact, by the end of
1
the decade Durgapur had become something of a disaster.
Inter alia, the growth in manufacturing labour force 
figures disguise the under-utilisation of that labour*
By 1971 the plant was expanded to produce 1.6 m.t. of 
steel, and actually produced 0.6 million; its output of 
pig iron had fallen since the mid-1960s to less than 1 m.t.
A significant part of the reason for this failure was due 
to circumstances at Durgapur itself, and not the general 
stagnation in investment demand. In this respect it 
serves as a contrast with the fate of Bhilai earlier 
described. Severe bottlenecks in production arose, 
stemming from erratic coal supplies and inappropriate design 
of coal-loading equipment, and technical complaints of this 
kind quickly interrelated with labour unrest to escalate
11 B.Tulpule, ’’Managing Durgapur: experience of a Trade
Unionist” , Economic and Political Weekly. 25th Dec. 1976| 
Hindustan Steel Corporation Ltd., Iron and Steel, cited 
in note above.
towards a crisis. The coal towns during this period 
continued their erratic development: Raniganj expanded both 
its mining and manufacturing activities in line with its 
fast population growth. Ondal declined severely, as did 
Kulti*
The older engineering towns grew modestly but lost 
their manufacturing growth, a sign of the overall 
depression, and Burnpur itself, the older Steel Town, 
stagnated for the same reason. What is particularly telling 
is the fate of the multiplier town Burdwan. Here again 
the effect of falling productivity elsewhere in the District 
was sufficient to reduce the demand for manufactures 
and (as will be seen later) to drive manufacturing labour 
into the small-scale and household sectors, which grew in 
proportional terms while the factory manufacturing work­
force fell* It was fortunate enough that this District, 
where local conditions compounded the effect of national 
recession, had acquired more diversified urban centres 
(and that Durg District in Madhya Pradesh, where less 
diversification had occurred, was subjected only to the 
national recession). We return later to these economic 
aspects of industrial demographic formation*
Cultural Differentiation over time: 
Bengalis and non-Bengalis in Burdwan
The diversity of regional origins of these large 
newly formed local populations has serious implications 
for the harmonious operation of the future labour market.
It has already been suggested that much recruitment in 
India is done through personal contacts, rather than 
through competitive advertising. Contacts are made 
on a regional-linguistic basis, as well as through the 
more concentrated networks of caste and family. Labour 
market rigidities are further strengthened by the 
continuing association of caste (determined at birth) 
and occupation. All this means that equilibrium is more 
likely to be achieved if the supply of labour for specific 
industries or occupations grows at approximately the same 
rate as does the specific demand. On the demand side, 
changing industrial composition and changing technologies 
make this very unlikely. The unlikelihood is enhanced further 
by differential demographic growth in local supply* It has 
already been mentioned that high sex ratios, implying the 
pursuit of family formation in urban areas, presage the 
more rapid growth of the future labour force in particular 
societal sub-groups. Social disharmony often follows on 
two accounts: first, the sub-group, outgrowing its
employment opportunities, resents the labour market
rigidites that it sees discriminating against it; 
secondly, the rest of the population resents the growth 
of the sub-group which it fears will compete for 
diminishing jobs with increasing success (and reacts 
by tightening the rigidities of the labour market).
We cannot usually pursue these populations through time 
empirically, though the problem was simulated in Chapter 3.
But in West Bengal the fairly clear linguistic differences 
between locals and migrants enable us to make some 
headway.
The Bengali-speakers in the Burdwan District towns 
and cities have high (f:m) sex ratios relative to the 
rest (Table 6.12), though perhaps lower fertility.
Projecting differential birth and death rates over time 
and distinguishing the consequent natural increase from 
net in-migration is hazardous. In the case of Burdwan 
District this can be gauged approximately from noting that 
the Hindi-speaking male population, once established through 
the massive migration of the late 1950s, grew slower than the 
male Bengali-speaking population down to 1971 (even despite 
net in-migration of male Hindi-speakers). In fact a growth of 
only 25.6% (Table 6.12) suggests that, if there was aiy net 
in-migration at all (which there clearly was into Durgapur 
for instance), natural increase was subdued. The case can 
be made even more strongly for the non-Bengali speakers
generally. This reflects the underlying bias against 
natural growth that is created, as illustrated in the 
simulations, by the adverse sex ratios among the migrants* 
Nonetheless, during the 1960s, family formation was 
proceeding rapidly, so that the female Hindi-speaking 
population increased much faster than the female Bengalis 
in Burdwan. But this process will only continue until 
the sex ratios are approximately equalised^ (if male migration 
ceased in 1971* the female Hindi-speaking migrant population 
would continue to grow, on this assumption, until the 
ratio between the Hindi and Bengali populations reached 
only 0 .1 3:1 .0 ).
Taking Durgapur alone (Table 6*12) we consider 
separately Bengali and all non-Bengali speakers (of whom 
Hindi-speakers are a substantial proportion). Again 
the native Bengali male population grew far faster 
than did the non-Bengali speakers between 1961 and 1971, 
reflecting increasing in-migration from within Bengal 
(East .or West), relative to that from other Indian States.
In this case we cannot make any quantitative judgements on 
relative rates of natural increase (though we do note that 
in 1961 and in 1971 the sex ratios of the non-Bengalis 
were well below those of the Bengalis. Over the , 
decade the growth of the non-Bengalis was primarily due to 
the influx of women (but even that was lower than the rate 
of growth of the Bengali female population). By 1971
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the sex ratio of the non-Bengalis was 0.608: though
there are no clear precedents upon which to base a sure 
judgement, it would seem likely that a ratio of 0 .8 0 0  
would be more likelynto remain stable (this is the sex 
ratio among the non-Bengalis in Burnpur Steel Town in 1961) • 
If that is the case, the female migrant population in 
Durgapur will continue to grow both absolutely and 
proportionately. This should not be mistaken for a long­
term expansion of the migrant population: it is simply a
1 We have already seen empirically, in the case of Bombay, 
that some migrant sub-groups remain as split families, 
retaining very low adult sex ratios with no potential 
for growth: this is especially true of migrants from
North India, from Uttar Pradesh, and in some cases, Bihar. 
These are the longer-term, longer-distance migrants who 
are employed in factory manufacturing and almost certainly 
have small amounts of land (but less than 2 acres, see 
Chapter 5 above), but who are nevertheless compelled 
(or feel it wise) to keep all adult members of the family 
at work to survive. At the other end of the spectrum 
the locally poor (usually landless) migrate as complete 
families and have little hope of employment in factories. 
Between these two groups are the long-distance migrants 
who gain factory employment and form families rapidly in 
the towns, and are able to leave the rest of their extend­
ed family to work the land, and still survive. Their sons 
will be born in the city. S.N.Sen in his study of Calcutta 
also found that the Hindi-speaking migrants were far more 
often single than were the Bengali-speakers (sex ratio 
of 0.253 versus 0.7^2, in the late 1950s). S.N.Sen,
The Citv of Calcutta: A Socio-Economic Survey. Bookland 
Private Ltd., Calcutta, i9 6 0.
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traverse towards a new stable state, in which there is no 
good reason to suppose that, one community will grow faster 
than another. Indeed between 1961 and 1971 the proportion 
of non-Bengalis in Burdwan's population remained constant at 
around 17.5 per cent. The short run fluctuations and 
instabilities in the labour market due to sudden increases 
in particular age cohorts of particular regional origin 
are quite another matter. These are the products of the 
highly unstable initial migration patterns plus differential 
patterns of family formation. The Bengalis' second 
generation will enter the labour market rather earlier, 
and the peak in the non-Bengali labour supply will follow.
The disequilibria and tension that this configuration may 
cause are more fully worked out for the case of Bhilainagar 
in Chapter 9 below. But there is no evidence to suppose 
that the longer run growth patters will differ substantially, 
once the new stable state has been approximately achieved.
The likely range in fertility between the two groups has 
been illustrated in the simulation Model, where 5*1 ior 
local total fertility and 5»7 for migrant total fertility 
wensetakens the ratios of migrant to local population 
ranged from 0.3251.0 (with same fertility) to 0.35s1.0 
(with the higher migrant fertility) (Table 3*3)t within 
twenty years* In Durgapur differential migration patterns 
caused that ratio to fall from 0 .3 8:1 .0  to 0.25:1 within 
a decade. Problems in short-run dynamics are far more striking 
than long term trends.
Class Structure in the Development of Urban Demography: 
A Study of the Newly Industrialising Areas
It is unfortunately not possible from the available 
materials to analyse the class composition of the urban 
areas of different character, nor to document how these 
areas might be changing in respect of class structure over 
time. Most of this thesis has had to be restricted to the 
demography of the aggregate urban population, with some 
extra detail being incorporated in the case of the migrant 
populations; most of this has had to relate to locational 
rather than economic background of the migrant, though 
some attempt has been made to deduce the latter from the 
former. In the Chapters that follow in Part III we shall 
make further attempts to reconstruct something of the 
areas' socio-economic structure, when we focus more 
strongly on occupational and income differentiation.
Limited demographic information is available to us, 
however, relating to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (known together as the Backward Classes); as these 
are predominantly the lowest socio-economic group, 
we can at least take their recorded experience as an indicator 
of the inter-play between demographic and social class 
factors (to put it no stronger than that).
The Backward Classes participate considerably 
less than their higher caste brethren in the industrial 
expansion of the heavy industrial areas developed in the 
Second Plan. This is perpetuated over time. In 1971 
there were still no Backward Classes reported as employed 
in factory-sector industry in the Bhilai-Durg urban 
agglomeration (Table 6 .9 ). This is despite there 
being 10,000 people of the Backward Clases in Bhilainagar 
town itself (and 35*000 in the urban locaities of Durg 
District), It is to be noted that in this District 
the participation of this social group in manufacturing 
is mainly in towns like Rajnandgaon and Dongargarh, 
where prosperity was least sustained.
Of further interest are their more balanced sex 
ratios, than those of the general population (Table 6.10). 
This may reflect in part simply a higher fertility 
(on which there is no evidence however), and insofar as the 
sex ratio is also higher in the adult population, it 
will clearly promote a higher fertility (cet. liar.).
The sex ratios are also higher among the workers, who 
will be predominantly adult. This was the case in 1961 
when it may have reflected a lack of migrants among the 
Backward Classes, for by 1971* in the case of Bhilainagar, 
the sex ratio of the Backward Classes did not differ 
much from: that of the general population (being skewed
towards males In both cases), and in this case we know 
that both Backward and general populations must have 
been migrant since Bhilai did not exist prior to 1955 
(Table 6.9).1
The picture is very similar in Durgapur with 
its 25*000 Backward Class people; only 2.8% of the working 
Backward Class population participated in the factory 
sector manufacturing industry (Table 6.9)* as against 
56.3% of general population. Again the well 
balanced sex ratios suggest that these people are just 
as committed to an urban life, through forming families in 
urban areas, as are their higher caste brethren. We 
should note how their participation in the cities has 
changed over the decades, enhancing the effect of a duality 
emerging in these industrial towns. The Backward Classes 
have either congregated around Durgapur, or else the re­
drawing of the urban boundary has encompassed them,(or both), 
as they have grown from 5*8 to 12.3 per cent of the, v  
total population; but their participation in the factory 
sector remained small (2.8%) in 1971* In Bhilai there has 
been much less congregation recorded over the decade, 
indeed a slight proportional fall (from 7*1 to 6.1 per cent 
of the total population) ,(Table 6.9). To take a comparison 
from Western India during the same period, the New-town
1 The Census did not record details of S.C. and S.T. 
at the level of the town itself in 1961.
areas of Maharashtra also have the lowest proportions 
of the Backward Classes: half as many in Pimpri-Chinchwad 
New-town as in Indapur, an old town in the same District 
(Poona), or as in Sholapur (Table 6,11),
Case studies that show large numbers of Scheduled
Caste migrants in cities have been able to point to
worsening rural conditions, rather than expanding
opportunities in urban areas, as the cause* In the
City of Poona in Maharashtra, for instance, the slum
settlements most peopled by migrants from drought-
stricken areas contain a high percentage of Scheduled
Castes (often over 50% compared with the average of ?%
in the City)* These migrants come as complete families,
from other Districts not far inland, and once located
there, having no rural land, they are effectively locked
in the city* If the latter fails to prosper, they are the
least likely to be able to return to a rural livelihood,
and the last to emigrate to other cities* It is interesting
to observe that this most depressed class group is
characterised by a high sex ratio (and fairly mature
family structure) from the start, just as are the higher
class migrants from other urban areas. In between fall the
industrial wage labour groups, who tend to migrate as single
males, but many of whom form families rapidly afterwards,
1 See M.M,Bapat, ’’Occupational and Spatial Mobility among 
Shanty Dwellers in Poona", Ph.D. thesis, University 
College London, 1979*
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In the mining localities, where the Backward Classes 
are more dominant, their population’s sex ratios 
are higher than those of their colleagues, though this 
is not specifically the case among the actual workers in 
the mining industry (Table 6.10)* Clearly they are more 
likely to be of local birth, and to have their families 
stay with them, than are other caste groups. The employment 
of women among the Backward Classes is generally more 
likely than is the case in the general population, 
partly because the Backward Classes only participate in 
branches of manufacturing that happen to be more suitable 
to female employment anyway (not so much in iron and steel 
production for instance), but partly, and more importantly, 
because women from the lower castes are permitted, 
and indeed forced through economic compulsion (the two 
are not unrelated) to work, when other women would not be.
Note the contrasting sex ratios in the construction 
industry (O.6 5 for the Backward Classes versus 0.27 for the 
general population), (Table 6.10).
It is the Backward Classes who remain when the mines 
close down or fail to expand (note the case of Chirmiri 
in Madhya Pradesh, Tables 6*9 and 6*7). In a later Chapter we 
discover how migrants generally manage gradually to work
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their way out of employment in mining and into employment
in manufacturing industry over time. The older the mine
the more local its workforce and the greater its component
of lower caste groups,; there is a concentration
of a class of people who are already the most vulnerable
in the rural areas (to losing employment as agricultural labour,
for instance, in the case of harvest failure). But
equally, the older the mine, the more likely it is to be
closed, which is the industrial equivalent to a harvest
failure in an urban monoculture with a clearly differentiated
class of wage labourers. At the community level the
problem is exacerbated by the older age structure of
a declining population, which we have seen characterises
older stagnating economies. At a family level the lack
of social mobility among the lowest class means that sons
will be of little help in diversifying the family income,
for they too will be miners*
The failure of the Backward Classes to be represented 
in the developing localities can be observed to be long­
standing. In the heavy industrial City of Jamshedpur 
(founded in the first decade of the Century) there was 
only 12.8% of the population recorded as Scheduled Caste 
or Tribe as late as 1971, and that is in a District where 
the Scheduled Tribes alone number 58.6% of the rural 
population. This is of course an extreme case* tribals
are predominant in this region of Bihar. But the observation 
strengthens the argument (consistent with our inference 
in Chapter 5 ) that recruitment managed, consciously or 
unwittingly, to miss the local labour; for it would be hard 
to argue that the Backward Classes were exceptional 
in being more fully employed than their fellows in agriculture, 
and hence less eager to participate in the alternative 
urban economy. But a further observation points in 
the reverse direction. Of those small numbers in 
Jamshedpur, a very high proportion was employed in 
manufacturing industry, 5^%, almost the same proportion 
as the general population in manufacturing. Without field 
research one has to remain agnostic. What remains striking 
however is the small number of tribals in this longstanding 
industrial city in the heart of a tribal area.
We have presented separately some contrasting data 
for other localities in Bihar (Table 6.11). The failure 
to employ tribals in the developing areas, in preference 
to migrants (who are mainly from West Bengal), has been 
a highly contentious issue in the 1960s. As mentioned above, 
depite the high proportion of tribals in the rural Districts 
of Ranchi and Singbhum, their urban representation is 
small. In the newly industrialising locality of 
Bokaro Steel Town the representation of the Backward 
classes is low but not negligible, and indeed their
presence in the town is higher than the rural average, 
but they are underrepresented in manufacturing, 
with only 11% in that sector. In the New-town 
of Jag&nnathnagar (part of Ranchi urban agglomeration) 
they are also well represented. But in Dhanbad urban agglom­
eration the familiar picture re-appears, with a small 
proportion of the Backward Classes there, and those 
predominantly engaged in mining. Developing Bihar is 
an area undergoing social change. But the overall
picture conforms to that presented before, and analysed
2
by others elsewhere in. India: the Backward Classes are
under-represented in urban areas because the occupations 
into which they are locked are under-represented. The 
exceptions are the mining and the declining towns, from 
where the more socially mobile have moved out, leaving the
1 N.Sengupta noted how Hindustan Steel employed local 
Bauri tribals in compensation for their loss of land, 
but only as temporary unskilled workers: the terms of 
contractual employment required literacy, thus effectively 
disqualifying the tribals. Since 1968, of the qualified, 
locals have to be found employment first. N.Sengupta, 
Destitutes and Development: a Study of the Bauri Community 
in the Bokaro Region. Concept, New Delhi, 19?8.
2 See for example V.S.D*Souza, "Scheduled Castes and 
Urbanisation In Punjab: an Explanation", Sociological 
Bulletin. March, 1975-
Backward Claeses over-represented. This may not, however, 
be the only reason for an increase in the proportional 
size of the Backward Classes: their more favourable sex
ratios are indicative of less disrupted family formation, 
and unless high mortality compensates, their growth rates 
and hence relative future population size will indeed 
increase. If the caste system exacerbates the disabilities 
of being born into a Backward Class by further restricting 
mobility there will be an increasing supply of labour 
to compete for non-expanding occupations in stagnating 
towns. Whatever the cause, more Backward Classes sharing 
a fixed resource means increased inequality between them 
and the rest of the population.
35 6
Figure 6 .1














N j o t t f i j f e  «S ^i«iv u<Hv d < u a i* L cjvOi-rffc*
Fig. 6.1 cont'd
















Fast to Moderate Growth Towns:
TiuXiluotw *^ uvtlUc»~ ftlt 
•W»%
CmMc*c.K WiU






















& W {  . 1
( j S . c ' k )  l 6 o | t
O'unts&.'r
a**«l Tc^Aifkjuj/ *•*< «*. U»Kar
T h K t if t r  i (  jfc . r A f lk a r U fk iv ’a , . •
360
Figures 6.2 to 6.5
Maps of Sub-region of Eastern Madhya Pradesh and 
District of Burdwan in West Bengal
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Selected Indices from the Model for Empirical Comparison
SEX RATIOS (fsm in total population with current migrants below)
Year: 0 5 10 15
Model
Type
1b 841 680 736 759
(484) (347) (1241) (486)
1a 841 742 816 830
(484) (521) (1 8 6 2) (486)
1c 841 426 588 631
CHILD : POPULATION RATIOS (0-4 by total population with 0-14 m+f
by total population below) (%)

































URBAN GROWTH RATES (decadal growth) (%)
below
Years: 0 - 5  5 - 1 0  1 0 - 1 5
1b , c66.8___9.1-— 9.7male { 81.9 19.8
c54.7_1-8.2„_13.1 > female [ ^3 .7
1a f66.8_10.4 __11.3 
malel 84.2 22.9
. . ^ 7 . 0 _ 2 1 . 5 ^ 1 3 . 2
female}
1c n «6o4.Q— .3.5.^ >5.8 
malel 627.3 9.3
 ^ 256.6_42.5 _^_13.6
female^ ^  ^
Table 6.1 a continued
SEX RATIOS











































URBAN GROWTH RATES (decadal rates below) 
0 - 5  5 - 1 0  1 0 - 1 5




i 2 8 .8  277^
femalesfl4.2 13*4 1 3 .2
1 29.6 28.5
NATURAL INCREASE @0.02 per annum 
Decadal growth 22.0
Source: Simulation Model (See further Table 3.1)
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Table 6.1b
Grouping of Empirical Cases by Model variants
SEX RATIOS
1961 1971 1961 1971
“  Bilaspur 901 907 —^ Bastar . 903 846
Ranchi 817 815 Bankura 905 920
Mayurbanj 810 840 Birbhum 844 893
Bhagalpur 832 821 Ganjam 951 955
Gaya 861 8741 b—  Burdwan 699 785 Monghyr 903 864
Howrah 644 702
24-Parg 737 702 —  Hoogley 749 784
Singbhum 797 802 Patna 813 822
Cuttack 745 772 Midnapore 830 865
(Bhagalpur 832 8 2 1)





■— ^ Baudh 949 865
Raigarh 901 901
Bolangir 923 -923
Calcutta 6 12 636
Shahabad 846 845
(Bankura 905 9 2 0)
1961 males 1961 males
—^ Bilaspur 13.5 ™  Bastar 13.6
Ranchi 13.1 Bankura 13.6
Mayurbanj 1 2 .6 Birbhum 13.1




Howrah 9*6 2b _ n — ■ Hoogley24-Parg 10.5 10.5
S ingbhum 12.9 Patna 1 2 .8
Cuttack 1 1 .0 Midnapore 12.5
1 C  -p.—  Durg
(Bhagalpur 12.7)
1 1 .2



















































1 1951 -6 1 6 1 -7 1 1951 -6 1 61-71
™  Bastar 44 111 Baudh 11 220
Bankura 29 24 Raigarh 21 27
Birbhum 46 24 Bolangir 22 75
Ganjam 36 67 Calcutta 8 8
Gaya 30 28 Shahabad 28 40
Mongyhr 40 23 (Bankura 29 24)





See Table 6.1a for Models
Model allocation:
1951-61 % decadal Model 
Growth 100+ 1c
5 0 -1 0 0 1b
5 0 -5 0 2b
50- B-3
1961 sex ratio 50%>h = a
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Table 6.2
Demographic Indices from the Study Districts 
over Two Decades
Decadal Growth (%) 

















Durg 30 2 0 0
(7 0 6)























































Chirmiri -ve! to 6563 35
__.C8l.6J
Notes: a average in-migration rate for the previous 5 years
(see text for interpretation); ditto sex ratio.(f:m).
b n.a., but see Table 6.7 for % aged 0-14.
c including outgrowth
Table 6.2 continued
Decadal Growth {%) % aged current sex ratio
1941-51 5 1 -6 1 6 1 -7 1 0-4 migration current




Howrah 22 58 23 11,4 5.2 593
(644) (7 0 2) (3.0) (481)
Calcutta 25 8 8 8 ,8 3.0 382
(6 1 2) (6 3 6) (2 .2 ) (3 8 1)
24-Parganas 50 64 49 1 2 ,2 4.8 676
(737) (7 0 2) (3.3) (893)
Hoogley 25 47 31 1 2 .1 6 . 0 788
(749) (784) (3.3) (854)
Burdwan 45 73 59 1 2 ,1 4.5 820
(699) (785) (2.9) (595)
Midnapore 34 32 26 12.5 3.4 720
(8 3 0) (8 6 5) (2.3) (791)
Birbhum 14 46 24 14, 0 4.8 768
(844) (8 9 3) (2 .8 ) (1 0 1 7)
Bankura 3 29 24 14.0 2.5 1339
(905) (9 2 0) (1.7) (9 0 8)
ORISSA
Mayurbanj 12 206 41 14,0 5.8 414
(8 1 0) (840) (3.2) (499)
Sundargarh - 783 79 1 1 ,6 1 1 .1 698
(6 3 0) (790) (5.6) (8 2 0)
B-K - 4 11 221 1 1 .2 1.7 93
(949) (865) (2 .8 ) (743)
Cuttack 40 53 47 1 2 .6 7.4 440
(745) (772) (2 .3 ) (6 3 6)
Ganjam 27 36 67 13.7 3.8 566
(951) (955) (1.7) (1 0 8 9)
Bolangir 37 22 75 14.3 6.7 1130
(923) (923) (3.0) (1173)
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Table 6.2 continued
Decadal Growth {%) % aged current sex ratio
*19^+1 — 5 1 -6 1 61-71 0-4 migration current




































































Sources: Government of India. Census of India 1961. 1971. 
(relevant States), General Population Tables,
Social and Cultural Tables (C II), Migration Tables 
(D III), Delhi#
Table 6.3
Sex Ratios among Workers in Manufacturing Industry
District Sex ratios female to male with % of





Calcutta ,0 8 8 (1 2) • 018
Howrah .0 6 6 (9 ) .0 2 1
24-Parganas .154 (15) .031
Hoogley .327 (8 ) .057
Midnapore .227 (44) .048
Burdwan .363 (2 2 ) .0 2 8
Birbhum ♦172 (23) .1 2 0
Bankura .487 (73) .133
BIHAR
Patna .3 2 2 (77) .048
Gaya .5 6 2 (8 2 ) .064
S ingbhum .2 1 1 (1 3) .0 6 2
Ranchi .411 (65) .074
Dhanbad .1 5 6 (2 8 ) .0 5 8
Monghyr .467 (8 0) .0 3 1
Shahabad .428 (8 0 ) .053
Bhagalpur .467 (92) .059
MADHYA PRADESH
Raigarh .877 (6 5) .191
Durg • 595 (46) .067
Bilaspur .795 (79) .219












.755 (84) ,6 6 7
.225 (73) .035
.7 7 6 (8 6) .1 3 8
.583 (8 1) .137
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961.
General Population Tables (relevant States), Delhi,
Table 6.4
Examples of Age Distribution in Stagnating Areas
CALCUTTA DISTRICT male population, proportions by age (with 
comparisons)
Age Proportion Comparison
10-14 ,0 8 6)
Burdwan .345
1 3 -1 9 .0 8 8  
20-24 .1 1 9
2 5 -2 9 .1 1 8  
30-34 .1 0 6
35-39 .0 8 7 1
40-44 .0731




55-59 .0 3 0 J
Table 6,4 continued.
Calcutta’s age distribution continued 
Age Proportion Comparison
60-64 *019) Cuttack ,046
6 5 -6 9 ,010} ,039 Burdwan *041
70+ .010J Asansol .031
Burnpur •0 2 2
Comparison with Stable model used as basis of this analysis 
Calcutta 3 5+ .320 Model .242
BAUDH KHONDMALS URBAN DISTRICT (Orissa) male population and 
Age Proportion (m,f) female P o r t i o n
0-4 .093) ,131]
5-9 .1395*342 .142^.364
10-14 .11 0 1 ,0 9 1J
1 5 -1 9 .1 0 0 .0 9 4
20-24 .1 0 7 .0 8 5
25-29 .0 8 7 .0 8 6
3 0 -3 4 .079 *0 6 9
3 5 -3 9 .0 6 4 .0 7 1
40-44 .0 5 6 .046
45-49 .043 .045
50-54 .048 .046
5 5 -5 9 ,0 2 8 .0 2 9
6 0 -6 4 .0 2 3 7 .0317
6 5 -6 9 .0 1 6 J.0 4 0 .0 0 8 } ,0 6 5
7 0+ .0 1 0J .0 2 6)
Sources: Calcutta, Government of India, Census of India 1961.
West Bengal, Social and Cultural Tables; Baudh, 
G.O.I., Census of India 1961. Orissa, Cultural and 
Migration Tables, Delhi, Tables CII and CIII.
Table 6.5
Origins of the Migrant Men in Case Study Areas. 1961
BURDWAN DISTRICT 
(West Bengal)
Burdwan City Proportion from Proportion from
each origin urban origins (in
— — — —  each row, with weighted
„ average at end of column)
Same District
(SD) 0 .3 6 0 .2 8
Another District 
(OD) 0.28 O.3 6
Another State 
(OS) 0 .3 6 0.27
Tot.









SD 0.31 0 .1 7
OD 0 .1 8 0.31
OS 0.31 0,24
1 .0 0  0 .2 3





























Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961.
(relevant States), Migration Tables, Delhi, 
derived in conjunction from Tables DII and DV.
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Table 6 .6
Comparisons of Growth of Manufacturing and General 
Populations in Selected Towns of Eastern Madhya Pradeah
Town8" Decadal Growth in Population (%) Principal
' % of male workers in manufacturing Manufactures (1971)
in 1961 bracketed below (factory) ■ 1 1 - ■ — ........
































1 2 .1 4.4(9.5)
(10)
1 2 1 .8 13.5(0.4),
(1 1) 5 0 .8  "
149.2(101.1)
(5)








pig iron, steel 
shapes and rail
poha oil, brass 
me tal
pulses, poha, cloth, 
cement pipes, curtains
groundnut oil, bidi, 
charcoal
bidi, soap, bronze 
& brass utensils
coal, kosa






kosa cloth, bell- 
metal; goods
(20412) 2 2 .0
Notes: a Municipalities, not Urban Agglomerations 
b Urban Agglomeration
Sources: Government of India, Census of India 1961. 1971«




Youth Detiendency Ratios in Selected Towns 
of Eastern Madhya Pradesh
Town Proportion of Population Decadal Growth of
— --- aged 0 - lif: Population 1961-71(90 :a
1961 1971 Male Female
Bhilainagar .2 3 0 *if21 67.3 17^.9
Durg .232 39.4 if9.7
Rajnandgaon .373 .398 2 5 .8 17.2
Dongargarh .378 *ifOif 3 0 *6 2 8 .1
Rajhara Jharan Dalli 
(iron ore colony) 
233^6 *232 *if21 -0 .0 (-1 0 0.0 f 3 6 .4
Bilaspur .373 .395 1 2 .8 14.3
Korba U*A* (.398)b (50.3 51.1)
(includes mining 
area) *2 9 6 .3 8 9 I46.9(20*8)a 1 8 3.if
Champa »3*t4 .390 1 0 .2 15.3
Ambikapur .383 .if 08 51.^ 6 1 .0
Manendragarh .3 6 1 *if09 23.3 33.5
Jhagrakhand 
(colliery) 
57^ .297 *372 ifif *0 (2 0*0 )a 50.if
Chirmiri
Colliery
6563 .3 4 4 .377 31*7 (8 *0 )a 39.1
Note a-Some mining towns have been added to the selection
given in Table 6*6 above* The growth of mineworkers 
from 1961-1971 is given in brackets* b Urban Agglom*
Source: As for Table 6*6, with addition of General Economic 
Tables for 1971* fable B I.
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Table 6.8
Demographic Characteristics of Ma.ior Towns
in Burdwan District





under 13 over 59
% of male Major 









6 5 2 8 -^








^1 6 9 6
1971
(Decadal Growth)
2 1 .2 1 .^
Male pop. 
growth
6 0 .0 iron 8c steel
Additional
Products




.764 i*i-7 23.3 6 7 .2 -
Burdwan 
(32. * 0








Note: Decadal growth rates are given as percentages.
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1 9 6 1. 1971.
West Bengal, General Economic Tables, Delhi, Table 
B I| Government of West Bengal, District Census 




Backward Classes in Developing Areas
Urban Locality % of Backward 




of BCs of TP 
1971 1971
(f:m)
% of male workers 
in factory manu­
facturing (or 
mining)0 1 9 7 1:
BCs TP
Durg District 9.8 8 .9 .9 0 6 .864 29.1 38.5
Bhilainagar 
Steel Town 7.1 6 .1 .798 .795 0 .0 6 1 .5
Rajnandgaon 6.7 8.3 .970 .932 45.9 2 9 .0
Dongargarh 7.1 1 2 .3 1 .0 7 2 1 .0 0 2 2 1 .3 1 2 ,3
Chirmiri 
Mining Colony 2 0 .1 2 8 .8 .8 3 6 .941 8 3 .1 76.9
Surguja District 
(mining) 1 7 .1 18.5 .915 .847 4 9 .8 37.3
Burdwan District:
Durgapur Steel 
Town 5.8 12.5 .842 .764 2 .8 56.3
Chittaranjan 
(loco works) 7.0 6.4 .7 0 2 .774 74.5 85.1
Jamuria
(mining) 22.5 34.5 .899 .792 2 2 .1 2 8 .2
Raniganj (r+u) 
(mining) 35.1 29.1 .794 .695 40.3 38.5
Burdwan City 1 0 ,6 7.8 .913 .8 0 6 15.5 11.4
Sources: Government of India, Census of India 1961. 1971 »
Notes:
(relevant States), General Population Tables, and 
Social and Cultural Tables (Tables oil Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes), New Delhi*
a The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (above) summed* 
b The total population*
c Mining is substituted for manufacturing where 
indicated in first column*
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Table 6.10
Industrial Participation of Backward Classes 
in Selected Districts of Eastern Madhya Pradesh in 1961
In each case the figure for the total 
population is included (in brackets)
District sex ratio % of males in sex ratio in
Urban of workers factory manufacturing fact, manufacturing
Durg District .523(.238) 





.356 (.0 6 7) 
.527 (.219) 
.246 (.0 7 8)
% of males in sex ratio in % of males





.8 8 7 (.795) 
.2 9 1 (.2 0 8)
sex ratio 
in mining/ in mining/ 
construction construct.
12.4 (1 0.0 ) .653(.2 7 0)
(construction)
45.5 (3 0 .0 )' .049(.043) 
(mining)
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961. Madhya
Pradesh, Social and Cultural Tables, Tables for 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes(Special 
Table SCT 1), and General Population Tablea, Delhi.
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Table 6.11
Backward Classes in Contrasting Cities of Bihar. 1971
% of BCs in District’s % of Bt&s in the % of BCs in 
rural population City population manufacturing/
■ — ........ ----------------  mining (same for
total pop* bracketed)
Monghyr City 17.9 6.5 17.6
Jamalpur City 17*9 10.6 42.6
Gaya City 2 5 .8  8 .6  13*4
Bhagalpur City 15*3 6 .6  11.9
Developing Areas:
Bokaro U*A,a 32*3 22.2 11.4
Dhanbad U.A. 32.3 16.4 4.4
75*3
(mining)
Ranchi U.A, 69*3 17*3 28.3
Jamshedpur TJ.A, 61.6 12*8 54*4
Comparisons from Maharashtra
Poona District:







Note: a- Urban Agglomeration
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971.
Bihar, and Maharashtra, General Population Tables,
and Social & Cultural Tables (C VIII), New Delhi.
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Table 6.12
The Linguistic Composition of Burdwan District 
between 1961 and 1971
BURDWAN District 
rural + urban












DURGAPUR Police Station 
rural + urban .
Growth rates 1961-71










m ales fe m a le s 1961 1'971
B e n g a l i 119.^ 207,5 • 576 .8 0 8
N o n -B e n g a li ^3*1 1 3 0 .8 • 377 .6 0 8




o f  ^ B e n g a li t o  r 
fe m a le s
B e n g a li P o p u la t io n :
1971
m ales fe m a le s
0 .38 :1 0.25:1 0.25:1 0 .19 :1
Sources: Government of West Bengal, Burdwan District Census
Handbook, 1961, Calcutta, Table C V.
Government of India, Census of India 1971. Social 
and Cultural Tables, New Delhi, Table C V (A ii).
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Appendix 6 .1 A Note on the Statistical Significance 
of Three Types of Urban Demographic Growth (Table 6A.1)
Clearly one would expect one industrial category 
of urban area to shade into another. Few towns are simply 
heavy engineering towns for instance* Their demographic 
characteristics would also tend to merge therefore.
Nonetheless it seemed worthwhile to see how far there are 
distinct clusters of urban areas, with broadly similar 
demographic, and industrial, features within each clusterf 
by which the clusters might be differentiated. For a 
statistical assessment of this hypothesis we undertake 
some Discriminant analysis.
We have taken three characteristics of urban areas 
within our sample (of Homogeneous Districts - see Appendix to 
Chapter 1): (i) demographic growth rates, (ii) percentage of 
male working population in (non-household) manufacturing, and 
(iii) percentage of the latter engaged in heavy industry 
(defined in Table 6A.1). Each in turn is subjected to discriminant 
analysis to see if there are three distinct groups of towns: 
the three groups postulated range from high to low, - 
more than 55% growth, 30% - 55% growth, less than 30% growth, 
for example. We use three variables by which to try and
1 These can be regarded as roughly corresponding to three 
sets of our model types: (1 a,b,c) (2 a,b) (Base, 3)«
distinguish the groups: the variables are sex ratio, 
child to population ratio, and elderly to population ratio.
The program* then investigates whether the three groups 
(of urban areas) can be regarded as significantly different 
in respect of this bundle of variables; in our case it tries 
out two different weighting systems, and presents them in 
order of significance as functions 1 and 2 (Table 6A.1).
It can be seen from the Table that the three 
characteristics (sex, youth, and senility) divide the urban 
Districts into three significantly different groups, whether 
the group is defined in terms of growth rates, manufacturing 
intensity, or heavy industrial importance. This merely 
confirms more strongly our contention that urban areas 
can be distinguished on the basis of their industrial 
structure (which we have shown to correlate closely with 
their rates of demographic growth), and that the distinguishing 
features do indeed include demographic structural variables 
like sex ratios and dependency.
More specifically, the analysis indicates predictable 
features and a few anomalies. The three urban growth groups 
are best distinguished (with 99%> confidence) by a combination 
of the variables that gives most prominence to the per cent of
1 The sex ratio is f:m, child population is 0-*f (m+f), 
elderly is 60+ (m+f).
e ld e r l y ,  and  s e c o n d a ry  im p o rta n c e  to  th e  se x  r a t i o ;  t a k in g  
a c c o u n t o f  c h i ld r e n  re d u c e s  th e  d i f fe r e n c e  be tw een  th e  g ro u p s *
The th r e e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  i n t e n s i t y  g ro up s  a re  b e s t  d is t in g u is h e d  
by th e  se x  r a t i o ,  w h ic h  i s  a d o m in a n t v a r ia b le  h e re *  F in a l l y  
th e  heavy i n d u s t r i a l  c a te g o r ie s  a re  b e s t  d is t in g u is h e d  by th e  
s e x  r a t i o  (a lm o s t  as im p o r ta n t  an e f f e c t  as i n  th e  p re v io u s  c a s e ) 
and  c h i ld r e n  once a g a in  d e t r a c t  fro m  th e  d is c r im in a t io n ;  th e  
e ld e r l y  a re  o f  m o d era te  im p o rta n c e  i n  d is t in g u is h in g  th e  g ro u p s *  
I n  t h i s  l a t t e r  case a second  f u n c t io n  i s  a ls o  s i g n i f i c a n t  
( w i t h  an a l t e r n a t i v e  w e ig h t in g  s y s te m ) ,  w h e re in  th e  se x  
r a t i o  and p e r  c e n t o f  c h i ld r e n  r e t a i n  t h e i r  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
in f lu e n c e ,  b u t  th e  e ld e r l y  d e t r a c t  fro m  th e  d is c r im in a t io n *
A g e n e ra l c o n c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  sex  r a t i o s  a re  e s p e c ia l ly  
a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  u rb a n  g ro w th  ( i t s  speed 
and i n d u s t r i a l  c o m p o s it io n ) ,  w h ic h  co n fo rm s  w i t h  o u r 
o b s e rv a t io n s  on d i f f e r e n t i a l  s e x  r a t i o s  among m ig r a n ts .  The 
o b s e rv a t io n  t h a t  c h i ld r e n  a re  o n ly  a m odera te  in f lu e n c e ,  and 
i n  th e  u n e x p e c te d  d i r e c t i o n ,  can be u n d e rs to o d  by n o t in g  some 
o f  th e  i n d i v id u a l  a n o m a lie s  ( t h a t  have been e x p la in e d  i n  th e  
c o u rs e  o f  th e  C h a p te r ) ,  F o r in s ta n c e ,  i n  th e  t h i r d  g ro up  
(e * g *  th e  lo w  g ro w th  a re a s )  th e re  a re  u rb a n  a re a s  w i t h  
lo w  (u n e x p e c te d )  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  c h i ld r e n  due t o  a d v e rs e ly  
d is t o r t e d  age s t r u c t u r e s  (e * g *  T a b le  6 ,^ f ) ,  and i n  th e  f i r s t  
g ro u p  (e *g #  f a s t  g ro w th  r a te  a re a s )  th e re  a re  u rb a n  a re a s  w i t h  
h ig h  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  c h i ld r e n  due to  h ig h  r a te s  o f  fe m a le
In-migration (the Model n 1 au types) in conjunction with 
favourable age structures. It is constructive to note 
here that, as a group, the stagnating towns are not so 
obviously characterised by large proportions of children; 
but they are characterised by larger than average proportions 
of elderly.
Table 6A.1 Discriminant Analysis
A Urban Growth Rates; Groups {% decadal) =55 5^-30 <30







B M a n u fa c tu r in g  -p ro p o r t io n  i n  w o rk fo rc e  {%) =30  2 9 -1 0  *10







C Heavy Industrial*T)roportion in manuf. lab. {%) =35 *35 as for B
Number of cases 9 12 5





Elderly 0.5789 - 1 . W
♦Industrial Manuf. groups 32,33*3^,36,37,38: described App. 5B,u 
Note b to first Analysis.
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A brief Overview of Chapter 6
A number of empirical patterns emerge in line 
with the Model (of Chapter 3), and some inconsistencies 
that the Model helps to elucidate. There are heavy industrial 
towns, with many working adults at one Census, and significantly 
more children at the next. There are some rapidly growing 
light industrial towns with many more women present.
There are more steadily growing mixed industrial town 
areas with a modest proportion of adult males and fairly 
constant composition over time. There are wildly fluctuating 
mining towns* Finally there are stagnant towns with rel­
atively mope children and considerably more old people.
And in the latter two cases there is a high proportion 
of the lowest caste groups.
PART THREE
Im p lic a t io n s  o f  th e  Hypotheses
CHAPTER 7
Demography, the State, and Social Welfare: 
The Housing Problem
A Summary of the Analysis
We turn to the more serious social and economic 
implications of these emerging demographic patterns.
We consider a major "welfare” expenditure, housing.
Increasing dependency experienced in newly industrialising 
urban areas leads to an increase in occupancy rates. But 
areas with low incidence of modern industrialisation continue 
to endure poor quality housing; and a failure of product­
ivity to rise significantly in the wake of continued in- 
migration in high productivity areas results in the 
emergence of low quality housing.: The initially high 
investment rates in this welfare sector are not sustained, 
despite increased need, i.e. dependency. It is made clear 
in a quantitative assessment that without dramatic change 
(that is hardly proposed in the planning literature) in 
technical construction standards, newly industrialising towns 
must face severe internal inequalities in housing provision. 
And without municipal transfers of funds towards the stagnat­
ing cities, existing housing standards will deteriorate as 
occupancy rises.
D em ograph ic
R e c a p i t u la t io n
To h e lp  fo c u s  th e  p ro b le m  now u n d e r d is c u s s io n  
we w i l l  r e c a p i t u la t e  th e  b a s ic  d e m og ra p h ic  s c e n a r io ,  
u n d e r l in in g  some o f  th e  fe a tu r e s  t h a t  im p in g e  m ost c lo s e ly  
on th e  h o u s in g  q u e s t io n ,  and r e s t r i c t i n g  o u r r e v ie w  to  
th e  e x tre m e  ty p e s  i n  o u r d em og ra p h ic  c o n tin u u m .
The heavy i n d u s t r i a l  tow ns a re  d is t in g u is h e d  
by th e  v e ry  r a p id  g ro w th  i n  t h e i r  la b o u r  fo r c e s  (M od e l 
ty p e s  "1 c "  and "1  b "  o r  ” 1 a ” ) ,  The f i r s t  n u m e r ic a l ly  
la r g e  com ponent i n  t h a t  g ro w th  i s  a c a te g o ry  o f  wage la b o u r  
w h ic h ,  f o r  v a r io u s  re a s o n s , w i l l  command an incom e t h a t  
i s  p e rh a p s  50 t o  100% above th e  e q u iv a le n t  i n  r u r a l  a re a s ,  
i . e .  be tw een  Rs 7 aud 1 0 , r a t h e r  th a n  Rb 3 t o  5» a day 
( i n  1 9 7 0 ,p r i c e s ) .  These la b o u r e r s ,  a f t e r  an  i n i t i a l  
p e r io d  o f  l i v i n g  a lo n e  i n  th e  c i t y ,  w i l l  r a p id l y  fo rm  
a  s m a ll  h o u s e h o ld , u s u a l ly  b r in g in g  i n t o  th e  tow n  n o t  
o n ly  a w i f e ,  b u t  up to  tw o  c h i ld r e n  a lr e a d y  b o rn  t o  th e  c o u p le .  
And w i t h in  th e  f i r s t  decade o f  th e  h u sb a n d ’ s re s id e n c e  
i n  th e  to w n , a t h i r d  c h i l d  w i l l  be b o rn ;  ( th e  case  
s tu d y  o f  B h i la in a g a r  i n  C h a p te r 9 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p ro c e s s  
q u i te  v i v i d l y ) .  The p o in t  t o  n o te  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  t h i s  
C h a p te r i s  th e  speed o f  g ro w th , and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e
1 The e v id e n c e  f o r  t h i s  comes fro m  v a r io u s  s o u rc e s .  The 
m o n th ly  wage o f  e n g in e e r in g  w o rk e rs  can be o b ta in e d
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single-member, or split, households are only very temporary#
In association with these migrants two other large 
population movements are found. The first (which actually 
pre-dates the core labour migration flow just described) 
consists of construction labour, about which we have said 
very little, except to note that in the case of the Steel 
towns where a subsequent expansion in capacity is expected, 
the labour is not encouraged to move away. In practice 
construction labour is never eager to abandon a developing 
city. Again, sometimes contrary to initial impressions 
of those who live there, a population is being established 
that will become far from temporary. Of greater numerical 
importance usually is the second population movement associat­
ed with the core migration, that is the rapid build-up of 
what I have termed a "multiplier" population, a migration 
stimulated by the prospects of supplying the goods and services 
demanded by the core labourers and their families. Typically
footnote continued
from Government of India labour statistics, and, after deflating 
for urban-rural price differentials, compared with average 
agricultural incomes, or agricultural wage rates. This is 
a rather crude methodology, but sophistication yields roughly 
similar results. For similar estimates, see H» and V.
Joshi and L.Deshpande, references in following note.
Ved Prakash, New Towns in India. Duke University,
1 96 9, found from a survey that average public sector 
incomes in the Steel Towns were Rs 2,200 per annum in
1963-^ .
its incomes are only marginally superior to those in 
rural areas (around Rs 3 to 5 per day)# Again there is 
rapid family formation (indeed a proportion, the worst off, 
tend to migrate as complete families). And again the 
striking characteristic is the speed of growth; (in five 
years Rourkela grew from scattered villages to a population 
of 9 0 ,0 0 0; in the next decade it grew to beyond the size 
of Middlesbrough in the U.K., and by 1981 had reached a 
third of a million. At the current rate of growth it will 
have taken three decades to reach the size of Sheffield; 
the Durg-Bhilai agglomeration is already that size (1981)).
This scenario has been presented as a stereotype, 
and the variations, in particular the different migration 
behaviours of different social groups or classes, will be 
commented upon in more detail when we come to discuss the
1 The best comparative estimates for the service and petty 
manufacturing population can be obtained from the Joshis 
study of Bombay, and L.Deshpande's survey of the same.
H* and V. Joshi, Surplus Labour and the City, OUP, Delhi 
1976; L.K.Deshpande, The Indian Labour Market (mimeo), 
Dept, of Economics, University of Bombay, 1979* who 
kindly allowed me to read his valuable manuscript*
The Labour Bureau Family Living Surveys, described in 
Chapter 8 , indicate differentials among factory sector 
workers•
2 Rourkela (1961) 9 02 7 8, (1971) 172502, (1 9 8 1) 321326, 
Middlesbrough (198 1) 149770; Durg-Bhilai (1 9 8 1) 490158, 
Sheffield (1981) 477142.
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strategies migrants adopt to ensure adequate housing for 
themselves and their families. How far the demographic 
implications differ in the,less rapidly expanding, 
more balanced industrial towns, will be discussed when we 
analyse the planning policies actually adopted by the State.
The other extreme stereotype to recapitulate at 
this stage is the case of towns going into industrial decline 
or stagnation (Model type ‘'Base" and uy %), of which many 
of the mining towns are a special case. These populations 
consist of fully mature families, often of two 
generations, with large average household size (except 
in the most extreme cases of out-migration). The demo­
graphic change is usually more gradual than in the growth 
areas. It amounts to steady out-migration of the better- 
endowed (usually better educated) workers, who have 
the higher income potential* The older generations are 
more likely to be left behind, as are the poorer sections 
of the work-force generally. This can be seen particularly 
clearly from Table 6*9 where we reviewed the caste 
composition of towns in a developing area. The stagnating 
towns retained their relatively high proportions of Backward 
Classes (i.e. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes): this
is especially true of mining towns* The only case where
a segment of the higher-income population remains in those 
towns is where the latter acquired an administrative, 
religious, or educational significance which ensured the 
presence of an elite whose bargaining .power in the 
state political arena was not easily suppressed* This 
may assist the maintenance of a social infrastructure 
even where there is a lack of industrial prosperity.
The Housing Problem
We will now present an economic model of the
problem that arises in the housing question. The
first observation is that the basic economic-demographic
1
model put forward by Coale and Hoover is especially 
relevant in New-town growth (type "1 cu),though they 
did not particularly observe this fact. Before the mills 
begin to deliver steel (or whatever), a huge investment is 
required in social infrastructure. This is a net 
investment in the economy: the rural or urban dwelling
from which the migrant comes continues 'to be occupied
2
by other members of the family, or is allowed to decay.
For the same reason it is a net capital expenditure to
1 A.J.Coale and E.M.Hoover, Population Growth and Economic 
Development in Low-income Countries. Princeton U.P., 
Princeton, 1958, (discussed in Chapter 1 above).
2 Migrants from other urban areas may be able to realise 
some of the value of their abandoned asset by sale: 
towns typified by out-migration, however, suffer a low 
valuation of social assets.
the migrant, and immediate ownership is out of the question.
The first implication then is that these very heavy capital
expenditures (in proportion to local incomes) lasting over
a ten to fifteen year period in the life of the rapidly
expanding town (and to a lesser extent beyond that time)
will have to be born by the State (or Central) Government,
unless the local Municipality, drawing revenues from its
own local incomes only, is prepared to devote most of its
budget to these causes* In a quantified model (Chapter 7
Appendix, which could be read in detail at the end of this
section) we estimate that the tax burden implied in this
policy is prohibitive. This is simply because of the
coincidence of the requirements of a large number of
newly migrant labourers to a '’greenfield '1 site, where
there is no pre-existing local population with savings to
1
invest in municipal construction.
The second point to be made arises from the 
detailed costing attempted in the budgeting exercise 
(Appendix). For if investment levels are not allowed 
to rise on a permanent basis (i.e. regardless of the 
temporary problem of the huge concentration of in-migration), 
then housing costs must keep in line with urban worker
1 The problem is that the whole population is at the same 
point in its collective life-cycle; so is industry.
In both cases this is before the point of maximum 
saving. The Model type ”1 b” would of course be a 
less extreme case, where there is a pre-existing local 
population*
3 9 2
productivities. As we indicated above that the rural-
urban income differential reaches 100% for industrial
workers, this means that dwelling costs (usually rents)
borne by the industrial worker should not exceed rural
dwelling costs (which usually means maintenance costs)
by more than 100% (with 50% being a safer target).
That is to say, if we take the value of rural housing
to be between Rs 1500 and Rs 2500 for a landless labourer 
2
or small farmer , then the new urban investment should 
not exceed Rs 5000 per dwelling for the core-sector 
industrial worker (i.e. between 2 and 2-J times his 
industrial income). For the remaining 75% of the 
(non-elite) population who are not core-sector workers 
(the multiplier workforce), housing costs must approximate 
those in rural areas experienced by the lowest income
1 Studies have shown that income elasticities of demand for 
housing are over 1, and increase with income. In developed 
countries a norm is usually established (e.g. by building 
societies) that the house value should not exceed 2-J times 
the annual income. See L.S.Burns and L.Grebler, The Housing 
of Nations, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1977*
2 Rs 1000 was the compensation offered in the late 1950s 
by Hindustan Steel to the villagers whose homes were 
destroyed to make way for the Rourkela plant (Rs 1500 in 
1970 prices). Government of India, Census of India 1961. 
"Social Processes in the Industrialisation of Rourkela", 
(Special Monograph), New Delhi*
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g ro u p s  ( i . e .  s h o u ld  n o t  exceed Rs 2 0 0 0 ) . One s im p le  b u t  
s t r i k i n g  o b s e rv a t io n  em erges fro m  t h a t  r e q u ir e m e n t :  
u rb a n  h o u s in g  has to  a d o p t r u r a l  c o n s t r u c t io n  te c h n o lo g y  
( o r  some a d a p ta t io n  t h e r e o f ) .
H o w e ve r, a t h i r d  c o n s id e r a t io n  c o m p lic a te s  th e  p ic t u r e .  
I n  a la n d -s c a rc e  econom y, new in v e s tm e n t i n  h o u s in g  
has a p o s i t i v e  la n d  c o s t .  I n  te rm s  o f  space a lo n e ,  th e  s o c ia l  
re q u ire m e n ts  o f  a S te e l  Town am ount to  th e  b u i ld in g  o f  a 
h u n d re d -o d d  v i l l a g e s  o f  2000 p o p u la t io n  s iz e  each  ( w i t h in  
th e  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s ) .  To m in im is e  la n d -u s e  c o s ts ,  
p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t ie s  h ig h e r  th a n  th o s e  i n  th e  v i l l a g e s  
(w h ic h  w ere  i n i t i a l l y  c o n c e iv e d  when la n d  was le s s  s c a rc e )  
a re  d e s i r a b le .  The e q u i l ib r iu m  p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t y  o f  
c o u rs e  depends on th e  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  la n d ,  b u t  i t  s h o u ld  be 
n o te d  t h a t  t r u e  la n d  v a lu e s  ( i . e .  s o c ia l l y  c o s te d )  may r i s e  
on th e  p e r ip h e r y  o f  th e  new tow n  i f  th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  
a g r i c u l t u r e  i s  i n t e n s i f i e d  and c h a n n e lle d  i n t o  th e  
p r o d u c t io n  o f  h ig h - v a lu e  cash  c ro p s  ( l i k e  v e g e ta b le s )  
to  fe e d  th e  c i t y .  H ig h e r  p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t ie s ,  h o w e ve r, 
o r  in d e e d  even  th e  e q u iv a le n t  o f  r u r a l  v i l l a g e  p o p u la t io n
1 The a s s u m p tio n  i s  t h a t  th e  h ig h  i n d u s t r i a l  w o rk e r  (and
p r o fe s s io n a l )  c la s s  wages a re  re g a rd e d  as s o c ia l l y  o p t im a l:  
o th e rw is e  p ro b le m s  o f  S e c o n d -B e s t v a lu a t io n  a r i s e .  I t  i s  
c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  t h a t  m a rk e t p r ic e s  o f  la n d  r i s e  on th e  
c i t y  p e r ip h e r ie s ,  som etim es e n o rm o u s ly : see f o r  exam ple  
K .W adhva, "L a n d -u s e  P a t te rn s  i n  U rban  F r in g e  A re a s " ,  
E conom ic  and  P o l i t i c a l  W e e k ly . 2nd A p r i l ,  1 9 8 j .
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d e n s i t ie s ,  r e q u i r e  v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  s o c ia l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  
i f  th e  same l e v e l  o f  w e lfa r e  i s  t o  he m a in ta in e d  o v e r t im e .  
B r i e f l y  p u t ,  t h i s  i s  because th e  e n v iro n m e n t i s  in c a p a b le  
o f  d is p o s in g  o f  th e  d o m e s tic  w a s te  o r  p r o v id in g  w a te r  
f o r  a la r g e  p o p u la t io n  ( th e  th r e s h o ld  s iz e  d e p e n d in g  
p a r t l y  on th e  l o c a l  e c o lo g y )  a t  th e s e  d e n s i t ie s  w ith o u t  
th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  l a t r i n e s ,  d r a in s ,  garbage  d is p o s a l ,  
and p ip e d  w a te r  f a c i l i t i e s .  S m a ll v i l l a g e s  c a n , i n  th e o r y ,
•i
c o p e . These la n d  d e ve lo p m e n t c o s ts  u s u a l ly  d o u b le  th e
c o s t  o f  p r o v id in g  a b a s ic  d w e l l in g ,  even i f  th e  l a t t e r
c o s ts  a re  k e p t  lo w  by th e  a d o p t io n  o f  a r u r a l  te c h n o lo g y :
in d e e d  s i t e s  and s e r v ic e s  a lo n e  w o rk  o u t a t  Rs 2500
( i n  1970 p r ic e s )  p e r  u n i t  b e fo re  any d w e l l in g  i s  c o n s t ru c te d
above fo u n d a t io n s .  T h is  im p l ie s  a r e n t  a b o u t d o u b le  t h a t
we c o u ld  e x p e c t th e  n o n -c o re  s e c to r  ( o r  m u l t i p l i e r )
2
w o rk e r  t o  a f f o r d *
1 T h is  i s  n o t  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  v i l l a g e s  a re  in h e r e n t ly  h e a lth y  
p la c e s :  w i t h  s e t t l e d  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  d is p o s a l  o f  w as te  
becomes a m a t te r  o f  c o n c e rn  i f  d is e a s e s  l i k e  d y s e n te ry  
and hookworm  a re  t o  be a v o id e d .  B u t kn ow led g e  and 
o r g a n is a t io n  a lo n e  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m a in ta in  le v e ls  o f  
w e l fa r e  i n  t h i s  c a s e . A f u r t h e r  p o l lu t a n t  comes fro m  
th e  b u r n in g  o f  s o f t  f u e ls :  a g a in  c o s ts  a re  in c u r r e d  i f  
t h i s  p ro b le m  i s  t o  be m i t ig a te d  i n  c i t i e s .
2 The q u e s t io n  h e re  a r is e s ,  s h o u ld  n o t  th e  " m u l t i p l i e r "  
p o p u la t io n  f lo w s  cease when i t s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  le v e ls
f a l l  so  f a r  as t o  be u n a b le  t o  f in a n c e  th e s e  in f r a s t r u c t u r e  
c o s ts ?  W ould  n o t  th e  s o c ia l l y  o p t im a l l e v e l  o f  th e  
m u l t i p l i e r  fo r c e  be a b o u t 2 t o  3 t r a t h e r  th a n  4 to  5* 
t im e s  th e  c o re  la b o u r  fo r c e ?  The answ er m ig h t be y e s ,
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We have now d is c u s s e d  th e  p ro b le m  o f  fu n d s  f o r  
h o u s in g  d e v e lo p m e n t. The o th e r  p ro b le m  i s  im m e d ia te ly  
due t o  th e  r a p i d i t y  o f  g ro w th  ( r a t h e r  th a n  one o f  incom es 
and  te c h n o lo g y ) .  F o r even  g iv e n  th e  need f o r  h ig h  p o p u la t io n  
d e n s i t ie s  and heavy s o c ia l  in f r a s t r u c t u r e  t o  m eet th e  
im p l i c a t io n s  o f  la r g e - s c a le  m ig r a t io n ,  h ig h  le v e ls  o f
fo o tn o te  c o n t in u e d
i f  ( i )  th e  in f r a s t r u c t u r e  c o s ts  were t r u l y  p a r a m e t r ic ,  
and n o t  s u b je c t  t o  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  in n o v a t io n ;  and 
( i i )  th e  m ig ra n t  s tre a m s  w ere t r u l y  u n d i f f e r e n t ia t e d ,  i n  
t h a t  a l l  m ig ra n ts  w ere  a t t r a c t e d  to  th e  c i t y  by th e  p ro s p e c ts  
o f  h ig h e r  incom es and  s u b s id is e d  c o s t o f  l i v i n g .  B u t i n  
f a c t  new te c h n o lo g ie s  a re  c o n s ta n t ly  lo w e r in g  u rb a n  d e v e lo p ­
m ent c o s ts  ( w h i le  a t  th e  same t im e  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  i s  
r a i s i n g  r u r a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  c o s ts  as v i l l a g e s  re a c h  th e  
th r e s h o ld  s iz e s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a b o v e ) ,  and i t  w o u ld  be p re m a tu re  
t o  a rg u e  t h a t  u rb a n  g ro w th  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  to o  c o s t l y  (e ve n  
th o u g h  i t  may have been so  a t  some t im e  i n  th e  p a s t ) .  
S e c o n d ly ,  a p r o p o r t io n  o f  m ig ra n ts  a re  pushed o u t o f  
th e  r u r a l  economy by re d u c e d  em ploym ent o p p o r t u n i t ie s :  
th e s e  m ig ra n ts  may be th e  l a s t  t o  a r r i v e  i n  th e  N ew -tow ns -  
w itn e s s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Backw ard C la sse s  a re  o v e r t im e  
in c r e a s in g ly  re p re s e n te d  i n  th e  S te e l  Town o f  D u rg a p u r (T a b le  
6 ,9  ) •  I n  a p o l i t i c a l  sys te m  w here  th e  r u r a l  economy i s  v e ry  
l i t t l e  u n d e r s o c ia l  c o n t r o l ,  th e  a c h ie v e m e n t o f  w e lfa r e  t a r g ­
e ts  by p e r m i t t in g  th e  Backw ard  C la sse s  to  m ig ra te  where 
o p p o r t u n i t ie s  d ic t a t e  may s t i l l  be a  le s s  c o s t l y  p o l ic y  
th a n  t r y i n g  to  i n i t i a t e  program m es to  meet th e s e  t a r g e ts  
i n  r u r a l  a re a s .  B u t w h a te v e r th e  a n s w e r, we w i l l  le a v e  a s id e  
h e r e ,  as we do e ls e w h e re , th e  b ro a d e r q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r 
m ig ra n ts  s h o u ld  be r e s t r a in e d ,  and c o n c e n tra te  . 
on how s o c ie ty  does and can m a in ta in  th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f  
w e l fa r e  o f  th o s e  who do m ig ra te  and l i v e  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
ty p e s  o f  to w n s*
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organisation are also required to ensure optimal location 
of housing (to minimise the cost of meeting targeted 
levels of welfare over time). In the case of heavy 
industrial centres, it would not be premature to plan 
for a.city of a million when the current population is 
a hundred thousand. The pure planning problem is of course 
much eased in the case of a better distributed pattern 
of demographic growth: the Model types "2 b" (and "2 a")
may be compared with the types "1 b" ("1 a") in this ' ,
respect, in that the absolute volume of migration is 
the same, but the phasing over time is different.
To turn now to the mature towns (types "Base" and "3"
in our Model), as wehave said, they have a larger 
percentage of Backward Classes and an older population.
The more they are subject to outmigration, the older,
1 This is no new problem. Observations, on the disorganised 
incorporation of villages as the city expands, and the 
resultant deterioration in welfare, are very similar 
whether one reads Engels on Manchester and other 
industrialising areas in England in the 19th Century, 
or Sivaramakrishnan on Durgapur today: the only
difference is that the latter is growing far faster 
thaniarer did the cities in England's industrial 
revolution (see Chapter 2 above). F.Engels, The Bousing 
Question. 1872; K.C.Sivaramakrishnan, "Case Study of 
an Indian New Town" in J.L.Taylor and D.G.Williams (eds,) 
Urban Planning Practice in Developing Countries.
Pergamon, Oxford, 1982
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and usually poorer, they become# There is then a dis­
investment in social infrastructure* Merely to maintain 
existing levels of welfare requires expenditure on the 
housing stock (for a quantification, see the Appendix)* 
That should not, however, create so much of a problem 
in terms of local expenditures, as occurs with very rapid 
growth* But a rather more serious problem does occur*
For it is not possible to upgrade the social fabric of 
older towns - provide drainage for instance..- without 
a considerable degree of demolition, as well as new 
investment, thereby considerably increasing the costs 
involved, particularly those of organisation incurred 
in relocating, even locally, an ageing population*
(At this point it might be helpful to read through the 
Appendix to this Chapter)*
Analysis of Official Planning
We proceed now to an analysis of planning policy,
with particular reference to housing, in the newly
expanding towns, and the older stagnating towns, of
India* The first thing that strikes us is the lack of
a co-ordinating body in New-town areas. None of the Steel
towns for instance had Municipal Councils, nor initially
did any of them even have a Development Authority#
1 K ,C*rSivaramakrishnan, "NewTowns in India", Indian Institute 
of Management, Calcutta, 1979* (mimeo).
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The planning was done /purely by the public sector industry, 
and catered exclusively for its core-sector heavy industrial 
work-force. As was mentioned above, the planners 
.did envisage a "civil township" of the order of 100,000 
people (given an. industrial output of 1 million tonnes 
of steel). But the actual administrative system did 
no more than lay down guidelines in the form of zoning 
for future land use. A striking example is the case of 
Durgapur, where, inspite of the setting up of a 
Development Authority (after the initiation of the core 
industrial investments), the official construction of 
a central business area did not begin until ten years later 
(197 1)| by which time an unofficial business area had 
already been established, on land zoned for residential 
purposes onlyl ^
As regards housing, the public industrial companies 
were eager to maintain their core work-forces (some of whom 
had been trained in colleges at public expense to the 
required level in engineering knowledge, and all of whom 
were assumed to be acquiring an expertise on the job that 
made them far less dispensable than, for instance, workers 
in the textile industries). This requirement of retaining
1 See K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, "Case Study of an Indian 
New Town", in J.L.Taylor and D.G.Williams (eds.)
Urban Planning Practice in Developing Countries. Pergamon, 
Oxford, 1982.
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the work-force implied ensuring adequate housing for
employee and family. In the Steel Towns the cost of housing
alone worked out at about Rs 1 5$000 per housing unit
(in 1970 prices) for those with average incomes of
about Rs 3 0 0 0, plus a further Rs 65OO for land development
and provision of public utilities. The total cost of
Rs 22,000 per unit required a huge subsidy, if we assume
the industrial core-sector workers were not prepared to
pay a rent equivalent to more than, say, 15%  of their
income: for a rental return of 8% this would imply a
property value of no more than Rs 6000 (as against the Rs 22,000
actually expended). In fact the subsidy provided amounted
to around 80%. A survey carried out in Bhopal and Bhilai
industrial townships (both in Madhya Pradesh) found that
40.6% and 44.8% respectively of their core industrial
1
labour forces were provided with public housing,
(and it will be recalled that the core labour forces in 
the Steel Towns was supposed to be 7500 men in total, 
not, as emerged in fact, 12,000 to 15,000 (see Chapter 2 
above)).
Regarding the remainder of the city's population, 
no provision was made at all. It was blindly supposed
1 V* Prakash, New Towns in India. Duke University, Durham, 
1969.
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that much of this population would be temporary, relating 
to construction requirements (and estimates of such labour 
forces run into very large numbers, averaging, for instance, 
^0,000 men for the public sector steel plants). Assuming 
that this labour was actually counted at all at the 1961 
Census it must have been largely classified outside the 
construction sector (which is recorded as quite small), 
and much.iof it was clearly enumerated outside the formal 
boundaries of the town (see further below). Visually it 
would be easy to confuse such large numbers of truly 
temporary workers with equally large numbers of non, 
temporary workers, who were to service the town in the 
trades and consumer goods manufacturing sectors. Indeed, 
in the event they will have been many of the same people.
1 Compare V .S .D'Souzia, writing about the New-town of his 
own residence, Chandigarh, in Punjab: "The slum problem 
has been allowed to grow because of misconceptions about 
the relationship of the slum dwellers with the community.
They were regarded as a transient population catering to 
the temporary needs of the community such as building and 
road construction11, Economic and Political Weekly, 18th 
Sept., 1976.
The author of the current thesis witnessed this 
blatant manifestation of blindness, followed by self- 
inflicted blindness, on the part of the urban Authority 
in this particular City, in that unauthorised housing 
was eventually 'huthorised11 in the form of “labour colonies11 
beyond the City boundary: these were kept behind a city wall
with slots in to allow access. This population amounted to 
13% of the City in 1971* It was quite impossible to see it 
unless you went through one of the slots.
It would appear that a very sharp duality emerged 
in the rapidly industrialising areas. Part was planned, 
part was not. The low level of facilities was experienced 
by a population far beyond those who could be described as 
the po:orest (and indeed the Backward Classes were initially 
a small minority in these towns, and in some, though 
not all, cases have tended to remain so (Table 6.9))*
But it was not of concern to the public sector industry 
to provide amenities for the “multiplier11 sector work-force, 
while the latteite own employers (insofar as this sector 
consisted of wage labour at all) regarded their work­
force as dispensable, and hence were unconcerned about the 
risks of low productivity that might result from poor health 
or general domestic dissatisfaction* There is admittedly 
not much explicit evidence on this duality of attitude, 
but data on provision of basic amenities at place of work 
(included in the Labour Bureau Family Living Surveys) are 
suggestive* A simple index (compiled by the current author) 
of water supply, latrines, canteens and medical services 
does indicate how the lighter manufacturing industries were 
less likely to provide such items at their own expense 
than were the heavy industries (Table 7.1). The same 
general pattern holds regarding housing, though here the 
mining sector was exceptional in providing housing, but 
not other facilities (Table 7*2).
At the same time as not providing housing, the
public authorities have often purchased land, earmarked it
for future development, and then left it vacant. No
private developer, or cooperative, could acquire that
1
land for low-income housing schemes* Furthermore,
"Low Income Group” construction loans available from public 
funds were only permitted to finance up to 75% of the 
construction costs, the total of which must amount to 
at least Rs 15*000 per unit to be eligible (in'1977 prices, 
or about Rs 8000 in 1971 prices). What was clearly required 
was for rather lower cost schemes to be implemented on 
public land. The Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
had expended Rs 2590 million by the mid-1970s, but only 
Rs 0 million (1.5%) was for sites and services schemes 
(according to press reports). As time went on, it was 
not as though funds were theoretically lacking at the local 
level of the New-towns, and least of all in the the 
thriving new industrial towns built on the oil and chemicals 
boom in Western India, but without a Municipal Authority in 
existence there was very little attempt to mobilise them.
Of the public sector Steel Towns for instance only Durgapur 
accepted an authority (a Notified Area Authority) with
1 The inevitable squatting that takes place on such land
eventually becomes legitimised, as the author has witnessed 
in Poona, with the resulting complications of re-planning 
that becomes necessary when drainage and water are supplied, 
all of which could have been organised or prepared for in 
the first place.
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power to levy a rate on the various company townships 
that loosely made up the urban agglomeration (as it became 
called)* And in some cases where funds were mobilised 
through the eventual creation of a Municipal Authority, 
they were kept, like the land, for more spectacular purposes 
than co-operative housing, - the New-town of Pimpri-Chinchwad 
in Maharashtra (in our comparative case-study area) being 
an outstanding example* But in the case of these rapid 
growth towns the effect of keeping funds idle is to encourage 
unplanned development of a socially costly nature: again the 
case of Pimpri-Chinchwad comes to mind, where unauthorised 
housing has severely encroached on the main Bombay-Poona 
highway*^
Official attention in the 1970s began to dwell 
upon (or at least hover over) some of the contradictions 
mentioned above* In 1972 the Working Group on slums 
reported to the Planning Commission on fifteen years
3
of slum clearance and improvement schemes* It is 
indicative of the failure to grasp the dynamics of the
1 V.K.Bawa, "Industrialisation, Urbanisation, and Planning 
in the Pune Metropolitan Region: A Study of Pimpri- 
Chinchwad" , paper presented to the 7th European Conference 
on Modern South Asian Studies, London 19&1, collected papers 
in press, eds* K.A.Ballhatchet and HD. Taylor*
The author of this thesis heard the City described on 
more than one occasion as being flush with funds, which were 
reserved for (among other things) the building of a stadium*
2 Reported in local press, e.g* Poona Herald, 22nd Oct. 1980.
3 Government of India, Planning Commission, Report of the 
Working GrQ-Up on Slums, New Delhi, 1972*
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problem that the Group*s terms of reference were confined 
to cities of a population of 300,000 and over alone*
To the credit of the Group, they did point out this anomaly: 
"slum growth is not exclusive to Metropolitan Cities and 
is prevalent to a varying degree in almost every town"*
By the time of the 1971 Census the Steel Towns* insubstantial 
(or "katcha") housing stock had reached between 10% and 20% 
of the total (Table 7*3)» but in 1961 when the previous 
enumeration was made none of these towns had reached 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  
in size, so that concern with slum growth would have been 
regarded as premature Similarly, the deterioration of 
housing stock of more substantial quality (or "pucca" 
housing), and the continued low level of basic amenity 
provision, ensure that the population in those stagnating 
industrial cities that have the misfortune to be smaller than 
300,000 in size, will continue to lag behind the larger 
cities' populations in their quality of life (as they 
do also in their average incomes and hence in their
1 An anecdote quoted to the author comes to mind. Research 
students at a University in Northern India were given the 
brief to investigate the possibility of a project analysing 
the slum areas of small towns in Uttar Pradesh. They reported 
back utterly perplexed, and asked for a clear indication 
of what areas of small towns they could possibly exclude 
from the definition of a slum. (Reported to the author 
by Professor Bigit Ghosh of the School of Planning and 
Architecture in New Delhi),
taxable base)* Provision of "welfare” tends to be regressive 
also# In Table 7*^ we have assembled the data provided 
by the Municipal Authorities to the Census Authorities in 
1971 on local expenditures and amenity provision; I select 
"protected water supply" as an example# Considerable 
ommissions (noted at the foot of the Tables) constrain the 
quality of these data, and a detailed discussion would 
demand too much faith in their pzajision, but, for what they 
are worth, we can draw attention to.some general 
implications# Not surprisingly the standards of amenity 
provision deteriorate inversely with town size (from 
100% in the larger to a mere *f0% in the smaller towns 
of Madhya Pradesh, for example); and yet the smallest 
town class sizes in these data contain towns that are far : 
larger than the threshold village populations that might 
be able to deal with fresh water supplies (for example) 
without raising resouces for social expenditure* These 
class-wise averages tell us nothing of course about the 
distribution of amenities within those classes (some of 
whose towns will be growing and prospering, while some 
stagnate or decline), nor do they tell us anything about 
the distribution of amenity provision within individual 
towns. The larger cities might be more clearly dual cities, 
in the sense noted above# But there is little a priori
406
reason to assume this, and indeed the only city within
our area to have instituted a fairly comprehensive slum
rehabilitation scheme at an early date was Calcutta, with
100% grant from Central Government, as recorded in the
1
above-mentioned Planning Commission report#
At the end of pur period of current reference 
a further committee reported to the Ministry of Works 
and Housing on slum clearance and environmental 
improvement schemes# The latter programme has been 
transferred to the State administration (a major advance,
given the lack of Municipal Authorities in New-towns and
o
the lack of a local tax base in the declining towns)#
The recommended policy, which is fully costed out, is 
approaching the possible: i#e# land and service provision
1 In 1975 the author was told by the Secretary of Calcutta 
Metropolitan Development Authority that this scheme was 
concentrated in the North of the City (Baranagar especially); 
the vast areas in the South (around Garden Reach) had to 
await the World Bank financed project of the late 1970s#
In the mid-1970s Bombay instituted a large slum 
clearance (not upgrading) scheme in several Northern Wards 
of the City, Relocation was supposed to be to prepared sites, 
but these included distant areas like Deonar (on the main 
highway inland), some of which were reported not to have 
been "prepared" at all, and which, in any case, as the 
author observed, are highly polluted and generally in need 
of drainage# (See Economic and Political Weekly, 4th October, 1975X
2 Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Report 
of the Committee set up to Review the Slum Clearance/
Improvement Scheme and. Scheme for Environmental Improvement 
in Slum Areas and Other Matters« New Delhi, 1975*
costing Rs 1850 per unit in 1975 prices, and materials 
provided for do-it-yourself construction, worth Rs 150, 
the total amounting to below Rs 2000 in 1970 prices#
And for the first time there is a recommendation to 
prepare and use hilly and low-lying land and even land 
earmarked for parks# As our calculations in the Appendix 
to this Chapter suggest, these costs are still a little 
too high for a comprehensive housing of1 the incremental 
urban population, and besides, the problem of a backlog 
still remains# Furthermore they do not address the question 
of the deteriorating standards in the older towns, or 
the declining towns (or the old-town areas in the modest- 
growth towns, like Patna, Cuttack, or Poona)# Laudable as 
it is to stress the need for safe water, and electrification, 
in villages, the same applies to the more "backward" 
towns which are areas of out-migration and declining 
productivity just as much as are the backward villages.
Strategies adopted by the People themselves
We' have reviewed official planning policy on 
growing and stagnating towns and cities (relevant to the 
cases under our study): on the whole we have condemned it 
as inadequate. What then have been the unofficial strategies 
adopted by the people themselves to bridge the gap between 
their perceived needs (but insufficient purchasing power
or collective organisation) and the provision of social 
infrastructure by authorised bodies? Can these strategies 
be relied upon to ensure a reasonable level of welfare, 
or more concretely, an increasing life-expectancy for 
example (toward which the social infrastructure on which 
we are concentrating is an undoubted contributor)?
For our evidence we turn again to the Census, from 
which we can make suggestive inferences regarding 
residential behaviour, specifically from the tables on 
migration# Secondly, we attempt some assessment of the 
degree of unauthorised hutment building in the areas 
under study, and its adequacy (though here, for reasons 
discussed in the notes to the Tables, the quality, or 
comparability, of the data leave much to be desired 
for our interpretations to be conclusive).
It is sometimes taken to be an obvious strategy 
for migrants to keep their families permanently divided.
In the past that was believed to be the natural way of 
relieving the urban authorities (or private industrialists) 
of the economic costs associated with the agglomeration 
of large populations, and, at the same time, it could
1 Good housing could be regarded as a"merit" good, worthy 
of provision in itself on direct welfare grounds. That 
it also contributes to better health is widely postulated 
but not so precisely documented: see M.Bapat and N,Crook
"The Environment, Nutrition, and Health in Urban Hutment 
Settlements: a study of Poona" (manuscript submitted to 
Habitat International) and references therein.
happily he rationalised in the case of North India on 
the grounds that the Hindu culture did not expect a 
woman to work outside the house: hence, interestingly,
Conlon, writing about the housing problem in Bombay in the 
19th Century, need hardly allude to the question of 
providing family housing# Tables 8#4 (and 8.7) below 
indicate that Bombay and Calcutta have a higher than average 
proportion of single-member, predominantly male, households# 
Table 7*2 shows how industrial labour in the oldest textile 
Cities is still predominantly housed in "pucca" chawls 
(witness Bombay and Ahmedabad)# Furthermore, the sex 
ratios of migrants from other States living in these 
Cities remain remarkably skewed at least as late as 1961, 
and in the particular case of Bombay, where we have later 
data, down to 197%(Table 7*5 - note Bombay, Calcutta and 
Sowrali; the same can be shown for Ahmedabad). This is despite 
the fact that these are not the fastest growing cities 
where men tend to predominate awaiting the arrival P 
of their wives: that is to say, their sex ratios are
permanently skewed (being more so than our Model would 
predict from their modest growth rates#) If we look at..*„ 
the more specific areas of origin of these migrants, we
1 F#C.Conlon, "YJorking Class Housing in Colonial Bombay", 
paper presented at the 7th European Conference on Modern 
South Asian Studies, London, 1 98 1* collected-papers in press, 
eds# K#A,Ballhatchet and B.D.Taylor.
find that those from Uttar Pradesh are particularly prone 
to remain single (as they always have been, Table 7.5a and 
4.2 for the case of Bombay). Of course, split families are 
not an impossible solution to the housing problem, but 
such a policy, if officially adopted, would be socially 
restrictive, and not necessarily attract the most potentially 
productive (or the fittest) migrants - simply those under 
acute economic stress. Industrialists in the heavy industries 
were quickly convinced of the need to attract whole families 
to migrate (as we noted above), and all the evidence from 
other urban areas shows that only a small minority, even of 
the more long-distance migrants, prefers to remain as a 
split family, given the opportunity to do otherwise (Table 
7.5). That is to say, by the mid-20th Century the 
preference (if it ever existed) of the Indian workers 
to keep their womenfolk back in the village was much reduced. 
Table 7*2 shows that the first Steel City of Jamshedpur
1 The evidence here, and that given in Chapters 4 and 5 ,
suggests that the long-distance migrants are divided into 
two streams: those attracted and recruited and able to find 
family housing in the city; and (a smaller contingent)
those under acute pressure, but not destitute, who will
migrate singly to help out the family income, like those 
from Uttar Pradesh, and to a lesser extent Bihar. The 
interpretation is generally consistent with findings from 
village surveys: J.Connell et.al*, Migration from 
Rural Areas. O.U.P*, Delhi, 1976.
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(a private Company Town of the Tatate) had housed 43% 
of its industrial work-force in flats by the late 1950s 
(as against chawls or bustees), and even Asansol, a modern 
industrial City in Burdwan District, managed 18% at this 
relatively high standard. It is clear from the 1971 
Census that migrants from the other States to the Steel 
Towns were forming families in the New-towns like other 
migrants: in both Rourkela and Durgapur there are 700 
women to a thousand men, still below the ratio experienced 
by short-distance migrants, but above that for 19&1 
when these towns were recently formed (Table 7*5&)#
The other strategy, that might be adopted by the 
migrant labour forces is to seek accomodation in neighbouring 
villages, and to commute from there. Insofar as migrants 
remain single men, this would show up as a distorted sex 
ratio in the neighbouring villages. As Table 7*6 shows, 
there is no evidence of such a strategy being adopted in
1 The Manager of a petro-chemical complex at Vellore 
in Madras told the author of this thesis that local 
people could not be persuaded to migrate without assurance 
of adequate services. His company provided workplace 
facilities, but not housing, as this proved to be prohibitively 
costly. (His firm could have taken out a loan, but as with 
Tata Steel, it is only after a lapse of time that the value 
of a more satisfied labour force becomes apparent; see 
Chapter 5 above).
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the environs of the newly industrialising areas, with 
the possible exception of the Durgapur complex.
(In Burdwan generally it is important to distinguish 
between the mining and other rural areas, since mining 
settlements are often defined as rural, when manufacturing 
towns of similar size might not.be). It is true that Durgapur 
locality (tehsil) had a heavily distorted sex ratio in 1 9 6 1, 
though not so in 1971 * as a temporary expedient the migrants 
may have housed themselves in the neighbouring villages.
In the case of Durgapur we know that such villages became 
absorbed within the new townships' areas. Similar practice of 
migration residence is reported for Bhilai, though it does 
not show up in the Census of 19&1, possibly because the villages 
were partly included in the urban area already. Vie 
observe a substantial proportion of houses recorded as 
having "roofs of thatch" in Bhilai in the 1961 Census (Table 
7»3)» but there are none in Durgapur until 1971« when 
they mushroom to 20% of all dwellings, presumably as a result 
of the incorporation of villages*
Of equal importance would be evidence of complete 
families taking up residence in surrounding villages, 
the husband commuting to the city. These should be
1 S.D.Badgaiyan, "A Sociological Study of the Effects of
Industrialisation of Bhilai on the Surrounding Villages",
Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Delhi,
197 .^
recorded, as resident in the rural areas of the District 
but engaged in industrial occupations. Table 7*7 
indicates the extent of this practice in the Steel town 
areas. Again there is very little evidence of factory 
sector employees in the core industry residing in villages, 
and virtually none (less than 1%) of the iron and'steel 
workers do so, with the exception again of Burdwan 
District (where 10*8% of these workers are recorded in 
rural localities)*
What can be said of the strategies adopted by 
the non-core sector workers? The first point that should 
be made is that in the industrial towns (of light or 
heavy industry) outside of the major Metropoles 
(Bombay and Calcutta) it is the majority's behaviour to 
try and form the family within the area of employment: 
in all cases the sex ratios improve over time. This 
strategy is clearly achieved by building one's own dwelling 
on private or public land, or by renting from private 
landlords (or slumlords) dwellings of similar quality, 
or, to a lesser extent, by renting a room in an existing 
house in the old-town area of a City • The Census is 
not very helpful in identifying the extent of this 
practice, since its definition of housing quality 
depends simply on the materials used in construction. 
Studies of hutment settlements have shown that such
hutments are rapidly upgraded by the occupants (if owners) 
themselves, so that materials alone become a rather 
inadequate indicator of deprivation or lack of planning: 
it is possible to have a solid roof but not even a shared 
latrine. These studies emphasise another point (that 
should also have become clear from our Census analysis by 
now): most hutment dwellers regard themselves as permanent,
given the restricted scope of the private or public formal 
housing provision. Hence to argue that services provision 
(latrines and drinking water, for example) is an unnecessary 
luxury in what amounts to an encampment, is wrong. Field 
surveys depict about 40% of the habitation in the three 
Steel Towns as slums by the mid-1970s (the same being true
p
of the later Steel Town of Bokaro). The Census recorded 
30% of the houses in Bhilai as being constructed of 
"roofs of grass" in 1 9 6 1, and 21% in urban Sundargarh 
(there being no specific information on Rourkela itself), 
but barely 0*5% in Durgapur, probably for reasons outlined 
above, (Table 7»3)* In some cases these proportions are 
above, in some cases below, the State average, and sometimes 
they increase and sometimes decrease over the decade. The
1 M.Bapat, Shanty Town and City; the Case of Poona.
Pergamon, Oxford, 19^2.
2 K.C.Sivaramakrishnan,"New Towns of India" (mimeo),
Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, 1979*
most one can safely say is that the existence of 
insubstantial dwellings emerges in all the heavy industrial 
towns, and is still apparent after the lapse of a decade 
(but it is quite impossible to make a useful comparison 
with the other towns in our area). Certainly the prestigious 
New-towns in our study did not escape this urban phenomenon 
(Table 7.3).
A little more analysis may be made of the populations 
within these urban areas of industrialising Eastern India.
It was argued earlier that the non-core workers in the 
rapid growth heavy industrial towns came substantially from 
local areas. Local migrants have higher sex ratios (f:m), 
indicative of earlier or more universal family formation 
(Table 7.5). The question of split families arises even 
less here. This is also true of the more Backward Classes 
among migrants, who, as we have said before, are also 
more local. The sex ratios among the Scheduled Castes 
is always above average (Table 7.8). As these migrants are 
more likely to have been forced out of their agricultural 
livelihood it is not surprising that the whole family 
migrates. On construction labour, an occupational group 
of predominantly low socio-economic status, there is 
evidence of rural residence (Table 7*7) while their 
employment is almost certainly in the rapidly expanding
towns. In 1961, for instance, there were recorded some
2 3 .0 0 0 formal sector construction workers in the Raipur 
Division of (Eastern) Madhya Pradesh, of which only
1 3 .0 0 0 were resident in urban areas, and of these only 
9000 in the towns in Durg District, although the majority 
of the 2 3 ,0 0 0 must have been employed at some time in 
building Bhilai steel works (and Town). Of the services and 
trades sector workers in these cities, whose employment is 
usually more permanently dependent on the core-manufacturing 
process, we cannot say anything definitive regarding 
residence. Some of these must be seasonal migrants
and hence unrecorded in the towns at time of Census 
taking: but their presence in the towns is related to
marketing at harvest or at festivals, and is of short 
duration, and they are usually only a minority (except in 
centres of pilgrimage). On balance it seems that most 
of the low-income population in out towns will have sought 
residence as well as employment within the urban boundaries. 
Rapid growth will not have made the organisation of this 
very easy. Nor do migrants fully appreciate the effect 
of the coincidence of so much of the population in the same 
age cohort implying a coincidence of family formation
41*7
1
and dramatic increase in the demand for space.
An industrial sub-group that retains a tradition 
of split families are the miners (see further in Chapter 8 
below). This is apparent whether we observe the urban or the 
rural areas of mining districts. We can see also that these 
areas have a particularly high concentration of Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes (Table 6.9)* These Backward Classes, 
however, retain higher sex ratios than average, and we 
infer therefore that they are not dividing their familiesy
1 The author visited a number of hutment settlements that 
had grown very rapidly in the City of Poona in 1980.
Areas bounded by existing buildings or natural features 
had often been settled upon initially, but very soon 
the area had become heavily populated. The local communities' 
own attempts at re-organisation to make way for drainage, 
for instance, proved frustrated in some cases by the 
difficulty in accomodating the re-aligned hutments within 
the same settlement area. Inevitably tensions arose: the 
author's interpreter vividly described one settlement as 
a case of the "Lord of the Flies". But on the whole the 
author was more impressed by the attempts at organisation 
than by the lack (or frustration) of them. Rapid demographic 
growth over a short period was not given as a cause of 
conflict or resentment, but it was cited as a reason for the 
repeated need to press the Municipal Authority for more 
toilet facilities, merely to maintain the existing stand­
ards, in one settlement populated predominantly by industrial 
workers: one of the author's informants pointed out that 
the settlement had grown from 138 huts in 19&5 to between 
1 ,A-00 and 1 ,5 0 0 in 19^0 , a tenfold increase over fifteen 
years. These anecdotal observations are unlikely to be 
very different from those one could make in some of the 
rapidly growing Steel Town hutment areas.
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(Table 7*8). Indeed the Backward Classes will be predominantly 
locally born* Even among miners the Backward Classes 
remain a minority (though a much larger one). The rest 
of the mining population consists predominantly of divided 
households, with single males being housed in Company 
housing (88% in Raniganj, in Jharia so housed, for
example, Table 7*3). They are extremely badly provided 
with facilities at home or at place of work, over 9 0% 
being without a communal latrine in the late 1950s (Table 
7*1» 7*2). This poor quality of welfare cannot be attributed 
to lack of planning during rapid demographic growth. Here 
is an industry where it apparently remained profitable to 
keep the work-force present on a temporary basis. Mining 
towns are subject to rapid growth and. decline, and are 
inherently very unstable demographically (shifting rapidly 
from our Model type M1n to type "3"). The full demographic 
implications are mitigated by the migrants retaining a 
stronger link in the rural areas than do other industrial 
groups* The male workers, however, suffer from the under­
provision of facilities, and the whole population, 50% 
of which after all does consist in complete families, 
suffers from the inadequate urban infrastructure, from 
investment in which no-one sees any long-term financial gain.
From Table 7*5 it can be seen that the stagnating 
towns (characterised by urban areas of Districts like 
Shahabad or Bankura) have exceptionally high sex ratios
4 19
among the short-distance migrants, and among migrants 
from urban areas (with more females than males frequently- 
occurring in the latter case). Male members of the 
household will have sought employment back in the place 
of origin, or more likely in another town. Such high 
sex ratios must indicate out-migration, in some cases 
net out-migration (and this is confirmed by the household 
sex ratios in small households, in Chapter 8 ); its particular 
high incidence in the case of migrants from urban areas 
is a reminder that the better endowed will be more mobile 
and more able to depart if prosperity dries up. Since 
figures on housing give no indication of the value of 
housing stock, we cannot tell whether such families 
manage to maintain their housing in good order despite the 
unfavourable age and sex ratios they experience. What is 
clear, however, is the following: the dependant family does 
not return to some rural haven whence it came, nor does 
it migrate out with the potential job-seeker to a new urban 
location. This underlines the need to regard the declining 
towns as particularly vulnerable to deteriorating standards 
in whatever low levels of residential welfare and infra­
structural provision they had once acquired. The only 
problem they may escape is that of over-crowding over time, 
although some of the slower growing areas (which are subject 
to positive natural increase) are still characterised
by high dwelling-occupancy rates in 1961,(see Table 7*9 
and note for instance Patna, Midnapore, and Bolangir, all 




Welfare Facilities at Place of Work by 
Industrial Type of Town
Type Number in Per Cent of Industrial:Workers: 
Sample i) in specified ii) reporting
industry facilities











Note a These are calculated as an unweighted average 
of workers reporting 
i) latrines 
ii) canteens 
iii) medical facilities, at place of work.
Source: Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of




Housing Conditions of Factory Workers in- 
selected Industrial Cities








C havrls/bus t e e s 55.0 58.7 63.3 46.2 98.3 66.7
Flats 17.8 42.9 13.3 0.4 0.8 1.1
Independent Bldgs 4-2.8 12.1 7.5 7.5 0 .3 10.0
Other 4.4 6.3 15.8 45.8 - 22,2
Employer owned 58.9 5 6 .2 8 8 .3 73.7 6.7 3.9
Self owned 21.7 22,9 1 0 .8 1 8 .3 72,5 21.7
Private owner 58.5 19.2 0 .8 6.7 2 0 .8 74.4
Permanent kaccha 2 8 .3 35.6 19.2 2 1 .2 44.2 19.4
" pucca 4-1.7 57.9 46.7 36.7 33.3 6 0 .6
Temporary kaccha 16.7 0.4 1 5 .0 6 .2 16.7 8.9
» pucca 1 2 .8 7.1 19.2 35.8 5.8 1 1 .1
Without latrine 46.1 1 8 .3 9 0 .8 96.7 72.5 23.3
With private lat. 2 7 .8 33.3 0 ,0 1.7 1 0 .8 0 .0














tt pucca 1 1 .2
Without latrine 11.9
With private latr. 3.3
With communal latr, 82.5
CALCUTTA HOWRAH AHMEDABAD
8 0 .0 6o,4 90.4
13.7 7.4 0 ,8
2.9 2 2 .1 6 ,2
3.3 1 0 .1 2 .1
12.5 2 0 .1 5.8
7.1 19.1 5.0
8 0 .0 5 6 .0 77.9
22.9 43.4 20.4
27.5 31.2 54.2





Source: Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of
Employment, Family Living Surveys among Industrial 




Size and Growth of lfPure Slums11
Percentage of housing with roofs of grass or 
similar material in the urban areas
District 1961 1971 District 1961 1971
ORISSA BIHAR (n.a.)
Sundergarh 2 1 *2 13.8 Patna 2 .2
Mayurbanj 53.1 39.9 Gaya 5.4
Cuttack 6 8 .9 55.5 Shahabad 2 .6
B.K, 85.5 73.2 Monghyr 6.7
Bolangir 29.5 2 1 .2 Ranchi 7.1
Ganjam 62.5 53.2 Bhagalpur 13.0
E. MADHYA PRADESH Dhanbad 9.3
Durg 23.4 1 0 .2 S ingbhum 3.4
Bilaspur 4.8 1.5 Towns/Cities:
Bastar 1.3 2.7 Patna 2.3
Raigarh 3.3 1 *6 Gaya 2 .2
Towns; Bhagalpur 8 .6
Bhilainagar 29.4 13.1 Ranchi 0 .2




24-Parganas 6 .2 2.9
Hoogley 5.2 3.1
Burdwan 17.4 14.8 Source: Government of India,
Birbhum 56.5 43.1 Census of India. 1 9 6 1. 1971
Bankura 53.2 40.4 Housing Tables, New Delhi,
Midnapore 43.1 31.0 Tables E IV (1961), H II (11
Towns/CitieE;:
Calcutta 2 .0 1 o2
Howrah 1 .0 0.5
Burdwan 39.2 29.3
Asansol 6.5 2.9
Durgapur 0.4 2 0 .0
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Table 7.4
Municipal Revenues. Expenditures- and 
Services, according to Size Class of Towns. 197Q
State & Per Capita Receipt Tax as % Per Cent of
Size Class (Expenditure) of Towns with
---------  Rs per annum Receipt Protected Water
BIHAR I II 12.6
(12.8)
I I I  8c below 9 * 4
(11.4)
O R I S S A  I , I I  23.3
( 2 3 . 9 )
III & below 13.3
( 1 3 . 9 )
MADHYA I,II 27.6 
PRADESH (26.5)





III 8c below 13.3
(12.4)
40.1
3 0 . 9
3 9 . 1
3 2 . 9
66.0
60.7
6 2 . 5
48.4
100.0




4 1 . 4
95.2
51.0
Note: Data are only available in some cases where Municipalities, 
(not, e.g., Notified Areas) exist. I  have given unweighted 
averages for groups of size classes. It is possible that 
the Census authorities, who give averages for each size 
class, took unweighted averages for the towns within 
each class. If they did not, but..took weighted averages 
according to population size, thea Bombay heavily dominates 
Maharashtra's class I.
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971. Town
Directories, New Delhi; (data for previous 2 or 3 years).
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Table 7.5a
Sex Ratios among Migrants to Urban. Areas
Cities & other 
Urban areas
sex ratios fsm among migrants from:
(1961)
RURAL area of: URBAN area of:
same District other State same Distr. other St*
BIHAR
Patna Munic* .953 .6 9 0 1 .1 0 2 .904
Gaya Munic* 1.093 .6 3 1 1 .6 0 8 1.041
Shahabad 1.515 .8 6 9 1.456 1 .2 8 3
Ranchi Munic. *990 .542 1.053 .932





1 .0 0 3 .843
Monghyr 2 * 464 .736 2 .0 7 2 1 .0 9 2
Bhagalpur 1 .3 1 8 .8 8 3 .9 1 0 1.234
WEST BENGAL
Howrah City .735 .2 6 9 .9 2 8 .514
Calcutta City (.6 1 0)® .237 (.571)a .397
Burdwan Municip*
VOOO• .529 ‘ .741 .511
Asansol Munic# .224 .609 .447 .795
Birbhum 1.009 .583 1 .1 8 0 .839
Bankura 1.249 .375 3.373 .927
Kharagpur Munic* .599 1.515 .253 1.243
WESTERN INDIA growth areas (197D





.8 6 5 .695:
Thana City ( .9 6 2 .422 .955 .604:
Notes: a from another District of the same State












same Distro other St.
from Urban area









(from U.P. .647 
from Bihar 1.054)
.480 ' .7 6 3





Durgapur City (0 8 9 5
.6 9 6 1.193
(from Bihar .73^)









Notes: a classified by place of last residence 
b rural + urban origins together
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Table 7.5 b
Sex Ratios among Short and Long-Distance Migrants 
in Contrasting Urban Areas
Steel Towns 1971 Migrants from:
*— :------------  Same State* Another State*
Durgapur .?6*f .6**4
Rourkela .72*+ ,680
♦(place of last residence)
Contrasting Urban Areas 1971
Migrants born in:
Same State Another State Same State Another St. 
RURAL URBAN
Calcutta .4 7 8 .273 .776 .**■05
Burdwan District 
(Durgapur)
.9 4 3 .530 .8 0 8 .732
Bankura District 2 .4 0 5 .535 .8 0 6 1 .0 8 3
Birbhum District 1 .2 2 1 .958 .8 0 8 1 .2 1 1
Sundargarh D. 
(Rourkela)
.514 ,6 9 6 .8 5*- .7 8 0
Ganjam 1.390 1.299 .8 2 8 1 .2 1 6
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1971,
M ig r a t io n  T a b le s ,  New D e lh i .
Table 7>6
Sex Ratios in Rural Areas neighbouring the Towns




Main Industry in 
Principal Town
Chittaranjan .8 8 5 .917 locomotive works
Salanpur .815 .8 9 5
Kulti .6 8 5 .7 8 5 iron works
Hirapur .8 6 6 .8 1 8 Burnpur steel mills
Asansol .7 2 0 .7 9 9 engineering
Barabani .8 0 8 .8 7 5
Jamuria .6 9 6 .752 mining
Raniganj .64-9 .6 6 0 mining
Ondal .6 2 5 .671 mining
Faridpur .772 .801
Durgapur .719 .976 iron and steel plant
Kaksa .938 .959
(All West Bengal .8 7 8 .8 9 1)
Other STEEL TOWN AREAS in 1961


















1 .0 3 2  
1 .OMf 
1.051 
1 .0 5 0  
1 .0 2 1  
1.053
(All Madhya Pradesh .
Rmiree! Government of India. Census of India 1861. 1971.
(relevant States), General Population Tables, Delhi.
Table 7.7
Participation of Resident Rural Population in
Core-Sector and Construction Industries in Steel Town Areas
Iron and Steel 
occupations ConstructionWorkers
District (rural) Number % of all in 
that occup. 
in District
Number % of total 
in District
Durg District 250 1 .0 4075 30.4
Raipur DMsion 253 1 .0 9885 4 5 .0
Sundargarh Dist. 0
0•0 440 8 .5
Burdwan Dist. 3629 1 0 .8 7211 40.3
Source: Government of India. Census of India 1961. 
States), General Economic Tables, Delhi.
(relevant
Table 7.8
Comparison of Sex Ratios among: Backward Classes and the
General Population in Selected Towns
Town or Urban 
Area





% of BCs 
in area




Rajnandgaon .932 .970 6.7

















(mining area) .6 8 7
1971 .695
Note: See also Table 6,9
Source: Government of India,
(relevant States), G 
Delhi,
% of BCs in 
1961 BCs 1961 area








Persons per house 
(same divided by rural 
State average)
WEST BENGAL
Calcutta 5 .0 1 (1 .2 6 )
Howrah if. 88 (1.2 5 )
Rif Parganas 5.01 (1 .2 6 )
Hoogle^___ 4.81 (1 .2 1 )
Midnapore 5.19 (1.31)
Burdwan 5.15 (1.30)
Birbhum 5 .1 6 (1.30)
Bankura ^ .9 5 (1.25)
BIHAR
Patna 6.9k (1 .0 2 )
Gaya 6 .2 2 (0 .9 2 )
Shahabad 6.57 (0 .9 7 )
Bhagalpur 7.1^ (1 .0 5 )
Monghyr 6 .9 0 (1 .0 2 )






Durg 3 .8 1 (0 .7 )^
Bilaspur (0 .9 1 )
Bastar (0 .8 8 )
ORISSA
Mayurbanj 5.32 (1.0 0 )
Sundargarh ^.15 (0 .7 8 )
B-K ^.87 (O.9 2 )
Cuttack 5.90 (1 .1 1 )
Bolangir 5.69 (1.0 7 )
Source: Government of India, 






Projections of Housing Needs!
NEW-TOWNS
(rapid growth: to 2^0,000 population in 15 years, and 
decadal growth of 66*6% for a further 10 years)*




per month Rs 250
Industrial 







rent! 10%x250 x 12 =:Rs 300<1760 per annum
Multiplier Labour 
Households (middle income):
5 0 ,0 0 0
Household income 
per month Rs 150
Maximum expenditure on 






Rent etc* at 
8% =















Total Income of 
Core sector 
Households:
1971: 1 5 ,0 0 0 x 
Rs 300 x 12 = 
Rs 5k million
1981: 25,000 x 










Total Income of 
Multiplier Sector:
1971: 6 0 ,0 0 0 x 
Rs 150 x 12 =
Rs 108 million
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per month Rs 100
Max. expenditure on rent: 





Rs 2500 per unit
Rent at 8% =
200 per annum
OLD TOWNS
(stagnation: 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 population in 1961, decadal growth of 
12% until 198 1)
1961 - 71 
All labour (male):
2 5 ,0 0 0  
Dependant Population
75,000 
(Housing units 100,000 t 5 =
1971 - 81 
All labour (male)
2 5 ,0 0 0  
Dependant Population
100,000
2 0 ,0 0 0 )  (House units 1 2 5 ,0 0 0  ?  6 =2qp00)
Higher Income Population 
2 0 ,0 0 0: Income Rs 250
Housing Capital 
Value from 
Rs 10 - 15,000
Maintenance costs 
@ 2% =
Affordable rent (10%)=RS 300^200 - 300 £
Middle Income Population 
40,000: Income Rs 150
Housing Value 
from
Rs 5 - 1 0 ,0 0 0
Maintenance costs 
Rent affordable (10%) = @ 2% =
Rs 180 >_ 100 - 200 £
Low Income Population 
40,000: Income Rs 100







Higher Inc. Pop. 
24,000: Inc. Rs 250
Rent affordable (8%);
240 per annum
Middle Inc. Pop. 









1* Projection 1 represents a rapid- growth town (like 
Rourkela or Bhilainagar)• The initial core-labour 
force of 1 5 ,0 0 0 males migrates to a "green-field.” site*
A "multiplier" labour force of 60,000 males follows (1961-71)*
2* Assume that in each case family household size will
stabilise at between 4 - 6  members in ten years (average 
of 5 members) with maximum of two members earning. Then 
family income is Rs 250 per month (1971 prices) for 
families with the main worker in the core sector, and 
Rs 150 for most of the multiplier sector families, 
but with the lowest 10,000 earning only Rs 100.
5* Assume that the core-sector families and the better-off 
multiplier families can afford 10% of their income on 
service and interest dharges that are made for urban 
living (typically in the form of rents and rates): 
i.e. Rs 300 and Rs 180 per annum respectively for the two 
groups{ assume the poorest families can afford only 2%, 
i.e. Rs 24 p.a*
4. The housing and facilities capital costs are taken as
follows: for the core sector, Rs 22^.000 per household unit
(for explanation and sources see text above). The economic 
rent, at a minimum of 8%, totals Rs 1760 p.a. - i.e. about 
five to six times the ability to pay. This is as far as the 
official housing scheme goes. For the middle-income 
multiplier families assume a universal provision of the 
L.I.G. housing scheme (see text), capital cost Rs 7500, 
rent Rs 600 p.a* - i.e. over three times the ability to pay. 
For the poorest group assume a sites and services scheme, 
costing Rs 2500, rent Rs 200, - say ten times the ability to 
pay. (A village dwelling without services would cost about
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Rs 1000, and could be maintained at a charge of about 
2% of the capital cost*, Construction materials would have 
been gathered from the land over time, and building over 
time would employ family labour only. No cash payments 
would be required as interest on loans, and material 
costs for maintenance would just be covered, at Rs 20.)
Conclusion 1
Using standards currently adopted in New-town construction, 
a housing scheme cannot be self-financing.
5. Now take alternatives; self-financing is possible with 
capital costs of Rs 3750, 2250, 300 for each group 
(which is implausible for the poorest group given any 
imagineable technology beyond a pavement dwelling). 
Self-financing is possible with costs of Rs 3000, 2000,
2000 for each group, i.e. with sites and services for 
all the multiplier population (using the cheapest technology 
developed up to 1975)* and fully constructed single-storey 
tenements as currently developed for the Economically Weaker 
Section (so called) for the core-labour sector families 
(politically difficult, if not unacceptable). If, however, 
core-sector incomes grow at 2% p.a. in real terms, then 
ia 35 years tenements of Rs 6000 would be affordable under 
the latter scheme, (and so on).
6 * Consider now the incremental growth, given tie initial
establishment of the population just described. The core­
labour force grows by 1 0 ,0 0 0 between 1971 and 1981. By 1981 
the incomes of the core-sector families are Rs 300 per month 
(with average family size still 5)» Incremental capital
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cost of housing 1,000 families per annum is Rs 22 million#
Can that sum be financed from municipal savings? In 1971 
the core sector aggregate income amounted to Rs 5^ million, 
so that a savins rate of about 50% would be required#
Conclusion 2
The incremental growth of heavy industrial towns cannot 
be financed entirely out of municipal revenues ‘(without 
changes in construction standards)#
7# Again there are alternatives# Housing plus facilities 
costing Rs 5000 could be financed; or with half the net 
migration rate and costs of Rs 10,000 financing would be possible, 
and so on. For the multiplier population various scenarios 
may be adopted too* Suppose for example an annual growth 
".of 4000 per annum (adult males). Take the average family 
income for the whole group to be Rs 150 per month.
Adopt sites and services at per unit cost of Rs 2500 for the 
whole group. The total incremental cost amounts to 
Rs 10 million annually, which has to be financed from 
an initial total multiplier family income of Rs 108 m.
This implies a 10% savings rate (devoted entirely to 
"urban development bonds", or an equivalent)t leaving 
nothing over to finance industrial investment, unless the 
savings rate of the middle-income group exceeds 10%.
8 . Projection 2 assumes a stagnating population. The total 
male labour force remains at a level of 2 5 ,0 0 0 over 20 
years (like some of the large towns in Bihar, e.g. Monghyr).
The dependant population rises from 3/4 to 4/5 of the 
total. Divide it into three income groups: say 40% at
Rs 100 p.m., 40% at 1.5 0, 20% at 250, none of which 
increases over time.
9. The top two groups pay 10% of their income in rent etc., 
the poorest pays 2%, on dwellings valued at Rs 10-15,000, 
7,500-10,000, and 1,000-2,000 respectively. Rent/rates
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average at 2% per annum on stock that is about 50 years 
old for the top two groups, or that consists of self- 
built village-like accomodation, that may have started 
as slum hutments in earlier periods of prosperity or 
at Independence with the large urbanward migrations 
associated with Partition).
10. By 1981 per capita incomes have been reduced by 1/5, 
owing to incroEBed dependency, and on assumption of 
no remittances sent by out-migrating males, and that 
households have increased in size rather than split 
(see text above). Hence the maximum maintenance charges 
affordable are assumed to drop to 8% of family incomes 
for the upper two groups, and to 1 .5% for the lowest 
group. This is below the cost of maintenance on the 
higher values of housing stock (i.e.assuming that it 
has not deteriorated to below those values). The poorest 
groups, if originally in rented accomodation, will, cet. 
par..have become pavement dwellers#
Conclusion 3
Towns subject to outmigration are likely to face 
deteriorating welfare levels if relying on local 
finance.
11* Clearly, somewhere between these projections there
are cities that coulc^^eir eown housing and facilities. 
Typically they will be of the Type 2 Demographic Model 
(Chapter 3). Cities of the demographic Type 1, 
especially 1 c, and of Base or Type 3, will need outside 
finance, certainly over some periods of their life.
Type 1 cities will have to adopt generally lower standards 
of housing (for core-sector and multiplier families) than 
have commonly been prescribed if they are ever to self- 
finance their maintenance charges* These standards can 
be improved, as incomes improve, over time*
A brief Overview of Chapter 7
This chapter shows empirically that without Central 
Government intervention the stagnant or declining towns 
have been unable to raise the same per capita resources 
for infrastructure in social amenities as have the more 
rapidly growing areas. This disequilibrium is enhanced 
by their age composition. Similarly, low quality housing 
is the norm in slowly growing areas (as would be expected 
from household age composition)? in rapidly growing areas 
low quality housing develops over time in so far as 
migrant families with lower income prospects migrate in.
The State has come too late in the day to appreciate the 
dimension of these problems; the strategies adopted by the 
people themselves (in New-towns) could have been economically 
incorporated in overall planning from the start. At the same 
time positive intervention will be needed in the case 
of the slow-growing towns.
CHAPTER 8
The .Family, Migrant Groups, and their 
Employment Strategies
A Summary of Empirical Findings
The implications of the foregoing demographic 
factors impinge on the long-term employment and income 
prospects of the families established in specific 
localities. The distribution of family structures with 
cities of contrasting types is investigated: we are
particularly interested in the strategies adopted by 
families, or by larger groupings of migrants, to spread 
their employment over various industries or occupations.
We find that families in heavy industrial towns usually 
rely on a single industrial earner; families in lower 
productivity towns require more. There is apparently an 
attempt by migrant subgroups of similar regional background 
to concentrate all their employment over time on the most 
rewarding industrial sector.to which they have access: a 
strategy of risk-spreading is not adopted. In towns 
dominated by a single industry such a strategy would in any 
case be ruled out; and in the stagnating towns of this 
type the regularMinks with the rural economy (the security 
of last resort) have usually, it seems, been severed.
At.the theoretical level we can observe the 
following distinctions. A family may be composed of a number 
of earners of various ages. In India its major source 
of income is likely to be from one or two adult males.
In the latter case, if both are employed as wage labour 
in the same, industry, or, in a more extreme case, in the 
same factory, the whole family is very vulnerable to the 
fortunes of that industry or factory. Security is not much 
enhanced in an alternative model, where the main bread­
winners are all empired in an industry providing goods 
and services for the core industrial labour force* A 
slightly better position is offered by the familial 
mode of production, as work-sharing always becomes 
possible provided the average productivity in the family 
does not fall below average consumption requirements.
But once again, the closer the work is tied to a single 
basic industry (for example through its contracting out 
to the household) the more risky the household 
industrial mode of production becomes. Clearly what 
emerges from all this is that the safest strategy is 
to diversify the family portfolio, as it were. To have 
two or more adult workers in quite distinct industries 
would be ideal. To have one member in an industry as
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a wage labourer, and one self-employed in a less closely 
related sector, would be a moderately secure strategy 
(perhaps at the cost of a higher income than would have 
been enjoyed with both members in the same industry).
Similarly, a mixture of household industry and wage 
labour (even in another family's household) could be 
more secure, but again this implies income foregone.
In practice in India the choice is often limited, even 
in the urban economy. There is some evidence that security
is preferred despite income foregone, even in low-income
2
families, but there is no evidence to my knowledge of 
strategies being deliberately adopted to diversify income 
at the family level in the manner I outline here. Quite
3
apart from the constraints of an imperfect labour market, 
there is the constraint of a lack of industrial diversification 
in precisely those cases where the problem arises. You 
cannot easily diversify your portfolio in an undiversified 
world.
Whether or not families, let alone broader social 
groups of caste, class, regional or ethnic distinction,
1 It may be argued of course that a sufficiently high income 
will generate savings enough to carry the family through 
periods of instability or unemployment, thus reducing the 
risk involved in this option (a point made to me by 
Camilla Toulmin).
2 This was suggested to me by Meera Bapat from her study of 
low-income families in Poona, where she has worked and lived 
most of her life.
3 Such imperfections reduce the amount of choice a family 
from a Backward Caste, for example, may have#
consciously adopt such strategies, it is; .worthwhile
investigating whether in practice the familial vulnerability
problem arises. Are family income sources particularly
concentrated, or more concentrated than they need be,
given the range of opportunities? For if they are, the
failure to diversify local industry in India becomes even
more socially undesirable (though whether the less costly
solution is to diversify industry, or to change family
behaviour, remains an open question). Furthermore it would
be possible to indicate to what extent the demographic
structure of the family, resulting from high or low
fertility in conjunction with various patterns of migration,
exacerbates, or alleviates, this vulnerability. And if the
strategies adopted are conscious, we could indicate in turn
how the vulnerability problem imposes constraints on
demography. For example, lower fertility might imply
higher family per capita income, but less scope for
security through diversification of employment that
1
becomes possible with a larger family.
1 The implications for fertility reduction programmes 
need hardly be spelled out. Yet the literature has 
focussed on the high fertility hedge against risks 
associated with ill-health and mortality, not on the 
security issue raised here. See, for example, R.H.Cassen, 
India: Population. Economy. Society. Macmillan, London, 
1978, Chapter 3*
This chapter is devoted to implications. It is 
not the intention to investigate the problem empirically 
beyond establishing some indicators from our region of 
study in India regarding the existence or otherwise 
of the family vulnerability problem* The first such 
indicator deals with the household composition, and 
some evidence on sources of household income through 
employment, in towns enjoying various degrees of industrial 
diversification. The second considers the concentration 
of geographical origins of migrants in particular industries 
in the newly industrialising regions of Bihar (for which 
special Census tabulations were undertaken). This, 
strictly speaking, is evidence on community or ethnic 
concentration, from which a few implications for the 
family may be drawn. Later an even broader overview 
of the evidence will be taken, on the industrial concentration 
of migrants in general.
Family Formation and Household Distributions 
in Urban Areas
It has already been established that towns of 
different industrial character differ, often quite 
markedly, in their demography. Among the economic 
implications this might have at the local level, one 
that we are particularly concerned to suggest is the
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effect on family welfare, and especially family income,
and on the security of family income over time* To do
this we need to reconstitute household structure from
aggregate demographic structure: this is fairly immediately
done since the Census tabulates household structure for
1
the urban areas of the Districts, But it is a frustrating
limitation to draw our conclusions simply from the observation
of the mean, and a sad reflection on statistical imagination
how often this, and this alone, is done# Fortunately
there are two sources of information from which ideas may
be culled on the distribution of household types within
the urban areas under study: the first is the simple
distribution of household size from the Censuses, the
second is the Labour Bureau Study of industrial worker
2
households in selected towns, carried out in 1 9 5 8-9 *
1 A household is defined for Census purposes as a unit 
consisting of people eating at the same table, as it 
were (and it is closely co-terminous with residents in 
a single building): in India there are almost as 
many "houses" as "households" recorded in the Censuses,
A family is less easy to define# Generally speaking
we will take it to be co-terminous with an Indian rural 
household not subject to past or present urbanward 
migration* Sometimes, however, we will be taking 
a somewhat more liberal interpretation# For our 
present economics analysis, what matters is how far 
financial or other welfare obligations would generally 
extend.
2 Government of India, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, 
Report on Family Living Surveys among Industrial Workers, 
1958-9* Delhi, 1968.
The latter can be compared with the 1961 Census to see
how far industrial wage-earner families are distinct from
other families in these towns and cities: additionally,
and unlike the Census, these Surveys indicate the distribution
1
of family composition within the urban wage-earner category. 
They also enrich our knowledge, for these types of households 
at least, of members* contributions to household income 
(though without unfortunately stating the occupational 
source, only the value, of that contribution). And finally 
they have some (though not much) usable information on 
remittances.
We should begin with some controls in mind. One of 
the more striking observations of demographers working on 
household composition has been on the similar mean value 
(and similar distributions) of household size in historical
Western European countries and contemporary India (among
2
other Oriental cases). For our rural areas of India, 
the mean size is about 5 members (Table 8.1). The striking 
difference, on the other hand, between the Orient and 
historical Western Europe is that in the-latter the fifth
1 A household was defined as "industrial" if the main 
contributor to family income was a wage-earner in industry.
2 See J.Hajnal, "Household Formation Patterns in Historical 
Perspective", Population and Development Review. Sept. 1982, 
Vol 8:3* The reference is to a period pre-dating the 
industrial revolution in Europe.
member was typically a non-family member, living in as a 
servant, whereas in the former he or she is a member 
of the family. But equally striking in the current author's 
view is the fact that only a minority of families are 
exactly of that five-member composition, or more significantly, 
that the distribution is quite evenly spread (not uniform, 
but distinctly "platycurtic"). In other words, most of the 
time families are experiencing either some transition 
toward or away from this "norm" of mean value 5 , with 
fertility adding to the base of a family's pyramid or 
mortality subtracting from its apex (and from below also), 
or else they are stabilising at lower or higher "norms" 
than the average, in association perhaps with their 
economic mode of production or with their cultural 
background. It is not our purpose here to explain the rural 
family composition, though some interpretation has to be 
offered owing to the observed fact (to which we later refer) 
that some urban households represent split rural families. 
Suffice it to remark on the following. Rural households 
of single members only are rare (around five per cent), 
and must represent, on the whole, single males migrating 
for employment as agricultural labour, or as rural infra­
structural or in some cases industrial labour; or they are
single females left behind in the course of such migration, 
(or widowed). The 2 -6  size group will consist of families 
that are in the process of formation and dissolution 
within that group, with high mortality among agricultural 
labour households for instance, or a greater tendency 
towards nucleation among some social groups (tribals, 
for instance) keeping the maximum size of such households 
usually below six. The quite significant proportion of 
households above six in size (around 30%) will include 
a lower mortality (probably higher fertility) subgroup 
whose size will range from 3 - 10 in the course of its 
life-cycle, associated with trading and commerce and 
land-ownership, and having little tendency towards 
nucleation. The proportion of rural households with 
above ten members (approaching 10%) is remarkable,
1 Seasonal migration of labour was not captured in the 
Censuses, taken as they were in February and April.
The definition of "rural" and “urban11 can also be mis­
leading here. The Census distribution of manufacturing 
establishments by size of workforce shows a small number 
of large enterprises established in rural areas* 
Similarly mining employees are often housed in "rural” 
villages; and so also in the rapidly industrialising 
areas are some of the urban workforce. Tables 7*6 
and 8 ,2  are of relevance here.
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especially when one considers that about 20% of the rural 
population live in households of this size# A majority, 
but not an overwhelming majority, of rural households, 
will represent the small-peasant stereotype, evolving 
during the family life-cycle between the limits of 
3 to 7 members on the whole, the stereotype that Hajnal 
has reported as the’horm".
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to 
determine who migrates and why# The analysis of migration 
has been restricted to changes in the demand for labour, 
resulting from differential industrial composition of 
urban localities, and the consequent change in the (broadly 
defined) locational origin of the supply# Labour also migrates, 
however, when conditions change at the rural end of the 
migration chain* The family composition of such migration 
is often very different: as an extreme example, in distress, 
total families move; in acute distress, only the able- 
bodied do so. It would be of considerable xnterest, 
however, if we knew rather more about the rural background 
of these urban migrants, as it might help explain the 
family earning strategies adopted* In an earlier Chapter 
we argued that the balanced sex ratios and local origin 
of social groups like the Scheduled Castes, and their lack
1 For a summary of the demographic characteristics of rural 
out-migrants see J.Connell, B.Dasgupta, R#Laishley, and 
M.Lipton, Migration from Rural Areas. Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1976.
of participation in the core industries in the newly 
industrialising areas, all suggested that these were 
migrants who were virtually forced to migrate out, 
and were not being recruited, nor very specifically 
attracted, into the cities. In this case they were 
almost certainly landless (or with very small holdings) 
otherwise they would have left family members behind, 
at least for a while, while they reconnoitred for 
suitable urban accomodation, as did their urban colleagues 
employed in the manufacturing industries. Further light 
was shed on this in the surveys referred to in Chapter 
5 above, giving evidence that factory industrial workers 
were more likely to own small amounts of land than were 
migrants who finished up in self-employment in smaller 
enterprises, or as casual labour in the cities.
With this sketch of rural household composition as 
a background, let us consider in more detail the 
composition in the towns, focussing on the manual labour 
categories, and especially on manufacturing wage labour.
A generalisation we could make is that urban households 
are smaller than rural in our region (Table 8 .1 ).
This will tend to follow if urban households are fragments 
of rural families (and not just of the largest rural families). 
Apart from the Labour Bureau Survey data (and survey evidence
in general), the population structures we have derived 
from the Census for urban areas is clear evidence of such 
split families, (note especially the detailed analysis of 
Bhilai in Chapter 9» where it is found that a majority 
of males-only households consist of married males)# 
Generally speaking then, households of one, two, or three 
members are proportionally greater in number in urban 
areas due to migration, not differential mortality, 
fertility, or cultural traits, (though the latter 
two factors undoubtedly work towards lowering urban 
household size among the professional and even the more- 
skilled wage labour categories, especially in the larger 
cities). The largest size class, households above ten, 
are distributed in rather similar proportions in rural 
and urban areas, so that it is the rural concentration 
of families in the k - 9 size group that is especially 
responsible for the larger average rural household size. 
Again, this is partly due to the lower fertility in urban 
areas, partly due to the absence of older relatives living
1 See above Chapter k for evidence on the marital status 
of the urban populations, compared with their rural 
counterparts: other things being the same, later
marriage will result in smaller household size.
By 1bultural traits” , as distinct from ’’fertility” 
we refer to preferences for living in nucleated 
rather than extended households in urban areas.
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with the urban migrant at the early stages of migration, 
and partly the absence of married sons and their wives 
in these young households. This interpretation is 
consistent with the smaller number of married relations 
(if we exclude brothers) in the urban households (Table 
8 .3 ) (though married relations could be living as couples 
in separate households), and, more significantly, with 
the absence of the higher age groups recorded in the aggregate 
urban age structures* On the whole, the small number 
of differences (and their small degree) between the rural 
and the urban is a striking feature, and this characterises 
above all the experience of the moderate growth towns, 
and the relatively stagnant towns. The real differences 
arise when we look at the rapidly growing towns.
The heavy engineering localities are immediately 
distinguished by one feature - the high proportion of 
single-member households. These are predominantly male,
(Table 8.4); the urban areas of Durg and Sundargarh are 
good examples here. Given our estimate of a time-lag 
between initial male migration and the joining of wives 
and family, this phenomenon is clearly a function of 
rapid growth, and indeed between 1961 and 1971 these 
high proportions of single-member households in the Steel 
Town localities have declined from around 20% to around 12%
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(see Durg and Sundargarh Districts in 1971)* The 
migration data we examined suggest that individual 
families tend not to remain split for more than 2 years 
on average. So that although we are dealing with 
urban societies having large numbers of split families, 
they are not chronically split (with some notable 
exceptions to which we referred in Chapters 4 and 5)*
And over a ten-year period the most noticeable change 
in family composition in these heavy industrial towns, 
apart from the addition of a spouse, is the addition of 
unever-married!r members, i.e.predominantly children,
(Table 8.5)* which the aggregate age structure changes 
also confirm (see, for example, Figure 601). Continuing 
this aspect of the detective analysis further, we observe 
high proportions of the 2 - 3  member households in these 
rapidly growing urban areas: but what distinguish them
markedly are their distorted sex ratios, indicative of 
brothers, or simply friends, among migrants, sharing 
accomodation, (note in Table 8.4 Sundargarh, Durg, Dhanbad, 
and Burdwan, among the non-Metropolitan examples).
1 It is also clear from the more detailed 1971 data that
urban households have a larger number of unrelated members 
living in than do rural households (Tables 8.3* 8.5)#
We may also note the high proportion (relative to rural 
areas) of already married males, mainly brothers, (not sons), 
(Tables 8.3 and 8.5), though we cannot confidently distinguish 
heavy industrial areas in this respect* The family composition, 
data were collected on a 20% sample basis,only.
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It would be advantageous to be able to analyjse 
the core industrial sector migrants separately (in the 
hope of discovering something regarding their 
vulnerability, as families, to economic shocks). This 
we cannot do for the most rapidly growing towns, but we 
do have the industrial labour surveys for the heavy 
engineering and Steel Towns of a slightly older generation, 
whose iron and steel works were expanded during our period of 
study: namely, Asansol-Burnpur and Jamshedpur (Table 8 *6 ,
8.7)* Asansol's industrial workers are of remarkably small 
households: single members, ky/o between 2 and 5,
(a proportion well above the average for Burdwan District 
urban households as a whole, as is clear from Table 8*7)*
One third of the single-member households consist of 
unmarried members. There are very few households of 
adults alone living together: usually children are present.
This suggests that the single-member households consisting 
of married men are in the course of transition towards 
becoming multiple-member households consisting of married 
couples and children, as we suggested above. Nonetheless, 
the larger proportion of single-member households among 
industrial workers, as compared with the general urban 
population, is remarkable. There are two possible explanations: 
first, that industrial workers are more likely then other
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workers to remain as split families (i.e. it is not just
1
a question of being in a transitional stage) ; secondly,
that industrial migrants are more likely to migrate singly
2
than are other migrants.
Jamshedpur, on the other hand, is sharply in contrast* 
Only 14% of the households are single (yet the urban 
District average compares well with that of Burdwan). 
Jamshedpur’s population grew more slowly over the 1951-61 
decade than did Asansol’s (39% versus 78%, and the male 
population much more slowly, 40% versus 98%). It would be 
tempting to infer from this that the industrial migrants in 
Asansol-Burnpur are indeed in a state of transition, and 
not that, in this respect as in many others, Jamshedpur 
is simply a special case. By 1971, Asansol City has as few 
single-member households as has the less industrialised Burdwan 
City (7%), and roughly the same as Jamshedpur. Tentatively 
we conclude that the migrant in heavy industry seeks to 
detach his nuclear family, at least, from its rural origin. 
Perhaps this weakens the rural link, and to some extent the 
support from two economic sources. We should now ask how 
far he broadens the basis of his family's income in the urban
1 We know this is true of migrants from Uttar Pradesh: 
see Table 7*5 for evidence on Burdwan District (as well 
as Bombay).
2 This is supported by survey data for Bombay (Chapter 5)*
In the case of both Jamshedpur and Asansol the 
answer is that multiple sources of income from work 
are rare in industrial households, (Table 8 .6 ). In 
80 and 89% of households respectively there was a sole 
earner (but in only 14 and 35% of cases was there a 
single-member, and in 26 and 23% of cases there was 
an adult member in addition to the married couple).
This is in line with survey data from elsewhere, 
showing that industrial workers either do not allow, 
or do not need, their wives or children to enter the 
labour market (at least in times of prosperity).
In Jamshedpur and Asansol wage income was average or 
above for industrial employees, and 57 and 66% of the 
workers were in the iron and steel industry, most of the 
rest being in other branches of heavy engineering.
To evaluate these findingsa little further, we 
proceed to look at some contrasting types. We will keep 
first to the case of the "monocultural1' industrial town, 
and observe a group subject to large fluctuations in 
growth and prosperity, the mining toms. The Labour
1 This is apparent from tne survey carried out by Meera 
Bapat in Poona (references in Chapters 5 and 7;, 
the relevant data and information being kindly communicated 
to tne present writer.
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B ureau  S u rv e y s  include Raniganj (West Bengal) and Jharia 
(Bihar)in our region. Neither is characterised by fast 
demographic growth during the 1951 - 19^1 decade.
(Indeed Raniganj was clearly subject to net outmigration 
given its growth rate of 16%, while Jharia grew at a 
modest 27%). Both survey samples consist almost completely 
of mine workers (Table 8.6), though not all will ! 
actually have been miners (below surface). Once again, 
single male households are a large proportion of total 
households (5 0 and 4-3% respectively). Given the towns’ 
modest growth rates, these would appear to be permanently 
split households (especially when we consider that 3% 
or less are of unmarried males, far fewer than in the 
Steel Towns above ). The other contrast with manufacturing 
industrial towns is that 15 to 20% of households have 
additional family members who are earning in the coal 
producing towns( in 5 - 8% of cases the wife is an earner).
This is high, given that out of the 450 households 
only 50% have more than one member in the town.
A combination of lower wage rates, and probably larger families 
to support overall (including the rural counterpart), has 
compelled this higher participation. Notice, for instance, 
in support of this interpretation, (Table 8.6), that a
4-member household earns a per capita income Rs 25 to 35
per month with an average of 1*6 workers in Jharia
(1.4 in Raniganj), whereas in Asansol a 5-member
household manages to earn the same per capita income
with only 1.1 working members, and in Jamshedpur a
6-member household manages to obtain the same income
with only 1 .2  worker members (and in that City a
4-member household needs only 1*3 workers to achieve
a per capita income twice as high, at between Rs 50 and 65 ).
In addition, Table 8.9 shows the relatively large number of
multiple-member households who report sending home remittances
in the coal mining towns, similar proportions, though
lower monetary amounts, as those recorded in the richer
industrial towns* In the two mining towns the additional
earners in the household must be employed in the mining
industry, the women presumably as surface workers,
since only 2 and 1% of the workers' - surveyed are
employed outside the coal industry, (whereas 14 and 20%
of them are not the principal breadwinner). This extreme
vulnerability is witnessed in a tragic sequence of events,
reported in the press, that followed the closure of mines in
the same area of Bihar in the late 1970s: in 1979 there
were accounts of widespread starvation among miners.
That could not have been possible if mining families
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either held reasonable land acreages, or divided their
employment between mining and trading or services related to
agriculture or rural industry. It would also have been
less likely if public investment in mining towns had
ensured the establishment of independent manufacturing or
1
food-processing activities.
At this point we feel the need to learn more 
precisely about the non-core industrial households in 
these industrial cities. Are they different in their 
demographic character? Above we remarked that migrants 
in these households may migrate more as a family unit 
than do the industrial worker migrants. Do these households 
show a higher proportion of non-nuclear families, with, 
say, seven or more members (taking this size range to be a 
proxy indicator of non-nuclear families)? There is rather 
little evidence that suggests this, despite the writerte 
prior expectation that it would be the case . For 
the fact, for instance, that Jamshedpur’s industrial
1 It is not possible from the Labour Bureau data to under­
take a rigorous analysis of how many earners are needed 
to prevent destitution, since the per capita family incomes 
are not cross-classified by occupational earnings. The 
families of 7 members that engage two earners in Jamshedpur 
may be just as compelled by economic necessity as similar 
families in Raniganj. But we can argue that, if it is possible 
to live off 1 0 -1 5 rupees per month per head, then a family 
of 7 needs an income of Rs 70 - 105, making it unlikely that 
a single earner would be sufficient for family survival 
in Raniganj, Jharia, or indeed Sholapur, to take three examples.
sector has fewer large households than does the urban 
area of Singbhum District generally, may still reflect the 
transitional status of industrial households in the former. 
For we observe how Asansol City in 1971 had alimost the same 
proportion of large households as has its non-industrial 
neighbour Burdwan City (and Jamshedpur in 1971 resembles the 
average for Bihar). The evidence we have already looked at 
does point, however, to the likelihood that the non-core 
sector households will have more earners per family than 
those with a core-sector industrial worker,(holding constant 
family size).
The only direct evidence available on this point 
relates to households engaged predominantly in a familial 
mode of production, defined loosely as "household industry" 
in the Census. There are drawbacks in using these data in 
direct comparison v/ith the industrial worker surveys 
used above. In common they have the disadvantage that 
households are defined by predominant source of income; 
the subsidiary home-based economic contribution of women 
is probably under-reported in both cases. But subsidiary 
non-wage male labour is possibly under-reported in the 
industrial labour surveys, whereas wage labour is certainly 
not reported if undertaken outside the household in the 
Census data. Hence a biased dichotomy is created between 
the two household types. With these reservations in mind 
we can make some general points. The total contribution to
household labour is characteristically much higher in 
the household industry households than in the industrial 
labour households. There are on average two members 
participating (including, however, one in ten households 
hiring in a worker). Between -J- and of households have 
a second male participating, (excluding hired-in labour, 
and therefore, incidentally, suggestive of larger family 
size). Looking in more detail (Table 8.10) at the heavy 
industrial localities, most household industries employ two 
family members. In most cases this appears to be the principal 
source of household income in that at least one male member 
is involved: in food production,for instance, in Singbhum 
District (containing Jamshedpur) usually two males are 
involved, and this is true of half the households in 
Dhanbad. In the locality of Durg, cotton textile-producing 
households employ a second male family worker in two out 
of three cases.
It is ,one thing to observe higher rates of part­
icipation; diversification is less easy to establish, 
but we can argue that those industries where households 
have two or more members involved are unlikely to be less than 
a major source of the household income. We would add to this 
that food production is less likely to be an urban "export” 
industry, and hence more vulnerable to changes in the
purchasing power of the core-industrial workers in
engineering or iron and steel production. But the
evidence is scanty, and the case of undue concentration
among the non-core sector households is not proven;
what is clear (from Table 8.10) is their reliance on
1
multiple earners.
As a further control against which to observe the 
heavy engineering workers, we turn again to textile 
manufacture. Here we are confronted with a wide range of 
technologies, as discussed earlier, and a range of modes 
of production. We draw upon two comparative case studies 
from Western India, the Cities of Ahmedabad and Sholapur, 
(Tables 8.6 and 8.7). The similarity between these two 
lies in their both being dominated by the cotton mills.
The difference lies in the more modernised industry in 
Ahmedabad, the more backward industry in Bholapur, and 
in the corresponding demographic growth and structure 
of the two localities, with the latter having a 
predominant contribution from natural growth, and the 
former a greater contribution from migration, (1951-81 
decadal growth was 37% in Ahmedabad and 22% in Sholapur).
1 As we have mentioned earlier, there is a further factor 
that can constrain family diversification of income source 
caste* The clearest evidence here (Table 8,10) is in the 
leather-making households, which are consistent in having 
more than one male worker (on average) per family in the 
same industry.
Ahmedabad would seem to resemble Asansol or Jamshedpur, 
with 21% of its households consisting of single-members 
and 22% of six members and over; 77% of its households 
derive their incomes from one principal breadwinner, 
and 91% of its industrial employees are in the mills*
When we look at Sholapur, we are turning from 
cases of industrial growth to a case of industrial 
stagnation* The potential problem of the industrial 
monoculture is underlined in these cases, (though one 
problem is missing, in that the unstable demographic 
dynamics associated with an initially distorted age and 
sex structure are absent in the industries where economies 
of agglomeration are more important than economies of 
plant size). Of Sholapur*s industrial workforce in 
the survey, 71% are in the textile mills* Only 4% of 
households are single-member, a striking contrast, and 
45% have over six members* This is almost exactly the same 
as the distribution given for Sholapur City in the 1971 
Census, and also for the whole of the urban District.
The second and related point to note is the proportion 
of single-earner households, which, at 55%, is very low. 
Finally we note that the principal earners can expect to 
earn only about a third of the income of a fellow weaver 
or spinner in Ahmedabad, or of an iron and steel worker
in Eastern India. Even after correcting for differences in 
purchasing power in the Cities being compared this will 
be a large differential. The effect of the second earner 
is unlikely to raise per capita income much above subsistence 
rather, it will be prevented from falling below. In view 
of the low wage it is perhaps surprising there are not more 
second-earner households; only 20% of them have man and 
wife at work (or recorded as such). Actually the household 
industry data (Table 8.10) indicate that the textile industry 
households (operating handlooms) have on average at least 
one female at work in the household industry. Indeed 
the textile household industry has on average 3 *8 persons 
employed per unit. And textile household industry accounts 
for 73% of all household industry in the Census sample.
This represents an extreme degree of concentration of 
earning power in a single industry; (in contrast, in 
Ahmedabad, only 50% of the household industry sector 
consists of textile households). The City of Sholapur 
as a whole has both a family and age structure almost 
identical with that in the rural area of the District,
The scope for income transfers on an inter or intra-
1 The distinction between factory and household industry is 
likely to be extremely blurred in the case of Sholapur.
It would not be surprising if workers in small factories 
received more than their marginal product in order to 
maintain the level of employment by work-sharing, exactly 
as in the household mode of enterprise, A similar lack 
of distinction is seen in that the so-called household 
sector hires on average one non-family worker.
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family basis, between country and town, would seem to be 
minimal, unless urban households are also hiring out 
their labour to rural or other urban sectors* Here 
therefore we may witness over time the full implication 
of the single-industry town.
Sholapur happens to be a well-recorded case of 
a declining or stagnating town, owing to its large size.
There are no truly comparable examples from our area of 
Eastern India (though the City of Monghyr has similarities). 
Looking at the District-wise data, we would not be able 
to discern much difference in these localities from the average 
experience in terms of household structure. We have indicated 
earlier that their demographic structures are such as to suggest 
the presence of more children and old people, and in extreme 
cases there appears something of a hollow in the centre of 
the age structure on the male side (e,g. Table 6.4) due to 
outmigration. A deeper analysis, however, reveals an 
important difference in the sex composition of the smaller 
households. For example, Bolangir and Mayurbanj in Orissa 
both have a similar minority of single-member households (10%), 
and between 25 and 50% of 2-3 member households. In 1 9 6 1, 
only Bolangir was the declining area, (with a decadal growth 
of 2 2%), whereas Mayurbanjfs small urban sector had grown 
very fast (206%), In Mayurbanj, as we would expect, these
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households are male-dominated. In Bolangir they are not,(Table 8.4),
which is clear evidence of outmigration (or mortality)
among men. For a comparison, observe Sholapur and Thana
Districts (Table 8.4) also in 19^1: similar proportions of
single-member households are found, but in Sholapur about
■j consist in lone women. These declining urban areas
bear comparison with rural areas in this respect.
The small female-dominated households are only as viable, 
in India, as the link with other familiesor other 
family members, is robust. That these absent members (if alive) 
are employed in a different economic environment is a 
strength,0 provided their purchasing power is channelled 
back to the original urban household. Unfortunately the 
only evidence we have on remittance flows is on those that 
are outward from urban areas ,(Table 8,9). As would be 
expected, households in the growth areas remit above average, 
those in the declining areas below average, indeed in 
Sholapur virtually not at all. The question is whether
1 Note also how small are the remittances from industrial 
workers in Monghyr, with virtually all coming from single 
member households, which are themselves a minority.
Monghyr is a declining town, but the industrial workers 
have retained reasonable incomes. On the whole it 
seems that they have broken their economic links with 
the rural areas.
1
there are net flows in the reverse direction. Without 
these there will be an unfortunate coincidence of both 
familial and aggregate local deprivation.
Industrial and Occupational Employment 
Concentration among Migrants
Our interest in employment diversification among 
migrants is threefold. First, as we have said, the 
major concern of this Chapter is with the stability of 
income (or, more broadly, welfare), which, we have suggested, 
depends on the mechanism for transferring incomes from those 
with employment to those without it. Generally speaking, 
this will occur within families. But additionally it 
will usually occur between families that feel in some 
way a moral , emotional, or expedient responsibility for 
others. One of the strongest links here will be ethnicity; 
and a strong, if less strong, link will be place of birth#
1 Hiring out one’s family labour, in the historical Western 
European manner, to work in other households, may be a 
source of security, provided the household's economic base 
is different from one’s own. It is among the strategies 
that individual families could adopt when faced with the 
problem of "monoculture". The author is informed that, in 
historical England the domestic servant did nut ..usually 
work in a...family very far distant from his or her own,
(a mean distance of 8 miles; personal communication from 
R,Schofield of the University of Cambridge); not perhaps 
the safest of strategies if crop failures, like coal 
pit closures, are fairly localised.
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Hence migrant families of common origin, born in the same 
State for instance, may be expected to be supportive of 
one another in distress. If those migrants draw their incomes 
form diverse sources, the reliability of this source of 
security is enhanced; if they do not, then distress itself 
will more likely be concentrated, and inter-family income 
stabilisation less easy.
Secondly we wish to assess what the strategy of 
migrants in this situation actually is. Do they themselves 
see the importance of diversification or not? It is, 
after all, possible that a conflict arises in that the 
best incomes or best security for the individual is 
to be found in particular industries or occupations.
Hence migrants would aspire, through whatever links they 
manage to forge via their own kith and kin, to enter those 
industries: furthermore, the more of their members they
can establish therein, the easier entry becomes. Thus the 
future wage of the potential migrant may be higher (i.e. 
the waiting period shorter) if he seeks entry to an employment 
in which his fellows are already well-represented. These 
atomistic advantages may appear to outweigh any collective
1 This likelihood is enhanced by the observation of residence 
patterns and social networks in the cities. It can be 
observed by eye hov; house-types among 'belf-built* hutments 
tend to cluster, indicative of the common origin of their 
inmates. Rather less casual evidence, however, can be 
obtained from, inter alia, M.S.Gore, In-migrants and 
Neighbourhoods . T a ta  I n s t i t u t e  o f  S o c ia l  S c ie n c e a , Bombay, 
1 9 7 0 .
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advantage of diversified employment (assuming the 
individual actually observes the collective advantage; 
a true case of the "isolation paradox")# We attempt to cast 
some light on the strategies adopted by observing, 
retrospectively, migrant behaviour over time (accepting 
the limitations that must be imposed by such a method)#
Thirdly we postulate that migrant occupational or 
industrial diversification may cast some light on family 
diversification of economic activity# For provided that 
family behaviour in this respect is fairly uniform 
throughout a particular migrant group, and provided migrant 
groups do not inter-marry, the more concentrated are 
occupations in specific migrant groups, the more concentrated 
will be occupations in families within the same groups#
In Northern India, many of the migrant groups under discussion 
are Hindi-speaking# One is told that inter-marriage 
between, for example, Biharis and Uttar Pradeshis, is quite 
likely# This does indeed weaken the use of this methodology, 
(though, as has been pointed out, most of the first generation 
migrants in the new industrial towns are married before they 
arrive, so that inter-State marriages are less likely)#
It is also possible that an occupationally concentrated 
migrant group may contain families that are more prone 
to seek diversification than any in a less concentrated
group# Nevertheless, the more occupationally concentrated 
a migrant group is, the less likely are families to 
achieve the same degree of diversification: if more than 
50% of workers are in the same occupation, and each family 
has two workers, some families simply cannot be diversifying# 
They may be constrained, or they may have chosen, not to 
follow such a strategy.
Now we turn to the evidence# The weakest evidence, 
available for the large cities only, simply distinguishes the 
migrant from the non-migrant. It shows that in these 
Cities at least there is altogether rather little difference 
between the distribution of migrants and non-migrants 
in occupational categories; nor is it immediately apparent 
whether migrants or non-migrants are the more likely to be 
diversified (though this is not a central issue).
Part of the problem of interpretation is statistical: 
the residual category of "other labourer" is often 
unhealthily large (amounting to J>0% of production workers 
or more) and usually particularly large among migrants# 
Insofar as this is a real (i.e. accurately recorded) 
observation, it may represent the pool of migrants 
hoping for more specific employment , or a more permanent
1 Migrants, that is, waiting for entry into the high-wage 
sector in the manner immortalised by M.P.Todaro*
"Rural Urban Migration.." in A.J#Coale (ed#), Economic 
Factors in Population Growth# Macmillan, London, 1976#
group of casual workers among the migrants, doomed for all
1
time to be nothing else ; on this we throw a little more 
light below. It would be more suggestive, and more important 
for our study, to look closely at the experience in the 
"monocultural" towns, but none of these in Eastern India 
was large enough to feature in the City sample in 1961.
The most pertinent observation would be that in Asansol 
City, where tool-makers and machinists form 25% of the 
production worker force, migrants are a little more 
concentrated than non-migrants (only 5% difference),
(Table 8.11); and in parts of the Calcutta Metropolitan 
region, notably Baranagar and Kamarhati in Hoogley District, 
jute workers form about a tenth (1 1.6/&) of the production 
workforce, but with the migrants being more concentrated: 
in Baranagar 21.59& of migrant production workers work in 
textiles, and in Kamarhati 10.7%, whereas the non-migrants 
in the two localities together have only 2*7% of their 
workforce in the mills. Though the differences between groups 
may be very large, the concentration is still below 50%: 
its significance would be greater for the employment 
stability of the migrant group as a whole, and for inter­
family financial support, than for the internal stability
1 As would be argued by the anti-Todaro school: see
for instance H. and V. Joshi, Surplus Labour and the City. 
O.U.P., Delhi, 1976*
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of family earnings# In a City in Western India,
Ahmedabad, 60% of the production workforce is engaged 
in cotton textile manufacture, with the migrants having 
7% higher participation than the non-migrants# In Sholapur 
exactly similar proportions are found, but with the 
significant difference that the non-migrants outnumber the 
migrants in absolute size: hence as high a proportion of 
migrants as 75% are employed in textiles# We have shown 
that in Sholapur families typically have more than a single 
earner in industry: they have little option than for 
their second earner to be in the textile industry too#
More discriminatory evidence must be sought by 
relating migrants in particular occupational or industrial 
groups to their regions of origin. This can be done in detail 
for Jamshedpur and for the Dhanbad-Jharia-Sindri group 
of towns in Bihar (using the special Census tabulations, 
see our Table 8,12). For Jamshedpur, it may be seen that 
the iron and steel industry employed 2 9.^% of the native 
Biharis, but 37*9% of the West Bengalis (a clearly distinct 
regional and linguistic group), and 38.7% of the .Orissans#
In the Dhanbad Town Group, 36.9% of Biharis were in mining, 
but as high as ^8 .8% of Uttar Pradeshis# These are fairly 
clear indications of particularly high degrees of concentration 
among particular migrant groups in town complexes that 
are already characterised by employment concentration
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in specific industries, and hence especially vulnerable to 
economic fluctuations# (If we divide even further into 
Districts of origin, we reveal even further degrees of 
concentration: for instance, *+3*3% of workers from 
neighbouring Hazaribagh are miners in Dhanbad)#
Comparing these observations with those from a textile 
City, Ahmedabad reveals a clear parallel. Only A-1.6% of 
local Gujarati migrants are employed in the textile industry, 
but 63*5% of the Uttar Pradeshis are so employed (a quite 
distinct regional group)# The skewed sex ratios among these 
migrants indicates that part of the family remains in 
the rural locality of origin# These families must have land, 
(like the industrial workers referred to in Poona, Chapter 
5 above) but clearly feel the need to supplement their 
income# The rural home will offer security in time of 
industrial distress, but the capacity of the village as a whole 
to perform that function is limited if there is a concentration 
of migrants in the textile industry in those villages, (like 
the Bombay textile workers from Ratnagiri, or the Dhanbad 
miners from Hazaribagh)#
It remains to observe how these migrant, groups 
have behaved over time# We have only evidence of those 
who have remained in the town in question, - in some sense
1 The currently protracted strike of the Bombay textile 
workers (1 9 8 2-8 3 ) would provide an opportunity for field 
research into this phenomenon#
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they may be referred to as the satisfied migrants#
Have they become more concentrated in their employment 
characteristics over time or not? On the whole it would appear 
that they have# Production process workers in Jamshedpur 
(Table 8 #1 3), i.e# mainly iron and steel workers, are 
nearly twice as likely to be found among those migrants 
of 1 to 5 years duration of residence as among new arrivals# 
This intensification is most strong among the West Bengalis 
(who we noted were already more concentrated in iron and 
steel work than the rest)# In the case of the Dhanbad Town 
Group, there is, in contrast, very little evidence of 
such intensification# And in the case of the Dhanbad 
miners, the reverse, if anything, is true. Not surprisingly 
perhaps, there is an attempt to get out of mining over time, 
(which is both badly paid and insecure, so that no question 
of a trade-off on that score need arise)# These inter­
temporal movements are fairly uniform across the various 
migrant groups#
In the case of Ahmedabad (Table 8#1^ f) we can 
distinguish further between industry and occupation.
But either way, the overall pattern is uniform# All 
migrant groups tend to move towards jobs as production 
workers over time, whether in textiles or not# This
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movement applies no less to the Uttar Pradeshis, whose 
employment is more heavily concentrated in production work 
in the first place. What particularly distinguishes them 
from other groups is their initial degree of concentration. 
Indeed these migrants from U.P., of whom we noted a 
majority were in textile occupations (spinning and weaving), 
intensified their concentration in the textile industry 
over time, from a participation of 65% to 90% (of those 
employed in manufacturing), an above average increase, 
and an extreme level of concentration indeed. It is true 
that migrants from Rajasthan and Maharashtra also achieved 
very high levels of concentration of their workforce within 
the textile industry: but interestingly they were less 
like^ to be operatives (spinners and weavers): for only 
about 65% of them (as against 75% of the Uttar Pradeshis) 
finished up in tbeoproduction worker category, the rest 
being in service or supervisory employment within the same 
industry. We also note that a far larger proportion of 
Uttar Pradeshis started off as operatives in any industry 
(67%) than did their fellow migrants from Rajasthan (50%) 
or Maharashtra (33%). The implications of such extreme 
concentration, not only in a single industry, but in a
1 We noted above some general observations on using and 
interpreting this retrospective information. We add 
here that there may have been more jobs in textiles 
offered 6 to 10 years ago in proportion to other employment. 
This would indicate the more extreme vulnerability of the
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single occupation within that industry, has manifold 
ramifications. It seems to have particularly characterised 
the textile industry within India, And now (1980s), of 
all the industries we have studied in this thesis, the 
textile industry is becoming the most 'hick1'. In the case 
of the Uttar Pradeshis there is a ray of hope: the extremely 
skewed sex ratios among the migrants indicates that only 
the male members of the families are so employed in the 
Cities, By carrying on their employment at two centres, 
at home and in a "foreign11 city, they may have perhaps 
maintained at the family level the diversification we argue 
is so important (probably splitting their income between 
manufacturing and agriculture), A contrast may be made 
here with the family employment in textiles in Sholapur 
City, where the rural links may have been severed for good.
footnote continued
older migrants, but not necessarily be indicative of an 
attempt by the migrants to improve their employment status 
by consolidating their position in textiles over time.
However, I suspect that this is not the burden of what the 
data reveal. For the Uttar Pradeshis have, among current 
migrants, a slightly lower than average degree of concentration 
among all the migrant groups, but among those of 6 -1 0  years 
duration an above average concentration. Now there is unlikely 
to have been a relatively higher supply of textile jobs 
specifically for U.P, migrants in the past than in the present 
in comparison with the other migrant groups. It seems more 
likely that they have penetrated the textile industry more 
successfully over time than have the other groups. They seek 
the personal security or companionship, and risk the group 
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Table 8.2
Sex Ratios in Rural Areas associated with
















Rural Baghmara 0 .9 0 1
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961. 
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Urban Household Size and Sex Distributions 
in the Study Districts
{,% of households in selected size groups 
with sex ratios, f:m, bracketed below)
1 member 2-3 members 10 members +
West Bengal (1961)
24-PARGANAS 13.1 26.1+ 8.4
(.154) (.864)
CALCUTTA 14.4 26.1 9.0
(.19*0 (.875)
HOWRAH 15.3 29.0 7.1
(.151) (.513) (.811)
HOOGLEY 16.1 27.5 8.5
(.263) (.6(A) (.907)
These Districts comprise CALCUTTA METROPOLIS
BURDWAN (1961) 13.0 26.0 8.7
(.156) (.573) (0833)
BURDWAN (1971) 9.6 22.2 n.a.
Burdwan City 7.4 9.3 n.&o
Asansol City 7.6 10.4 n.a.
Durgapur Steel. 12.2 11.6 n.a.
BIRBHUM 10.3 24©5 9.*f
(.484) (.901) (.912)
BANKURA 9.5 20.8 11.^
(1.09) (.976) (.909)
MIDNAPORE 11.5 23.1 8.7
(.337) (.881) (.908)
Table 8.4 continued







































Bastar 13.2 33.3 5.5
* (.950) (.873)
Durg 22v5 39.1 2.7
(.1^2 ) (.6 25) (.870)
Durg 1971 12.7 27.9 n.a.
Bhilai 1971 1 3 .8 2 9 .2 n.a.
Raigarh 11.^ 3^.7 5 .5
(.525) (.910) (.880)
Bilaspur 13 .6 3^.5 5.1
(,W8) (.885) (.952)
Note * small numbers
Table 8.*f cont'd
Bihar (1961) 1 member 2-3 members 10members
PATNA 9.0 21.3 11.9
(.2**3) (.693) (.889)
GAYA 10o5 22.1 10.8
(.32*0 (.751) (•9**8)
RANCHI 8 .6 21.9 11.0
(#217) (.707) (.902)
SINGBHUM 10.8 27.5 7.3
(.202) (.659) (0888)
DHANBAD 15.** 28.3 7.0
(.066) (.**65) (.777)
BHAGALPUR 7.0 20.6 11.1
(.398) (.812) (.925)
SHAHABAD 9.3 22.** 11.8
(.317) (o7*f7) (.9***0
MONGHYR 8.7 20.9 10.7
(.362) (.815) (.926)
Rural Bihar 5.3 20.9 9.3
(.99*0 (1.0W (.998)
Sources: Government of India, Census of India. 1961.
1971 (relevant States): for 1961, Household 
Economics Tables, Table B XVII; for 1971* 
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Concentration of Workers in Household Industry, by Industry
This table gives the number of recorded workers per 
household in each specified household industry, for 
a selection of Districts©
mph = males per household
fph a= females per household
hwph = hired workers per household
(number of households in Census sample is provided in brackets)













































GANJAM mph fph hwph (606)
food 0*8? 











































































food 1.25  
wood 2.2*f 





























WEST BENGAL (urban Districts)
BURDWAN mph fph hwph (209)
food 0*82 0.36 0.14 (22)
tobacco 1.08 0.28 0 d 6 (25)
cotton text* 0.97 0.29 0.17 (35)
misc. text* 1.43 (7)
wood 1.07 0.3** 0.45 (29)
leather 1.70 (10)
chemicals 0.75 0.50 1.25 (4)
non met*min. 1.30 0.47 0.23 (30)
basic metals 1.60 0.00 0.27 (15)
BIRBHUM (83)
food 0.73 0.45 0.09 (11)
tobacco 1.05 0.32 0.11 (19)
wood 1.75 0.58 0.00 (12)
CALCUTTA (791)
food 1.85 0.15 0.71 (48)
tobacco 1.23 0.36 0.95 (44)
text* misc* 1.37 0.07 0.90 (89)
wood 1.47 0.19 0.47 (103)
paper 1.11 0.82 O .63 (38)
leather 2.65 0.12 0.91 (159)
non met*min* 1.95 0.59 0.53 (73)
basic metals 2.09 0.11 0.51 (47)
24-PARGANAS (124?)
tobacco 1.12 0.29 0.26 (58)
cotton text. 1.24 0.61 0.38 (157)
misc. text* 1.66 0.04 0.4o (659)
wood 1.31 0.50 0..12 (132)
non met* min..1.48 0.40 O .89 (63)
£. MADHYA PRADESH (urban Districts)
DURG mph fph hwph (473) BILASPUR mph fph hwph
food 0.92 0.93 0.15 (71) 1.02 0.79 0.26
cotton text. 1.53 1.40 0.10 (30) 1.69 1.73 0.04
misc. text. 1.13 0.35 0.14 (72)
wood 1.11 0.73 0.15 (62) 1.23 0.54 0.19
























































































































Source: Derived from Government of India, Census of India 19&1t 
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Indices of Industry-specific Concentration among
Migrants of different Origins in two Centres of Heavy Industry
Migrants to DHANBAD-JHARIA-SINDRI, Bihar (1961) 
Origin Percentage of Male Workers of specified origin 
who are employed ins










West Bengal 43*3 __(2880)_____
Migrants to JAMSHEDPUR, Bihar (1961)
1®in Percentage of Male Workers of specified origin 
who are employed in:
Iron & Steel (Numbers) Transport Equipment (Numbers)
Bihar 29o4 (8843) 8 .8 (2648)
Orissa 3807 (3072) 12.7 (1008)
Punjab 34.3 (1300 13.7 (543)
U.P. 34.5 (2372) 12.8 (881)
West Bengal 37•9 (3682) 11.6 (1127)
Outside 7Q k 
India 5 0 ,4 (2916) 4.8 (364)
Sources: Government of India, Census of India, 1961. Special
Migration Tables for Dhanbad-Jharia-Sindri Town Group, 
Delhi, Table 5* Special Migration Tables for Jamshedpur, 
Delhi, Table
Table 8,13
Concentration of Industrial Employment according to 
Duration of Residence at two Centres of Heavy Industry
DHANBAD-JHARXA-SINDRI Bihar, 1961
Migrants from. Duration of Residence in Dhanbad:
1 year 1-5 years 6-10 years 
Proportion of all male workersa 
in Production Work
Other States
(than Bihar) .202 .206 .2^9
Uttar Pradesh d 68 .167 .2^9
All places .2  6k .279 *308
Proportion in Mining
Uttar Pradesh *557 e^2b .386
All places *386 *353 *327
JAMSHEDPUR




Uttar Pradesh *352 .Gkk *503
Orissa *3 k3 *538 *513
Punjab •36? *509 **f73
West Bengal *356 .676 .567
All places .38^ 0625 .5^0
Notes: a The proportion of all male workers from the specified
origin and of the specified duration who are 
recorded in the occupation of production worker 
(miner)•
Sources: See Table 8#12 above0
Table 8.14
Concentration of Industry-specific Employment among 
Migrants to Ahmedabad. according to Duration of Residence
Origin
1 year 1-5 years 6-10 years
Proportion of&all male 
Manufacturing
workers in
All places .311 .463 *563







Rajasthan o269 *392 *575
(14826)
Proportion of all male manufacturing workers 
in Textiles®























Notes: a The proportion applies to each origin-duration-specific 
cell in following bank of figures.
Source: Government of India, Census of India, 1961, Special 
Tables on Migrants to Ahmedabad City, Delhi,
Tables 4 and 5*
A brief Overview of Chapter 8
If the State does not resolve the labour 
market disequilibria and resultant income losses, how 
far can families protect themselves? It becomes clear 
that migrant groups do not attempt to spread their 
sources of employment, but rather seek to concentrate 
it in particular industries or occupations. At the same 
time families in urban areas tend to loosen their 
rural links by family formation in the towns (an exception 
being the miners).
CHAPTER 9
Family Income Security, Employment Aspirations, 
and the State
A Summary of the Argument
The adverse implications of rapid demographic 
growth for the equilibrium of the future labour market, 
and the adverse implications of single-industry towns 
for the long-term family income security, are considered 
finally in the light of possible interventions by the State 
Empirically a reconstruction of the local demography of 
Bhilai Steel Town helps to illustrate the first problem, 
and this is taken down to 19&1. Costs of alternative 
strategies that the State might adopt towards alleviating 
both these problems, - subsidised diversification or 
suboptimal scale of plant -, are assessed: in some cases
the costs are less than the loss of social income involved 
in the event of a local industrial stagnation or closure. 
Finally, an original hypothesis is put forward: that family 
or other social group, income security is at its worst 
when both direct income-producing employment and indirect 
transfer incomes from fellows in the same social group (or 
family) are, at source, concentrated in the same industry.
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Concentration of Industry and Security of 
Incomes: the Policy Issues
Our interest in the relationship between demography 
and industrial structure, or demography and industrial 
technologies, has been prompted by a concern for some 
of the welfare implications of industrialisation strategy.
A particular problem worth investigation has been the 
security of incomes obtained through employment in single­
industry towns. It is a commonplace to observe that changes 
in industrial structure or technologies may render a 
high proportion of the workforce unemployed, and a higher 
proportion in such towns than in more diversified locations.
Before proceeding further it would be pertinent to ask 
whether that observation alone is in any way an argument 
for encouraging (i.e. subsidising) local diversification*
The question is more complex than may be immediately appreciated. 
Some of the major points, in regard to which careful quantification 
is needed, (and an illustration is attempted in the Appendix), 
are as follows,
1 For instance in the case of our comparative study from the 
U.K., we note unemployment rates of approximately M-0% soon 
after the closure of Consett steel works.
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If there is a freely operating market, industries
of a similar nature, or highly inter-dependent industries
(in an input-output sense), will tend to locate in close
proximity to one another to reap certain economies of
production, related to (inter alia) the physical fact of
1
their mutual proximxty itself* To attract wholly unrelated 
industries to the same area may require heavy subsidies 
continuing over time* This we will document below.
To be sure, it will often be possible to attract modern 
industries providing consumption goods (particularly food) 
for the local population at rather low levels of subsidy, 
especially if the local population is close to the threshold 
size at which local industry (also subject to economies of 
scale) would in any case become profitable. But then, 
as we shall argue, the social benefit of a subsidy in the 
case of a consumption goods industry will also be considerably 
smaller.
The question to ask is, how could any subsidies be 
justified? Clearly they could not be justified on any 
grounds of industrial efficiency (if, as we say, factor 
and product markets are competitive). The short answer 
would seem to be that if the State has a policy of providing
1 The availability of a particular factor of production will 
often decide the location in the first place. On the econ­
omies of location and agglomeration there is a voluminous 
literature. For a summary, see, e.g., E.3.Mills,
Urban Economics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 
1979.
unemployment relief (for the wholly unemployed) it is 
arguable at least that, provided unemployment levels 
would be higher in the economy as a whole if industry 
remained locally concentrated, then the reduction in 
future unemployment relief might more than compensate 
for the cost of a continuing subsidy needed to promote 
and maintain some degree of local diversification.
But why should open unemployment rates be higher if
industry is more concentrated? The argument is that in a .
recession or decline in demand for a locally produced
commodity exported from the locality for national (or inter
national consumption), the reduction in incomes from direct
employment in the depressed industry further depresses local
demand for consumer goods and services, due to a reverse
1
multxplier, as it were, setting xn# This puts more of 
the local workforce wholly out of work# Whereas if, say,
50% of local industrial output (for export beyond the 
community) held up in the case of a more diversified town 
despite recession or changes in the structure of aggregate 
demand, then those employed in consumer goods and services 
production, through working shorter hours and receiving
1 If the recession is severe enough, the opportunity for 
viable work-sharing among the workforce supplying the 
’'multiplier’* goods is severely curtailed: some people
become wholly unemployed once average income from work 
reaches subsistence levels#
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lower incomes, would not be out of work altogether, even 
if one of the core industries closed down. This effect would 
be even stronger in a largely self-employed or household 
production economy. Shopkeepers will take a cut in income 
rather than close down and seek unemployment relief or new 
work outside the locality. The fall in demand and employment 
is spread throughout the community and survival remains 
possible: if the fall is a more significant proportion of 
local demand, then spreading the incidence becomes impossible 
without reducing the average income from work to below an 
acceptable subsistence level, and hence the work-sharing ethic 
breaks down, and the marginal producers become wholly unemployed. 
Thus the social returns to a policy that attracts a second 
exporting industry (unrelated to the first) would of course 
be higher than those from attracting an industry purely 
intent on providing commodities or services for immediate 
consumption in the town itself: for the consumer goods
industry would add to local unemployment if the first 
industry goes into a severe enough recession (since the 
first industry's wage labour is the source of local consumption 
demand. 1
1 There is a further consideration here, arguably in the 
realms of the unquantifiable, but almost certainly of 
significance. A level of unemployment concentrated in 
a locality may be socially more costly than the same 
amount of unemployment dispersed over a region. The 
psychology of aggregate depression may encourage crime 
and other social malaise, may discourage labour itself 
from seeking re-training or new job opportunities, 
or may discourage new private investment from entering the 
area (for reasons other than the more objective economic
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So far we have been discussing the issue on the 
assumption that the State provides unemployment relief#
Insofar as it does not, the matter becomes one of income 
distribution alone# Inequalities clearly become sharper 
if 40% of the town becomes wholly unemployed (i#e. 2 0% 
due to the closure of the basic industry, and a further 
20% due to the reverse multiplier described above), than 
if only 15% of a town twice as large and more diversified 
becomes unemployed (i#e# 10% due to the closure of the basic 
industry and only 5% due to the reverse multiplier), with 
an additional 5 to 10%, also affected by the reverse multiplier, 
taking a considerable cut in income, but due to the continuation 
of other basic industries, not losing employment (at
"I
subsistence level remuneration) completely# Of course 
the effect of a local reverse multiplier is much more 
severe on individual families if the workers in the core 
industry, who are made jobless, have to share in the existing 
local income to survive (thus considerably cutting local 
aggregate consumption), than it would be in a State with 
full unemployment relief financed out of national income
footnote continued
ones suggested above)# Together these arguments may well 
justify an additional element of subsidy in an effort to 
encourage diversification (which is not to say they should 
be used to justify any level of subsidy)#
1 It is appreciated of course that definitions of inequality 
differ# At least one can say that the distributional effects 
are different in the two cases# The author's own value 
judgement would be that they are worse in the first case#
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(implying a consumption transfer toward the locality 1 
under relief). Indeed if large redundancy payments are 
also made, the immediate effect may be to increase 
aggregate consumption in the' locality (again an experience 
of the British Steel Towns). But as pointed out above, 
there is no indication that such additions to consumption 
compensate over time for the welfare loss in being out of 
work in a morally depressed community. That is to say, 
the unemployed labour force is constrained to use its 
incremental income to purchase goods, rather than to 
purchase the satisfaction of being at work. Unless the 
redundancy pay is enormous, there may be a net welfare loss. 
And if it is enormous, the question arises whether this 
plus unemployment relief (plus any subsidies used to attract 
new industry) may together be more costly than the option 
of keeping the original industry open.
But it is in the context of an economy without 
unemployment relief, but with a developing system of 
industrial wage labour, that the demographic aspects of 
single-industry towns become more important. This is because 
the source of income to the wholly unemployed is the family 
in the broadest sense (as we have argued in Chapter 8 above). 
The scope for income sharing, by transfers alone, outside of 
the immediate or extended family is very limited. There 
might be, cet* par., opportunities for work (and hence income)
sharing outside the wage sector, but at times of industrial 
closure the redundant wage labour will find it less easy 
to become absorbed in the non-wage sector: the potential
entrants will be just too many in an indiversified town*
This is why we focus on the family.
The fact that there is no State unemployment relief 
does not necessarily imply no State intervention in, 
or planning of, industrial location. The National and 
State Governments of India have enacted and implemented 
rather more effectively regarding location than regarding 
unemployment# Furthermore, though one cannot immediately 
suggest political strategies that could be adopted at the 
community or family level toward the effective adoption of 
unemployment relief, one may be able to suggest strategies 
to ensure a more even sharing of the unemployment burden. 
This may look like a recipe to prevent structural reform,
I shall argue later, though cannot prove, that it is not.
In summary, the problem may be presented as follows. 
Welfare transfer systems operate between individuals. 
but the organisation of these transfers may take place
1 For details on regional subsidies see the references noted 
in the Appendix to this Chapter. For an appraisal and 
critique see J.W.Mackie, "Industrial Location and Regional 
Policy in South India", Ph. D. thesis, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, London, 1982; I am grateful to him 
for some useful references.
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at the level of the family, local community, industry, 
region, or nation# There is typically, but not necessarily, 
a spatial dimension involved here# On the other hand 
factor incomes, as distinct from welfare transfers, 
that is, in this context, wages or payments dependent on 
work, are distributed across individuals in ways that make 
them, as individuals or groups of individuals, vulnerable 
to recessions or structural changes in the economy#
Again there is typically a spatial dimension here, of the 
kind that this thesis has emphasised# But there need not 
be# All Chinese overseas in India might be restaurant 
workers for instance, but they could be geographically 
scattered in all the major cities# Now the interesting 
problem arises with the overlapping of these two sets: 
the income transfer, and the income source, (Figure 9*2)#
If they overlap completely (as would be the case if the 
Chinese re-distribute income among their own overseas 
community, receiving nothing from outside), then individual 
welfare is at its most insecure in the event of economic 
structural change (a fall in the demand for Chinese cuisine)#
1 Another example would be that of the textile workers from
Ratnagiri in Maharashtra# Thay may work in textile towns all 
over the State, and live permanently where they work, but 
if they transfer income among' themselves, the problem of 
the overlapping sets arises, should the textile industry 
fail# In practice there is probably a spatial dimension: 
these migrants all work in Bombay and return to Ratnagiri 
regularly: the closure of a cotton mill could impoverish 
a village#
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The Implications for Employment over time: 
Local-level Disequilibria Explored
A striking, and some would argue depressing, 
feature of the Indian Censuses is that they indicate 
consistently a failure of the labour force to shift proportion­
ally into non-agricultural employment, and a similar failure 
of the manufacturing sector to grow proportionally to the 
rest# This is thought to be depressing because productivity 
is believed to be higher in manufacturing (even when social 
pricing of outputs is used), and above all in particular 
branches of manufacturing outside the household sector, 
than it is in agriculture# There are reasons to believe 
that it is in India's economic interests to develop the 
manufacturing sector: quite apart from achieving goals of
dynamic independence (which Governments of developing countries 
have rightly or wrongly regarded as being promoted by the 
development of the manufacturing sector), India undoubtedly 
has comparative advantage in world production in certain 
industries in that sector#
1 Quite apart from the question of the undesirability of a 
slow growth of industry, per se, the failure to absorb 
significant quantities of labour in this sector (even at times 
of its fairly rapid expansion) would be undesirable, given 
the importance of employment as a means to income in India. 
These are complex and fundamental issues, beyond the scope 
of the discussion in this thesis (but see Chapter 2)# •
This phenomenon is well illustrated in our region of 
study. Its implication for growth of income is acutely 
observed at the level of the locality. At the start of 
our period of study, in the mid-1950s we witness a major 
investment in this region. This is physically centred 
on a few localities. The investment leads to a national 
income flow that induces further investment: in physical 
terms the output of basic materials like steel plates 
is followed by the establishment of factories for manufact­
uring finished products, downstream, as economists say: 
these developments in turn promote the creation of more 
capacity in steel production, and in mining (through backward 
linkage, in the jargon). In aggregate we are examining 
an accelerator effect, again creating employment at the level 
of the community.
The accelerator effect operates over time# But of 
more immediate reaction is the change in purchasing power 
of the working community (and families) employed in these 
investment goods industries: this will stimulate a:
further utilisation of productive and service capacity, 
as in turn will the increased purchasing power of those 
employed in providing these consumer goods and services#
The local potential of this multiplier effect is often
missed in discussion of employment problems of developing 
countries, simply because the disaggregation to the level 
of the,locality is not done. But in actual fact there is 
no doubt that towns neighbouring the growth centres just 
described expand their processing of consumer goods to 
meet the demand of the wage-labour migrating into the area 
(though it cannot be denied that some of that demand is met 
by importing finished goods into the area, and even into
'i
the country, - leakages as the economist would say).
1 This is not the place for a social cost-benefit analysis 
of investment of this kind# Suffice it to say that a 
major dis-benefit is the rise in the local retail prices 
induced by the arrival of a high-productivity workforce: 
in the short-run at least this will cause a fall in the 
real income of the working members of the original 
community who are not sufficiently integrated into the 
new economy, and of dependent household members whose 
monetary allocation is fairly inflexible, and of those on 
fixed incomes established by non-market forces outside the 
locality (e.g. State transport workers). This point was 
made forcibly to the author by the manager of a chemicals 
factory outside the industrial areas in Madras •
We are to focus here on three growth centres, in the 
Districts of Burdwan, Durg, and Sundargarh. Each District's 
urban area achieved a proportion of workforce in manufacturing 
of between JO and k0% in 1961. During the following decade 
that proportion stabilised in Burdwan, fell slightly 
in Sundargarh, and stabilised in Durg (Table 9*1).
Distinctions between Burdwan and Durg will become clearer 
when we view these Districts at the level of Municipalities* 
Both Districts achieved a higher crude proportion of working 
males in manufacturing than did Sundargarh, There is no 
a priori reason why the proportion should level off at around 
JO to k0%; in the non-central Districts of Metropolitan 
Calcutta the proportion is around J0% (and in that case 
at least the high level cannot be ascribed to the high 
initial level of manufacturing with new growth running 
ahead of the expansion of tertiary establishments).
In each case the surrounding Districts have a far
lower proportion in manufacturing, and no notable improvement
in that proportion over time (in the case of Durg, see
‘ 1Table 9.1» quite the reverse). Within Burdwan District 
(Table 9#1)» as within the other rapidly growing Districts,
1 Owing to a change in the Census definition of activity
status (among other inconsistencies) the safest comparisons 
are restricted to adult males only; see J.Krishnamurty, 
"Working Force in 1971 Census: Unilluminating 'Final1 
Results", Economic and Political Weekly. August 1973,
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there is considerable variance between urban localities; 
the manufacturing labour force grew fast from 1 9 6 1 -7 1  
in Durgapur, moderately in Asansol-Burnpur, and fell 
absolutely in Burdwan City, In Sundargarh (using slightly 
different data) we find it grows slowly in Rourkela, 
but falls in Sundargarh Municipality, and particularly in 
Birmitrapur. In Durg it grows moderately in Bhilainagar, 
but falls in Durg Municipality, and, more importantly, 
in Rajnan&gaon (see also Table 6 ,6 ),
It is a major thesis of this study that due to the
demographic nature of income-sharing#the maternal and social 
prosperity of a community requires it not being dependant
on a single industry (see Chapter 8 ). A glance at the
composition of manufacturing will help establish how 
far this was avoided over the 1961 - 1971 decade (Tables 
9*2, 9*3* and Figure 9*3)* The heavy concentration of 
large units in the basic metals, machinery, and transport 
equipment industries in Sundargarh and Durg Districts in 
1961 is immediately apparent. In Sundargarh other developments 
are under way by 1 9 7 1, noticeably a large-scale chemicals 
sector. That is a crucial diversification, Burdwan 
achieves a similar mix of heavy industry, including electricals. 
It also has a large-scale food and beverage manufacturing 
sector dating from the initial period. Arguably the broader
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base accounted for the maintenance of the manufacturing sector 
in Burdwan despite the depression in. the basic metals 
industry. In the latter sector, the large-scale units 
in Burdwan increased only slightly. In Sundargarh, however, 
there was a considerable expansion. But ten years is a short 
time on which to form the basis of a judgement. Confining our * 
selves to observing the Steel Towns themselves we find 
the contrasts are even stronger. Durgapur grew far faster 
than the'other two, and diversified at the same time.
In this analysis, the question inevitably arises, where 
should we draw the boundaries of the local economy, given 
the ability of labour to migrate? Migration between 
towns as close as Durg and Bhilai may cause no serious 
social upheaval; migration between Durg and Bhopal may 
do so: family income and social ties become weakened.
It is true that inter-State migration took place readily 
when the New-towns were formed. But the rapid family 
formation indicated that the migrants expected to stay 
in their new location: and as they age, their propensity 
to move again is diminished (so that the social costs of 
forcing them to do so increase). The point to be made 
here is simply that such a skewed industrial structure 
as that of Durg or Sundargarh is known to be particularly 
vulnerable to overall change in comparative advantage, 
economic strategy, and national prosperity. The Western
world's experience is not irrelevant. Corby and Consett 
Steel Towns (see Chapter 2) are smarting from just such 
an affliction. When incomes of local populations are 
largely determined locally the problems are even more 
acute. Industrial monocultures have severe future employment 
and hence welfare implications. We have illustrated the 
contrast between Durg District and Burdwan in their degree 
of industrial diversification in Figure 9*1 (employing 
a technique that resembles the familiar Lorenz curve 
analysis).
Earlier we drew some contrasts between regions of 
Eastern and Western India (Chapter 1). The case we want to 
review here for Western India is the urban District of Poona* 
in Maharashtra. This consists predominantly of the large 
City of Poona itself, and the emerging New-town area of 
Pimpri-Chinchwad close by. The City has a history of 
commercial and administrative activity in Mughal and British 
days; it was a military centre and hill station for escape 
from the sweltering heat of Bombay by the sea. After 
Independence a steady growth of manufacturing was experienced 
in nearly every industrial sector (Table 9.2)* This was 
maintained through to 1971# The growth was sustained for 
several reasons. First, the City was not wholly dependant 
on the production of a commodity for which national demand 
was to level off; admittedly there are metal products and
machinery establishments in Poona, and their expansion was 
limited during the 1961 - 1971 decade, but they do not 
dominate the industrial sector. As can be seen from Table 9.2 
almost every sector (at the two-digit level of aggregation) 
is represented with a large-scale unit. Secondly there is 
an established chemicals industry, a sector least affected 
by the depression of the 1960s, Thirdly there has been 
little experience of labour unrest, a situation possibly 
assisted by the continued steady expansion and well- 
balanced age structure of the City, As an aside it may be 
observed that in the late 1960s the City was subjected to 
an unprecedented in-migration due to drought in rural areas. 
But these migrants were not, and had no more than fleeting 
aspirations to be, absorbed in the modern industrial sector. 
They came with their families, and (initially at least) 
they presented little opposition to authority.
But the real expansion of chemical and modern . 
consumer-durable manufacturing has centred around Pimpri 
and Chinchwad, By 1971 Poona and these outliers were 
regarded as a single urban agglomeration. But even taken 
separately, the proportion of the workforce in manufacturing 
underwent a steady increase over the 1961-71 decade, from 
below to above JQf/o in Poona, and from to 6 5% in 
Chinchwad. It cannot be said that such a desirable industrial 
mix was planned; but it may be predicted that the results 
will be happier for employment and welfare prospects over
the coming decades, than the results of industrial expansion 
in parts of the iron and steel belt of Eastern India,
(Table 9*3» Figure 9*1)* So long as the District has a broad 
manufacturing potential it can more rapidly expand in 
whatever sector it finds its comparative advantage to lie: 
and that way the second and third generations (and indeed other 
dependants of the initial migrant families) will more readily 
find local employment.
Strategies to Achieve Economic-Demographic 
Equilibria: case-study of Bhilainagar revisited
Y/e now return to the site of the most outstanding 
demographic disbalance, the Steel Town of Bhilainagar.
We try to reconstruct exactly what the demographic evolution 
has been, in some detail down to 1 9 7 1♦ and with some 
speculation beyond that date. We relate the expansion of 
the steel plant to the expansion of the labour force to 
see in practice how far an equilibrium has been achieved.
We then propose a scenario for future strategists posed with 
similar economic questions, the planners of Bofcaro and Vizag 
being among them. Taking a number of parameters, social 
and political, as given, we suggest alternative investment
1 There is a fairly strong assumption here that the labour- 
to-capital ratios will not significantly change*
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strategies in order to enquire how the desired equilibrium 
might have been achieved. Finally we investigate alternative 
demographic strategies to meet the same ends. In short we are 
posing the following question: given that India intends to
make steel, and to make it at Bhilai (or at some specified 
location), how can the supply of, and demand for, manufacturing 
labour be matched, to avoid prolonged periods of local 
unemployment, especially of the sons of the original migrants, 
by the use of a limited number of policy variables over 
which we can assume control?
In Figure 9*4 we present the essential demographic
data. A consistent reconstruction of what happened after
the arrival of the first 1 5*000 steel workers (that is
operatives and service workers for Hindustan Steel, not
including construction labour per se) is offered in a
note that follows below. Here we pinpoint the more
startling conclusions. First we note that Bhilainagar
grew from 86,000 to 174,000 in a decade (the exact figures
are in the Tables 9*4 and following). However, the work
force in steel production increased to only 2 5 ,0 0 0, and
the total male labour force rose from 46,000 to only
57,000. What is more, we estimate that only 8,000 to
10,000 male migrants joined the labour force during that
decade. In other words, nearly 90% of the 100% decadal
1 And perhaps only 5000 if we exclude migrating sons 
of the original 46000 workforce.
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demographic growth came from '’natural" demographic forces: 
given the structure of the population that had amassed 
between 1956 and 19&1 , the rest followed naturally on the 
road to demographic stability.
But demographic stability takes nearly 100 years
before it achieves its recognisable characteristics,
its unchanging age structure for instance, not a mere 
1
decade. Hence our second rather surprising conclusion 
(surprising in the light of demographic-industrial relationships 
that had generally been experienced historically in India, 
and partly incorporated in our Model type "1 c"): to
Bhilainagar was transposed a segment of the stable rural 
population, with very little interruption resulting from 
the process of migration. Most of the men were already 
married, and their wives followed soon after their 
husbands' arrival, brought their existing children with 
them, and continued their child-bearing. Hence by 1971 
a familiar age-pyramid was restored in Bhilai, similar in 
structure to the rural population except for its youthfulness 
(being more youthful than the almost stable population 
from which.dt was drawn; see illustration in Figure 6.1).
The built-in potential for a fast natural increase that 
might have been seriously retarded by an adverse sex ratio
1 A.J.Lotka, "A Contribution to the Theory of Self-
renewing Aggregates, with Special Reference to Industrial 
Replacement", Annals of Mathematical Statistics. 10:1,
March 1939»
suffered no perceptible retardation. In ten years the 
sex ratio had reached 0.800 (females to males), against 
the expected 0.600. I estimate the birth rate as being 
about 42 per thousand in Bhilai in 1971; in the Model 
it is still 56 per thousand 15 years after the first 
major migrations, though in the stable state it reaches 43.
The interruption caused by the process of migration was hardly 
sufficient to lower the fertility of the couples concerned 
(the pattern traced out in Model ,?1 a" seems more appropriate).
If we concentrate now on the sons of the migrants in 
the manufacturing industries (whom I have called the "second 
generation in this thesis), this phenomenon means that we have 
a quinquennial addition to the labour supply of between
6,000 and 9*000 (allowing for mortality from birth) 
starting in 1970 and continuing and increasing until 
1985 (Figure 9*4).^ This is a dramatic increase (the 
male population under 15 in 1961 had only been 11,000), 
and the absolute numbers are very large too; the instability 
of our Model is there, but without the period of slow or 
negative growth in labour force entrants (at least as far 
as our decennial data can indicate), (Table 3»1). On the 
demand side we have already noted the lack of diversification 
of industry in the urban areas of the District of Durg between
1 The sons of the 46000 (196 1) workforce inrease the 
workforce by between 9000 and 14000, the sons of the 
core-sector steel workers by between 3000 5000*
over this decade.
19^1 and 1971* Figures for manufacturing employment are 
hazardous to use due to the redefinition of employment 
between the Censuses, but it seems that males in factory 
manufacturing hardly increased as a percentage of the male 
labour force# From 1971 to 1981 we are rather in the dark, 
but using alternative models to reconstruct figures 
consistent with the few published so far from the 1981 
Census, around 11,000 adult males seem to have been attracted 
into the township# We also know that 'downstrearn" metal- 
goods manufacturing capacity was installed during this period, 
coming on stream towards the end of the decade. Let us 
suppose some 30% of the adult migrants were recruited 
into manufacturing. The crucial question then is, were 
they recruited after the second generation entrants to the 
labour force (numbering about 2 3*000 f bad sought, and 
some failed to gain, employment in manufacturing, (in which 
case the latter may have faced a period of unemployment 
or underemployment), or before they had done so, (in 
which case the latter may have faced a period of under­
employment towards the end of the decade)? And certainly 
the prospect of mismatch still arises since the early 
1980s will experience the largest-second..generation cohort 
to date.
1 Various reports in Financial Express (Bombay) in 1 9 8 0,
e.g. on 6th October, 1 9 8 0, page 10, column 3»
2 That is , over ten years: perhaps 8,000 the sons of
l!core-sectorn fathers.
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No disequilibrium need have arisen if the demand 
and supply had been contemporaneous, more or less.
However, the core industry was in iron and steel 
making. This employed 1 5 ,0 0 0  men in 1961 and 2 5 ,0 0 0  
by 1971 (Table 9.8) by which time capacity had risen to 
2 million tonnes, implying an output-employment elasticity 
of O .7 8 at this scale of production. By 1977, 2-J m.t* 
output was achieved* All this implies severely diminishing 
employment potential (in the face of increasing supply, 
at least of steel workers' sons). A well targeted 
expansion programme toward the original goal of 10 million 
tonnes could have provided all the employment needed at 
Bhilai: but the time-phasing becomes crucial. The current 
expansion programme to 4 m.t. will be particularly welcome 
if it is achieved by the mid-1980s.
1 Some occupational mobility is to be expected, though I
have been told that steel workers' sons do aspire towards 
the secure and well-paid employment in that industry.
Spatial mobility, the out-migration of the second generation
in search of work is taken as an unacceptable solution to 
disequilibrium in this thesis. This may strike the reader 
as an unacceptable limitation on our solution strategies.
The problem is the scale of redeployment needed, ''compressed 
into so Bhort a space of time, when economic expansion is now 
being concentrated in other parts of the country. When 
professional and academic people I met in India in 1976 raised 
the objection that the population in India was too mobile, not 
insufficiently so, they were thinking of the initial process 
of population formation in urban areas, of small-holders
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We can now review alternative strategies toward 
labour market equilibrium in the context of the demographic 
situation at Bhilai (see also Appendix, Figure 2). They 
are fivefold:
(i) Industrial diversification (see Appendix).
(ii) Phased creation of additional capacity in steel production 
(in discrete "lumps" of not less than 1 million tonnes
capacity each, - this being the minimum efficient scale 
in 1955).
(iii) In-migration controls.
(iv) Delayed fertility (especially among wage labour,
to prevent the build-up in new labour-force entrants 
pre-dating the planned investment expansion) (see note 
that follows).
(v) Mini steel plants, preferably to be installed from
start of any new investment programme (i.e. in 500,000  
tonne range, as are currently being built following the 
Direct Reduction technology (see Chapter 2)).
We note en passant the alternatives that I am taking to be 
unacceptable, socially or politically, in the contemporary 
Indian context. They are (i) the disallowance of green­
field steel plants, or, more strongly, disallowance of any 
steel plants, or similar heavy engineering investment 
involving huge economies of scale; (ii) the forced out­
migration of large cohorts of young (or old) members of the
footnote continued
and landless labourers, rapidly drawn into one centre of 
industrial growth; my discussants were not, I would claim, 
trying to imagine the reversal of this process.
community, whether initially in-migrants or not (and, it 
might be noted here, for reasons suggested in Chapter 5 
the strategic option (iii) of in-migration controls is
-i
not favoured) ; (iii) prevention of marital unions, by
adopting a sex selective migration control policy, or,
a weaker control, the restriction on marital fertility
by limiting severely ultimate family size, for example to
a single child per couple# To repeat, our objective
behind the strategies put forward is first to minimise
second generation underemployment, especially among the
families of manufacturing labour (and especially when
that underemployment is specific to ethnic or regional
groups), and second, to maximise family income security
over time, as discussed above (favouring the adoption
of option (i) above)# In all, a reliance on options
(i) and (ii), and perhaps (v), would appear most practical 
2and sensible#
1 The efficience and equity of migration control policies 
are described in N#R,Crook, "On the Management of 
Urban Migration and Residence'’, Asian Journal of Public 
Administration. 5i1, June 198j5*
2 As we noted in Chapter 2 , we are having to make strong 
assumptions here that the new technologies are not 
seriously labour displacing#
The D ynam ic Im p l ic a t io n s  and P o l i t i c s  o f  
M ig r a t io n s  a C o n c lu s io n
To p u rs u e  th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  th e  dynam ics  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  n o n - in d u s t r ia l i s a t i o n ,  and d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s ­
a t io n  t h a t  we have been d e s c r ib in g  i s  o b v io u s ly  a com p lex  
u n d e r ta k in g .  To a t te m p t t o  fo r e c a s t  w o u ld  be p a t e n t ly  
a b s u rd .  We can o n ly  p o in t  t o  a few  s p e c i f i c  im p l i c a t io n s ,  
some more c o n c re te  i n  t h a t  th e  p re c e d e n ts  a re  c le a r ,  some 
more s p e c u la t iv e  i n  t h a t  e i t h e r  th e re  i s  no p re c e d e n t ,  
o r  th e  p re c e d e n ts  were i n  t h e i r  t im e  s t r o n g ly  in f lu e n c e d  
by d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t io n s .
The m ost c le a r - c u t  case i s  t h a t  o f  th e  r a p id  
d e ve lo p m e n t o f  N ew -tow ns on g r e e n - f ie ld  s i t e s .  I t  has 
been shown t h a t ,  u n d e r c e r t a in  c o n d i t io n s  on th e  age (and  
s e x )  s t r u c t u r e  o f  m ig ra n ts ,  th e  age g ro u p  re a d y  to  e n te r  
th e  la b o u r  m a rk e t i s  i t s e l f  s u b je c t  to  p e r io d s  o f  f a i r l y  
d ra m a tic  e x p a n s io n  o v e r th e  medium te rm  o f  25 y e a r s .
As f a r  as em ploym ent i s  c o n c e rn e d , such  f lu c t u a t io n s  c o u ld  be 
h a n d le d  by th e  w o rk -s h a r in g  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  n o n - fa c to r y  
s e c to r .  The im p l i c a t io n  a t  th e  fa m i ly  l e v e l  i s  t h a t  sons 
em p loyed  i n  th e  n o n - fa c to r y  s e c to r  may become p a r t l y  dependen t
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on t h e i r  f a t h e r s  f o r  th e  m a in te n a n ce  o f  t h e i r  in c o m e . T h a t 
i n  i t s e l f  may c re a te  te n s io n  w i t h in  th e  f a m i ly  -  p e rh a p s  
e s p e c ia l ly  i n  a s o c ie ty  w here  th e  in t e r - g e n e r a t io n a l  
incom e f lo w s  a re  e x p e c te d  to  be i n  th e  re v e rs e  d i r e c t i o n ,  
fro m  son  t o  f a t h e r *  A f u r t h e r  s o u rc e  o f  te n s io n ,  h o w e v e r, 
i s  t h a t  th e  sons a re  e x p e c te d  a t  le a s t  t o  a c h ie v e  em ploym ent 
o f  th e  same s ta tu s  as t h a t  o f  t h e i r  f a t h e r s .  T h is  s i t u a t i o n  
i s  e x a c e rb a te d  i f  th e  f a m i ly  i s  fro m  a n o th e r  u rb a n  a re a  
o r  th e  sons a re  e d u c a te d . A s p i r a t io n s  w i l l  be a t  t h e i r  h ig h e s t .
A n o th e r  s o u rc e  o f  te n s io n  a r is e s  n o t  fro m  th e  age 
s t r u c t u r e  as s u c h , b u t  fro m  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  im m ig ra n ts  
a re  fo r e ig n *  They may e n jo y  i n i t i a l  a c c e p ta n c e  i f  e x p a n s io n  
i n  em ploym ent i s  r a p id  enough f o r  m ig ra n ts  and lo c a ls  t o  have 
e q u a l a ccess  to  jo b s :  once i t  s lo w s  down, th e re  i s  r i v a l r y
be tw een th e  "s o n s  o f  th e  s o i l * 1 and th e  m ig ra n ts  th e m s e lv e s , 
who a re  th e n  seen to  be o c c u p y in g  jo b s  t h a t  th e  l o c a l  g ro w in g  
la b o u r  fo r c e  f e e ls  i t  s h o u ld  have by r i g h t .  The more r a p id  th e  
i n i t i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p a n s io n , th e  le s s  l i k e l y  th e  same r a te  
o f  g ro w th  can be m a in ta in e d ;  i n  any ca se , c o n t in u e d  g ro w th  
depends on th e  in v e s tm e n t d e c is io n s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  n o t  
th e  s o c ia l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  o f  th e  co m m u n ity . The more s p e c i f i c
52?
th e  c o n d i t io n s  fa v o u r in g  th e  o r i g i n a l  lo c a t io n  o f  th e  
in d u s t r y  ( o r  th e  le s s  c o m m e rc ia lly  c o m p e t it iv e  th e  re a s o n s  
f o r  th e  o r i g i n a l  l o c a t i o n ) ,  th e  le s s  l i k e l y  i t  i s  t h a t  th e  
g ro w th  o f  in v e s tm e n ts  can he s u s ta in e d ,  u n le s s  s im i la r  o r  o th e r  
n o n -c o m p e t i t iv e  fo r c e s  a re  p e rp e tu a te d  o r  in t r o d u c e d .
Now, to  ta k e  t h i s  p o in t  a l i t t l e  f u r t h e r ,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
re s p o n s e  e n c o u n te re d  i s  l i k e l y  to  be a n t i - m ig r a n t  (b y  w h a te v e r 
l o c a l  i n t e r e s t  g ro u p  i t  was t h a t  p rom o ted  th e  o r i g i n a l  in v e s tm e n t ) ,  
r a t h e r  th a n  p ro  f u r t h e r  in v e s tm e n t .  And i n  an e n v iro n m e n t o f  
r e g io n a l  s ta g n a t io n ,  th e  o r i g i n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n c e rn  i s  
u n l i k e l y  to  fa v o u r  f u r t h e r  e x p a n s io n .  The u p s h o t w i l l  be 
to  keep  m ig ra n ts  o u t  r a t h e r  th a n  to  p ro v id e  more jo b s .  T h is  
re s p o n s e  i s  e x a c e rb a te d  i f  th e  m ig ra n t  .p o p u la t io n  su b g ro u p s  
a re  g ro in in g  o w in g  t o  fa v o u ra b le  age s t r u c t u r e  ( o r  h ig h  
f e r t i l i t y ) .  I n  cases w here  m ig ra n ts  a re  more l o c a l ,  i t  
i s  n o t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  more e n t e r p r is in g  o f  them  w i l l  
e m ig ra te  fro m  th e  l o c a l i t y ,  b u t  as we have s u g g e s te d , th e  
more l o c a l  m ig ra n ts  seem, on th e  w h o le , t o  be th e  le s s  w e l l  
endowed ( th e  le s s  l i k e l y  t o  own la n d ) ;  th e  r e s t  s im p ly  f a i l  
to  p o l i t i c i s e ,  o r ,  w o rse  s t i l l ,  a re  e a s i ly  b o u g h t o f f  by 
th e  p ro m is e s  o f  th e  l o c a l  p a r ty  who have a lr e a d y  a c h ie v e d  t h e i r  
m a jo r  o b je c t iv e  on th e  in v e s tm e n t  f r o n t .  And h e n c e , f o r  
e xa m p le , th e  Backw ard  C la s s e s  have re m a in e d  backw ard  i n  
th e s e  a re a s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  g ro w th *  B u t n e i t h e r  o f  th e se
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g loom y s t o r ie s  i s  i n e v i t a b le ,  th o u g h  d em og ra p h ic  f a c t o r s  a lo n e  
c o u ld  n o t  d is t in g u is h  be tw een a l t e r n a t i v e s .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  
i s  t h a t  th e  te n s io n  d e s c r ib e d  g e ts  c h a n n e lle d  i n t o  
b a r g a in in g ,  th ro u g h  p o l i t i c a l  m o b i l i s a t io n ,  f o r  f u r t h e r  
in v e s tm e n t  fro m  o u ts id e  th e  l o c a l i t y ,  t o  m ax im ise  l o c a l  
g ro w th  as w e l l  as t o  e n su re  i t s  e q u i ta b le  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
(b e tw e e n  g ro u p s , and o v e r t im e ) .  H e re , as we have s a id ,  
th e  d a n g e r i s  t h a t  b a r g a in in g  i s  seen  as d is r u p t i v e ,  so 
t h a t  c a p i t a l  i s  s im p ly  s c a re d  aw ay.
I f  th e  f a i l u r e  s t o r y  i s  th e  r e a l  one , w h a t a re  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n ts  o v e r tim e ?  T he re  i s  c o n t in u e d  im p o v e r is h m e n t 
o r  o u t - m ig r a t io n  o f  th e  y o u n g . G ive n  th e  f a i l u r e  t o  d i v e r s i f y  
th e re  i s  a b r i t t l e n e s s  i n  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r :  t ra d e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  fo r tu n e s  s p e c i f i c  to  th e  in d u s t r y ,  a l l  
im m e d ia te ly  a f f e c t  th e  h o u s e h o ld  incom e o f  th e  f a m i ly ,  
whose o p p o r t u n i t ie s  a re  n o t  d i v e r s i f i e d  e i t h e r .  I n  th e  case 
o f  an  i n d u s t r i a l  c lo s u re  th e re  i s  maximum d is r u p t io n .  I f  t h i s  
o c c u rs  w i t h in  t h i r t y  y e a r s ,  th e  c u r r e n t  f i r s t  g e n e ra t io n  
m ig ra n ts  a re  s t i l l  a l i v e ,  th o u g h  th e y  a re  becom ing  o ld e r  
so t h a t  th e  p ro s p e c ts  o f  o u t - m ig r a t io n  to  a l t e r n a t i v e  l i v e l i h o o d s  
a re  h o p e le s s .  I f  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  m ig ra n ts  have r e ta in e d
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t h e i r  s m a ll  la n d - h o ld in g s  th e y  may r e t u r n  to  a l i f e  o f  
r e l a t i v e  (a n d  p e rh a p s  a b s o lu te )  d e p r iv a t io n .
These a re  e x tre m e  c a se s * L e s s e r deg re e s  o f  th e  same
may be fo u n d  i n  o th e r  tow ns and  c i t i e s .  P a r t i c u l a r
in d u s t r ie s  may have a t t r a c t e d  o r  r e c r u i t e d  fro m  a 
1
p a r t i c u l a r  a re a .  Sons o f  m ig ra n ts  may have a s p i r a t io n s  
r e la t e d  t o  a p a r t i c u la r  e x p a n s io n  o f  em ploym ent w i t h in  a 
c i t y .  B u t i n  th e s e  cases i t  can be c la im e d  t h a t  th e  l o c a l  
p re s e n c e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  em ploym ent te n d s  to  b lu n t  th e  is s u e ,  
and  th e  n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  s e c to r s  a re  no lo n g e r  so  c lo s e ly  
t i e d  to  th e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  a s in g le  in d u s t r y .  To ta k e  an e xa m p le , 
c o n s t r u c t io n  w o rk e rs  e x p e c t t o  be m o b ile :  b u t th e y  w o u ld
r a t h e r  be m o b ile  w i t h in  th a n  be tw een c i t i e s ,  f o r  th e  l a t t e r  
m o b i l i t y  i s  a h a za rd o u s  b a s is  f o r  l i v e l i h o o d .
We have been a d d re s s in g  tw o  p ro b le m s . The f i r s t  
i s  th e  em ploym ent o f  th e  "s e c o n d  g e n e r a t io n "  m ig r a n t .
The second  i s  th e  s u s ta in e d  em ploym ent o f  th e  f i r s t  
g e n e ra t io n  o v e r  t im e .  The l a t t e r  n a t u r a l l y  le a d s  us 
t o  fo c u s  on th e  a re a s  o f  u rb a n  s ta g n a t io n ,  th o u g h  none o f  
th e s e ,  w i t h  th e  p o s s ib le  e x c e p t io n  o f  C a lc u t ta ,  was e v e r a
1 The heavy f lo w s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  m ig ra n ts  fro m  O r is s a  and
B ih a r  i n t o  C a lc u t ta  a re  a good e xam p le . S im i l a r l y ,  i n
Bombay, some o f  th e  more v o c i fe r o u s  p o l i t i c a l  movements 
t  o
r e la t q / t h e  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  in - m ig r a n ts  fro m  th e  S o u th  
( th e  S iv a  Sen m o ve m e n t).
a s t r o n g  i n d u s t r i a l  c i t y *  I t  i s  th e  f a c t  o f  econom ies 
o f  s c a le ,  b ro a d ly  d e f in e d ,  t h a t  has made i t  a p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  th e  v ig o ro u s  i n d u s t r i a l  c i t i e s  o f  to d a y  may become 
a re a s  o f  u rb a n  s ta g n a t io n  i n  th e  f u t u r e *
The s ta g n a t in g  tow ns  in  I n d ia  a r e ,  on th e  w h o le ,
a t  th e  o th e r  end o f  th e  s p e c tru m , where th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r
i s  t y p i c a l l y  s m a ll  and u n s o p h is t ic a te d ,  even i f  d i v e r s i f i e d *
I t  can be a rg u e d  t h a t  th e y  possess  .none o f  th e  d em og raph ic
fe a tu r e s  t h a t  c o u ld  p o t e n t i a l l y  p rom o te  th e  w i l l  t o  f i g h t
f o r  th e m se lve s#  I n s o f a r  as th e  w h o le  fa m i ly  i s  p r e s e n t ,
o f t e n  h a v in g  been b o rn  i n  th e  tow n i t s e l f ,  th e  incom e
s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  fa m i ly  w i l l  be l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
and no r u r a l  la n d  w i l l  be m a in ta in e d :  sons w i l l  f o l lo w  in
th e  lo w -in c o m e  t ra d e  o f  t h e i r  p a re n ts  w i t h  l i t t l e  e x p e c ta t io n
t o  do o th e rw is e #  The w h o le  f a m i ly  i s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r, p re s e n t
i n  e v e ry  c a s e : o u t - m ig r a t io n  o f  a m in o r i t y  o f  m a les
1o c c u rs  , and w h o le  f a m i l ie s  a ls o  m ig ra te  o u t ,  p re s u m a b ly , 
th o u g h  we have no e v id e n c e  f o r  o u r a re a ,  t h i s  in v o lv e s  
m ig r a t io n  to  a n o th e r  to w n . T h is  may w e l l  p a r a l l e l  th e  
p ic t u r e  o f  r u r a l  o u t - m ig r a t io n  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  th e  p o o re s t  
who le a v e ,  b u t  th o s e  w i t h  th e  re s o u rc e s  and e n te r p r is e  to
1 See M *K .P re m i, U rban  O u tm ig r a t io n .  A S tu d y  o f  i t s  N a tu re  
Causes and C onsequences. S t e r l i n g ,  New D e lh i ,  1980 ,
The b e s t  e v id e n c e  on r u r a l  o u t - m ig r a t io n  i s  c o l le c t e d  
i n  J ,C o n n e l l  e t  a l# ,  M ig r a t io n  fro m  R u ra l A re a s . 0 * U .P , ,  
D e lh i ,  1976*
c o n te m p la te  a move, w i t h  a t  le a s t  th e  p ro s p e c ts  o f  s u c c e s s . 
The B ackw ard C la s s e s , as we have s e e n , a re  n o t  among them *
I n  w h ic h  c a s e , th e  incom e base o f  th e  l o c a l i t y  i s  f u r t h e r  
d e p re s s e d .
As we s ta te d  a t  th e  o u t s e t ,  u rb a n  p o v e r ty  has many 
fu n d a m e n ta l in g r e d ie n ts  s im i l a r  to  th o s e  o f  r u r & l  p o v e r ty .  
T h a t i s  now here c le a r e r  th a n  i n  th e  tow ns whose econom ic 
base i s  c o m p le te ly  i n  th e  n o n - fa c to r y  s e c to r .  F o r th e y  
a re  o v e rg ro w n  v i l l a g e s *  As such  th e y  sh a re  th e  same 
p ro b le m s . A r u r a l  m o n o c u ltu re  r i s k s  th e  s c o u rg e  o f  
a p e s t ,  A m a n u fa c tu r in g  m o n o c u ltu re  r i s k s  th e  f l u c t u a t io n s ,  
o r  w o rs e , s e c u la r  ch an g e , i n  m a rk e t demand. T h is  may 
o c c u r  a t  th e  lo w e s t  le v e ls  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s o p h is t i c a t io n .  
P o t te r y  i s  re p la c e d  by s t a in le s s  s t e e l ,  c o t to n  t e x t i l e s  
by s y n t h e t ic s .  The w o rs t  s c o u rg e s  o f  p o v e r ty  may l i e  in  
th e s e  ( o f t e n  n e g le c te d )  to w n s . And a lth o u g h  th e  new g ro w th  
a re a s  c a n n o t be s a id  t o  d r a in  s p e c i f i c a l l y  th e  m ost b a c k ­
w ard  u rb a n  a re a s  o f  t h e i r  human re s o u rc e s  (se e  C h a p te r 5 ) ,  
y e t  th e y  may i n  t h i s  way have p r e c ip i t a t e d  t h e i r  la c k  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o m p e t it iv e n e s s .
O f c o u rs e  th e s e  changes a re  a n e c e s s a ry  fe a tu r e  o f  
th e  d e s i r a b le  s h i f t  to w a rd s  h ig h e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  I t  w o u ld  be 
a b s u rd  to  se ek  p e r f e c t l y  b a la n c e d  g ro w th  in  e v e ry  r e g io n  
o r  l o c a l i t y .  B u t w i t h o u t  i t ,  th e re  m ust be la c k  o f
d em og ra p h ic  s t a b i l i t y  a ls o #  T h e ir  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h ip  
has been o u r m a jo r  theme# I t  seems a d e s i r a b le  e x e rc is e  
t o  e x p lo re  th e  s o c ia l  p ro c e s s e s  t h a t  n o t  o n ly  p ro m o te  th e  
r a p id  c o n t in u i t y  o f  th e  s h i f t  to w a rd  h ig h e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  
b u t  a ls o  e n su re  t h a t  th e  s id e  e f f e c t s  a re  n o t  to o  p a in f u l  
(e v e n  th o u g h  th e  m i t ig a t io n  o f  th e  l a t t e r  may c a r r y  i t s  
own econom ic c o s ts )#  These p ro c e s s e s  have been an 
u n d e r ly in g  c o n c e rn  i n  t h i s  d em og raph ic  a c c o u n t o f  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n #
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Figure 9•'I
Industrial Employment Diversification in
Three Contrasting Localities
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Figure 9*5 b
Change i n  th e  C o n c e n t ra t io n  o f  
M a n u fa c tu r in g  I n d u s t r y  i n  th e  
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A N o te  on th e  Dem ography o f  t h i s  Case S tu d y  ( F ig u r e  9*k)
The d em o g ra p h ic  r e c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  B h i la in a g a r  o v e r th e  
th re e  p o s t- In d e p e n d e n c e  decades i s  as f o l lo w s f  (we r e f e r  
th ro u g h o u t  to  th e  1981 b o u n d a r ie s  w h e re v e r p o s s ib le ) .  The 
Census g iv e s  us t o t a l  p o p u la t io n  f ig u r e s  f o r  each se x  f o r  
each  d eca d e , whence th e  se x  r a t i o  i s  o b ta in e d .  A d d i t i o n a l l y  
we have b ro a d  age d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ( u s u a l ly  i n  1 5 -y e a r  age 
g ro u p s ) ,  b u t  o n ly  an  in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  a d u l t  p o p u la t io n  f o r  
1981 .
To b e g in  i n  1 96 1 , v i r t u a l l y  th e  w ho le  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  
was m ig ra n ts  T h e re  were a p p ro x im a te ly  5 8 ,0 0 0  m a les  and
2 8 ,0 0 0  fe m a le s ,  a t o t a l  o f  8 6 ,0 0 0 . The 0 -1 k p o p u la t io n  
num bered 1 1 ,0 0 0  (m a le s ) , and  a d u l t  m a les b e lo w  60 num bered 
^ 6 ,0 0 0 ,  o f  w h ic h  w ere w o rk in g  as o p e ra t iv e s  i n  th e  i r o n  and 
s t e e l  p la n t .
T a b le  9»k g iv e s  th e  fe m a le  age s t r u c t u r e  as r e p o r te d  i n  
th e  1971 C ensus, th e  o n ly  m o d i f ic a t io n  I  have made b e in g  to  
s p l i t  some o f  th e  age g ro u p s  i n t o  tw o . We p r o je c t  t h i s  
p o p u la t io n  b ackw ards  i n  a s im p le  m ode l t h a t  i n i t i a l l y  assumes 
no m o r t a l i t y ,  t o  g iv e  a m inimum p o p u la t io n  i n  each age 
g ro u p  i n  19&1 (T a b le  9 * 5 a )*  T h is  ( fe m a le )  p o p u la t io n  w i l l  have 
been p a r t l y  r e s id e n t  i n  B h i l a i  and p a r t l y  s t i l l  i n  r u r a l  a re a s  
p r i o r  t o  m ig r a t io n .  (Thus th e  1 0 ,9 0 0  women aged 2 5 -5 °  i n  
1971 (T a b le  9 - ^ )  w i l l  have been aged 1 5 -2 0  i n  1961 (T a b le  
9 .5 a ,  l a s t  q u in q u e n n iu m )). We th e n  c a lc u la te  th e  b i r t h s  
th e s e  women w o u ld  h a v e , re g a r d le s s  o f  w h e th e r th e y  w ere l i v i n g  
i n  B h i l a i  o r  i n  a r u r a l  v i l l a g e , i f  t h e i r  t o t a l  f e r t i l i t y  was
1 To a v o id  s p u r io u s  p r e c is io n  i n  t h i s  r e c o n s t r u c t io n ,
and t o  h e lp  th e  eye f o l lo w  th e  g i s t  o f  th e  c a lc u la t io n s ,  
we have ro u n d e d  f ig u r e s .  The e x a c t r e p o r te d  f ig u r e s  a re  
g iv e n  i n  th e  T a b le s .
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t o  be 5 *0  ( b i r t h s  p e r  woman) and t h e i r  age p a t t e r n  o f  
c h i ld - b e a r in g  as i n  th e  a g e - s p e c i f ic  s c h e d u le  shown i n  
T a b le  9 * 5 b . T h is  w o u ld  g iv e  a n n u a l b i r t h s ,  m a le  p lu s  fe m a le , 
n u m b e rin g  7500 by th e  la t e  1960s (T a b le  9 «5a , f i r s t  q u in ­
q u e n n iu m ), and we go on to  assum e, f o l lo w in g  th e  a rg um en t in  
th e  t e x t  (C h a p te r  9 )  and d e t a i le d  b e lo w , t h a t  th e s e  c h i ld r e n  
w ere  in d e e d  b o rn  d u r in g  t h a t  p e r io d  and b ro u g h t i n  to  B h i l a i  
(b y  1971 , i f  n o t  b o rn  th e re  i n  th e  f i r s t  ...p lace ) •  The b i r t h  
r a te  o f  t h i s  m ig r a t io n  c o h o r t  i s  a t  i t s  maximum i n  t h i s  p e r io d  
s in c e  th e  la r g e s t  c o h o r ts  a re  a t  t h e i r  m a x im u m - fe r t i l i t y  ages* 
T h is  g iv e s  a t o t a l  p o s s ib le  o f  be tw een 7 0 *OCX) and 7 5 ,0 0 0  
b i r t h s  d u r in g  th e  decade ( 7 00 0 -7 50 0  p e r annum ), o r  a b o u t 
3 5 *0 0 0  m a les  u n d e r 15 i n  1971 *(we a re  s t i l l  ig n o r in g  c o r r e c t ­
io n s  f o r  m o r t a l i t y :  t h i s  c o r r e c t io n  w o u ld  r a is e  th e  num ber
o f  b i r t h s  i n  a b a c k - p r o je c t io n ,  b u t  re d u ce  th e  num ber o f  
s u r v iv o r s .  A p p ly in g  th e  c o r r e c t io n  p a ra m e te rs  g iv e n  i n  
T a b le  9 .6  p ro d u ce s  3 0 ,0 0 0  as th e  n e t  r e s u l t ) .  A c c o rd in g  to  th e  
1971 Census a b o u t k0% o f  th e  m ale p o p u la t io n  f e l l  i n t o  t h i s  
(0 -1 ^ -)  g ro u p , i . e .  3 ^ ,0 0 0  (T a b le  9#*0# The d i f f e r e n c e  betw een:, 
t h i s ,  and th e  3 0 ,0 0 0  o r  so  p r o je c te d ,  w i l l  be made up o f  
th e  s u r v iv o r s  o f  th e  b i r t h s  p r e - d a t in g  19&1 : i . e .  a
p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  y o u n g e s t o f  th e  1 1 ,0 0 0  m a les  o f  th e  0 -1 4  
u rb a n  c o h o r t  o f  1961 (s a y  3 *5 0 0 ) ,  p lu s  any c h i ld r e n  o f  th e  
m ig r a n ts ,  who vsre  a ls o  b o rn  p r i o r  t o  19^ 1 ; i n  o u r back  
p r o je c t io n  th e  tw o g ro up s  sum to g e th e r  as ^ ,9 0 0  b i r t h s  a n n u a l ly
A
(T a b le  9»5&* f i n a l  q u in q u e n n iu m ). T h is  f i l l s  th e  gap 
o f  8000  ' s u f f i c i e n t l y :  o u r f e r t i l i t y  r a te s  a re  p o s s ib ly  to o
■high. The sum s, h o w e v e r, add up q u i te  w e l l .
I n  1971* th e  re m a in in g  5 8 ,0 0 0  a d u l t  m a les  c o m p rise  
th e  f o l lo w in g :  th e  s u r v iv o r s  o f  th e  0 - 1k c o h o r t  re c o rd e d  i n
1961 a t  B h i l a i ,  now aged i n t o  th e  20 -29  age g ro u p , sa y  7500 ,
1 I . e .  a b o u t 12000 m ale b i r t h s  o v e r 5 y e a r s .
th e  s u r v iv in g  a d u l t s  o f  th e  1961 a d u l t  c o h o r ts ,  and 
new m ig r a n ts .  The 1961 a d u l t  c o h o r ts  w ere h e a v i ly  
c o n c e n tra te d  i n  th e  lo w - m o r t a l i t y  1 5 -3 4  a-ge g ro u p  (T a b le  9 * 4 ) ,  
so  t h a t  o v e r 90% c o u ld  have e x p e c te d  to  have s u r v iv e d  f o r  te n  
y e a rs  ( u s in g  p a ra m e te rs  i n  T a b le  9 * 8 )  , a m o u n tin g  to  
4 1 ,5 0 0 . Thus th e  t o t a l  s u r v iv o r s  i n  t h i s  age g ro u p  
am ount t o  be tw een  4 8 ,0 0 0  and 4 9 ,0 0 0 . The t o t a l  re c o rd e d  
i n  th e  1971 Census i s  5 7 ,0 0 0 . T h is  a l lo w s  f o r  be tw een
8 ,0 0 0  and 9 ,0 0 0  a d u l t  m ale  m ig ra n ts  ( r a t h e r  s m a ll com pared
p
w i t h  th e  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  o f  8 8 ,0 0 0 J ) .
O ver th e  n e x t  decade th e  b i r t h s  due to  th e  i n i t i a l  i n -  
m ig r a t io n s  w i l l  d e c l in e  fro m  t h e i r  1970s p e a k , b u t ,  to  
ju d g e  fro m  th e  se x  r a t i o s  p e r t a in in g  i n  th e  more m a tu re  
heavy i n d u s t r i a l  c i t i e s ,  th e re  may be 5000  women s t i l l  t o  come.
We do n o t  have an age d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  1981 fro m  w h ic h  to  
p r o j e c t . backw ard  any f u r t h e r  b i r t h s .  B u t by 1 9 7 5 -8 0  th e  
d a u g h te rs  o f  th e  la r g e  i n i t i a l  m ig ra n t  c o h o r ts  have th e m s e lv e s  
begun to  re p ro d u c e , th o u g h  s t i l l  i n  th e  e a r ly ,  lo w  f e r t i l i t y ,  
y e a rs  o f  c h i ld b e a r in g  ( t h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  b e fo re  th e  ages where 
u n iv e r s a l  m a rr ia g e  can be e x p e c te d ) .  The n e t  e f f e c t  i s  to  
o v e r-c o m p e n s a te  f o r  th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e i r  own m o th e rs *  a g e in g ,  
so  t h a t  th e  a g g re g a te  num ber o f  b i r t h s  due to  th e  o r i g i n a l  
m ig r a t io n  (w h e th e r  as c h i ld r e n  o r  g r a n d c h i ld r e n )  in c re a s e s  
t o  o v e r 7 000 . The s in u o u s  q u in q u e n n ia l b i r t h  p a t t e r n  i s  
im m e d ia te ly  a p p a re n t (F ig u re  9 * 4 ) .  Our o n ly  c lu e  on th e  age
1 H ere  we assume a m o r t a l i t y  t a b le  a p p ro x im a t in g  t h a t  o f  th e  
’ 'P r in c e to n  S o u th "  l e v e l  13* T h is  i s  a d e p a r tu re  fro m  th e  
"W e s t"  l e v e l  9 used  h e r e to fo r e .  A p r o je c t io n  m ode l f o r  a 
s p e c i f i c  a re a  may as w e l l  a t te m p t to  in c o r p o r a te  lo c a l  
p a ra m e te rs .  M o r t a l i t y  i n  N o r th  and C e n tr a l  I n d ia  seems to  
c o n fo rm  r a t h e r  more c lo s e ly  to  th e  S o u th  m ode ls  w i t h  t h e i r  
h ig h  le v e ls  o f  c h i ld  m o r t a l i t y ,  and le v e l  13 ( fe m a le s 1 l i f e -  
e x p e c ta t io n  o f  5 0 ) seems more a p p r o p r ia te  f o r  th e  1970s ,  and 
f o r  th e  c o r e - s e c to r  i n d u s t r i a l  p o p u la t io n .
2 These may in c lu d e  some 3000 sons o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  46000 w o rk e rs .
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d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  198*1 i s  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  48% o f  m a les 
as w o rk e rs .  R o u g h ly  s p e a k in g ,  and f o l lo w in g  th e  same m ethod­
o lo g y  as a b o v e , t h i s  means t h a t  th e re  were 1 1 ,0 0 0  new m ale 
m ig ra n ts  o f  w o rk in g  age d u r in g  th e  d eca d e , (s o n s  in c lu d e d ) .
The o b je c t iv e  o f  any p o l i c y  in t e r v e n t io n  i s  to  m i t ig a t e  th e
e f f e c t  o f  th e  r a p id  in c re a s e  i n  new e n t r a n ts  ( 15- 1 9 ) t o  th e
m ale  la b o u r  fo r c e  fro m  th e  5000  b o rn  and s u r v iv in g  o f  th e
f i r s t  g e n e ra t io n  m ig ra n ts  (w h e th e r  p re  o r  p o s t  1961 m ig r a t io n s ) ,
and e n te r in g  th e  la b o u r  fo r c e  i n  th e  f i v e  y e a rs  1966 - 7 1 ,
t o  th e  14000 e n te r in g  th e  la b o u r  fo r c e  i n  197&-81  (a  d e c a d a l
in c re a s e  o f  l80% ). To m i t ig a t e  th e  e f f e c t  i t s e l f ,  changes
in  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  la b o u r  demand have been s u g g e s te d  ( i n
th e  t e x t ) ,  as w e l l  as th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t e m p o r a r i ly  h a l t i n g
th e  in - m ig r a t io n  o f  th e  1 1 ,0 0 0  new m ig ra n ts  t h a t  w ere  to
a r r i v e  betw een 1871 and 198 1 . B u t a p u r e ly  d em og ra p h ic
in t e r v e n t io n  i s  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  c h i ld b e a r in g .
The f i r s t  v a r ia t i o n  o f  th e  l a t t e r - a tte m p te d  h e re  ( i n  i l l u s t r a t i o n )
i s  to  d e la y  th e  pace o f  c h i ld b e a r in g  w ith o u t  r e d u c in g  th e
o v e r a l l  l e v e l  (5  b i r t h s  p e r  wom an), t h a t  i s  to  e x te n d  th e
e a r ly  b i r t h  i n t e r v a l s ,  and c o n t r a c t  th e  m id d le  and l a t e r  o n e s .
T h is  s m o o th in g  p ro c e s s  causes a t a n g ib le  r e d u c t io n  i n  th e
t o t a l  num ber o f  b i r t h s  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  i n  q u e s t io n
( w i th o u t  a f f e c t i n g  th e  t o t a l  num ber t h a t  w i l l  o c c u r a l t o g e t h e r ) ,
s in c e  th e  peak age o f  c h i ld b e a r in g  no lo n g e r  c o in c id e s  w i th
-1
th e  peak i n  th e  m ig ra n t  age c o m p o s it io n .  T h e re  i s  a ( te m p o ra ry )  
r e d u c t io n  o f  6.% i n  th e  num ber o f  b i r t h s ,  re d u c in g  a c c o r d in g ly  
th e  1976-81  la b o u r  fo r c e  e n t r y  t o  '1 3 ,2 0 0 . The a l t e r n a t i v e  
d em og ra p h ic  in t e r v e n t io n  i s  a f e r t i l i t y  r e d u c t io n  a t  th e  l a t e r  
ages o f  c h i ld b e a r in g  o n ly  ( r e d u c in g  th e  b i r t h s  p e r  woman to  
4 .4 ,  and t h i s  re d u c in g  th e  t o t a l  num ber o f  c h i ld r e n  to  be b o r n ) :  
B u t t h i s  re d u c e s  th e  b i r t h  c o h o r t  s p e c i f i c  t o  o u r c o n c e rn
1 The p o in t  i s  t h a t  we can re d u ce  th e  t o t a l  num ber o f  b i r t h s
o v e r  a g iv e n  p e r io d  o f  t im e ,  w ith o u t  re d u c in g  th e  t o t a l  b i r t h s  
t h a t  an a g e -c o h o r t  o f  m o th e rs  w i l l  b e a r th ro u g h o u t  t h e i r  l i f e ­
s p a n , As a p o l i c y ,  t h i s  may s t r i k e  th e  re a d e r  as b iz a r r e  $ 
i t  i s , b u t  th e  C h in ese  a re  s e r io u s ly  c o n s id e r in g  i t  as a 
s o lu t i o n  t o  p r e c is e ly  th e  p ro b le m  we a re  d is c u s s in g  h e r e 0
by le s s  th a n  6 %, t o  1 3 ,4 i0 0 . C le a r ly ,  h o w e v e r, a c o m b in a t io n  
o f  o v e r a l l  re d u c e d  f e r t i l i t y  and d e la y e d  c h i ld b e a r in g  w o u ld  
have th e  g r e a te s t  e f f e c t .  On a p r a c t i c a l  n o te ,  th e  f e r t i l i t y  
r e d u c t io n ,  w h e th e r th ro u g h  m a r i t a l  f e r t i l i t y  c o n t r o l ,  o r  
d e la y e d  age a t  m a r r ia g e ,  needs to  be in s t ig a t e d  i n  th e  
r u r a l  a re a s ,  s in c e  i t  i s  h e r e ,  as we have s e e n , t h a t  th e  
h ig h  f e r t i l i t y  (a n d  u n iv e r s a l  m a r r ia g e )  ta k e s  p la c e ,  p r i o r  
t o  th e  m ig r a t io n  o f  th e  women0
C om parison  be tw een  th e  M o d e l "1  c "  and B h i l a i
The c h ie f  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een th e  d em og raph ic  e x p e r ie n c e  a t  
B h i l a i  and th e  s im u la t io n  in te n d e d  to  r e p re s e n t  th e  case 
o f  g r e e n - f ie ld  u rb a n  dem ography i s  due to  th e  a s s u m p tio n  
I  made on m a rr ia g e  and c h i ld - b e a r in g  b e h a v io u r*  I n  th e  
M o d e l, m ale  m ig ra n ts  w ere  assumed to  a r r i v e  s in g le  
and m a rry  s u b s e q u e n t ly ,  o r  a t  le a s t  to  s t a r t  t h e i r  c h i l d -  
r e a r in g  i n  th e  c i t y ,  on th e  a r r i v a l  o f  t h e i r  w iv e s  ( o r  w iv e s  
to  b e ) .  Hence th e  peak e n t r y  to  th e  la b o u r  fo r c e  w o u ld  be 
d e la y e d  u n t i l  1981 - 8 5 .  I f  t h a t  a s s u m p tio n  i s  k e p t  f o r  th e  
B h i l a i  m ig r a n ts ,  i n s u f f i c i e n t  b i r t h s  a re  g e n e ra te d  to  e q u a l 
th e  s iz e  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  re c o rd e d  as u n d e r 15 i n  1971 .
Hence c h i ld b e a r in g  m ust have s t a r t e d  b e fo re  th o s e  m ig r a t io n s  
b e g a n ; n o r  w ere any o f  th e  c h i ld r e n  l e f t  b e h in d  i n  th e  r u r a l  
a re a  once th e  women a r r i v e d .  F u r th e r  c o r r o b o r a t in g  e v id e n c e  
i s  t h i s ,  (T a b le  9 .7 ) *  I f  we ta k e  th e  D u rg  D i s t r i c t  u rb a n  
p o p u la t io n  as a w h o le , we have a b o u t 3 4 ,0 0 0  m a r r ie d  men aged 
1 5 -3 0  i n  1 981 . L e t  us assume t h e i r  fe m a le  p a r tn e r s  t o  be 
aged  1 5 -2 5 *  We o n ly  have 18000 re c o rd e d  i n  u rb a n  D u rg .
T h a t le a v e s  1 6 ,0 0 0  m a r r ie d  women to  be a c c o u n te d  f o r  e ls e w h e re . 
I f  we assume th e  D i s t r i c t  m a rr ia g e  r a te s  t o  a p p ly  t o  B h i l a i  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e n  we have 2 4 ,0 0 0  m a rr ie d  men, and 1 2 ,0 0 0  
m a r r ie d  women i n  B h i l a i  i n  1961 . T h a t le a v e s  13 *0 0 0  m a r r ie d
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women s t i l l  i n  th e  r u r a l  a re a s  o f  o u t - m ig r a t io n  ( o r  
e ls e w h e re ) .  T h e i r  e x i s t i n g  f e r t i l i t y  i s  a p p a r e n t ly  g r a f te d  
on to  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  s t r u c t u r e  o f  B h i l a i  th e  moment th e y  
a r r i v e .
The o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e  has been d is c u s s e d  i n  C h a p te r 6 a b o v e .
I n  th e  S te e l  Towns th e  pace o f  fe m a le  m a rr ia g e  re s p o n s e  
m ig r a t io n  i s  r a t h e r  f a s t e r  th a n  t h a t  e s t im a te d  fro m  more 
a g g re g a te  d a ta #  To ju d g e  fro m  se x  r a t i o s  o f  r e c e n t  m ig ra n ts ,  
f a m i l ie s  a re  fo rm e d  r a t h e r  f a s t e r  w i t h in  th e  d e ca d e .
T o g e th e r  th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a c c o u n t f o r  
th e  v e ry  d ra m a t ic  g ro w th  i n  th e  age c o h o r t  o f  yo u n g  p e o p le  
i n  B h i l a i ,  w h ic h  in c re a s e s  fro m  25% to  42% o f  th e  t o t a l  
p o p u la t io n  i n  th e  c o u rs e  o f  a decade , i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  th e  p e rh a p s  
le s s  u n s ta b le  p ic t u r e  g iv e n  by th e  M ode l (w h ic h  does how ever 
in c lu d e  a m odest d e c l in e  fo l lo w e d  by a m odest r i s e  i n  th e  
g ro w th  o f  th e  1 5 -1 9  c o h o r t  f o r  e xam p le , r a t h e r  th a n  p r e c ip i t o u s  
g ro w th )  w here  th e  p r o p o r t io n  re m a in s  a ro u n d  33%* B o th  
p o p u la t io n s  a re  u n s ta b le ,  b u t  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  i n s t a b i l i t y  
i s  d i f f e r e n t .
A N o te  on th e  L a b o u r Demand
The o r i g i n a l  p la n  was f o r  th e  e x p a n s io n  to  10 m i l l i o n  to n n e s  
o f  a l l  th e  p u b l ic  s e c to r  p la n t s .  I t  i s  .a ls o  re p o r te d  t h a t  
i t  w o u ld  c o s t  tw ic e  as much to  s t a r t  a new in t e g r a t e d  w o rks  
( e . g .  V i ja y n a g a r )  as to  expand th e  e x is t in g  p la n t  a t  B h i l a i .
T h is  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e re  i s  a p u r e ly  econom ic j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  a s t r a te g y  o f  in c re m e n ta l g ro w th  on an 
i n i t i a l l y  g r e e n - f ie ld  s i t e .  T h is  w o u ld  e n su re  a c o n t in u in g  
in c re m e n t i n  la b o u r  demand, so t h a t  th e  second  g e n e ra t io n  
and in c r e m e n ta l m ig r a t io n  e f f e c t s ,  on w h ic h  we have been . .  
com m enting  on th e  s u p p ly  s id e ,  w o u ld  be le s s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
a b s o rb  on th e  demand s id e *
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I n  p r a c t ic e  w h a t has happened i s  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t .  O u tp u t 
o f  f in is h e d  s t e e l  has been h o v e r in g  a ro u n d  th e  1 .5  m i l l i o n  
to n n e  m a rk , im p ly in g  an o u tp u t  o f  p ig  o f  a b o u t 2 m . t .  o v e r 
th e  1970s ( th e  l a t e s t  f ig u r e  to  hand i s  O c to b e r 1980 , -  
1 .6  m . t . ) «  T h is  i s  th e  e x p a n d in g  p ro d u c t io n  to w a rd s  a 
c a p a c ity  o f  2-g- m . t .  We e s t im a te  t h a t  o n ly  5000 new jo b s  
i n  s te e l- m a k in g  w i l l  have been c re a te d  s in c e  1971 ( t a k in g  
i n t o  a c c o u n t econom ies o f  s c a le ,  th e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  
w h ic h  we d is c u s s e d  i n  C h a p te r 2 ) .  These p r iz e  jo b s  w i l l  be 
com peted f o r  by th e  1 4 ,0 0 0  new e n t r a n ts  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  
1956-1971  m ig r a t io n s ,  and th e  1 1 ,0 0 0  e n t i r e l y  new m ig r a n ts .
O n ly  be tw een  -J and £ o f  th e  1 4 ,0 0 0  a re  sons o f  th e  s t e e l  
w o rk e rs *  C le a r ly  th e  la b o u r  m a rk e t i s  t i g h t ,  and  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  a re  s e r io u s  (b e tw e e n  m ig ra n ts  and 
n o n -m ig ra n t  g ro u p s ) .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  p ro b le m  w o u ld  have 
been e x a c e rb a te d  i f  th e re  had been no e x p a n s io n  i n  s t e e l ,  
w i t h  1 4 ,0 0 0  l o c a l  b o rn  15 y e a r  o ld s  s e e k in g  e m p loym en t, and 
p e rh a p s  5 -  7000  o f  them  h o p in g  f o r  a jo b  i n  heavy in d u s t r y .
By th e  e a r ly  1980s th e  p ro s p e c ts  o f  t a k in g  up th e  la b o u r  s u p p ly
seem more h o p e fu l ,  w i t h  c o n t in u in g  o n - s i t e  e x p a n s io n  ( th o u g h
no a p p a re n t d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o u t o f  i r o n  and s t e e l ) :  t h i s  i s
i n  dow nstream  p r o d u c t io n ,  -  a new f la t - p r o d u c t s  m i l l ,  and
1
a c o n t in u o u s  c a s t in g  m i l l ;  a d d i t i o n a l l y  w o rk  i s  s t a r t i n g  on 
a new oxygen  p la n t ,  a c a p t iv e  pow er p la n t ,  and a new c o n v e r te r  
s h o p , i n t e r  a l i a ,  f o r  th e  e x p a n s io n  phase to  b r in g  th e  in t e g r a te d  
s t e e l  p la n t  to  i t s  now r e v is e d  c a p a c ity  t a r g e t  o f  4  m . t *
The em ploym ent c re a te d  up to  th e  1970s decade can be gauged 
fro m  T a b le s  9 *8  and 9 ,9 ;  t h a t  g e n e ra te d  by th e  e x p a n s io n  phases 
( i n  th e  in t e g r a te d  w o rk s )  has had to  be e s t im a te d  (F ig u re  9 . 4 ) .
1 C o l u m n  i n  F in a n c ia l  E x p re s s . Bombay, 6 t h  O c to b e r ,  1980 .
2 T im es o f  I n d ia  Y e a rb o o k , 1979*
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I n  a l l  t h i s  d is c u s s io n  we have s a id  l i t t l e  a b o u t th e  
p ro b le m  o f  c o n s t r u c t io n  la b o u r .  Here th e  re c o rd s  a re  n e a r ly  
im p o s s ib le  t o  i n t e r p r e t .  From T a b le  9 *8  i t  can be seen 
t h a t  B h i l a i  had 1 2 ,0 0 0  w o rk e rs  in  H in d u s ta n  S te e l  engaged 
on c o n s t r u c t io n  w o rk  i n  th e  m id - 1960s ,  b u t  o n ly  7900  by 
1970 . T h is  does n o t  s q u a re  w i t h  th e  p a y r o l l  f i g u r e s ,  b u t  
th e  f lu c tu a t io n s , ,  a re  i n  th e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  The 1961 
Census re c o rd s  6 ,0 0 0  c o n s t r u c t io n  w o rk e rs  a t  B h i l a i  (T a b le  
9 *9 ) ,  b u t  a num ber o f  w o rk e rs  a c t u a l l y  engaged i n  c o n s t r u c t io n  
may ha, e been re c o rd e d  as b e in g  i n  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s t r y ,  
and b e s id e s ,  we have a lr e a d y  shown (C h a p te r  7 )  t h a t  many o f  
th o s e  engaged i n  c o n s t r u c t io n  a re  r e s id e n t  i n  n e ig h b o u r in g  
r u r a l  a re a s .  I n  any c a s e , u n d e r w h ic h  c a te g o ry  th e y  s h o u ld  
be re c o rd e d  may be a m oot p o in t ,  as H in d u s ta n , S te e l  a re  
known to  have k e p t  i n i t i a l  c o n s t r u c t io n  la b o u r  on th e  p a y r o l l  
o s te n s ib ly  i n  p r e p a r a t io n  f o r  e x p a n s io n  phases , b u t  no 
d o u b t e m b a rrasse d  by th e  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  la y in g  o f f .
The new s t e e l  p la n t  a t  B oka ro  i n  B ih a r  i s  r e p o r te d  i n  1980  
t o  be s a d d le d  w i t h  4000 re d u n d a n y  la b o u re rs  f o r  j u s t  t h a t  
re a s o n . I t  can be seen  t h e r e fo r e  t h a t  th e  em ploym ent o f  th e  
c o re  c o n s t r u c t io n  la b o u r  w h ic h  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  im m o b ile  i s  
s u b je c t  t o  th e  same p ro b le m  o f  m a ss ive  u p su rg e  i n  demand 
fo l lo w e d  by o n ly  m odest r e c u r r e n t  demand c y c le s  t h a t  c h a r a c te r ­
is e s  th e  la b o u r  m a rk e t f o r  th e  c o re  s te e l- m a k in g  o p e r a t iv e s ,  
an  im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e in g  t h a t  i n  th e  case o f  c o n s t r u c t io n  
an a c tu a l  f a l l  i n  demand i s  e x p e r ie n c e d , b u t  as t h i s  i s  a t y p i c a l  
fe a tu r e  o f  th e  in d u s t r y  th e  w o rk fo rc e  i s  p re p a re d  to  be more 
m o b ile  (w h ic h  s im p ly  sa ys  t h a t  th e  w ho le  c o n s t r u c t io n  in d u s t r y  
i s  c h a r a c te r is e d  by a s o c ia l  h a rd s h ip  n o t  p e c u l ia r  to  B h i l a i  
a lo n e ) .  The t r u l y  te m p o ra ry  and m o b ile  s e c to r  o f  t h i s  co n ­
s t r u c t i o n  la b o u r  w i l l  be m isse d  by b o th  H in d u s ta n  S te e l  re c o rd s
1 Column i n  F in a n c ia l  E x p re s s  (B om bay), 6 t h  O c to b e r ,  1980 .
and. th e  C e nsuses . I t s  m a ss ive  num bers can be gauged fro m  
a m anua l on th e  D u rg a p u r s t e e l  w o rks  p r o je c t .  C o m p a ra tive  
d a ta  a re  g iv e n  f o r  R o u rk e la  and B h i l a i ,  The l a t t e r ,  d u r in g  
th e  i n i t i a l  c o n s t r u c t io n  phase ( p r e - 196 0 ) em p loys 4 0 ,0 0 0  
c o n t r a c t  and 2 0 ,0 0 0  d i r e c t  c o n s t r u c t io n  la b o u r e r s ,  i . e . ,  
i t  i s  c la im e d ,  6 0 ,0 0 0  i n  a l l  on th e  s i t e i
1 I r o n  and  C o a l T ra d e s  R ev iew  ( U .K . ) ,  "A T e c h n ic a l 
S u rv e y  o f  th e  D u rg a p u r W o rk s " , (u n d a te d , ? 1 9 6 0 )o
Table 9o1
Change in the Proportion of workers in non-household 
Manufacturing in Steel Town Areas






Percentage of males aged 15-59 Decadal 




Durg 36 33 14.9
Bilaspur 10 7 21*1
Raigarh 18 12 0 .2
Bastar 11 6 19*4
Towns within Burdwan
Asansol 21 22 28 o3
Outer Burnpur 65 62 -0 .1
Burnpur 78 76 -0.0
Durgapur 61 56 127.2
Burdwan City 17 12 -1 5 *0











Comparative New-town area in Maharashtra: % males aged 15-59 in 








Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961, 1971.
General Population Tables, & Economic Tables (B I), Delhi
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Table 9.2
Industrial Diversification in 1961 and 1971? 
Steel Town areas and a comparative New-town area
Industrial
Establishments
Number of manufacturing units




1961 1971 1961 1971 1961 1971






cotton 8 7 107(1) 29 65
jute - 1 - 2(1) 3
wool
silk, synthetics
- 2 13 11 1
misc. textiles **6 
(1971 incl. products)
228 *+30 353 972
wood **9 97 173 167(1)
paper
printing 3 17 18
1
7*f 159
leather 22 12 6** *f5 72
rubber, petrol., 
coal w 20(**) ** 17 37
chemicals 8 **6(10) 21(1) 37 125(2)
minerals 23(5) 31 109(1) 1** 1**7(*0







machinery - 28 33(8) 63(1) 73
electrical mach. 1 - - **8 (5)
transport equip. 15(2) 1 16**(11) 311(6) 17(*0
misc. 16(3) **** 307(1) **08 822(3)
repair (1971 only) 367 871(2)
Notes: * not available at time of writingo The 1961 and 1971
categories are not all strictly comparable« In particular, 
"repaij** became a separate category in 1971*
Source: Government of India, Census of India« 1961* 1971 .
E s ta b lish m e n t Tables^ D e lh i .
Table 9*2 continued





c o tto n
s y n th e t ic s
ju te
t e x t i l e  p ro d u c ts  
wood
paper & p r in t in g  
le a th e r
ru b b e r & p la s t i c  
chem ica ls
non m e ta l*  m in e ra ls
b a s ic  m e ta ls  & p ro d u c ts
m ach inery
t ra n s p o r t  equ ip *
o th e r
r e p a ir
Number o f  e s ta b lis h m e n ts  in
POONA DISTRICT 
(th ose  w ith  more th a n  50 































207 ( 23 )





N o te : As f o r  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  tab le©
S ource : Government o f  I n d ia ,  Census o f  In d ia  1961, 1971*
M aharash tra , E s ta b lish m e n t T a b les , D e lh io
Table  9*3
I n d u s t r ia l  W ork fo rce  D is t r ib u t io n s  in  
C ase-S tudy D i s t r i c t s ,  1961
S e c to r o f  Number o f  w orke rs  in :
M a n u fa c tu r in g DURG BURDWAN POOW
food 2406 3730 7433
beverage 229 202 297
tobacco 2010 2471 5808
c o tto n  t e x t i l e 3178 733 3849
ju te  t e x t i l e - 189 396
wool t e x t i l e 74 7 23
s i l k  t e x t i l e 3 69 44
m isc . t e x t i l e 1379 2596 6632
wood 1936 2671 5384
paper 12 136 933
p r in t in g 176 840 3822
le a th e r 462 661 2097
ru b b e r 8c p e t r o l . 21 1621 1306
chem ica ls 277 633 11493
non m e ta l m in e ra ls 522 1324 3340
b a s ic  m e ta ls 26738 36472 5425
m ach inery 1656 1873 4242
tra n s p o r t  e q u ip . 732 12047 8172
m is c . 973 3513 4231
TOTAL 42804 71814 52252
Source: Government o f  In d ia ,  Census o f  In d ia ,  1961,
G enera l Economic T a b le s , D e lh i,  ( r e le v a n t  S ta te s ) .
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Table 9»^











1971 Bhilai (and Outgrowth, total population 17^370)
0-14 38333 34856
15-59 57171 40767 Detail of 15-59 m f
15- 5987 4566
20- 6640 8881









0-14 15591 14473 *10-year cohorts
15-59 20320 17674
60+ 1234 1462
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961, 1971 
General Economic Tables, Delhi,
, Madhya !
Table 9»5
Estimation of Birth Cohorts among Married Women
with Husbands working in Bhilai
Crude illustrative model based on age structure recorded
in 1971 Census; no mortality*.
Ages of Number of" women in age group
Women 1965-71 1960-65 1955-60
15- 4600 89OO 10900
20- 8900 10900 7000
25- 10900 7000 4000
30- 7000 4ooo 2100
35- 4000 2100 1200
40- 2100 1200 1000




Births generated from above cohorts
Altemative (period specific) and,, for ASF(1),
Fertility in the two following quinquennia*
Schedules •per annum
ASF(1) 8500* 7600* 7^00 :6800 4900
ASF(3) (calculated for '60-65) 
b) Age specific fertility used
age ASF(1) ASF(2) ASF(3)
15- d 3 6 o100 .136
20- ©259 .210 o259
25- .234 .300 •244
30- ♦ 187 •210 o150
35- • 125 • 125 •091
40- .054 .054 oOOO
45- .007 .007 .000
TFR: ___5*2_____„ 5 a2____ 404
Note: * the 15-19 cohorts of 1971-85* generated from 
births of 1961-75 (and consistent with the 
1971 0—14 cohort) are:
71-75 75-80 80-85
89OO 12600 13700 per annum.
Table 9*6
Survival Ratios used in the Bhilai Simulations







ratio for 5-year 
age groups from 







for 5-year age 
groups from 
15 to 49 - 0.944
Source: A.Coale and PoDemeny, Regional Model Life-Tables
and Stable Populations. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1966.
Table 9©7
Age-specific Marriage Rates in Durg District Urban Populations
Age Rate Male (number) Female (number)
15-19 0o31 (2864) 0,84 (7247)
20-24 0.57 (13348) 0 o86 (11480)
25-29 0 .7 6 (17627) 0 .9 6 (10313)
30-34 0 .9 2 (13021) Oo93 (6745)
weighted average 0 .6 7 0 .9 0
Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961. Madhya Pradesh, 
Social and Cultural Tables, Delhi.
Table 9*3
Categories of Steel Workers at Bhilai
Category Date 196^ 1970
Process and 
Main workers 5623 9929
Services 1161*7 15522
Construction 12026 7578
Total on Payroll 
by date 196^ 1967 1970 1973 1977
1+1*158 1*9768 1*6386 4991^ n.a0
Total Output 
Pig-iron 
(000 tonnes) 1257 2080 2152 n#a0 (21*00)*
**«# p»—— #-———•» ■■ ■- 1- <
Sources: Hindustan Steel Limited, Iron and Steel, Ranchi 1970* 
(mainly), and * press reports.
Table 9»9
Industrial Distribution of Workers at Bhilai t 1961 and 1971
1961 1971 (includ-
Mining & Quarry# 851 18
Household Ind# 1*62 765
Manufacturing 24691 30156
Construction 6671 2389
Trade & Commerce 2976 6019
Transport etc# 2593 3521*
Other services 6102 6986
Total ,1*1*825 51132
(Manufacturing Workers at Durg Municipality
1*236 327^
Total Workers 15072 168M*
Source: Census of India. 1961 and 1971. Madhya Pradesh, 
General Population Tables* Delhi#
Appendix 9*1 Industrial Location Policy Issues: 
A Quantitative Assessment
Unemployment relief is not the only policy tool 
available to neutralise the social effects of industrial 
restructuring# Incentives to labour mobility will also 
serve# For these to be effective it is crucial that there 
is a well-developed housing market also. But what is often 
neglected by planners is that physical housing is not a 
sufficient incentive to mobility# A satisfactory social 
environment has to be created as well# That is why people 
are so reluctant‘to leave their communities the moment 
there is a local industrial recession, and especially people 
of the older age groups. Additionally of course they have 
to be assured that ' -they can move to secure alternative 
employment# But the latter is not assured when a large 
number of workers of like experience are thrown on the 
labour market together# Absorption may take years. 
Unemployment relief therefore may be a necesaary Second-Best 
(to mobility); the question arises whether subsidised 
diversification would be a better Second-Best. The problem 
is that one is estimating quantities under uncertainty 
over a time horizon of ten to fifteen years at least:
it would be efficient to postpone consideration of the 
subsidy until early-warning signals of industrial 
restructuring were seen (but not, as so often in 
practice, later than that)#
In India there has been a package of subsidies
available to encourage industrial location in specific
areas; many of these have been restricted to the small-
scale industrial sector, on the mis-apprehension that such
industries would be more inclined to favour de-centralised
locations in any case# That this has not been the case is
well-documented# Industrial estates, establishing the
necessary infrastructure for new small-scale industry,
3
have similarly failed to attract entrepreneurs# Our 
present study is however concerned with large-scale industry#
The subsidy needed to attract investment out of the 
existing agglomerations (the Calcutta-Howrah belt, for 
instance) could be estimated from the comparative costs 
of locating in these agglomerations as against the new growth 
areas like Burdwan District of West Bengal# Studies that 
have attempted this estimate suggest that the costs of
1 See the Indian Investment Centre booklets: Industrial 
Investment: Facilities and Incentives, for individual
regions, New Delhi, 1979? also, Government of West Bengal,
West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation, Assistance 
from Concents to Commissioning. Calcutta# The latter State 
includes subsidies in growth areas, like Asansol and Durgapur#
2 S*K#Saha,”Industrial Policy and Locational Dynamics of Small- 
scale Enterprises in India” , European Modern South Asian 
Studies Conference, London (SOAS), July, 19&1#
3 Government of India, NCAER, Perspective Plan of Industrial 
Development of'Bihar, New Delhi, 1979.
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of location in Calcutta are in fact higher - the main component 
in the differential being the cost of land (four times as high 
as in Burdwan, in the 1960s)• That this differential 
only just reflects the intangible benefits of agglomeration 
can be gauged from the fact that through tie subsequent 
twenty years the workforce grew faster in...the urban .areas 
of Burdwan than in the suburbs of Calcutta (e.g. Hoogley 
District and H^-Parganas)t and marginally faster in the 
less developed Districts of Midnapore and Birbhum. The 
differences have become substantial by the 1971-19^1 decade 
(though here some problems of interpretation arise, owing to 
the non-comparability of Census definitions). The above- 
mentioned studies make it clear that a major deterrent to 
firms shifting out of Calcutta was sheer lack of information 
on conditions in the Burdwan-Durgapur region. Nonetheless., 
even by 197 1* a substantial number of firms (in the private 
sector) in the chemicals industry and in textiles, had 
located in this region, thereby promoting its diversification.
It would appear therefore that a major constraint on earlier 
location in the area was the need for assurance that sufficient 
other enterprises were going to do the same to ensure a resulting 
economic agglomeration with as attractive economies as Howrah-
1 J.MacDougall, Ancillary Industries in Asansol-Durga-pur.
Asia Publishing House, London, 19&5*
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Calcutta and suburbs bad* The lacking input was information, 
and a capital subsidy would therefore be a rather poor Second- 
Best.
But the case of Bhilai was different. Its relative 
physical isolation moan t that it would not be an economic 
centre of attraction for many decades (except for industries 
particularly related to the natural resources of iron and 
coal). But that allows sufficient time for the possible 
collapse, or stagnation, of the local steel industry.
Hence the question of a subsidy to promote early diversification 
arises. The Government of India (in conjunction with the 
State Governments in some cases) offers a capital subsidy of 
15% to industries prepared to locate in designated backward 
areas* Because of a ceiling on permitted subsidy per 
project, these measures will tend,to favour medium-scale 
enterprises (or smaller). And only in exceptional cases are 
they supplemented with employment subsidies as such (as, 
for instance, currently is the case in West Bengal)*
These instruments were not therefore really designed to cure 
the malaise on which much of this study focuses; though they 
could cure the malaise of the stagnating small towns.
1 The different States offer a complex collection of 
subsidies and incentives, relating to capital and 
current inputs. These are summarised in the Indian 
Investment Centre booklets, referred to in a note above.
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For the purposes of the illustrative exercise 
attempted here (Figure 1 in this Appendix), we have taken 
a subsidy of 15% on capital and 15% on current costs (approximately), 
which is not out of line with some of the packages offerred 
in India, but we have applied these to a project as large 
as Rs 50 crores (of initial investment). It must, however, 
still be stressed that adequate information is often the 
lacking input, and also that appropriate policies for 
establishing socially efficient industrial localities often 
go beyond mere cash subsidies. As was remarked earlier 
(Chapter 5), the potential docility of the local labour 
force may feature highly in a location decision (whether taken
'I
by private or nationalised industry).
The simulation exercise (Figure 9A.1) takes as 
a model, for the diversification intervention, a plant 
of capital cost of Rs 50 crores (the size of a 50,000 tonne 
steel plant in 1 98 2, or a fertiliser plant about 50% of the 
size of the Trombay units near Bombay). The gross annual 
revenue is Rs 20 crores, with current costs of Rs 15 crores
at the location to which this enterprise is directed. In an
optimal location the costs of operation would be Rs 15 crores 
(about 15% lower than at this location), and capital cost
would be heavily reduced (15% below that incurred at the
current location). The plant comes on stream in year three, 
and is assumed to become obsolescent in year sixteen. At a
1 See P.Townroe, Planning Industrial Location. Leonard Hill 
Books, London, 1976, for evidence of this factor having an 
important weight in the location decisions of both U.K. 
and U.S. firms.
10% discount rate the present value of the projectte net 
revenue is 30% below its capital cost# A 15% capital 
subsidy plus a 10% gross revenue subsidy would be 
financially sufficient to attract the industry to the 
location (which is currently occupied by a single undiversified 
industry)} the subsidy would be provided by, say, a 74% 
sales tax holiday and a 34%  input subsidy, lasting for six 
years, i.e. half-way through the project's life# The 
workforce is 8000 per annum, with monthly wages of Rs 500, 
so that the wage bill amounts to 4  the recurrent costs#
In the first scenario, illustrated in Figure 9A#2a 
the justification for the subsidies is that the full 8000 
workforce (to be employed in the new plant) would be otherwise 
redundant for five years from the date of initial operation 
of the subsidised project, due to insufficient additional 
investment being undertaken in the core industry that 
dominates this undiversified town; the additional investment 
would have been needed to take up the labour generated by 
the original migration dynamics# (Alternatively, as in 
Figure 9A#2b, we can imagine the core plant having to be 
closed, with the result that 8000 or more men would lose 
their jobs#) We assume that the State would be committed 
to the consumption costs of maintaining that workforce 
(or be regarded as socially responsible for its continuing 
consumption needs)# This would cost Rs 5 crores per annum,
1f See P.Townroe, Planning Industrial Location. Leonard Hill 
Books, London, 1976, for evidence of this factor having
• .an important weight in the location decisions of both 
UK and US firms#
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the complete annual wage bill of the project# We examine 
the effect .of taking different values and assuming different 
scenarios in the notes to Figure 9A#1#
It should be said immediately that there are no 
simple conclusions# But two general and important points 
can be made# If the total value of the subsidies required 
is closer to 15% than 30% of the present value of the 
investment, then subsidised diversification is more likely 
to be a superior policy to the financing of unemployment 
relief# And if the wage bill is closer to *4f than -J* of the 
recurrent costs, as might be the case in a labour-scarce 
economy, then the same is true again# It cannot therefore be 
said that subsidised diversification is an uneconomic strategy 
under any plausible conditions#
Similarly, a subsidised medium-scale.investment, 
losing some 15% to 30% of the potential net present value 
to be got from a (larger) optimal scale investment, would 
also be viable in certain circumstances, the object being to 
ensure the continuing take-up of the labour supply generated 
on the spot (as a repercussion of labour migration), or to 
ensure less demographic instability over time# In this 
case we need to add in additionally the social expenditure 
savings that result from a better overall utilisation of
welfare infrastructure over time (due to a more stable 
demographic growth), insofar as the State would be committed 
to the provision of such services.
Finally we observe that the high rates of discount 
used here (10%) militate strongly against starting a 
subsidised industry well in advance of any forseen un­
employment# But as calendar time proceeds, and, maybe, 
aggregate labour supply reduces, driving up real wage costs 
(cet# par.), and reducing equilibrium interest rates, 
it becomes socially viable to subsidise diversification 
rather earlier in the lifetime of the core industrial plant.
Figure 9A.1 Social Evaluation of a Subsidy 
to promote Diversification
Project data: Capital costsRs 50#0 crores
Variable costs:Rs 15 cr# per annum 
of which Labour: Rs 5*0 cr# 
(workforce 8,000; wages Rs 500 p.m.) 
Gross revenue: Rs 20#0 cr. p#a. 
Discount rate: 10% p#a#
Capital cost is incurred years 1 & 2 
Project on stream years 3 - 1 6
Social Subsidies: Capital subsidy (15%)* Rs 3 * 7  cr#
(in years 1 8c 2 )
Sales tax rebate: Rs 1.5 cr# (*J2%
Input subsidy: Rs 3 * 3  cr# costs
year 3
Unemployment relief or "cost*1:
Rs 5*0 cr# years 3 - 8
56 3
Private Net Present Value of Project =
( - 25 - 25 ) + rj 20 - 15
TTT 4  ------- 1 1 = 35.5 - ^7.7tTj (1+0 .1  y
Net Present Value of Social Costs of Subsidised Project = 
(0  + 2 5 .0  + 5.7) + (0  + 2 5 .0  + 3.7) +
1.10
+ (-20.0 + * 1.5 * 0.5 - 5.0) + ...... (until year 9)
1 .21
+ (-20.0 + 15.0) +   (until year 1 6 ) + (-2 0 .0  + 1 5.0 )
2 -1^  ------
Notes:
1 The basic assumption is that cost and revenue subsidies 
last until year 8 , and unemployment costs saved last 
until year 8 .
Then the net P.V. of the social recurrent costs due to the 
intervention is Rs—11.9 crores.
And the Net P.V. of the Capital Subsidy is Rs 7.1 crores.
Hence the Net Social Value of the Intervention is Rs ^ .8  cr. 
(Rue to rounding, the subsidy is a little too generous, 
as can be seen from the alternative calculation, that 
the private project makes a loss of Rs 1^.2 cr. in order 
to save Rs 19.8 cr* of unemployment (in value), a social 
gain of Rs 5.8 cr.).
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2 This is simple but unrealistic. In practice the subsidy 
would be needed throughout the life of the project (to 
make up for the high current costs), or else the costs 
would fall over time (due to economies of agglomeration 
as other firms were attracted to the site). Suppose that 
a subsidy of Rs 1.2 crores per annum is needed from years
v  -
3 to 16, or that a subsidy of Rs 1*2 cr. is needed from 
years 3 to 8 , after which costs fall to 13*8 until year 16*
In either case the firm breaks even; and in the first case 
the social value is the same as before, in the second it 
is higher (7 *9 )*
3 Suppose the capital cost is lower: Rs 23 cr. in year 1,
and 22 in year 2. Then the capital subsidy needed to ensure 
the firm break even is approximately Rs 2.2 cr. (i.e. 5%)*
The social value of the subsidised diversification is raised 
to 9*7* The high discount rate makes the scheme very 
sendtive to the capital subsidy.
A If the unemployment relief saved were to cost only Rs 2.5 
cr., then the social value would become negative (-5 .1 )*
This would be true whether the relief offered were halved 
per person, or the wage bill in the redundant industry 
were half what we assume, or if the new project only 
employed half of the unemployed.
5 The quantification here attempts to address the intervention 
of subsidised diversification only (Figure 9A.2a).
Subsidised suboptimal scale is unlikely to be viable 
(given the economies of scale discussed in'.the text in 
the case of the iron and steel industry following convent­
ional technology), unless the discount rate is very low, 
since unemployment relief is not saved until 10 to 15 
years after the subsidies begin (Figure 9A.2.), Indeed,we need 
a discount rate as low as 2% to yield a social benefit 
of Rs 5 cr*, i.e. roughly similar to that inthe.first 
intervention model (^.7 )$ this is with a capital subsidy of 
15% on two mini-plants, each half the size of the current 
one, initiated respectively in years 1 and 8 , with no 
subsidy on current costs, and unemployment of Rs 2.5 ia 
value saved from years 10 - 1 5*
Figure 9A #2
Scenarios of Public Policy Interventions 
in the Economic-Demographic Relationship



















(or equivalent social 
welfare transfer with 
shared under-employment)
Industry II























(locational subsidy...... ...expansion (?subsidy)*
 __  _2nd_inves tment (^subsid^*
Note: *Subsidies for agglomeration type economies no longer
needed# Raw material/finished product transport subsidies 
may still be needed#
A brief Overview of Chapter 9
If rapidly growing areas fail to diversify their 
industry, local labour market disequilibria are enhanced 
further (and the prospects for family income diversification 
outlined in Chapter 8 are reduced)# This is apparent from 
a detailed demographic study of a Steel Town. A solution 
that may be taken by the State would be to diversify 
industry (under subsidy) rather than bear the welfare 
costs of underemployment in a locality.
Modern technologies and contemporary demography 
combine in India to accentuate employment and welfare 
problems in urban areas, as they evolve over time•
Strategies to mitigate these externalities of industrial­
isation may be devised at the level of the State, or the 
level of the family. Either way, the implications of 
not doing so have to be seen well in advance. For 
these populations have a built-in momentum: large
migrant cohorts, once established, can no more have their 
progress checked than a huge groundswell in a calm sea.
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The study confirmed my hunch that modern industrial 
tednology in certain fields - especially heavy engineering - 
adopted by developing countries would give rise to curious 
social phenomena in towns; curious in that demographic 
structures would arise leading to serious second generation 
employment prospects. To this was added the observation that if, 
as was likely, such towns remained single industry towns, the 
total workforce would be as vulnerable to a change in industrial 
fortunes as would be an agricultural labourer or small-holder 
to the failure of the crop in a monoculture. It also became apparent that, 
at the other end of the scale, the older towns, in failing 
to attract new populations, would also face economic problems 
arising from their emerging demographic structures, notably 
a lack of taxable surplus for social spending* In all, the 
average or aggregate picture of the Indian urban population was 
misleading! at each end of the spectrum demographic phenomena 
exacerbated social difficulties.
What recommendations follow from this work? There:as, I believe, 
little social change without political revolution. But I also 
happen to believe that there is a human drive for social (as well 
as individual) survival, despite the fact that the two are often 
in conflict. There are implications in what I have to say for 
public policy, and for the strategies of smaller social groupings, 
right down to the family.
I advocate the adoption of a more balanced urban growth, 
by promoting a more diversified industrial structure in each town 
(despite the economic costs), and not uniformly, but selectively.
This could be done through the complex of location subsidies 
that exist.
I advocate some demographic understanding to make these 
controls sensible: new industry too early or too late for the 
second generation is useless.
I am not certain if it is wise for extended families 
or people from particular origins, the same village or even 
district, to congregate in the same industry. If they would 
not all grow millet, they should not all make steel: the
former could fail for two years running, the latter could 
fail for ever.
I advocate cross-financing of urban social development 
and the planning for large areas of spontaneous settlements 
in rapidly growing towns from their inception.
Note that I am not suggesting pouring industrial 
development finance into sick cities: I am easing the
death pangs, just as I am preventing fatal accidents to those 
of headlong growth.
